


8.1.02

From the Library of
Professor William Henry Green
Bequeathed by him to
the Library of
Princeton Theological Seminary

SCC
7813
V. 2



W. Henry Green

Philadelphia

Aug 31st 1850

Handwritten text in Arabic script, appearing to be a list or a series of entries, possibly related to a historical document or manuscript. The text is written in a cursive style and is somewhat faded and obscured by noise.

LEE'S MEMOIRS.





Edwin sc.

Marquis Cornwallis

MEMOIRS OF THE WAR

IN THE

SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT

OF THE

UNITED STATES.

✓
BY HENRY LEE,

LIEUTENANT COLONEL COMMANDANT OF THE PARTISAN LEGION
DURING THE AMERICAN WAR.

Quæque ipse miserrima vidi
Et quorum pars fui.

VIRGIL.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY BRADFORD AND INSKEEP;

AND

INSKEEP AND BRADFORD, NEW YORK.

Fry and Kanmerer, Printers:

1812.

THE MARS

1914

THE MARS

THE MARS

THE MARS

THE MARS

MEMOIRS OF THE WAR

IN THE

SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

IT has been before observed, that the British cabinet, despairing of the subjugation of the United States, had changed its plan of operations, in the expectation of wresting from the Union its richest though weakest section.

In pursuance of this system, the breaking up of Virginia was deemed of primary importance, and to this object sir Henry Clinton devoted all his disposable force. It will be remembered, that general Mathews, with a small detachment, in 1779, laid waste all the seaboard of the state; destroying, or transporting to New York, an immense quantity of naval and military stores, besides private property; and that a subsequent expedition under major general Leslie had taken place, which was soon abandoned, in consequence of the derangement which occurred in the

plans of lord Cornwallis by the fall of lieutenant colonel Ferguson.

The British commander in chief, pursuing steadily this favorite object, prepared, as soon as it was practicable, a third expedition for that devoted country. It consisted only of one thousand six hundred men, and was placed under the direction of brigadier general Arnold; who, preferring wealth with ignominy, to poverty with honor, had lately deserted from the service of his country, having been detected in the infamous attempt to betray West Point, with the care of which fortress he was then entrusted. The object being devastation and plunder, sir Henry Clinton could not have made a more appropriate selection: but when we consider the nice feelings inherent in soldiership, he ran no inconsiderable risk of alienating the affections of his army, by honoring a traitor with the command of British troops. Mortifying as was this appointment to many, it seems that the British officers determined to submit in silence, lest their opposition might delay, if not prevent, an expedition deemed necessary by their commander in chief. Arnold, foul with treason to his country, and with treachery to his friend, escaped from the probable consequence of a well digested plan laid by Washington for his seizure, which had advanced almost to the point of consummation, when he removed from his quarters to prepare for the expedition to Virginia. He was accidentally withdrawn from surrounding conspirators, ready, on the night of that very day, to have seized his person, conveyed him across the

North river to Hoboken, where they would have been met by a detachment of dragoons, for the purpose of conveying the traitor to headquarters. Thomas Jefferson still continued at the head of the government: a gentleman who had taken an early and distinguished part in the revolution, highly respected for his literary accomplishments, and as highly esteemed for his amiability and modesty. General Greene, when passing to the south through Richmond, had left, as has been mentioned, major general baron Steuben in command in Virginia.

Early in December, the governor was informed, by letter from the commander in chief, of the preparations in New York for an expedition to the south; but neither the governor nor the baron seems to have acted under this communication, presuming, probably, that the detachment making ready in New York was destined for South Carolina, to reinforce the British force under lord Cornwallis. It would appear, that a due recollection of the preceding attempts upon Virginia, with the knowledge that as long as that state could hold safe its resources, so long would resistance in the south be maintained, ought to have admonished the governor and the general to prepare, at once, means to meet the invasion, should it be directed against that quarter. General Arnold's preparations were slow; for the British had not yet relinquished their apprehensions that the count de Terney, commanding the French squadron at Rhode Island, would receive from the West Indies a reinforcement that would give him

such a naval superiority as to endanger any maritime expedition of theirs. In November this apprehension ceased, and about the middle of the next month the convoy with the expedition left the Hook. After a tedious passage, it reached the Chesapeak on the 30th, when was felt the fatal effect of omitting timely preparations to defend the country. The governor detached general Nelson to the coast, as soon as he was informed of the entrance of the enemy into the bay, for the purpose of bringing the militia into the field; while baron Steuben, believing Petersburg, the depot for the southern army, to be the object, hastened his continental force, about two hundred recruits, to that town. Arnold, embarking his troops in the lighter vessels, proceeded up James river, and on the fourth of January approached City Point, situated at the confluence of the Appomatox with James river. It was now evident, and, indeed, a little reflection would have before demonstrated, that the lower country was not the primary object with the enemy. Mathews, in his incursion, had deprived the state of the contents of her arsenals in that quarter; and had our ability permitted their renewal, prudence would have forbidden the collection of articles of value in spots so accessible to the enemy. As soon, therefore, as the governor and general learned that the squadron had cast anchor in Hampton Road, (however hope may heretofore have prevailed over vigilance, on the receipt of general Washington's letter in the first week in December, communicating the readiness of a body of troops in New York to em-

bark, believed to be destined for the south,) due reflection would have shown, that Richmond or Petersburg, or both, was the probable destination of this small armament, the suddenness of whose approach, more than its force, could give to it efficacy. It is true that the honorable and continued efforts to uphold the states to its south, had exhausted much of the resources of Virginia; yet she possessed enough, more than enough, to have sustained the struggle for their restoration, and to have crushed any predatory adventure like that directed by Arnold. But unfortunately we were unprepared, and efforts to make ready commenced after the enemy was knocking at our doors. The government, which does not prepare in time, doubles the power of its adversary, and sports with the lives of its citizens; for to recover lost ground, when the required force becomes ready, compels resort to hazardous enterprise, sometimes ruinous by disappointment, always debilitating by the prodigal waste of resources.

Upon this occasion, the celerity of the enemy's advance, however unequivocally it exemplified the first, gave no opportunity for the illustration of the last part of the observation.

On the fourth of January, Arnold debarked at Westover, the seat of Mrs. Byrd, relict of colonel Byrd, the honorable associate of Washington, in defence of the frontiers of Virginia against the Indian enemy, then guided and aided by France. This step, though indecisive, from the facility with which the conveyance derived from naval co-operation admitted to with-

draw to the southern banks of the river, in case Petersburg had been his principal object, gave serious alarm to the governor and general. Now, for the first time, they discovered that the seat of government was to receive a visit from Arnold; and now they ascertained, that although general Nelson had been sent below, and the militia commandants had been summoned to furnish aid from above, yet the postponement of commencing preparations on the receipt of the letter of advice from general Washington, to the hour of the enemy's arrival in Chesapeake bay, had left them, the archives of the state, its reputation, and all the military stores deposited in the magazines of the metropolis, at the mercy of a small corps conducted by a traitor, who, feeling the rope about his neck tightening in every step he advanced, would have hastened to his naval asylum the moment he saw the probability of adequate resistance. Yet for the want of due preparation on the part of the invaded state, nine hundred British troops, with Arnold at their head, dared to leave their ships, and advance to Richmond, twenty-five miles distant from their place of safety. It will scarcely be credited by posterity, that the governor of the oldest state in the Union, and the most populous, (taking for our calculation the ratio established by the present constitution of the United States to designate the number of representatives allowed to each state,) should have been driven out of its metropolis, and forced to secure personal safety by flight, and its archives, with all its munitions and stores, yielded to the will

of the invader, with the exception of a few, which accident, more than precaution, saved from the common lot. Incredible as the narrative will appear, it is nevertheless true.

On the fifth of January, Arnold entered Richmond, untouched by the small collection of militia detached to interrupt his advance; and on the following day lieutenant colonel Simcoe, one of the best officers in the British army, proceeded at the head of his corps of rangers, horse and foot, supported by a detachment from the line, to Westham, where was the only cannon foundry in the state, which, with its various appurtenances and their respective contents, he destroyed. Here, unluckily, the public stores removed from Richmond in the perturbation excited by the novel appearance of British battalions, had been deposited: the last spot which ought to have been selected; as the most common reflection ought to have suggested the probability that the enemy in Richmond, safe as he was, would never retire until he had destroyed an important military establishment so near as Westham. Making it a place of additional deposit, was therefore increasing the inducement to destroy it.

Simcoe having fully executed his mission, undisturbed by even a single shot, returned to Richmond, where devastation had been extended under Arnold's direction, until even his greedy appetite was cloyed, and his revengeful heart sated. Having spread desolation all around, the brigadier decamped, and on the 7th returned to Westover, without meeting even the

semblance of resistance. Our militia were now assembling: brave men, always willing to do their duty, never brought to understand how best to execute it, never properly equipped, or judiciously conducted.

Some few unfortunately assembled at Charles City courthouse, in conformity to orders from government, not more than eight or nine miles from Westover. Simcoe hearing of it, put his corps in motion and soon dispersed them, happily with very little loss, in consequence of the impatience of the enemy, who omitted some of those precautions necessary to secure complete success. The object was trivial, or this superior soldier would have conducted his enterprise with the proper forecast and circumspection.* Nothing re-

* This officer commanded a legionary corps called the Queen's Rangers, and had during the war signalized himself upon various occasions. He was a man of letters, and like the Romans and Grecians, cultivated science amid the turmoil of camp. He was enterprising, resolute, and persevering; weighing well his project before entered upon, and promptly seizing every advantage which offered in the course of execution. General Washington expecting a French fleet upon our coast in 1779 or 1780, and desirous of being thoroughly prepared for moving upon New York, in case the combined force should warrant it, had made ready a number of boats, which were placed at Middlebrook, a small village up the Rariton river, above Brunswick. Sir Henry Clinton being informed of this preparation, determined to destroy the boats. The enterprise was committed to lieutenant colonel Simcoe. He crossed from New York to Elizabethtown Point with his cavalry, and setting out after night, he reached Middlebrook undiscovered and unexpected. Having executed his object, he baffled all our efforts to intercept him on his return, by taking a

maining to be done, Arnold reimbarked on the 10th, and descending the river, landed detachments occa-

circuitous route. Instead of turning towards Perth Amboy, which was supposed to be the most probable course, keeping the Rariton on his right, he passed that river, taking the direction towards Monmouth county, leaving Brunswick some miles to his left. Here was stationed a body of militia, who being apprized (it being now day) of the enemy's proximity, made a daring effort to stop him, but failed in the attempt. Simcoe, bringing up the rear, had his horse killed, by which accident he was made prisoner. The cavalry, deprived of their leader, continued to press forward under the second in command, still holding the route to English town. As soon as the militia at Brunswick moved upon the enemy, an express was despatched to lieutenant colonel Lee, then posted in the neighborhood of English town, waiting for the expected arrival of the French fleet, advising him of this extraordinary adventure.

The legion cavalry momentarily advanced towards the British horse; and notwithstanding the utmost diligence was used to gain the road leading to South Amboy (which now was plainly the object) before the enemy could reach it, the American cavalry did not effect it. Nevertheless the pursuit was continued, and the legion horse came up with the rear soon after a body of infantry sent over to South Amboy from Staten Island by sir Henry Clinton to meet Simcoe, had joined, and gave safety to the harassed and successful foe.

This enterprise was considered, by both armies, among the handsomest exploits of the war. Simcoe executed completely his object, then deemed very important; and traversed the country, from Elizabethtown Point to South Amboy, fifty-five miles, in the course of the night and morning; passing through a most hostile region of armed citizens; necessarily skirting Brunswick, a military station; proceeding not more than eight or nine miles from the legion of Lee, his last point of danger, and which be-

sionally, for the purpose of destroying whatever could be discovered worthy of his attention. At Smithfield, and at Mackay's mill, were found some public stores; these shared the fate of those in Richmond and at Westham. On the 20th, the British detachment reached Portsmouth, where general Arnold commenced defences indicating the intention of rendering it a permanent station.

Major general Steuben, having under him the indefatigable patriot and soldier general Nelson, had by this time drawn together a considerable body of militia, in consequence of the exertion of the governor. With all who were armed* the baron followed Arnold;

came increased from the debilitated condition to which his troops were reduced by previous fatigue. What is very extraordinary, lieutenant colonel Simcoe being obliged to feed once in the course of the night, stopped at a dépôt of forage collected for the continental army, assumed the character of Lee's cavalry, waked up the commissary about midnight, drew the customary allowance of forage, and gave the usual vouchers, signing the name of the legion quarter-master, without being discovered by the American forage commissary or his assistants. The dress of both corps was the same, green coatees and leather breeches; yet the success of the stratagem is astonishing.

* Arnold was practically acquainted with the dilatoriness attendant on militia movements; and finding, on his arrival in the state, that no preparations for defence had been made, or even ordered, he determined to avail himself of the supineness of the government, and by taking the first fair wind to approach within one day's march of Richmond, possess himself of it, and destroy the arms; which were then useless for want of men, as now men had become useless for want of arms. A well conceived and well executed project, answering completely in manner and object.

and at Hood's, lieutenant colonel Clarke (an officer in the Virginia line, taken at Charleston, and lately exchanged) by a well concerted stratagem allured Simcoe to pursue a small party exposed to view, with the expectation of drawing him into an ambuscade, prepared for his reception. Judiciously as was the scheme contrived, it was marred in the execution, by the precipitation with which the militia abandoned their post, after discharging one fire. Simcoe lost a few men, and deeming pursuit useless, retired to the squadron.

Recurring to the past scene, we find that the British general entered the Chesapeake on the 30th of December; that he took possession of Richmond on the 5th of January, ninety miles from Hampton Roads, destroying all the public stores there and at Westham, with such private property as was useful in war; that he reached Portsmouth on the 20th, spreading devastation as he descended the river, wherever any object invited his attention; and that during this daring and destructive expedition, he never was seriously opposed at any one point.

What must posterity think of their ancestors, when they read these truths! Had not the war demonstrated beyond doubt that the present generation possessed its share of courage and love of country, we should have been pronounced destitute of these distinguished characteristics. There was, in fact, no deficiency of inclination or zeal (unequal as was the contest) in our militia to advance upon the foe; but there was a fatal destitution of arrangement, of military apparatus, and of system.

Abounding in the finest horses, and our citizens among the best riders in the world, no regular corps of horse had been provided for state defence; although the face of our country, intersected in every quarter with navigable rivers unprotected by floating batteries and undefended by forts, manifested the propriety of resorting to this species of defence, as better calculated than any other within our command, to curb the desultory plundering incursions, under which we had so often and severely suffered.

One single legionary corps of three hundred horse and three hundred musketry, with a battalion of mounted riflemen, accompanied by a battalion of infantry, under a soldier of genius, would have been amply sufficient to preserve the state from its past insults and injuries; and as this body might have been, when necessary, conveyed with the despatch of horse, by double mounting, it would in some degree have diminished the disadvantage we labored under from the facility and ubiquity of our navigation. Such a force might readily have been made up by drafts from the militia, and, being devoted to local defence, many would have enlisted themselves to avoid more distant service.

Throughout the state were interspersed officers, bred under Washington, compelled to turn away from the field of battle, because our diminished number of rank and file rendered a proportionate diminution in the higher grades incumbent: they were devoted to the great cause for which they had fought, and with

alacrity would have rallied around the standards of their country, whenever summoned by government. Out of such materials, in the manner suggested, the commonwealth might have been held untouched, and our military stores, so much wanted, and so hard to obtain, would have been secured.

Indeed when known in New York, that such means of defence were provided, no attempt like that entrusted to Arnold would have been projected; and sir Henry Clinton, not having it in his power to spare large divisions of his force, these injurious and debasing incursions would not have taken place. Never in the course of the war was a more alluring opportunity presented for honorable enterprise, with so fair a prospect of success.

Had the governor fortunately prepared, on receipt of general Washington's letter early in December, six or seven hundred militia of those most convenient to Richmond and Petersburg, being the only two places within the state possessing objects which could attract the British armament, well directed efforts against Arnold, as soon as he approached Rockets', would have saved Richmond and Westham; and might have terminated in the capture of the traitor and the destruction of his detachment.

The position at Rockets' is strong, and peculiarly adapted for militia: the enemy's right flank being exposed, as soon as his front crossed the creek, to a sudden assault from the main force posted along the rivulet and upon the heights, while the houses in front

gave defences from which it would not be very easy to dislodge an inferior force determined to do its duty. Opposition in this quarter would have stopped the invader. The country through which he must retreat presents three points where he might have been successively and advantageously assailed. The first at Four Mile creek, where the ground not only affords powerful aid to the assailant, but is exactly suitable to the Americans, who understood passing with facility through mud, water, and thick brush, fighting from covert to covert; whereas the enemy would never feel himself safe, unless in close order and unison of action, neither of which could long be preserved when attacked in such a position.

The next is, as you pass from Richmond, at Pleasant's mills, and the last, more advantageous than either, is close under Malvern hills, the north margin of the creek which intersects the road.

A discriminating officer, with inferior force, availing himself with dexterity of the advantages which in many places the country affords between Richmond and Westover, against a retreating foe, could hardly fail to bring him to submission.

But we were unprepared for resistance; and inviting as was the moment, it passed unseized. Our people in the lower country, finding the metropolis gone, and the enemy unresisted, followed the example of the government, abandoned their habitations, exposed their families to the misery of flight, and left their property at the mercy of the invader. What ills spring

from the timidity and impotence of rulers! In them attachment to the common cause is vain and illusory, unless guided in times of difficulty by courage, wisdom, and concert.

This scene of dismay, confusion and destruction took place much about the time that lord Cornwallis again opened the campaign in the south; and during the difficult retreat which soon after ensued, the intelligence of Arnold's success reached the two armies, deeply afflicting to the one, and highly encouraging to the other. Greene saw the state, on whose resources and ability he relied for supplies and reinforcements, prostrated at the feet of a handful of men, led by a traitor and deserter, while lord Cornwallis anticipated with delight his certain ultimate success, from comparing Arnold and his detachment with himself and his army.

Baron Steuben, not being in a condition to force intrenchments, wisely distributed his militia in the vicinity of the enemy, for the purpose of protecting the country from light incursions, made with a view to collect provisions or to seize plunder. No event occurred in this quarter worthy of notice, general Arnold continuing to adhere to his position in Portsmouth, and baron Steuben never having force sufficient to drive him from it.

Congress and the commander in chief, not less surprised than mortified at the tidings from Virginia, bestowed their immediate attention upon that quarter. The Virginia delegation, deploring the situation of its

country, pressed the chevalier La Luzerne, minister plenipotentiary from his most christian majesty, to interpose his good offices with the commander of the French fleet at Rhode Island, for the purpose of inducing him to detach an adequate naval force to the Chesapeake, conceiving that such co-operation was alone wanting to restore the tarnished fame of the state, and to punish the base invader. Washington, participating in the feelings of the delegation, and urged by the duty of his station, took measures forthwith to assist the invaded state. He addressed himself to count Rochambeau, commanding the land forces of his most christian majesty, and to Monsieur Destouches, admiral of his squadron in the American seas, urging them to seize the present moment for inflicting a severe blow on the common enemy. He represented the condition and situation of the British armament in Virginia; and expatiated in fervid terms on the signal good which a prompt movement with the fleet, having on board a small auxiliary force from the army, to the Chesapeake, would certainly produce. He deprecated a naval operation unaided by an adequate detachment from the army, as incapable with the militia of the country to effect the desired object; and pressing co-operating exertions from the general and admiral, he announced his intention, arising from the confidence he felt that they would adopt his proposal, of drawing a corps of twelve hundred men from his army, and detaching it with orders to reach by forced marches the position of the enemy. Providentially, the French

possessed at this moment naval superiority; the British having just before suffered severely in a storm off Long Island. The loss of one ship of the line, and the subtraction of two additional ships rendered unfit for service until repaired, gave this advantage. Had the admiral and general adopted at once the plan proposed by Washington, the object might have been effected before the disabled British ships could have been refitted for sea: but for reasons not explained, Monsieur Destouches did not move with his squadron, but despatched a part of it only to the Chesapeak, without a single regiment from the army. The commodore had no sooner reached his place of destination than, discovering his inability to execute the expected service, he hastened back to his admiral. Falling in with a British frigate on his return, he captured her; thus obtaining some little compensation for the otherwise useless expedition. In the meantime general Washington's detachment, under the marquis de la Fayette, proceeded to the head of Elk, where embarking in bay craft collected for the purpose, the marquis soon reached Annapolis; from which place, in pursuance of the concerted plan, he was to have been taken down the bay, under convoy of Monsieur Destouches.

In all military operations there is a crisis, which once past, can never be recalled. So it was now. We had failed to seize the favorable moment, when in our grasp; it went by, and was irrecoverably lost. Had the suggestion of Washington been adopted in the first

instance, the British armament must have fallen, and the American traitor would have expiated upon a gibbet his atrocious crime. So persuaded was Washington that such was now the probable termination to his infamous life, that he instructed the marquis not to admit any stipulation in his surrender for his safety, and forbad, as he had done on a former occasion, the smallest injury to the person of Arnold; his object being to bring him to public punishment, agreeably to the rules and regulations established by congress for the government of the army. The commander in chief was much mortified when he learnt that his proposition to the general and admiral had not been executed, as he was well convinced the propitious opportunity was irretrievably past. His chagrin arose not only from failure in striking his enemy, from failure in vindicating the degraded reputation of Virginia, but also from this second escape of Arnold, whose safe delivery at headquarters engaged his attention from the moment of his desertion. Nevertheless, he concurred with zeal in the late adoption of his proposed plan by the French commanders, and continued the marquis at Annapolis for co-operation. Monsieur Destouches finding, by the return of his commodore, that the contemplated object had not been effected, sailed from Rhode Island with his squadron on the eighth of March, with a suitable detachment from the army, under the count de Viominil. Time had been afforded for the refitment of the two disabled ships belonging to the British fleet, which being accomplished, admiral Ar-

buthnot put to sea on the tenth, in pursuit of the French fleet, and came up with it on the sixteenth, off the capes of Virginia.

The hostile fleets were not long in view before they engaged. The action was not general, and, like most sea battles, indecisive. After one hour's combat the fleets separated, each claiming the victory. However well supported might be the title of the French admiral, it cannot be doubted that he entirely failed in the object of the expedition; nor is it less certain that his disappointment resulted from the rencontre that had just taken place, which was followed by the British admiral's possession of the entrance into the Chesapeake, and by the return of the French fleet to Rhode Island.

Nevertheless congress, the states, and the commander in chief, were considerably elated by the issue of the naval combat; for although the fleet of our ally had not gained any decisive advantage, and had been obliged to abandon its enterprize, still, without superiority of force, it had sustained an equal combat against an enemy whose predominance on the ocean had been long established. Congress complimented Monsieur Destouches with a vote of thanks, expressing their approbation and confidence; while general Washington, with much cordiality and satisfaction, tendered to the admiral his sincere congratulations. So sensible had been sir Henry Clinton of the vulnerable condition of Arnold, that he hastened the embarkation of a considerable body of troops, under

major general Phillips (lately exchanged) intended ultimately to cooperate with lord Cornwallis, and now applied to reinforce the detachment in Virginia, as soon as the British fleet should be enabled to put to sea.

Arbuthnot had not long sailed when he was followed by the transports with the armament under Phillips, which, steering directly for the Chesapeake, safely arrived, after a short passage; and, proceeding up Elizabeth river, the troops debarked at Portsmouth, to the great joy of brigadier Arnold, whose apprehensions during the preceding three weeks had been unceasing and excruciating.

The marquis la Fayette was recalled from Annapolis to the head of Elk, whence he was directed to proceed to Virginia, and take upon himself the command of the troops collected and collecting for its protection. The British force, united at Portsmouth, amounted to three thousand five hundred; and, to the great satisfaction of the officers heretofore serving under Arnold, was now placed under the direction of general Phillips. This officer occupied himself in completing the fortifications begun by Arnold, and making such additional defences as the security of the post required. As soon as this was effected, he prepared for offensive operations.

Leaving one thousand men in Portsmouth, he embarked with the residue in vessels selected for the purpose, and proceeded up James river, with a view of consummating the system of destruction so successfully pursued by Arnold during his short expedition.

Although the heavy hand of the enemy had been stretched twice before across this defenceless country, withering every thing it touched; although the difficulty with which our infant nation, without money and without credit, gathered together small quantities of supplies, without which resistance must terminate; and although the state of our interior forbade the hope of effectual opposition, not from the want of means, but from the want of wisely husbanding and wisely applying our resources, proved again and again by severe experience; yet the interval since Arnold's unopposed visit to the metropolis was passed in inactivity as all preceding periods of quietude had passed. What little remained of the vitals of resistance were still left in the exposed region of the state, instead of being all collected and transported over the Blue ridge, our nearest security. Instead of admonishing our planters of the danger to which their tobacco was exposed in the public warehouses on the navigable rivers, and urging them to keep this valuable resource safe at home for better times, our towns were filled with our staple commodity, ready to be burnt, or to be exported, as might best comport with the enemy's views.

Indeed, in the language of scripture, "we left undone those things which we ought to have done, and did those things which we ought not to have done," and well might follow the disgraces and distresses which ensued.

At York Town were deposited some naval stores, and in its harbor were a few public and private vessels. This little assemblage seems first to have engaged the notice of the British general. Having advanced up the river opposite to Williamsburg, the former seat of government, Phillips landed with his troops at Barwell's ferry, and took possession of this deserted city without opposition; hence he detached to York Town, where destroying our small magazine, he returned to his fleet and proceeded up the river. Reaching City Point, which is situated on the south side of James river, where it receives the Appomatox, the British general again debarked his army.

Petersburg, the great mart of that section of the state which lies south of Appomatox, and of the northern part of North Carolina, stands upon its banks, about twelve miles from City Point; and after the destruction of Norfolk, ranked first among the commercial towns of the state. Its chief export was tobacco, considered our best product, and at this time its warehouses were filled. In addition were some public stores; as this town, being most convenient to the army of Greene, had become necessarily a place of depôt for all imported supplies required for southern operations.

Phillips directed his march to Petersburg, which he soon reached, without opposition, as appeared then to be the habit of Virginia.

All the regular force of this state being under Greene in South Carolina, its defence depended entirely upon the exertions of its executive government, and its mi-

litia. Two thousand of this force were now in the field, directed by the baron Steuben, seconded by general Nelson; half of which was stationed on each side of James river. Steuben, not doubting as to Phillips' object, put himself at the head of the southern division in the vicinity of Petersburg, whose safety he endeavored to effect; but as he was incapable of doing more than merely to preserve appearances, this effort was abortive. Advancing into the town, the British troops fell upon Steuben's division, well posted, and as usual, willing, but incapable, to resist effectually. A distant cautious rencontre ensued; adroitly managed by the baron, and sharply upheld by his troops. It terminated, as was foreseen, in the retreat of Steuben over the Appomatox, breaking down the bridge after passing it, to prevent pursuit. Phillips, now in quiet possession of the town, pursued the British policy of crushing southern resistance, by destroying the resources of Virginia. The warehouses, stored with tobacco, our best substitute for money, were consumed. Every thing valuable was destroyed; and the wealth of this flourishing town in a few hours disappeared. Pursuing this war of devastation, he crossed the Appomatox, having repaired its bridge; and dividing his superior force, he detached Arnold to Osborne's, another place of tobacco storage, while he proceeded himself to the court-house of Chesterfield county, which lies opposite to Richmond, between the James and Appomatox rivers. At this latter place was no tobacco, the present chief object of British conquerors;

but barracks had been erected, and stores collected there, for the accommodation of our recruits, when assembled at this place to join the southern army. Arnold destroyed tobacco and every thing he found at Osborne's, as did Phillips the barracks and stores at the court-house. These exploits being performed, the two divisions of the army rejoined on the route to Manchester, a small village south of James river, in view of the metropolis, one of them passing through Warwick, another small village: here was more tobacco, of course more devastation followed.

The tobacco war being finished, our small squadron of armed vessels lying in the river, here very narrow, became the next object of the British detachment. This naval force had been collected for the purpose of co-operating with the French expedition from Newport against Portsmouth, which proved abortive; and among other ills flowing from the abortion, was the loss of this little squadron. The commodore was very politely summoned to surrender, to which summons he bid defiance, and declaring "his determination to defend himself to the last extremity." Quick two sixes and two grasshoppers were brought to bear upon him; when he as quickly scuttled and set fire to his vessels, escaping with his crew to the northern banks of the river: one way of "holding out to the last extremity," but not that commonly understood by the term. Reaching Manchester, general Phillips renewed hostility upon tobacco, of which great quantities were found in the warehouses; this village, although in sight

of Richmond, being saved by the intervening river from sharing with the metropolis in Arnold's ravages. Nothing now remained on the south side of James river, below the falls, for British fire; all the tobacco, with all our valuables within reach, were burnt, or conveyed on board ship. It was necessary to cross to Richmond, or to lay aside the torch. The former measure was the one desired, and would have been executed, had not the opportune arrival, on the preceding evening, of the marquis de la Fayette, with his New England regulars, put an insuperable bar to the project. No bridge then united the two shores, and no maritime aid was at hand to accelerate a passage, now to be effected only by the bayonet, covered by adequate and commanding batteries. The British force under Phillips was between three and four thousand, fully adequate of itself to have prepared a bridge of boats, and to have forced its way across; but nature had bestowed upon the north side of the river heights commanding effectually both shores. The marquis, strengthened*

* Whenever the commitment of our militia in battle with regulars occurs, the heart of the writer is rent with painful emotions; knowing, as he does, the waste of life resulting from the stupid cruel policy. Can there be any system devised by the wit of man, more the compound of inhumanity, of murder, and of waste of resources? Ought any government to be respected, which, when peace permits substitution of a better system, neglects to avail itself of the opportunity? Was a father to put his son, with his small-sword drawn for the first time, against an experienced swordsman, would not his neighbors exclaim,

by two thousand militia, presented a respectable force, better appropriated to marches and countermarches, waiting for the assistance which time and opportunity never fail to present, than for the close and stubborn conflicts which defences of posts and resistance to river passages are sure to produce. Had Phillips been in Richmond, and the marquis in Manchester, the river would have been passed with ease. Such is the value of what is called the advantage of ground in war. Relinquishing his design, general Phillips quitted Manchester, marching down the south side of the river to Bermuda Hundred; the only spot in the state which retained the old Anglican term brought over by the first settlers; situated on the south shore of the James, at its confluence with the Appomatox river. Although no tobacco warehouses, with their contents, remained to attract the exertions of British valor, yet various articles presented themselves in this ill-fated district, which, exciting cupidity, could not fail in being taken into safe keeping by this formidable army.

When governments adopt the policy of plunder and conflagration, they owe to the world, as well as to their nation, the justification of such departure from the liberal usage of war. In every condition of things such justification is difficult; in this state of affairs it was impracticable. The subjugation of the weakest portion

murderer! vile murderer! Just so acts the government; and yet our parents are all satisfied; although, whenever war takes place, their sons are to be led to the altar of blood. Dreadful apathy! shocking coldness to our progeny!

of the Union, to which alone all the disposable force of Great Britain had been and was devoted, began to be viewed as chimerical even by the British officers. The battle of Guilford had fixed an impression on the condition of the war, which audibly declared the futility even of victory itself. To burn and to destroy, where no hope of effecting the object could exist but with the infatuated, was not less cruel than disgraceful. That the only people in the world, understanding and enjoying political liberty, powerful and enlightened, the brethren of Locke, of Newton, and of Hampden, should encourage, by their example, a return to barbarism, affords a melancholy proof of the inefficacy of the arts and the sciences, the sweets of civilization, nay, even of liberty itself, over passion supported by power. The British nation guided by ministers without talents, disappointment could not but ensue to many of their enterprises; which, embittering the heart instead of correcting the head, produced this baneful system, so destructive to the comfort first of the farmers of Connecticut, now of the planters of Virginia; heaping up a stock of irritation and hate, to be dissipated only by the force of time.

Opposite to Bermuda Hundred is City Point, where Phillips had disembarked when proceeding to Petersburg; the fleet continuing in its harbor, the British general reembarked his army, and fell down the river.

The marquis La Fayette, informed by his light parties of the movement of the enemy, followed cautiously on the north side of the river, until he reached the head

waters of the Chickohominy, one of the branches of James river, behind which he took post. Here he learned, by his exploring parties, that the British fleet was reascending the river; when, breaking up from Chickohominy, the marquis hastened back to Richmond.

On his route he was informed, that Phillips was again disembarking his army on the south side of the river; one division at Brandon, the seat of Benjamin Harrison, esq., and the second division at City Point. Persuaded that the enemy's present object was the possession of Petersburg, for the purpose of meeting lord Cornwallis, whose approach to Halifax was known, La Fayette determined to move by forced marches in that direction. The British general advancing with equal rapidity, and being nearer to Petersburg, reached it first. Phillips had flattered himself, that the powerful advantage derived from the celerity and ease with which his army might be conveyed by water, would enable him to strike decisively the American general, whom he hoped to allure low down the neck formed by the James and Chickohominy. While occupied in the incipient step to this end, he received lord Cornwallis's despatch, forwarded, as has been before mentioned, when that general commenced his march from Wilmington; and therefore hurried to Petersburg, the designated point of junction. Though young and enterprising, La Fayette was too sagacious to have risked the bold measure of occupying Petersburg, even had he been free to act as his own judg-

ment might direct; but acting, as he did, in a subordinate character, he never could have been induced to violate orders. Major general Greene, commanding in the Southern Department, directed the operations in Virginia as well as in Carolina; and apprehending loss from temerity, he enjoined, first on baron Steuben, and afterwards upon his successor, the preservation of the army, by avoiding general action, and confining his operations to the "petit guerre;" convinced that the steady adherence to such system only could save the South. It is not to be presumed, that, with such instructions from his superior, at the head of a force inferior to that under Phillips, with a few lately raised cavalry, the American general would have hazarded the certain danger awaiting him, from placing himself between Cornwallis and the army under Phillips. But in his difficult situation, it was necessary to preserve appearances, to keep the country in good spirits, as well as to render his soldiers strict in attention to duty, and therefore never so susceptible of discipline as when impressed with the conviction that battle is at hand. Finding the British general in occupation of Petersburg, La Fayette fell back; and recrossing the James river, took a position upon its northern margin, some miles below Richmond. Here he exerted himself to increase the ability of his army, by diminishing his baggage, establishing system and punctuality in its several departments, and introducing throughout rigid discipline. Nor was he unmindful of the peril which awaited the public stores again collected in Richmond;

notwithstanding the severe admonition lately received from brigadier Arnold. To their removal he administered all the aid in his power, which was effected in due time, though unhappily not to a proper place.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE hostile army being separated, general Greene turned his attention to the improvement of his unresisted possession of the field.

Whether to approach Wilmington, with a view of opposing Cornwallis's operations at the threshold; or to take a more salubrious and distant position, with Virginia in his rear, and there to await his lordship's advance towards his long meditated victim, became at first the subject of deliberation. Very soon a plan of action was submitted to the general, radically repugnant to those which had risen into notice, and which combating both in principle, reduced the discussion to a single point: "Shall the army wait upon the enemy, or shall it instantly advance upon Cambden."

The proposer suggested, that, leaving Cornwallis to act as he might choose, the army should be led back into South Carolina. That the main body should move upon Cambden, while the light corps, taking a lower direction, and joining brigadier Marion, should break down all intermediate posts, completely demolishing communication between Cambden and Ninety-Six with Charleston; and thus placing the British force in South Carolina in a triangle, Charleston and Ninety-Six forming the base, insulated as to co-operation, and

destitute of supplies, even of provision, for any length of time.

From the first moment the substitute was presented to the mind of Greene, it received his decided preference. There was a splendor in the plan which will always attract a hero. Yet the stake was great, the subject difficult, and powerful arguments, pressed by deservedly influential soldiers, maintained the propriety of adhering to the first contemplated system.

They contended, that the battle of Guilford had given a superiority to the American arms which might be preserved; and if preserved, the liberation of the South must follow. They admitted the insalubrity of the lower country, but denied the necessity of placing the army in it; as the healthy region was sufficiently near to the enemy for all the purposes of offence, whenever he should advance. They laid it down as a cardinal principle, never to be relinquished or even slighted, that the safety of the South hung upon the safety of Virginia; and the sure way to yield to that state full protection, was to face Cornwallis. They reinforced this argument by dwelling, with much emphasis, upon the singular fitness of Greene to cope with his lordship, as well as the superior capacity of his army to contend with that under Cornwallis. That the British general and the British soldier had been taught, through the keen and trying struggles just concluded, the value of their enemy—a consideration entitled to weight; and that this value of character would be thrown away, by abandoning that army on which it would always most bear.

That the British dragoons, so dreadful heretofore, had been rendered comparatively innocent by the superior ability of the American horse; and that, withdrawing the curb now imposed upon its prowess, would be sure to restore it to its pristine sway and effect. They contended, by observing that our continental force exceeded in number the army of Cornwallis, that should his lordship even abandon Wilmington, which was not probable, because injudicious, he would only bring himself to an equality; and the state of North Carolina, already in high spirits from what had passed, would exert itself to give to us the weight of numbers, so long as it found the contest directed by a general deep in its confidence: whereas, the relinquishment of the state, with the enemy in its bosom, as proposed, would be sure to excite gloom and apprehension, which would infallibly lead to the ancient state of apathy, the fatal effects of which had been severely experienced.

In opposition, it was admitted, that the primary object in all the measures to be adopted was the safety of Virginia, as it could not be denied that on its preservation depended the restoration of the subjugated states; and the various arguments adduced were acknowledged to be correct and cogent, but not entitled to that preponderance which was so strenuously pressed. It was urged, as the surest mode of reaching right conclusions, to lay down the probable conduct of the enemy, and to compare the effects

of the northern or southern movement upon that conduct. The British general would either return to South Carolina, to uphold the ground already gained—or, leaving his conquest to the force left for its protection, he would advance upon Virginia. Should he return to South Carolina—ignorant as for days he must be of our movement, and incapable, from his crippled condition, of immediate operation, should he even be so fortunate as to learn with celerity the design of his foe—very probably we should in the interval obtain an advantage which the British general would not be able soon to retrieve, even with his united force. But, granting that we should fail in this expectation; and that Cornwallis should, by crossing the Pedee at the Cheraw hills, force the light corps and Marion to fall back upon Greene, relieve Camden, and unite to his army its garrison, still we should be safe, and greatly the gainer. For, reinforced as would be general Greene by the corps of Marion, of Sumpter, and of Pickens, he would preserve a numerical superiority over the enemy, although strengthened by all the disposable troops under lord Rawdon. The quality of these corps, and the well known ability of their leaders, placed them far above any force to be derived from North Carolina, should general Greene renew his contest in that state. We should, therefore, be in better condition to risk battle by going to the south than by continuing here; and we should enjoy the immense advantage of rendering a campaign from which so much was expected by the enemy, entirely abortive; inasmuch as we

brought our opponent back to the very ground which he had left months before, when menacing the subjugation of North Carolina instantly, and that of Virginia remotely. This single good would be of itself adequate compensation; as it would confirm the superiority of our arms, and demonstrate, even to a British cabinet, the folly of persevering in the hopeless, destructive conflict.

But supposing lord Cornwallis should not return to take care of his conquest,—inasmuch as it would unequivocally declare the mastership of his opponent, and when we reflect how often the best and wisest men prefer any course to that which is coupled with admission of their own inferiority, we might presume that his lordship would follow in the beaten tract,—what will be the consequences? The states of Georgia and South Carolina restored to the Union; the disaffected in North Carolina restored to their senses, by feeling unequivocally the frivolity of British conquest; North Carolina in a capacity to contribute its portion of annual force; and Virginia saved from that devastating flight of human vultures which follow in the train of conquering armies, whose appetite for plunder is insatiate so long as objects of prey are attainable. How can you so effectually save Virginia, it was asked, as by withholding from her territory a visitation so dreadful, the precursor of famine and of plague? This was completely effected by moving to the south; as the contest for the Carolinas continuing, that state of quiet submission could not take place—and that

condition must ensue before these destroyers of property would adventure to approach a new theatre of plunder.

This reasoning, however respectfully regarded, did not persuade the advocates for the original plan to concur. They had felt the degradation of one retreat through North Carolina, and they could not be readily induced to advise the risk of its repetition, which was deemed the infallible consequence of a return to South Carolina should lord Cornwallis act the part which his finished military reputation induced them to expect. They persevered in maintaining the propriety of holding Virginia as our primary object; and contended, that the proposed substitute did effectually reduce her to a secondary station, however sincerely its author shared in the general policy of giving to her, in all our measures, a decided preference. They rejected the idea of the British general's leaving general Greene in the undisturbed pursuit of his object; and although, at first, his return would convey the acknowledgment presumed, yet the effect of this acknowledgment would be short-lived, as the superior force of the enemy would enable him to push Greene a second time into Virginia; and the sole benefit we should derive from this perilous movement would be entering Virginia a few weeks later, greatly overweighed by the loss of that superiority in arms, now possessed, and to be sacrificed by a second retreat.

That highly as were respected the brigadiers Marion, Sumpter, and Pickens, and much as was prized

the tried courage of their associates, yet the effect of their co-operation was overrated: but, even admitting it to the presumed extent, a movement of such magnitude never could be warranted by a reliance on means so precarious.

The discussions being now extremely narrowed, by presuming on the British general's return into South Carolina, it was only necessary to demonstrate, that the same perilous retreat would not necessarily ensue, to secure the adoption of the substituted plan of operations.

The fact of equality in force was reasserted, and proved by recurrence to official data. The precariousness of militia succor could not be denied; but it was urged that the South Carolina corps, above designated, formed an exception to the general rule. What rendered our retreat in the course of the past winter so difficult and dangerous was, not only a numerical inferiority,* but an inferiority in quality also, and a separation of the two divisions of the army. Now the army was united; the untried battalions had now gone through severe service, and had confessedly improved

* Two of our continental regiments, the second of Maryland and the first of Virginia, were composed of raw troops, although the officers were experienced. These regiments had, in the course of the preceding service, been much improved. The two divisions of our army being at a great distance from each other, Greene was necessarily compelled to fall back; and we find that, with all his exertions, he could not reunite until he reached Guilford Court-house.

in soldiership; its numerical strength was now at least equal, and would be sure to be increased by the adoption of timely measures to secure reinforcements; whereas that of the enemy could not increase, and must insensibly diminish without battle.

That the strong and faithful country west of Charlotte gave a safe retreat; that a powerful corps of the King's Mountain militia could be readily brought to meet us in that neighborhood, or upon the Yadkin, if deemed advisable further to retire. With this reinforcement, the corps of South Carolina, and our superior cavalry, general Greene would be much better prepared to appeal to the sword than he was when he fought at Guilford Court-house, where all admitted that he gained an advantage. That lord Cornwallis must either sit down in the vicinity of Cambden, to guard South Carolina,—an inert condition, as foreign to his disposition as it was incompatible with his duty, or he would, in conformity to his temper and his duty, advance upon general Greene. That, should he presume upon a repetition of retreat, he would not only be disappointed, but would probably be destroyed; for the moment he passed Lynch's creek his danger commenced, and increased every step he took towards the Yadkin. He would, therefore, be compelled to be satisfied with protecting his line of posts from Cambden to Augusta, or he would again encounter the peril of a Guilford Court-house victory, out of which he would not so happily now escape as he

then had done. By taking the first course, he lost a year: by taking the second, he lost himself.

That, from the Yadkin, Greene could readily reach Virginia, if necessary, and should the British general forbear to approach him, and in a few weeks drive all the force collected there to the ocean—the asylum of Englishmen—and return to South Carolina in time for a winter campaign.

These, with other arguments equally forcible, were offered in maintenance of the other system; and the effect upon Virginia, which would probably ensue, should the British general proceed thither instead of returning to South Carolina as presumed by the author of the substitute, was examined in all its bearings.*

General Greene gave to the subject that full and critical investigation which it merited, and which, by long habit, had become familiar to his mind. He perceived advantages and disadvantages attendant upon either course, and felt for the evils to which Virginia must be exposed, whichever plan he might adopt. Doubting whether her sufferings would not be increased rather than mitigated by rendering her the seat of the southern war; and convinced that he had

* No man was more familiarized to dispassionate and minute research than was general Greene. He was patient in hearing every thing offered, never interrupting or slighting what was said; and, having possessed himself of the subject fully, he would enter into a critical comparison of the opposite arguments, convincing his hearers, as he progressed, with the propriety of the decision he was about to pronounce.

much to hope, and little to apprehend, from returning into South Carolina, he determined to carry the war into that state.

No sooner had he decided, than he commenced operations. The legion of Lee, with captain Oldham's detachment, was ordered to move on the subsequent morning (6th of April), and the army was put in motion the following day. Previous to the general's departure from Deep river, he communicated his intention to the brigadiers Sumpter and Pickens, and required those generals to assemble all the force they could collect for the purpose of co-operation.

To the first he signified his desire that he would be prepared to join him when he should reach the vicinity of Cambden: to the last he expressed his wishes that he would invest Ninety-Six, or, at all events, counteract any attempt to reinforce Cambden from that post. To the commander in chief he made known at large his plan, with his hopes and his doubts, assuring him that he should take every measure to avoid a misfortune; "but necessity obliges me to commit myself to chance, and if any accident should attend me, I trust my friends will do justice to my reputation."

Lieutenant colonel Lee being instructed to join Marion, was directed to deliver to that officer the general's despatch, and to assure him of the entire confidence reposed in his faithful efforts to maintain his share in the expected co-operation.

Lord Cornwallis had not long indulged in the enjoyment of repose and abundance, before his active

mind turned to the probable measures of his antagonist, and, shortly after he reached Wilmington, he advised lord Rawdon, commanding in South Carolina, of his apprehensions, lest general Greene might direct his attention to the recovery of the lost states.

If, as I believe, a general is sure to act wisely when he takes the course most dreaded by his adversary, the late decision of general Greene was indubitably correct. For never was a leader more affected, than was Cornwallis, by the disclosure of his enemy's object. Day after day did his lordship revolve in his mind the difficulties of his situation, seeking the most eligible course to diminish or to surmount them.*

Sometimes he determined to follow Greene into South Carolina, and to punish him for his temerity; at other times he would proceed to Virginia, and, by the rapidity of his success in that quarter, compel Greene to abandon his object, and hasten to its relief. At length he decided in favor of the latter measure;

* Lord Cornwallis was exceedingly perplexed in making up his decision, and at length took the course which risked all to gain all, and, as generally happens, he lost all. Thus it often occurs in war. The great Frederic of Prussia committed the same error before Prague, when he attempted to force the intrenched camp of marshal Daun, and afterwards at Cunnersdorf against the Russians and marshal Laudohn. Once the resolution to follow Greene was not only adopted but in execution, a portion of the British army having passed to the southern banks of Cape Fear. This decision being soon after changed, the troops were recalled.

persuaded that Greene had gained so much time as would probably enable him to strike his first blow, in which, if he failed, his presence would not be requisite, and if he succeeded, his lordship's approach might place his own army in extreme danger.

This reasoning was plausible, but not solid; for, by taking the route by Cheraw hill to Nelson's ferry, he held himself safe, even had Greene succeeded against Rawdon—an event which, however practicable, was not to be effected under many weeks, unless fortune should indeed be extremely propitious to the American general.

Lee, in obedience to his orders, took the route towards Cross creek, which, it was inferred, would very much conceal his real object, by inducing the British general to believe that Greene proposed to place himself in his neighborhood.

After progressing in this course, as long as was compatible with its speedy union with Marion, the light corps turned to the right, and, by a very expeditious march, gained Drowning creek, a branch of Little Pedee. In a large field, on the southern side of this stream, Lee encamped for the night, when a very extraordinary occurrence took place, worthy, from its singularity, of relation.

Between two and three in the morning, the officer of the day was informed that a strange noise had been heard in front of the piquet, stationed on the great road near the creek, resembling that occasioned by men moving through a swamp.

Presently, and towards that quarter, the sentinel fired, which was followed by the sound of the bugle calling in the horse patrols, as was the custom on the approach of the enemy. The troops were immediately summoned to arms, and arrayed for defence. The officer of the day reported very particularly every thing which had passed, adding that several of the sentinels and one patrol concurred in asserting, that they heard plainly the progress of horsemen, concealing with the utmost care their advance. Never was a more perplexing moment: yet, knowing as lieutenant colonel Lee did, that no enemy could be near him, unless lord Cornwallis, devising Greene's plan and Lee's route, had pushed a body from Wilmington, with orders to proceed until it reached Drowning creek, where Lee would probably pass it, for the purpose of intercepting him, he was induced to consider the intelligence as the fabrication of imagination, which sometimes leads the most serene and circumspect into error.

In a few moments, in a different quarter of our position, another sentinel fired, and soon afterwards the same report, from that point, was made, as had just been received from the other. Appearances now were so strong as to dissipate the first conclusion, and what was deemed imaginary, was felt to be real.

A change in the formation of the troops was made to correspond with this last annunciation of the enemy's approach.

This was not completed before, in a different direc-

tion, we heard the discharge of a third sentinel. Now the most excruciating sensations were experienced: it appeared as if these different feelings of our position were wisely and dexterously made, preparatory to a general assault, to take effect as soon as the approach of light should warrant its commencement. All that could be done, was done. The piquets and sentinels held their stations; the horse patrols had been called in; and the corps changed its position in silence and with precision upon every new annunciation, having in view the conjoint object of keeping the fires between us and the enemy, and holding the horse in the rear of the infantry. During our last evolution to this end, we were again interrupted by the discharge of the line of sentinels in our rear, along the great road. Thus the enemy had traversed the major segment of our position, and had at length fixed himself upon the road of our march.

No doubt now remained, not only of the enemy being upon us, but that he was in force, and well understood his object. He had reconnoitred with penetration and perseverance, and had ultimately placed himself in the very spot most certainly promising success.

To attempt to regain Deep river was idle, if practicable; for Greene must now be two or three day's march towards Camden, the intermediate country hostile, and the British army within striking distance of some points of our route. Marion only could afford safety; and he was on the south of the Pedee, at least two

days' march from us. The review of our situation admitted but one conclusion,—that hope of aid could not be indulged, and that we must rely upon ourselves only. Brave soldiers can always be safely trusted with their situation. Lee, passing along the line of infantry, made known our condition: reminding them of their high reputation; enjoining profound silence throughout the approaching contest; and assuring them, with their customary support, he had no doubt but that he should force his way to the Pedee, where we should find all that was desirable. To the cavalry he briefly communicated the dangers which surrounded us, mingled with expressions of his thorough confidence that every man would do his duty, and concluded by pressing upon the officers not to permit any partial success to tempt pursuit, without orders, or to relax circumspection, but to bear in mind, that the contest before us was not the affair of an hour, but might last for days.

This address was answered by whispers of applause; and having formed in columns, one of horse, and the other of foot, Lee waited anxiously for the break of day, the presumed signal for action.

It soon appeared, and the columns advanced to the great road, infantry in front, baggage in the centre, and the cavalry in the rear. As soon as the head of the column reached the road, it turned to the left, pursuing the route to the Pedee. The van officer, proceeding a few hundred yards, now got up to the sentinel who had fired last, and received from him the same account

so often given before. The enigma still remained unexplained, and the corps continued its march, in slow motion, expecting every moment the enemy's fire. In this state of suspense we might have continued long, had not the van officer directed his attention to the road, for the purpose of examining the trail of our active foe, when, to his astonishment, he found the tracks of a large pack of wolves. It was now evident, that the presumed enemy was a troop of wild beasts, collected together, and anxious to pass along their usual route, when, finding it obstructed, they turned from point to point to pass through the field: every where fired upon, they continued widening their circuit until they reached the great road from which they had been originally turned. Our agitation vanished, and was succeeded by facetious glee. No where does wit and humor abound more than in camps; and no occurrence was more apt to elicit it than that which we had just experienced. Never was a day's march more pleasant, being one continued scene of good humor, interspersed with innocent flashes of wit. For a time the restraint of discipline ceased. Every character, not excepting the commandant's, was hit; and very salutary counsel was often imparted under cover of a joke. Each considered himself a dupe, and all laughing at a credulity, any attempt to remove which, during the scene, would have been treated as insulting temerity. The piquets, the patrols, the sentinels, and the officer of the day, were marked as the peculiar objects of derision. Wonderful that not one of the

many could distinguish between the movement of wolves and soldiers! They were charged with disgraceful ignorance, shameful stupor, bordering close upon rank cowardice. Vain was the attempt of the abused individuals to defend their character and conduct: it was the interest of the many to fix the supposed stigma on the few, and the general verdict was against them. Reaching a settlement, the corps halted, and for a while the remembrance of the ludicrous occurrence of the night yielded to the solicitude of every one to provide his breakfast.

Here what had passed was imparted to the inhabitants, and the unintelligible adventure was very satisfactorily solved. We were informed that there had been in the field where the corps had encamped a store of provisions, collected for the army; but that it never had been conveyed to camp, being too distant from the line of march. Being neglected, its contents became putrid: the wild beasts soon profited by the neglect, and enjoyed nightly the food intended for the soldier. Having comprehended within our range of sentinels this abandoned store, we had interrupted their usual visits, and the circle which they nearly completed was from solicitude to find access to their nightly repast.

This was what had been termed "acute reconnoitring," and "an enemy in force, well understanding his own views."

Such is frail man, in war as well as in peace. Subject to be imposed upon by his own conceits, not-

withstanding the remonstrances of reason, and his experience of the delusions of credulity. Yet, when we consider that the night was very dark, that the troops were waked from sleep to prepare for defence, and that it was possible, though improbable, for the British general to have been advised of the march of Lee, in time to strike him, our surprise at the alarm excited will vanish.

Having finished our repast, we resumed our march; and, after getting within a day's distance of the Pedee, lieutenant colonel Lee despatched an officer, with a small party of dragoons, to discover in what part of his extensive range brigadier Marion then was. The officer, on reaching the river, learnt that the brigadier, when heard from, not many days before, was in the swamps of Black river. This was his general quarters when he found it necessary to retire from active service. It not only afforded safety, but, there being several fertile plantations in one settlement, he was well supplied with provisions and forage. Marion received with joy Lee's officer, and furnished boats, which he kept concealed on the Pedee, for the transportation of the corps across that river. On the 8th of March, Lee joined the general.

These military friends had not before met since their wiredrawn expedition against Georgetown, and very cordially rejoiced at being again united in the great attempt of wresting South Carolina from the enemy. The letter from the general, inclosing his plan of operations, was delivered to the brigadier, and the references

to lieutenant colonel Lee fully explained. The evening was devoted to repose, and on the next day the two corps quitted the dark and favorite recess, for the execution of the trust confided to them by general Greene. During their separation many had been the vicissitudes produced by the fickleness of fortune. Now blazoning with glory, then shading with disaster the American standard. From the battle of Guilford, the long wished reannexation of South Carolina and Georgia to the Union became the avowed as it had before been the meditated object of the American general. Emboldened by the effect of that well fought day, he no longer veiled in the mysteries of war his object, but openly disclosed the end to which all his toils and perils pointed. North Carolina became encouraged, by finding that her safety was not now considered precarious, and that the contest turned, not upon *her* defence, but upon the expulsion of the common enemy from her southern neighbors. The ethereal spirit which had animated Marion, Sumpter, and Pickens, and year after year had sustained, through their example and efforts, the unequal conflict, had been long subsiding. Enthusiasm is short-lived; and is soon succeeded by apathy, which deadens vigorous exertion as fully as the former promotes it.

In this state of dejection was the country when Greene entered South Carolina. Lord Rawdon, well apprized of the feelings of the people, adopted measures to give a finishing blow to further resistance. Beginning with the eastern quarter of the state, where

opposition was still sustained by Marion, Rawdon detached lieutenant colonel Watson, with five hundred infantry, towards Nelson's ferry, for the purpose of forcing Marion to submission, or to flight into North Carolina. Watson was sent from Cambden soon after Cornwallis had communicated to the commandant there the victory obtained at Guilford Court-house; and having established a post on the Santee, some miles above Nelson's ferry, which he fortified, and where he deposited the baggage of his corps, he continued his march towards Georgetown; vainly endeavoring to induce Marion, with his inferior force, to advance from his impenetrable recess, in order to defend the country; and was, as Marion believed, taking measures with a view of entering into the swamps and driving him across the Pedee,—an enterprise much desired by him, and to meet which he was fully prepared,—when the approach of the corps of Lee was announced.

Active operations now became practicable, and on the evening of the 15th, Marion and Lee took a position in the open country, with Watson to their left, considerably below them, and on the route for the fort called by his name, which he had erected.

Determined to carry this post without delay, Marion and Lee sat down before it early in the evening; not doubting, from the information received, that the garrison must soon be compelled to surrender, for want of water, with which it was supplied from an adjacent lake, and from which the garrison might be readily

and effectually secluded. In a very few hours the customary mode of supplying the post with water was completely stopped; and had the information received been correct, a surrender of the garrison could not have been long delayed. The ground selected by colonel Watson for his small stockade, was an Indian mount, generally conceived to be the cemetery of the tribe inhabiting the circumjacent region: it was at least thirty feet high, and surrounded by table land. Captain M'Koy, the commandant, saw at once his inevitable fate, unless he could devise some other mode of procuring water, for which purpose he immediately cut a trench from his fosse (secured by abbatis) to the river, which passed close to the Indian mount. Baffled in their expectation, and destitute both of artillery and intrenching tools, Marion and Lee despaired of success; when major Mayham, of South Carolina, accompanying the brigadier, suggested a plan, which was not sooner communicated than gratefully adopted. He proposed to cut down a number of suitable trees in the nearest wood, and with them to erect a large strong oblong pen, to be covered on the top with a floor of logs, and protected on the side opposite to the fort with a breastwork of light timber. To the adjacent farms dragoons were despatched for axes, the only necessary tool, of which a sufficient number being soon collected, relays of working parties were allotted for the labor; some to cut, some to convey, and some to erect. Major Mayham undertook the execution of his plan, which was completely finished

before the morning of the 23d, effective as to the object, and honorable to the genius of the inventor. The besieged was, like the besieger, unprovided with artillery, and could not interrupt the progress of a work, the completion of which must produce immediate submission.

A party of riflemen, being ready, took post in the Mayham tower the moment it was completed; and a detachment of musketry, under cover of the riflemen, moved to make a lodgment in the enemy's ditch, supported by the legion infantry with fixed bayonets. Such was the effect of the fire from the riflemen, having thorough command of every part of the fort, from the relative supereminence of the tower, that every attempt to resist the lodgment was crushed. The commandant, finding every resource cut off, hung out the white flag. It was followed by a proposal to surrender, which issued in a capitulation. This incipient operation having been happily effected by the novel and effectual device of major Mayham, to whom the commandants very gratefully expressed their acknowledgment, Marion and Lee, preceded by the legion cavalry under major Rudolph, who had been detached on the day subsequent to the investiture of the fort, turned their attention to lieutenant colonel Watson, now advancing from below to relieve his garrison. Knowing that the fall of Cambden was closely connected with the destruction of Watson, the American commandants viewed with delight his approach; and having disposed of the prisoners, moved to join the cavalry, now retiring in front of the enemy.

General Greene broke up from Ramsay's mills on the 7th of April, the day after he had detached Lee to join Marion; and determined to approach Cambden with a celerity which would preclude the British general from being apprized of his movement until the appearance of his army announced it. In this expectation, notwithstanding his pressing endeavors, he was disappointed. The country through which he necessarily marched was barren, its settlements few, the produce of the soil scanty, and the inhabitants disaffected.

Being obliged to depend upon himself for subsistence, always difficult to be procured from the inadequacy of the annual products, and rendered more so by the secretion of part of the little made, (from hostility to the American cause, or from the natural and powerful claim of securing sustenance at home) general Greene did not reach the neighborhood of Cambden until the nineteenth.

By the last return made before the American army decamped from Ramsay's mills, the regular force of every sort under Greene, may be put down at one thousand eight hundred effectives.

Deducting the corps under Lee, about three hundred horse and foot, the army, when arrived before Cambden, exclusive of a small body of North Carolina militia, cannot be estimated at more than one thousand five hundred. Here the American general confidently expected to be joined by brigadier Sumpter, in consequence of his instructions to that officer

previous to his movement from Deep river; with whose aid, and the co-operation of Marion and Lee below, Greene very justly concluded that the evacuation of Cambden was certain, and the destruction of Rawdon and his army probable. Brigadier Sumpter held off, much to the surprise, regret and dissatisfaction of the American general, and very much to the detriment of his plans and measures. Happily this disappointment was balanced by the accidental absence of a large portion of the garrison of Cambden, under lieutenant colonel Watson; who, as before mentioned, was low down in the eastern quarter of the state.

General Greene not having adequate force to invest Cambden, placed himself before it; not doubting that, by depriving the garrison of its usual supplies from the country, he should compel the British general to withdraw; when he flattered himself opportunities would occur for his striking him in detail, until reinforced by the junction of Marion, Lee, and Sumpter; after which he might fall upon his retreating enemy, with well grounded expectation of decisive success.

Severed as Watson was from Cambden, Rawdon's effective force was not more than nine hundred men; nor was there any possibility of adding to this force but by the safe return of lieutenant colonel Watson, to whom lord Rawdon despatched a courier as soon as he was informed of general Greene's approach, communicating that event, and requiring his immediate junction. Informed of the union of the corps under Marion and Lee, and of their advance upon Fort

Watson, with the situation of Watson, then returning towards Cambden on the north side of the Santee, Greene determined to change his position from the north to the east side of Cambden; by which movement he could readily bring to him Marion and Lee, if circumstances should demand it, and more effectually withhold the expected succor, should lieutenant colonel Watson force or elude the corps below.

This change of position could not be effected without passing Sandhill creek, with its deep and difficult swamps, impracticable with artillery and baggage, or making an extensive circuit, alike forbidden by the posture of affairs and the want of time. To surmount the obstacles opposed to his plan, the American general determined to relieve himself from every incumbrance, and by a rapid movement on the direct route through the swamps, to gain his desired position on the road leading from Cambden to Nelson's ferry. With this view he placed in charge of the quartermaster general, lieutenant colonel Carrington, his baggage and artillery; directing that officer to retire to the strong country north of Lynch's creek, putting himself with his small detachment safe from any practicable attempt to break him up. This being done, general Greene assumed his desired position on the east of Cambden; where his communication with Marion and Lee being direct, he soon was informed of their condition, and the situation of Watson.

With pleasure he heard that the operations against Fort Watson were advancing to a close, with the

prospect of certain success; and that not only the legion cavalry had been detached to attend the movements of lieutenant colonel Watson, but that a strong pass on the route of the British officer had been occupied with a detachment of infantry, to which place the whole corps would hasten, the moment the garrison of Fort Watson submitted; an event which was soon expected to happen. Finding that the approach of Watson could not speedily take place, if at all; and not doubting but that by this time brigadier Sumpter must be in the vicinity of Cambden; Greene relinquished his position lately taken, and returned to the north side of the town. The moment this resolution was adopted, the general despatched orders to lieutenant colonel Carrington, to rejoin him with celerity. Within a small distance of Cambden, on the Waxhaw's road, is Hobkick's hill, the position selected by general Greene after repassing Sandhill creek; not only from its being on the route prescribed for the rejunction of Carrington, and most convenient to the union with Sumpter, but because the ground gave advantages in case of battle; which, though not presumed upon, was nevertheless always to be kept in view. Regarding this consideration, the American army decamped in order of battle.

The regulars composed one line, with their centre on the road; the militia, amounting to two hundred and fifty, with the cavalry, formed the reserve, in a suitable distance in the rear. Strong piquets were posted in front, aided by the customary patrols

ranging in front and on the flanks. Thus prepared for whatever might happen, the American army lay waiting for the expected return of Carrington, and the much desired junction of Sumpter.

On the 24th, Greene was officially informed of the surrender of Fort Watson; and in the course of the day, the prisoners reached headquarters. Among them were a few American soldiers, who had been taken, as they represented, and who had enlisted with the enemy as affording the best chance in their judgment for escape to their friends. These men were cheerfully received into the regiments to which they belonged. One of them, a drummer in the Maryland line, availed himself of the confidence with which the whole had been treated, and in the course of the night deserted. Being intelligent, he communicated to lord Rawdon the position of Greene with accuracy; and informed his lordship, that as yet the detachment under lieutenant colonel Carrington, with the artillery, &c. had not joined, nor had Greene been reinforced by Sumpter, or any other corps.

Already straitened for provisions, and despairing of succor, this enterprising young soldier resolved to risk battle at once; confident that every day would probably strengthen his adversary, and consequently diminish his chance of victory, (without which not only the evacuation of Cambden must ensue, but with it might follow the destruction of his army) and hoping that he would find Greene destitute of artillery, conformably to the information just derived from the drummer.

Giving orders for his troops to make ready, and placing Cambden in charge of the convalescents, he advanced at nine in the morning of the 25th, with his total, (nine hundred only, of every description.) Avoiding the direct approach to his enemy, he took a circuitous course to his right, along the margin of the swamp which lines Pine-tree creek, and winds with its meanders.

The position of Greene was on a ridge covered with uninterrupted wood, the Waxhaw's road running directly through it; his army resting with its left upon the swamp of Pine-tree creek, where the ridge or eminence was easiest of ascent, and extending on the right to woods uncovered by water courses or any other obstructions. In this quarter the American position was easiest assailed, but the probability of an undiscovered approach was not so encouraging. Therefore did Rawdon prefer the route to our left; inasmuch as an unexpected assault upon our camp was a leading feature in his plan.

In the morning Carrington joined, with a comfortable supply of provisions, which had been rather scarce during the late hurried changes of position. These were issued, and of course engaged a portion of the troops; while the residue were employed along the rivulets in washing their clothes, an occupation which had been for some days past impracticable.

We being absorbed in these employments, the period was very propitious to the enemy's object. His advance was never discovered until his van fell

upon our piquets. The two in front, commanded by captain Benson of Maryland and captain Morgan of Virginia, received him handsomely; and, retiring in order, disputed bravely every inch of ground, supported by Kirkwood with the remains of the Delaware regiment. This rencontre gave the first announcement of the contest at hand. Disposed, as has been before observed, for battle by the order of encampment, the American army, notwithstanding its short notice, was quickly ranged for action,—an event, although unexpected, of all others the most desirable; because, in all probability, the readiest to the production of that issue so anxiously coveted by the American general.

During the contest with the piquets Greene formed his army. The Virginia brigade with general Huger at its head, having under him the lieutenant colonels Campbell and Hawes, took the right; the Maryland brigade, led by colonel Williams, seconded by colonel Gunby and the lieutenant colonels Ford and Howard, occupied the left. Thus all the continentals, consisting of four regiments, much reduced in strength, were disposed in one line, with the artillery, conducted by colonel Harrison, in the centre. The reserve consisted of the cavalry, under lieutenant colonel Washington, with a corps of North Carolina militia, about two hundred and fifty, commanded by colonel Reade.

The British general, pushing before him the piquets and Kirkwood, pressed forward to battle. The king's American regiment on the right, the New York vo-

lunteers in the centre, and the sixty-third on the left, formed the line of battle. His right wing was supported by Robertson's corps, and his left by the volunteers of Ireland. The reserve consisted of the South Carolina regiment, with a few dragoons, all the cavalry then at Cambden.

Greene, examining attentively the British disposition, discovered the very narrow front which it presented; and, gratified as he was with the opportunity, so unexpectedly offered, of completing, by one blow, his first object, he determined to avail himself of the advantage given by the mode of attack.

He directed the lieutenant colonels Campbell and Ford to turn the enemy's flanks; he ordered the centre regiments to advance with fixed bayonets upon him ascending the height; and detached lieutenant colonel Washington with his cavalry to gain his rear. Rawdon no sooner cast his eyes on our disposition than he perceived the danger to which his unequal front exposed him, and, bringing up the volunteers of Ireland into line, he remedied the defect seized by Greene in time to avert the expected consequence.

The battle opened from right to left with a vigor which promised a keen and sanguinary contest; but the superiority of our fire, augmented by that from our well served artillery, must have borne down all opposition, had the American line maintained itself with becoming firmness. On the right Huger evidently gained ground; Washington was carrying every thing before him in the rear; and lieutenant colonel

Hawes, with fixed bayonets, conformable to order, was descending the hill ready to fall upon the New York volunteers.

In this flattering moment the veteran regiment of Gunby, having first joined in the fire, in violation of orders, paused, its right falling back. Gunby unfortunately directed the disordered battalion to rally by retiring to its right company.* Retrograde being the consequence of this order, the British line, giving a shout, pressed forward with redoubled ardor; and the regiment of Gunby, considered as the bulwark of the army, never recovered from the panic with which it was unaccountably seized. The Virginia brigade,

* Although the army of Greene was not surprised, yet it was very suddenly assailed; no notice of the attack having been given until our piquets fired. The troops, in the hurry of forming, had not got settled before they advanced. Gunby was anxious to lead his regiment into battle thoroughly compacted; and, therefore, ordered lieutenant colonel Howard to call back captain Armstrong, who, with two sections, was moving upon the enemy. This Howard did, and Armstrong very reluctantly obeyed. The enemy was not yet in strength in this point; and it is probable had Gunby, instead of recalling Armstrong, made him the point of view in forming, that the fate of the day would have been favorable to our arms. This Greene always declared as his opinion, and Gunby as uniformly denied.—The latter officer was called before a court of inquiry, at his own request; whose statement of the facts, as before recited, was followed by the general's orders announcing the spirit and activity displayed by colonel Gunby unexceptionable; but his order for the regiment to fall back improper, and the probable cause of the loss of a complete victory.

and the Second regiment of Maryland, with the artillery, notwithstanding the shameful abandonment by the First Maryland, maintained the contest bravely. Williams with Gunby, assisted by lieutenant colonel Howard, who had so often and so gloriously borne down with this very regiment all opposition, vainly exerted themselves to bring it to order. Not the menaces of the one, not the expostulations of the other, not the exhortations of the third, nor the recollection of its pristine fame, could arouse its cowering spirit.

The Second Maryland, which had from the commencement of the action acted with gallantry, feeling severely the effect produced by the recession of the First, became somewhat deranged; and lieutenant colonel Ford being unluckily wounded, while endeavoring to repress the beginning disorder, this corps also fell back. Rawdon's right now gained the summit of the eminence, flanking Hawes' regiment, which had undeviatingly held its prescribed course, although early in the action abandoned on its left by the First Maryland, and now but feebly sustained on its right by the First Virginia,—for this corps had now begun to recede, notwithstanding its preceding success. Greene recalled Hawes, our only unbroken regiment; and, finding every effort to reinstate the battle illusory, conscious that his reserve was not calculated to face the veteran foe, wisely determined to diminish the ills of the sad and unaccountable reverse, by retiring from the field. Orders were given to this effect, and

lieutenant colonel Hawes was commanded to cover the broken line.

The retreat was performed without loss, although the enemy continued to pursue for a few miles. Washington with his cavalry retiring from the rear the moment he discovered that our infantry had been forced, came in time to contribute greatly to the safety of the army, having necessarily relinquished most of the fruits of his success. Checking the enemy's efforts to disturb our rear,* he at length, by a rapid charge, effectually discomfited the British van, and put a stop to further pursuit. General Greene having passed Saunders' creek, about four miles from the field of battle, encamped for the night, and on the next day proceeded to Rudgely's mill.

The loss sustained by the respective armies was nearly equal. On the side of America two hundred and sixty-eight were killed, wounded, and missing: on the side of the enemy two hundred and fifty-eight, including the prisoners brought off by lieutenant colonel Washington, and those paroled by him on the ground. The British lost no officer of distinction,

* After Greene halted at Saunders' creek, Washington returned with his cavalry to examine the situation of the enemy. His advanced patrol was pursued by major Coffin with his cavalry. Washington, hearing their approach, placed himself in ambush, covered by some thick bushes, near the road, and pressed upon his adversary. Coffin attempted to bring his men to face us; but they put spur to their horses to regain their camp. Some were killed, some taken, and the rest dispersing reached lord Rawdon. Coffin himself escaped.

which was not the case with us. The wound of lieutenant colonel Ford proved mortal, and captain Beatty, of the First Maryland, was killed, than whom the army did not possess an officer of more promise.

No military event had occurred in the course of the war, whose issue was so inexplicable as that of the late engagement. The daring attempt of the enemy was readily accounted for, and exhibits in the most convincing manner the wisdom of the movement into South Carolina. Without risk or loss, the American general, although disappointed in the aid of brigadier Sumpter, had in six days placed his adversary in a situation so dangerous as to compel him to resort to the measure of all others the most desired by his enemy. Greatly inferior in infantry, more so in cavalry, and destitute of artillery, the British general, aware of the inevitable consequence of holding himself shut up in Camden, took the bold resolution of attacking his antagonist, notwithstanding his many advantages, considerably augmented by the convenience of a position selected with the view and from the hope that the critical condition of Rawdon would force him to hazard assault. Lord Rawdon certainly chose the most propitious moment for his gallant attempt, and as certainly conducted it in the most martial manner. Yet he would have been inevitably destroyed had the troops of Greene executed his orders with common resolution. The satisfaction enjoyed by the American general, on discerning the enemy advancing upon him, was not confined to

himself, but prevailed throughout the army, and afforded no inconsiderable pledge that, upon this occasion, every man would do his duty. So decisive was the confidence which actuated the general, that he held all his continental infantry in one body, never doubting their sufficiency to insure success; and, with the same impression, on his first view of his enemy, he gave orders for striking him in front, in rear, and on both flanks: thus conveying to his troops his conviction that victory was certain, as well as his determination that it should be complete.

Sad and immediate was Greene's disappointment. The first regiment of Maryland, as has been mentioned, deservedly held up to the army as its model, and which upon all preceding occasions behaved well,* now shrunk from the conflict, abandoning their general, their country, and their comrades: this too in defiance of the efforts and example of Williams, Gunby, and Howard, all dear to the troops, and when the British line, so far from having gained any advantage, was beginning to stagger under the combined operation fast bearing upon it. It is true that captain Beatty, commanding the company on the right, fell at this moment; and it is also true that colonel Gunby,

* It was this regiment which forced the guards at the battle of Guilford Court-house, killing their commandant, and driving them back, seeking shelter under cover of the British artillery; and a portion of the same regiment constituted a part of the infantry which, under Howard, gave to us the victory at the Cowpens, by the free use of the bayonet.

with a view of bringing the regiment to range with its colors, ordered it to fall back to the right company; but Morgan had given the same order, at the Cowpens, to the corps of Howard, which was not only executed with promptitude, but was followed by its decisive advance, and consequent signal success.

Relinquishing an investigation which does not promise a satisfactory solution, I cannot but observe that the battle of Hobkicks adds to the many evidences with which military history abounds of the deranging effects of unlimited confidence. It is the only instance in Greene's command, where this general implicitly yielded to its delusive counsel, and he suffered deeply in consequence of it; for had he for a moment doubted the certainty of success, the cavalry would not have been detached in the rear until the issue of the battle had begun to unfold.

Nor is it risking too much to suggest the probability that, had the horse been still in reserve, not only would the forward movement of the enemy, which followed the recession of the first regiment of Maryland, been delayed, but that regiment would have been restored to order, and the battle renewed with every reason still to conclude that its event would have been auspicious to America. The maxim in war, that your enemy is ever to be dreaded until at your feet, ought to be held inviolate; nor should a commander permit the gratifying seductions of brilliant prospects to turn him from the course which this maxim enjoins.

Honorable as was this victory to the British general and to the British arms, it yielded not one solitary benefit. The loss sustained being proportionate, the relative strength of the combatants was unchanged; and lord Rawdon experiencing his inadequacy to improve success after gaining it, reluctantly relinquished his offensive plan of operations, and returned to Cambden, in the expectation of lieutenant colonel Watson's arrival before the American general would feel himself in strength and spirits to renew his investment.

General Greene, heretofore soured by the failure in his expected succor from Sumpter, now deeply chagrined by the inglorious behaviour of his favorite regiment—converting his splendid prospects into a renewal of toil and difficulty, of doubt and disgrace—became for a while discontented with his advance to the south. He sent orders to lieutenant colonel Lee, requiring him to join the army forthwith; and indicated by other measures a disposition to depart from his adopted system.

As soon as the capitulation for the surrender of fort Watson was signed, Lee followed by his infantry hastened to the cavalry, still in the front of Watson; and on the subsequent morning was joined by brigadier Marion, who had been necessarily delayed until the prisoners and stores were disposed of. The British lieutenant colonel, seeing that the passes on his route were occupied, and knowing that the advantages possessed by his enemy would be strenuously maintained, relinquished his project of gaining Cambden on the

direct route, and determined, by passing the Santee, to interpose it between himself and the corps opposed to him; presuming that he might with facility make his way good to Cambden, by recrossing the Santee above; or, by taking the route by fort Motte, pass first the Congaree, and then the Wateree, which unite some small distance below the post at Motte's.

Drawing off in the night, he placed himself at a considerable distance from his enemy before his change of plan was discovered. Nevertheless he would have been pursued, with the expectation of falling upon him before he could make good his passage of the river, had not the general's orders directing the junction of the corps under Lee arrived, which necessarily arrested the proposed attempt upon Watson. With all possible despatch lieutenant colonel Lee set out for the army; and, in the course of the day and a small part of the night, marched thirty-two miles.

Sorely as Greene felt the severe disappointment lately experienced, he did not long permit his accustomed equanimity to be disturbed; nor could his strong mind long entertain suggestions growing out of adverse fortune. Persuaded that his movement upon South Carolina was, under all the circumstances of his situation, the most promising of good to his country, he determined to adhere to his plan of operations with firmness, and to obliterate his late repulse by subsequent success. Fixed in this resolution, he despatched an officer to meet Lee, countermanding his orders, followed by captain Finley of the artillery,

with a six pounder, detached by general Greene to Marion and Lee, in consequence of representations from those officers soliciting this aid.

As soon as Finley joined, Lee returned to Marion, who had approached the vicinity of the confluence of the Congaree and Wateree, waiting for Watson's advance. The despatch from general Greene contained directions to proceed in the execution of his original orders, taking care by every practicable exertion to repel Watson's attempt to throw himself into Cambden; and communicated the general's decision to pass the Wateree with the army, for the purpose of intercepting lieutenant colonel Watson, should he select that route to Cambden. In conformity with this decision, Greene broke up from Rudgely's mill, and, passing the Wateree above Cambden, sat down in a strong position near to Cambden; which deprived the British garrison of its usual supplies in this quarter as effectually as it debarred Watson's approach to Cambden on the southern route.

Rawdon now demonstrated by his conduct that his late victory, though brilliant, produced no support or benefit to him; as he was compelled to a painful inactivity in the face of his enemy, who but a few days before had retired from before him. The accession of the corps under Watson only could save him; and this accession he saw completely prevented, on the most eligible route, by his adversary,—he saw it without being able to take a single step in counteraction or in furtherance of the desired aid.

Marion and Lee lost not a moment after their union in taking measures to execute the command of their general, well apprized of the vast importance attached to the interception of Watson. The militia general, being perfectly acquainted with the country, guided the measures adopted. He well knew that, although general Greene's position would stop the lieutenant colonel on the usual route from Motte's post to Cambden, it would not stop him from passing the Wateree at or below the high hills of Santee; and that lieutenant colonel Watson, to avoid the corps destined to strike him, would probably, notwithstanding the judicious position taken by Greene, pass the Congaree at Motte's, and afterwards pass the Wateree below the high hills. If Watson should not deem it eligible to pass the Congaree, but one way was left for him, and that was to recross the Santee at the confluence of the two rivers just mentioned. Whether to sit down on the north side of the Santee, prepared to fall upon the British lieutenant colonel in the act of passing the river, or to cross it and strike at him on the southern banks, was the alternative presented to the American commandants. Well informed of every step taken by Watson after he reached the southern side of the Santee, no doubt remained but that he would pass either the Congaree or the Santee on the ensuing morning. It was now decided to cross to his side of the river, from a conviction that we should reach him on its southern banks, which ever course of the two before him he might select. The indefatigable Marion, seconded by his

zealous associates, foreseeing the probable necessity of a quick passage over the Santee, had provided the means of transportation, which was effected in the course of the night, and, with the dawn of day, the troops moved with celerity up the Santee. It was now ascertained that lieutenant colonel Watson had taken the route leading over that river where its two branches unite—the very spot which had so forcibly attracted the attention of Marion and Lee, and would have been selected by them, had it not been apprehended that the British lieutenant colonel might have preferred the route across the Congaree.

Had these two officers confined their attention entirely to the north side of the river, the much desired interception would have been effected: for with horse, foot, and artillery, it was not to be expected that a corps of infantry only could have made good its landing in the face of an equal foe, and secured its arrival into Cambden.

Mortified with the result of their unceasing exertions, the deranging information was immediately forwarded to general Greene, and the disappointed commandants moved upon fort Motte.

Persuaded that lord Rawdon would resume offensive operations the moment Watson joined him, Greene withdrew from the vicinity of Cambden, and took a more distant position in the high grounds behind Sawney's creek. On the 7th of May the long expected succor reached Cambden; and on the next day the British general put his army in motion, passed the

Wateree at the ferry below Cambden, and advanced to attack Greene. On his way he was informed of the American general's decampment, and proceeded towards Sawney's creek, still determined to execute his object.

The two armies were nearly equal, about twelve hundred each. The advantage in number and quality of infantry was on the side of Rawdon, while Greene continued to hold his superiority in cavalry. Convinced that the British general would press battle, and anxious to restore the humbled spirit of his troops, general Greene broke up from his position, and retired to Colonel's creek, leaving Washington with his cavalry and some infantry on the ground to cover his retreat. Rawdon, examining critically his adversary's situation, and perceiving his well prepared condition, did not deem it advisable to carry into effect his projected enterprize, but withdrew about the time that Greene commenced retreat, and returned to Cambden. Thus it happened that both armies retired at the same moment from each other. Convinced that he could not force the American general from his neighborhood, and persuaded that the breaking up of the intermediate posts between him and Charleston would not only endanger his army, but must complete that spirit of revolt which had begun to manifest itself on the entrance of the American army into the state, his lordship wisely decided to give up Cambden, and, with it, all the country north of the Congaree. Preparing for retreat, he sent orders to lieutenant colonel

Cruger to abandon Ninety-Six and to join Brown at Augusta, and directed major Maxwell, commanding at fort Granby, to fall back upon Orangeburgh.

This arrangement was indubitably the best practicable; and, duly maintained, would have preserved all the country south of the Congaree and west of the Santee. But so completely had the American general taken his measures to prevent all communication with lord Rawdon, that none of his despatches reached their destination.

On the 10th the evacuation of Cambden took place, and the British general proceeded to Nelson's ferry with the expectation of crossing the Santee in time to dislodge Marion and Lee, still prosecuting the siege of fort Motte. Previous to his lordship's departure he burnt the jail, the mills, and some private houses, and destroyed all the stores which he could not take with him. He carried off four or five hundred negroes, and all the most obnoxious loyalists accompanied him.

As soon as Greene was informed of the retreat of the enemy, persuaded that Rawdon's first effort would be directed to relieve fort Motte, he advanced towards the Congaree, determined to pass that river, if necessary, and to cover the operations of the besieging corps.

This post was the principal depot of the convoys from Charleston to Cambden, and sometimes of those destined for fort Granby and Ninety-Six. A large new mansion house, belonging to Mrs. Motte, situa-

ted on a high and commanding hill, had been selected for this establishment. It was surrounded with a deep trench, along the interior margin of which was raised a strong and lofty parapet. To this post had been regularly assigned an adequate garrison of about one hundred and fifty men, which was now accidentally increased by a small detachment of dragoons,—which had arrived from Charleston, a few hours before the appearance of the American troops, on its way to Camden with despatches for lord Rawdon. Captain M'Pherson commanded, an officer highly and deservedly respected.

Opposite to fort Motte, to the north, stood another hill, where Mrs. Motte, having been dismissed from her mansion, resided, in the old farmhouse. On this height lieutenant colonel Lee with his corps took post, while brigadier Marion occupied the eastern declivity of the ridge on which the fort stood.

Very soon the fort was completely invested; and the six pounder was mounted on a battery erected in Marion's quarter for the purpose of raking the northern face of the enemy's parapet, against which Lee was preparing to advance. M'Pherson was unprovided with artillery, and depended for safety upon timely relief, not doubting its arrival before the assailant could push his preparations to maturity.

The vale which runs between the two hills admitted our safe approach within four hundred yards of the fort. This place was selected by Lee to break ground. Relays of working parties being provided for every

four hours, and some of the negroes from the neighboring plantations being brought, by the influence of Marion, to our assistance, the works advanced with rapidity. Such was their forwardness on the 10th, that it was determined to summon the commandant.

A flag was accordingly despatched to captain M'Pherson, stating to him with truth our relative situation, expressing with decision the fate which awaited him, and admonishing him to avoid the disagreeable consequences of an arrogant temerity. To this the captain replied, that, disregarding consequences, he should continue to resist to the last moment in his power. The retreat of Rawdon was known in the evening to the besiegers; and in the course of the night a courier arrived from general Greene confirming that event, urging redoubled activity, and communicating his determination to hasten to their support. Urged by these strong considerations, Marion and Lee persevered throughout the night in pressing the completion of their works. On the next day, Rawdon reached the country opposite to fort Motte; and in the succeeding night encamping on the highest ground in his route, the illumination of his fires gave the joyful annunciation of his approach to the despairing garrison. But the hour was close at hand, when this fallacious joy was to be converted into sadness.

The large mansion in the centre of the encircling trench, left but a few yards of the ground within the enemy's works uncovered: burning the house must force their surrender.

Persuaded that our ditch would be within arrow shot before noon of the next day, Marion and Lee determined to adopt this speedy mode of effecting their object. Orders were instantly issued to prepare bows and arrows, with missive combustible matter. This measure was reluctantly adopted; for the destruction of private property was repugnant to the principles which swayed the two commandants, and upon this occasion was peculiarly distressing. The devoted house was a large pleasant edifice, intended for the summer residence of the respectable owner, whose deceased husband had been a firm friend to his oppressed country, and whose only marriageable daughter was the wife of major Pinckney, an officer in the South Carolina line, who had fought and bled in his country's cause, and was now a prisoner with the enemy. These considerations powerfully forbade the execution of the proposed measure; but there were others of much cogency, which applied personally to lieutenant colonel Lee, and gave a new edge to the bitterness of the scene.

Encamping contiguous to Mrs. Motte's dwelling, this officer had, upon his arrival, been requested in the most pressing terms to make her house his quarters. The invitation was accordingly accepted; and not only the lieutenant colonel, but every officer of his corps, off duty, daily experienced her liberal hospitality, politely proffered and as politely administered. Nor was the attention of this amiable lady confined to that class of war which never fail to attract attention. While her

richly spread table presented with taste and fashion all the luxuries of her opulent country, and her sideboard offered without reserve the best wines of Europe,—antiquated relics of happier days,—her active benevolence found its way to the sick and to the wounded; cherishing with softest kindness infirmity and misfortune, converting despair into hope, and nursing debility into strength. Nevertheless the imperative obligations of duty must be obeyed; the house must burn; and a respectful communication to the lady of her destined loss must be made. Taking the first opportunity which offered, the next morning, lieutenant colonel Lee imparted to Mrs. Motte the intended measure; lamenting the sad necessity, and assuring her of the deep regret which the unavoidable act excited in his and every breast.

With the smile of complacency this exemplary lady listened to the embarrassed officer, and gave instant relief to his agitated feelings, by declaring, that she was gratified with the opportunity of contributing to the good of her country, and that she should view the approaching scene with delight. Shortly after, seeing accidentally the bow and arrows which had been prepared, she sent for the lieutenant colonel, and presenting him with a bow and its apparatus imported from India, she requested his substitution of these, as probably better adapted for the object than those we had provided.

Receiving with silent delight this opportune present, the lieutenant colonel rejoined his troops, now making

ready for the concluding scene. The lines were manned, and an additional force stationed at the battery, least the enemy, perceiving his fate, might determine to risk a desperate assault, as offering the only chance of relief. As soon as the troops reached their several points, a flag was again sent to M'Pherson, for the purpose of inducing him to prevent the conflagration and the slaughter which might ensue, by a second representation of his actual condition.

Doctor Irwin, of the legion cavalry, was charged with the flag, and instructed to communicate faithfully the inevitable destruction impending, and the impracticability of relief, as lord Rawdon had not yet passed the Santee; with an assurance that longer perseverance in vain resistance, would place the garrison at the mercy of the conqueror; who was not regardless of the policy of preventing the waste of time, by inflicting exemplary punishment, where resistance was maintained only to produce such waste. The British captain received the flag with his usual politeness, and heard patiently Irwin's explanations; but he remained immovable; repeating his determination of holding out to the last.

It was now about noon, and the rays of the scorching sun had prepared the shingle roof for the projected conflagration. The return of Irwin was immediately followed by the application of the bow and arrows. The first arrow struck, and communicated its fire; a second was shot at another quarter of the roof, and a third at a third quarter; this last also took effect, and;

like the first, soon kindled a blaze. M'Pherson ordered a party to repair to the loft of the house, and by knocking off the shingles to stop the flames. This was soon perceived, and captain Finley was directed to open his battery, raking the loft from end to end.

The fire of our six pounder, posted close to one of the gable ends of the house, soon drove the soldiers down; and no other effort to stop the flames being practicable, M'Pherson hung out the white flag. Mercy was extended, although policy commanded death, and the obstinacy of M'Pherson warranted it. The commandant, with the regulars, of which the garrison was chiefly composed, were taken possession of by Lee; while the loyalists were delivered to Marion. Among the latter was a Mr. Smith, who had been charged with burning the houses of his neighbors friendly to their country. This man consequently became very obnoxious, and his punishment was loudly demanded by many of the militia serving under the brigadier; but the humanity of Marion could not be overcome. Smith was secured from his surrounding enemies, ready to devote him, and taken under the general's protection.

M'Pherson was charged with having subjected himself to punishment, by his idle waste of his antagonists' time; and reminded as well of the opportunities which had been presented to him of saving himself and garrison from unconditional submission, as of the cogent considerations, growing out of the posture of affairs, which urged the prevention of future useless

resistance by present exemplary punishment. The British officer frankly acknowledged his dependent situation, and declared his readiness to meet any consequence which the discharge of duty, conformably to his own conviction of right, might produce. Powerfully as the present occasion called for punishment, and rightfully as it might have been inflicted, not a drop of blood was shed, nor any part of the enemy's baggage taken. M'Pherson and his officers accompanied their captors to Mrs. Motte's, and partook with them in a sumptuous dinner;* soothing in the sweets of social intercourse the ire which the preceding conflict had engendered. Requesting to be permitted to return to Charleston, on parole, they were accordingly paroled and sent off in the evening to lord Rawdon, now engaged in passing the Santee at Nelson's ferry. Soon after, general Greene, anxious for the success of his detachment against fort Motte, attended by an escort of cavalry, reached us, for the purpose of knowing precisely our situation, and the progress of the British general, who he expected would hasten to the relief of M'Pherson, as soon as he should gain the

* The deportment and demeanor of Mrs. Motte gave a zest to the pleasures of the table. She did its honors with that unaffected politeness, which ever excites esteem mingled with admiration. Conversing with ease, vivacity and good sense, she obliterated our recollection of the injury she had received; and though warmly attached to the defenders of her country, the engaging amiability of her manners, left it doubtful which set of officers constituted these defenders.

southern banks of the Santee; to counteract which the American general had resolved, and was then engaged in preparing boats, to transport his army over the Congaree. Finding the siege prosperously concluded, he returned to camp; having directed Marion, after placing the prisoners in security, to proceed against Georgetown, and ordering Lee to advance without delay upon fort Granby, to which place the American army would now move. As soon as the troops had finished their repast, Lee sat out with his detachment, composed of horse, foot, and artillery; and marching without intermission, he approached the neighborhood of fort Granby before the dawn of the second day. Brigadier Sumpter, having recovered of his wound, as soon as he received Greene's despatch from Ramsay's mill, assembled his corps of militia. For reasons not understood by the author, the brigadier, instead of joining Greene before Cambden, directed his attention to the fort of Ninety-Six and its upper communications with Charleston, fort Granby and Orangeburgh. He had moved from before fort Granby, but a few days before Lee's arrival, for the purpose of forcing the small post at Orangeburgh, which he accomplished on the 14th.

Fort Granby was erected on a plain, which extended to the southern banks of the Congaree, near Friday's ferry. Protected on one side by that river, it was accessible in every other quarter with facility; but being completely finished, with parapet encircled by fosse and abbatis, and being well garrisoned, it could not have been carried without considerable loss, except by

regular approaches; and in this way would have employed the whole force of Greene for a week at least, in which period lord Rawdon's interposition was practicable. Lieutenant colonel Lee, apprized of the readiness with which the British general might attempt its relief, determined to press to conclusion his operations with all possible celerity, having detached, before he left Motte's, captain Armstrong, with one troop of cavalry, to attend to the movements of lord Rawdon.

As soon, therefore, as he reached the neighborhood of the fort, relying upon the information of his guides, he began to erect a battery in the margin of the woods to the west of the fort. The morning was uncommonly foggy, which fortunate circumstance gave time to finish the battery before it was perceived by the enemy. Captain Finley, with his six pounder mounted in the battery, was directed as soon as the fog should disperse to open upon the fort; when the infantry, ready for action, would advance to gain the ground selected for the commencement of our approaches. The garrison consisted of three hundred and fifty men, chiefly loyal militia, commanded by major Maxwell, of the Prince of Wales' regiment, (a refugee from the Eastern Shore of Maryland) represented to Lee as neither experienced in his lately adopted profession, nor fitted by cast of character to meet the impending crisis. He was the exact counterpart of M'Pherson; disposed to avoid, rather than to court, the daring scenes of war. Zealous to fill his purse, rather than to gather military laurels, he had, during his command, pursued his favorite

object with considerable success, and held with him in the fort his gathered spoil. Solicitous to hasten the surrender of the post, lieutenant colonel Lee determined to try the effect of negotiation with his pliable antagonist; and prepared a summons, couched in pompous terms, calculated to operate upon such an officer as Maxwell was represented to be. The summons was entrusted to captain Eggleston, of the legion horse, who was authorized to conclude finally upon the terms of capitulation, if he found the enemy disposed to surrender.

The fog ceasing, Finley announced our unexpected proximity; which excited much alarm and some confusion, evidently discerned from our position. The legion infantry advancing at the same time, took possession of the desired ground without opposition; severing the enemy's piquets in this quarter from the fort. Eggleston now setting out with his flag, produced a suspension of our fire, which induced the piquets and patrols, cut off by our disposition, to attempt to gain the fort. This effort was partially checked by the rapid movement of the cavalry; and an officer was despatched to captain Eggleston, requiring him to remonstrate to major Maxwell upon the impropriety of the conduct of his piquets and patrols, with a demand that he would order them to resume their station; it being never intended, by presenting him with an opportunity of avoiding the useless effusion of blood, to permit the improvement of his capacity to resist. Eggleston's remonstrance was duly respected; and

Maxwell despatched his adjutant with the required orders, replacing the portion of his force on duty out of the fort in its original station. The negotiation was begun, and the British major testified a favorable disposition to the proposition submitted to him. After consulting with some of his officers, he agreed to deliver up the fort, upon condition that the private property of every sort, without investigation of title, should be confirmed to its possessors; that the garrison should be permitted to return to Charleston prisoners of war, until exchanged; that the militia should be held in the same manner as the regulars; and that an escort, charged with the protection of persons and of property, should attend the prisoners to the British army.

The first condition being diametrically repugnant to the course contemplated by Lee, as it prevented restoration of plundered property, captain Eggleston did not think proper to act under the full discretion with which he had been so properly invested, but submitted by letter the enemy's demands to the lieutenant colonel; accompanied with one from major Maxwell, requiring two covered wagons for the conveyance of his own baggage, free from search. In reply, Eggleston received directions to accede to the proposed terms, with the single exception of all horses fit for public service, and to expedite the conclusion of the business. This exception was illy relished by many of the officers, although not resisted by the commandant. Finding that the capitulation would be thus arranged, the

Hessian officers came in a body to Eggleston, protesting against proceeding, unless they were permitted to retain their horses; a protest not to be overruled by the authority of Maxwell. The capitulation was suspended, and a second time Eggleston found it necessary to refer to Lee. About this moment a dragoon arrived from captain Armstrong, commanding the detachment of horse near lord Rawdon, communicating his lordship's passage across the Santee, and his advance towards fort Motte. Had lieutenant colonel Lee determined to resist the requisition of the Hessian officers, this intelligence would have induced a change in his decision. He directed captain Eggleston to make known to the officers, that he took pleasure in gratifying them, by considering all horses belonging to individuals in the fort as private property, and claiming only such, if any, belonging to the public.

This obstacle being removed, the capitulation was signed; and the principal bastion was immediately occupied by captain Rudolph, with a detachment from the legion infantry. Before noon, Maxwell, with his garrison, consisting of three hundred and forty men, (sixty regulars, the rest loyalists,) its baggage of every sort, two pieces of artillery, and two covered wagons, moved from the fort; and the major, with his garrison, protected by the stipulated escort, proceeded on their route to lord Rawdon. The public stores of every sort, consisting chiefly of ammunition, salt, and liquor, were faithfully delivered, and presented a very convenient as well as agreeable supply to our army. The

moment Maxwell surrendered, Lee despatched an officer with the information to general Greene, who had pressed on with much expedition, and was within a few miles of Friday's ferry when he received Lee's despatch. The army continued its march to Ancran's plantation, near the ferry; and the general, crossing the river, joined his light corps. Delighted with the happy termination which had just taken place, his satisfaction was considerably increased when he saw the strength of the fort, connected with that of the garrison. He testified with much cordiality, and in most gratifying terms, his obligations to the light corps; applauding as well the rapidity of its advance as the vigor of its operations.

Lord Rawdon made but one day's march towards fort Motte; yielding up with much reluctance his anxious desire to defend his line of posts, already broken through in its weakest points, and about to be assailed throughout. Retiring to Monk's Corner, he there encamped; impatiently waiting for an accession of force to enable him to resume offensive operations.

Fort Watson, fort Motte, fort Granby, and that at Orangeburgh, had successively yielded: Marion was now before Georgetown, which was sure soon to fall. Thus in less than one month since general Greene appeared before Cambden, he had compelled the British general to evacuate that important post, forced the submission of all the intermediate posts, and was now upon the banks of the Congaree, in the heart of South Carolina, ready to advance upon Ninety-Six, (the only

remaining fortress in the state, besides Charleston, in the enemy's possession,) and to detach against Augusta, in Georgia; comprehending in this decisive effort, the completion of the deliverance of the two lost states, except the fortified towns of Charleston and Savannah,—safe, because the enemy ruled at sea.

The American general, reposing his army for the day, and strengthening the light corps with a battalion of North Carolina levies under major Eaton, directed lieutenant colonel Lee to move upon Augusta; to which post brigadier Pickens, with his corps of militia, had been commanded to repair. Lee commenced his march in the course of a few hours, marching thirteen miles in the evening of the day on which Maxwell had surrendered. Resuming motion at a very early hour in the morning, he pressed forward with the utmost expedition; relieving the fatigued infantry by occasionally dismounting his dragoons and mounting his infantry. Not only the claim for celerity, arising out of the general state of affairs, enforced this exertion; but there was cause to apprehend that lieutenant colonel Cruger, apprised, as was presumed, of lord Rawdon's abandonment, first of Cambden and lastly of the field, would, in consequence of these untoward events, hasten to Augusta; giving up South Carolina to save Georgia. To reach Pickens before Cruger could join Brown, became, in this view of events, of the first importance. Pickens and Lee united could readily strike Cruger on his march, with the prospect of bringing him to submission. This

done, the destruction of Brown only remained to be effected for the complete re-annexation (except the sea coast) of these states to the Union.

Approaching in the course of his march the point nearest Ninety-Six, lieutenant colonel Lee detached a squadron of horse, under major Rudolph, towards that post, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the enemy exhibited the appearance of breaking up, and with the hope by this sudden dash of seizing some of the garrison;—a very acceptable present to the American general, then on his march for that place, and in want of that accurate information to be derived only from residents in the place. Rudolph concealing his approach, appeared suddenly near the town; but was not so fortunate as to find a single individual of the garrison without the lines. He seized one or two countrymen returning home, who accompanied him to camp. From these we learnt that lieutenant colonel Cruger was uninformed of the events that had lately taken place; but hearing of Greene's advance upon Cambden, he had been industriously engaged in strengthening his fortifications, and was determined not to abandon his post. Lee despatched a friendly countryman to general Greene with the intelligence procured, which banished all those apprehensions heretofore entertained lest Cruger might unite himself to Brown. Persevering in his march, lieutenant colonel Lee reached on the third day the vicinity of Augusta, which is seventy five miles from fort Granby, preceded by captain O'Neale, with a light party of horse,

charged with the collection of provisions and with the acquirement of intelligence. From this active and discerning officer the pleasing information was received of the recent arrival of the annual royal present to the Indians, which was deposited at fort Galphin, about twelve miles below Augusta, on the north side of the river, consisting of articles extremely wanted in the American camp.* To relieve the wants of the army was in itself grateful, but this intelligence was important in a military view; because it showed that colonel Brown's force in Augusta was reduced by detachments from it to secure his deposit at fort Galphin. Two companies of infantry now made the garrison of this latter post, which was a small stockade. Persuaded that his approach was alike unknown to Brown and to the officer commanding here, from the precautions which, by means of his superior cavalry, he had been enabled to adopt, Lee determined by a forced march, with a detachment of infantry mounted behind his dragoons, to seize the Indian present. Leaving Eaton behind with his battalion, the artillery, and the tired of the corps, to follow, he accordingly pushed on to fort Galphin.

On the ensuing morning (21st of May), sultry beyond measure, the fatigued detachment gained the desired point; and, halting in the pine barrens which skirted the field surrounding the fort, waited for the

*Powder, ball, small arms, liquor, salt, blankets, with sundry small articles, were gained, one of the many useful and valuable acquisitions occasionally procured by the legion; for which, of the promised remuneration, not a cent has been ever paid to officer or soldier.

moment of assault. For many miles not a drop of water had been procurable; and the extreme heat of the scorching sun, rendered more oppressive by the necessary halt under the pines, without any liquid whatsoever to revive sinking nature, produced a debility forbidding exertion. Having with him some mounted militia, Lee directed them to dismount and to advance upon the fort in the opposite direction—not doubting that the garrison, as was the custom, would eagerly pursue them, when an opportunity would be presented of obtaining the contemplated prize without loss. The major part of the garrison, as had been expected, ran to arms on sight of the militia, and, leaving the fort, pursued them. A selection having been made of all the infantry whose strength was fitted for action, a portion of them under captain Rudolph was ordered to rush upon the fort, while the residue, supported by a troop of dragoons, took a direction which shielded the militia from the menaced blow. Rudolph had no difficulty in possessing himself of the fort, little opposition having been attempted, and that opposition having been instantly crushed. We lost one man from the heat of the weather; the enemy only three or four in battle. The garrison, with the valuable deposit in its safe keeping, gave a rich reward for our toils and sufferings. Never was a beginning more auspicious. This success not only deprived Brown of a very important portion of his force, but yielded to his enemy an abundance of supplies much wanted by the army of Greene,—among which

were the essentials of war, powder and ball—which articles had become scarce in the American camp, notwithstanding the occasional contributions of the several posts wrested from the enemy.

Lieutenant colonel Lee, reposing his infantry for a few hours, detached major Eggleston, at the head of his horse, to pass the Savannah below Augusta; and, taking a western direction, to join a corps of militia, known to be in the neighborhood, under colonel Clarke, in case brigadier Pickens should not yet have arrived. Eggleston was also ordered to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the enemy's situation for the information of his commandant, who wished to begin his operations the moment of his return; and was further enjoined to send in a flag with a summons from himself, stating the near approach of part of Greene's army, with the investiture of Ninety-Six by the main body under the general himself; and urging the propriety of sparing the useless waste of life—the certain consequence of resistance,—cruel, because vain. The substitution of a second officer for his superior in summoning the fort arose from the course taken by Brown. He had refused to receive flags, forbidding all intercourse with the militia officers; and Lee, having profited by negotiation at fort Granby, was desirous of removing the obstacles which prevented resort to the like course here. To effect this, he thought it advisable to authorize Eggleston, then the senior continental officer on the south of Savannah, to attempt negotiation. Brown, either discrediting the informa-

tion contained in the summons, or immutable in the decision he had taken, would not answer the letter addressed to him, and forbad the renewal of such communication.

In the evening lieutenant colonel Lee, with the artillery and infantry, joined Eggleston, then united to the militia under Pickens and Clarke, and encamped in the woods to the west of Augusta. This town is situated on the southern banks of the Savannah, in an oblong plain, washed by the river on the east and covered by deep woods in the opposite direction. In its centre stood fort Cornwallis, judiciously constructed, well finished, and secure from storm. A half mile in its front up the river the plain is interrupted by a lagoon or swamp with a rivulet passing through it; and on the northwestern border of this lagoon was erected another fort, very inferior, called Grierson, from the militia colonel who commanded its garrison. Brown conducted the British force in upper Georgia, and resided in fort Cornwallis. Lieutenant colonel Lee, hearing from Eggleston the affrontive rejection to his proffered negotiation, was considerably ruffled at the contemptuous treatment received, and determined never to enter into any communication with the British commandant until solicited by himself. Thus decided, he was gratified in discovering the divided condition of the enemy—its regulars in fort Cornwallis and its militia in fort Grierson; not doubting, if the moment was duly improved, that a tender of negotiation, on the part of Brown, would follow.

While the troops, still concealed, were engaged in taking refreshments, lieutenant colonel Lee employed himself in examining the ground. He did not hesitate in his decision, which was instantly to drive Grierson out of his fort, and to destroy or intercept him in his retreat to fort Cornwallis.

Communicating his plan to Pickens and Clarke, it was adopted; and the troops were soon after arrayed for executing it.

Brigadier Pickens with the militia was to attack the fort on its north and west; major Eaton with his battalion, by passing down the north side of the lagoon, was to approach it on the south, co-operating with the militia; while lieutenant colonel Lee, with his infantry and artillery, was to move down the lagoon on its southern margin, parallel with Eaton, ready to support his attack if required, or to attend to the movements of Brown, should he venture to leave his defences and interpose with a view to save Grierson. The cavalry, under Eggleston, were ordered to draw near to fort Cornwallis, keeping in the wood and ready to fall upon the rear of Brown should he advance upon Lee. These arrangements being finished, the several commandants proceeded to their respective points. Lee's movement, open to view, was soon discerned by Brown, who, drawing his garrison out of his lines accompanied by two field pieces, advanced with the appearance of risking battle to save Grierson, now assailed by Pickens and Eaton. This forward movement soon ceased. Brown, not deeming it prudent,

under existing circumstances, to persevere in his attempt, confined his interposition to a cannonade, which was returned by Lee, with very little effect on either side. *Grierson's resistance was quickly overpowered; the fort was evacuated; himself with his major and many of his garrison killed; the lieutenant colonel with others taken; and the few remaining, by reaching the river, escaped under cover and concealment of its banks to fort Cornwallis. Lieutenant colonel Brown, perceiving the fall of this post, withdrew into his fort; and apprehending, from what he had seen, that he had to deal with troops fitted for war, applied himself to strengthening his situation. Whatever was attainable in the town, and necessary to his defence, was now procured; and every part of the works requiring amendment was repaired with industry. These exertions on the part of the enemy could not be counteracted; all now to be done was to assume proper stations for close investiture, and, by regular approaches, to compel his surrender.

* The militia of Georgia, under colonel Clarke, were so exasperated by the cruelties mutually inflicted in the course of the war in this state, that they were disposed to have sacrificed every man taken, and with great difficulty was this disposition now suppressed. Poor Grierson and several others had been killed after surrender; and although the American commandants used every exertion, and offered a large reward to detect the murderers, no discovery could be made. In no part of the South was the war conducted with such asperity as in this quarter. It often sunk into barbarity.

In the late contest our loss was trivial,—a few wounded, and fewer killed. But unhappily among the latter was major Eaton of North Carolina, who had served only a few weeks with the light corps, and in that short period had endeared himself to his commandant and fellow soldiers by the amiability of his manners. He fell gallantly at the head of his battalion in the moment of victory.

On the banks of the Savannah, south of the lagoon near its flow into the river, was situated a large brick building, the mansion-house of a gentleman who had joined the enemy. Here lieutenant colonel Lee with his corps took post, while brigadier Pickens with the militia occupied the woods on the enemy's left. The morning was spent in ascertaining the most eligible mode of approach; to execute which all the requisite tools found at fort Galphin, with many collected from the neighboring farms, had been brought to camp.

Fort Cornwallis was not far from the Savannah river, the shelter of whose banks afforded a safe route to the troops. It was determined to break ground in this quarter, and to extend our works towards the enemy's left and rear.

General Greene did not continue in his camp at Friday's ferry longer than to give time to lieutenant colonel Carrington to procure means for the transportation of the stores gained by the fall of fort Granby, all of which were necessary to the army in the proposed operations. Taking the direct road for Ninety-Six, he sat down before it on the 22d; his effective

force, exclusive of militia, not exceeding one thousand: Marion, after taking Georgetown, having continued in that quarter for the protection of the country; and Sumpter, who had joined Greene while at Friday's ferry, being sent to apply his attention to the care of the region south and west of the Congaree.

Ninety-Six derives its name from the circumstance of its being ninety-six miles distant from the principal town of the Cherokee Indians, called Keeowee; and is the chief village in the district of country lying between the Saluda (the southern branch of the Congaree) and the river Savannah, the southwestern boundary of the state, to which district it gives its name.

The country is strong, the climate salubrious, and the soil fertile; and Ninety-Six exceeded in its white population any of the nine districts into which South Carolina is divided. When the British recovered the state, here, as has been before observed, was fixed a post—forming, with Cambden to its right and Augusta to its left, the frontier barrier established for the security of the country. The village of Ninety-Six, previous to the war, had been slightly fortified for defence against the neighboring Indians. These works were considerably strengthened after the arrival of the British troops; and additional fortifications, to secure the post from assault, were erected under the superintendence of lieutenant Haldane, of the corps of engineers, aid-de-camp to lord Cornwallis.

Lieutenant colonel Cruger, the present commandant, was a native of New York, of respectable connexions, who had taken part from the first with the British army, and commanded one of the provincial regiments raised in that state. His garrison amounted to five hundred and fifty men; three hundred and fifty of whom were regulars, and, like himself, Americans; the residue were loyal militia of South Carolina, conducted by colonel King. On the left of the village, in a valley, ran a small rivulet which furnished water to the town and troops. Passing this rivulet westwardly, you ascend an eminence, on which was erected a stockade fort, which, with the fortified prison in the village situated contiguous to the valley, constituted the chief defence of the water. On the right of the village stood the principal work, called the star, from its form. It consisted of sixteen salient and re-entering angles, with a ditch, frieze, and abattis; and was judiciously designed, and well executed. We have before mentioned that lord Rawdon, previous to his retreat from Camden, had informed lieutenant colonel Cruger of the changed and changing condition of affairs (which compelled him to prepare for the abandonment of that post) with orders to him to evacuate Ninety-Six and to join Brown in Augusta; but that all his attempts to communicate with Cruger had been frustrated. Entirely ignorant of these events, lieutenant colonel Cruger, nevertheless, guided by his own reflections, wisely employed his time in making all the necessary repairs to his works and some additional defences. A mound

of earth, parapet high, was thrown up around the stockade, and secured by abbatis; blockhouses were erected, traverses made, and covered communications between the different works established. Throughout the preparations directed by Cruger, the garrison, regulars and militia, officers and soldiers, vied with each other in the zealous execution of their commandant's orders. The appearance of Greene's army increased the vigorous exertions of Cruger and his garrison in completing their defensive measures; and very soon the works became strong, affording additional confidence to the garrison.

Colonel Koschiusko, a Polish officer, at the head of the engineers in the southern army, was considered to possess skill in his profession, and much esteemed for his mildness of disposition and urbanity of manners. To this officer general Greene committed the designation of the course and mode of approach. Never regarding the importance which was attached to depriving the enemy of water, for which he entirely depended on the rivulet to his left, Koschiusko applied his undivided attention to the demolition of the star, the strongest point of the enemy's defence. Breaking ground close to this fortress, he labored during the first night with diligence, but had not been able to place in great forwardness his incipient works. No sooner was this attempt of the besieger perceived than lieutenant colonel Cruger determined to prepare a platform in one of the salient angles of the star, opposite to our works, for the reception of three pieces

of artillery, the whole he possessed, with intention to cover a detachment charged with the expulsion of our working parties, to be followed by a second for the demolition of the works. Before noon the platform was finished, and the artillery mounted in it. The parapet was manned with infantry; and the sallying party under lieutenant Roney, supported by major Greene, ready in the enemy's ditch, rushed upon our works, covered by the artillery and musketry. Roney drove before him our guards and working parties, putting to the bayonet all whom he found; and was followed by a detachment of loyalists, who quickly demolished the works, carrying off the intrenching tools. The enemy sustained no loss in this first exhibition of his decision and courage but that of lieutenant Roney, who died of a wound he received while gallantly leading on his men, much regretted by his commandant and the garrison.

So judiciously was this sally planned, and so rapidly conducted, that, although Greene instantly sent a detachment to support Koschiusko, the object was accomplished before support could arrive. Taught by this essay that his enemy was of a cast not to be rashly approached with impunity, Koschiusko was directed to resume his labors under cover of a ravine, and at a more respectful distance. He broke ground again in the night of the 23d, still directing his approaches against the star redoubt.

Pickens and Lee pressed forward their measures against fort Cornwallis with zeal and diligence; but

not with the wished for celerity, so vigilant and resolute was the active and sagacious officer opposed to them. The condition of several of the wounded taken in the attack on fort Grierson called for various comforts not to be found in the American camp, and the principal officer who had been taken asked permission to procure the requisite supply from colonel Brown, whom he knew to be well provided, and whose disposition to cherish his soldiers he had often experienced. To this application Pickens and Lee answered, that after the ungracious determination to stop all intercourse, announced by the commandant of fort Cornwallis, disposed as they were to obey the dictates of humanity, it could not be expected that any consideration could prevail with them again to expose the American flag to contumely. If, however, he thought proper to wait upon colonel Brown, they would permit him to proceed whenever he pleased, on the faith of his parole, returning immediately after receiving Brown's reply.

This offer was cheerfully accepted, and a letter was prepared on the part of the American commandants, expressing the regret with which they permitted a flag to pass from their camp, though borne by a British officer, after the affrontive treatment experienced upon a late occasion; and assuring the commandant of fort Cornwallis, that no consideration affecting themselves or their troops would ever have led to such a condescension.

To this letter Brown returned a very polite answer by the prisoner (whose application was instantly complied with), excusing what had passed by a reference to some previous altercations, which had rendered such a decision necessary on the part of the British commandant, so long as the individual to whom he alluded continued to command,* and whom he really did believe had sent in the flag refused to be received, not knowing or suspecting the extraordinary change of force opposed to him which had taken place. Pickens and Lee were very much gratified that, while obeying the claims of humanity, they should have produced a renewal of intercourse, without which the contest drawing to a close could not be terminated but with a painful waste of human life.

The works contiguous to the river had advanced nearly to the desired state, and those which had been subsequently commenced in the rear of the fort began to assume a formidable appearance; yet extreme difficulty occurred in the consummation of the plan adopted by the besiegers, as the surrounding ground presented no swell or hill which would enable them to

* The individual meant was colonel Clarke. Brown and this officer had before (as will be recollected) a very severe conflict. Clarke was often beating up the British quarters, and striking at the light parties of the enemy, chiefly loyalists; with whom and the militia a spirit of hate and revenge had succeeded to those noble feelings of humanity and forgiveness which ought ever to actuate the soldier. At length all intercourse between the troops was broken up, and the vanquished lay at the mercy of the victor.

bring their six pounder to bear upon the enemy. It was determined to resort to the Mayham tower, the effect of which Lee had so happily witnessed at fort Watson; and orders were accordingly issued to prepare and bring in timber of such a size as would sustain our only piece of artillery.

Brown heretofore had patiently looked on at our approach, diligently working within his fort, as we discovered by the heaps of fresh dug earth in various directions, but with what view remained unascertained. Seeing that his enemy's works were rapidly advancing, he now determined to interrupt our progress by sallies, however hazardous, which he foresaw could alone retard his approaching fate,—hoping that in delay he might find safety. On the 28th he fell upon our works in the river quarter at midnight, and, by the suddenness and vigor of his onset, drove the guard before him; but the support under captain Handy coming up, after an obstinate conflict, regained the trenches, and forced the enemy to take shelter in the fort. The determined spirit manifested by the foe in this attempt to destroy our approaches, induced lieutenant colonel Lee to appropriate his infantry exclusively for their defence at night, relieving them from any further share in labor and from every other duty. It was divided into two divisions, to one of which was alternately committed the protection of our works. On the succeeding night Brown renewed his attempt in the same quarter; and for a long time the struggle was continued with mutual pertinacity, till at length captain

Rudolph, by a combined charge with the bayonet, cleared the trenches, driving the enemy with loss to his strong hold. On the 30th the timber required to build the proposed Mayham tower was prepared and conveyed to the intended site. In the evening we commenced its erection, under cover of an old house to conceal our object from the enemy. In the course of the night and ensuing day we had brought our tower nearly on a level with the enemy's parapet, and began to fill its body with fascines, earth, stone, brick, and every other convenient rubbish, to give solidity and strength to the structure. At the same time the adjacent works, in the rear of the fort, were vigorously pushed to the enemy's left to connect them with the tower, which was the point of their termination.

Brown's attention was soon drawn to this quarter; and, penetrating the use to which the log building would be applied, he determined to demolish it without delay.

Pickens and Lee, well assured from what had passed that their judicious opponent would leave nothing unessayed within his power to destroy their tower,—on the completion of which their expectation of immediate success chiefly depended,—determined to prepare before night for the counteraction of any attempt which might be made. The lines in that quarter, entrusted to the militia, were doubly manned; and Handy's division of the infantry, though on duty every other night, was drawn from the river quarter to maintain the militia.—

The North Carolina battalion supplied its place; and to captain Handy on one side, and to captain Rudolph on the other (approved officers), were committed henceforward the protection of our lines. The tower was designated as the peculiar object of attention, and to its defence one company of musketry was exclusively applied. Not more than one third of the night had passed when the enemy began to move; concealing his real object by renewing his attempt upon the river quarter, where Rudolph, with his accustomed gallantry, gave him a warm reception. While the contest here was bravely urged, and as bravely sustained, lieutenant colonel Brown with the elite of his garrison fell upon our works in his rear. Here for awhile the militia of Pickens contended with vigor, but at length were forced by the bayonet out of the trenches. Handy, leaving one company at the tower, with his main body hastened to support the militia, who very gallantly united with the regulars, and turned upon the successful foe. The conflict became furious; but at length the Marylanders under Handy carried the victory by the point of the bayonet. Upon this occasion the loss on both sides exceeded all which had occurred during the siege. Brown, finding that every effort to destroy our works by open war proved ineffectual, now resorted to stratagem. Lee had omitted to put down,* as was originally

* This omission resulted from that spirit of procrastination common to man, and was certainly highly reprehensible. Luckily no injury resulted, whereas very great might have ensued.

intended, the old wooden house, under cover of which the tower had been commenced, and which by accidentally taking fire would have probably consumed it. This house attracted Brown's notice, and he determined, by burning it, to rid himself of the tower. He had by this time erected a platform in one of the angles of the fort opposite to our Mayham tower, and which, being mounted with two of his heaviest pieces of ordnance, opened upon it before it was finished.

Nevertheless the exertions of the builders did not slacken, and on the first of June the tower was completed, and was found to overlook the enemy's parapet. The upper logs having been sawed to let in an embrasure for our six pounder, it only remained to make an apron upon which the matrosses could draw up their piece to the floor of the tower.

This was done in the course of the day, and at dawn on the second our six pounder was mounted, completely commanding the enemy's fort. Finley instantly announced his readiness to act by returning the enemy's cannonade, which had been continued without intermission. Before noon the enemy's two pieces were dismounted from the platform, and all the interior of the fort was raked, excepting the segment nearest to the tower and some other spots sheltered by traverses. It was now that lieutenant colonel Brown determined to put in execution his concerted stratagem. In the course of the night a deserter from the fort was sent to lieutenant colonel Lee.

He was a Scot, with all the wily sagacity of his country, and a sergeant of the artillery. Upon being questioned upon the effect of our cannonade, and the situation of the enemy,—he answered, that the strange loghouse lately erected, gave an advantage, which, duly improved, could not fail to force surrender; but that the garrison had not suffered so much as might be presumed; that it was amply supplied with provisions, and was in high spirits. In the course of the conversation which followed, Lee inquired, in what way could the effect of the cannonade be increased? Very readily, replied the crafty sergeant: that knowing the spot where all the powder in the fort was deposited, with red hot balls from the six pounder, directed properly, the magazine might be blown up. This intelligence was received with delight, and the suggestion of the sergeant seized with avidity, although it would be very difficult to prepare our ball, as we were unprovided with a furnace. It was proposed to the sergeant, that he should be sent to the officer commanding our battery, and give his aid to the execution of his suggestion, with assurances of liberal reward in case of success. This proposition was heard with much apparent reluctance, although every disposition to bring the garrison to submission was exhibited by the sergeant, who pretended that Brown had done him many personal injuries in the course of service. But he added, it was impossible for him to put himself in danger of capture, as he well knew he should be executed on a gibbet, if taken. A good supper was now

presented to him, with his grog; which being finished, and being convinced by the arguments of Lee, that his personal safety could not be endangered, as it was not desired or meant that he should take any part in the seige, but merely to attend at the tower to direct the pointing of the piece, he assented; declaring that he entered upon his task with dire apprehensions, and reminding the lieutenant colonel of his promised reward. Lee instantly put him in care of his adjutant, to be delivered to captain Finley, with the information communicated, for the purpose of blowing up the enemy's magazine. It was midnight; and lieutenant colonel Lee, expecting on the next day to be much engaged, our preparations being nearly completed, retired to rest. Reflecting upon what had passed, and recurring to the character of his adversary, he became much disquieted by the step he had taken, and soon concluded to withdraw the sergeant from the tower. He had not been many minutes with captain Finley, before an order remanding him was delivered, committing him to the quarter guard. In the morning we were saluted with a new exhibition, unexpected though not injurious. Between the quarters of Lee and the fort stood four or five deserted houses; some of them near enough to the fort to be used with effect by riflemen from their upper stories. They had often engaged the attention of Pickens and Lee, with a view of applying them, whenever the enemy should be assaulted, to aid in covering their attack. Brown, sallying out before break of day, sat fire to all but two of the houses. No

attempt was made to disturb the operation, or to extinguish the flames after the enemy had returned; it being deemed improper to hazard our troops in effecting any object not material in its consequence. Of the two left, one was most commodious for the purpose originally contemplated by Pickens and Lee in the hour of assault.

The besiegers being incapable of discovering any reason for the omission to burn the two houses, and especially one nearest the fort, various were their conjectures as to the cause of sparing them: some leading to the conclusion that they were left purposely, and consequently with the view of injuring the assailant. The fire from the tower continued, and being chiefly directed against the parapet fronting the river, in which quarter the proposed attack would be directed, demonstrated satisfactorily that the hour had arrived to make the decisive appeal. Orders were accordingly issued to prepare for the assault, to take place on the next day at the hour of nine in the forenoon. In the course of the night, a party of the best marksmen were selected from Pickens' militia, and sent to one of the houses nearest to the fort.

The officer commanding this detachment, was ordered to arrange his men in the upper story, for the purpose of ascertaining the number which could with ease use their rifles out of the windows, or any other convenient aperture; then to withdraw, and report to the brigadier. It was intended, before daylight, to have directed the occupation of the house by the same

officer, with such a force of riflemen as he should report to be sufficient. Handy was ordered to return to the river quarter at the dawn of day, as to his detachment and the legion infantry the main assault would be committed. These, with all the other preparations, being made, the troops continued in their usual stations,—pleased that the time was near which would close with success their severe toils.

About three in the morning of the fourth of June, we were aroused by a violent explosion, which was soon discovered to have shattered the very house intended to be occupied by the rifle party before day-break. It was severed and thrown into the air thirty or forty feet high, its fragments falling all over the field. This explained, at once, not only the cause of Brown's omitting its destruction, but also communicated the object of the constant digging which had until lately employed the besieged.

Brown pushed a sap to this house, which he presumed would be certainly possessed by the besieger, when ready to strike his last blow; and he concluded, from the evident maturity of our works, and from the noise made by the militia, when sent to the house in the first part of the night, for the purpose of ascertaining the number competent to its capacity, that the approaching morning was fixed for the general assault. Not doubting but the house was occupied with the body destined to hold it, he determined to deprive his adversary of every aid from this quarter; hoping, too, by the consternation which the manner of destruction

could not fail to excite, to damp the ardor of the troops charged with storming.

Happily he executed his plan too early for its success, or our gallant band would certainly have shared the fate of the house. This fortunate escape excited grateful sensations in the breasts of the two commandants, for the gracious interposition of Providence; and added another testimonial to the many already received, of the penetration and decision which marked the character of their opponent. The hour of nine approached, and the columns for assault were in array, waiting the signal of advance. Pickens and Lee having determined, as intercourse with the fort was now open, to present to the enemy another opportunity of avoiding the impending blow by capitulation, a flag was despatched on the 3d of June, with a joint letter from the American commanders, adapted to the occasion. Lieutenant colonel Brown, in reply, repeated his determination to defend the post. This resolution could not be maintained; and on the next day an officer, with a flag, proceeded from the fort. The bearer was received at the margin of our trenches, and presented a letter addressed to the two commandants, offering to surrender upon conditions detailed in the communication. Some of these being inadmissible, the offer was rejected, and other propositions made, which would be ratified by them, if acceded to by lieutenant colonel Brown. This discussion produced the delay of one day, which was gratifying to Brown;

it being unpleasant to surrender on the birth-day of his king.* The terms, as altered, were accepted; and

** Brigadier Pickens and lieutenant colonel Lee to lieutenant colonel Brown.*

Augusta, May 31st, 1781.

SIR,

The usage of war renders it necessary that we present you with an opportunity of avoiding the destruction which impends your garrison.

We have deferred our summons to this late date, to preclude the necessity of much correspondence on the occasion. You see the strength of the investing forces; the progress of our works; and you may inform yourself of the situation of the two armies, by inquiries from captain Armstrong, of the legion, who has the honor to bear this.

Lieutenant colonel Brown, in answer, to Pickens and Lee.

GENTLEMEN,

What progress you have made in your works I am no stranger to. It is my duty and inclination to defend this place to the last extremity.

Pickens and Lee, to lieutenant colonel Brown.

Augusta, June 3d, 1781.

SIR,

It is not our disposition to press the unfortunate. To prevent the effusion of blood, which must follow perseverance in your fruitless resistance, we inform you, that we are willing, though in the grasp of victory, to grant such terms as a comparative view of our respective situations can warrant.

Your determination will be considered as conclusive, and will regulate our conduct.

Lieutenant colonel Brown, to Pickens and Lee.

Fort Cornwallis, June 3d, 1781.

GENTLEMEN,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your summons

eight o'clock in the morning of the 5th was designated for the delivery of the fort, &c. to captain Rudolph,

of this day, and to assure you, that as it is my duty, it is likewise my inclination, to defend the post to the last extremity.

Pickens and Lee, to lieutenant colonel Brown.

Headquarters, June 4th, 1781.

SIR,

We beg leave to propose, that the prisoners in your possession may be sent out of the fort; and that they may be considered yours or ours, as the siege may terminate.

Confident that you cannot oppose the dictate of humanity and custom of war, we have only to say, that any request from you, of a similar nature, will meet our assent.

Lieutenant colonel Brown, to Pickens and Lee.

GENTLEMEN,

Though motives of humanity, and a feeling for the distresses of individuals, incline me to accede to what you have proposed concerning the prisoners with us; yet many reasons, to which you cannot be strangers, forbid my complying with this requisition. Such attention as I can show, consistently with good policy and my duty, shall be shown to them.

Lieutenant colonel Brown to Pickens and Lee.

GENTLEMEN,

In your summons of the 3d instant, no particular conditions were specified; I postponed the consideration of it to this day.

From a desire to lessen the distresses of war to individuals, I am inclined to propose to you my acceptance of the inclosed terms; which being pretty similar to those granted to the commanding officers of the American troops and garrison in Charleston, I imagine will be honorable to both parties.

Pickens

appointed on the part of the victors to take possession of it with its appurtenances. At the appointed hour

Pickens and Lee, to lieutenant colonel Brown.

June 5th, 1781.

SIR,

There was a time when your proposals of this day ought to have been accepted. That period is now passed. You had every notice from us, and must have known the futility of your further opposition.

Although we should be justified by the military law of both armies to demand unconditional submission, our sympathy for the unfortunate and gallant of our profession, has induced us to grant the honorable terms which we herewith transmit.

Lieutenant colonel Brown to Pickens and Lee.

June 5th, 1781.

GENTLEMEN,

Your proposition relative to the officers of the king's troops and militia being admitted to their paroles, and the exclusion of the men, is a matter I cannot accede to.

The conditions I have to propose to you are, that such of the different classes of men who compose this garrison be permitted to march to Savannah, or continue in the country, as to them may be most eligible, until exchanged.

Pickens and Lee, to lieutenant colonel Brown.

June 5th, 1781.

SIR,

In our answer of this morning, we granted the most generous terms in our power to give, which we beg leave to refer to as final on our part.

Lieutenant colonel Brown, to Pickens and Lee.

GENTLEMEN,

As some of the articles proposed by you are generally express-

the British garrison marched out, lieutenant colonel Brown having been taken into the care of captain

ed, I have taken the liberty of deputing three gentlemen to wait upon you, for a particular explanation of the respective articles.

Articles of Capitulation, proposed by lieutenant colonel Thomas Brown, and answered by general Pickens and lieutenant colonel Lee.

Article 1st. That all acts of hostilities and works shall cease between the besiegers and besieged, until the articles of capitulation shall be agreed on, signed and executed, or collectively rejected.

Answer. Hostilities shall cease for one hour; other operations to continue.

Art. 2d. That the fort shall be surrendered to the commanding officer of the American troops, such as it now stands. That the king's troops, three days after signing the articles of capitulation, shall be conducted to Savannah, with their baggage; where they will remain prisoners of war until they are exchanged. That proper conveyances shall be provided by the commanding officer of the American troops for that purpose, together with a sufficient quantity of good and wholesome provisions till their arrival at Savannah.

Ans. Inadmissible. The prisoners to surrender field prisoners of war: the officers to be indulged with their paroles; the soldiers to be conducted to such place as the commander in chief shall direct.

Art. 3d. The militia now in garrison shall be permitted to return to their respective homes, and be secured in their persons and properties.

Ans. Answered by the second article, the militia making part of the garrison.

Art. 4. The sick and wounded shall be under the care of their own surgeons, and be supplied with such medicines and necessities as are allowed to the British hospitals. Ans.

Armstrong, of the dragoons, with a safe guard to protect his person from threatened violence.* This pre-

Ans. Agreed.

Art. 5. The officers of the garrison, and citizens who have borne arms during the siege, shall keep their side arms, pistols, and baggage, which shall not be searched, and retain their servants.

Ans. The officers, and citizens who have borne arms during the siege, shall be permitted their side arms, private baggage, and servants; their side arms not to be worn, and the baggage to be searched by a person appointed for that purpose.

Art. 6th. The garrison, at an hour appointed, shall march out with shouldered arms and drums beating, to a place agreed on, where they will pile their arms.

Ans. Agreed. The judicious and gallant defence made by the garrison, entitles them to every mark of military respect. The fort to be delivered up to captain Rudolph at twelve o'clock, who will take possession with a detachment of the legion infantry.

Art. 7.

* This precaution was indispensable. Already had the humanity of the besieging corps been dreadfully outraged by the slaughter of colonel Grierson, and some of his associates. To risk a repetition of the same barbarity, would have justly exposed the commandants to reproach and censure. It was determined to take measures in time to prevent such an issue. Lieutenant colonel Brown's life was, we knew, sought with avidity; consequently it became our duty to secure his person before the garrison marched out. Brown had himself suffered very cruel and injurious personal treatment in the beginning of the revolution; and succeeding events more and more embittered both himself and the Georgia militia, heretofore his only opponents, till at length in this quarter a war of extermination became the order of the day.

caution, suggested by our knowledge of the inveteracy with which the operations in this quarter had been conducted on both sides, turned out to be extremely fortunate; as otherwise, in all probability, the laurels acquired by the arms of America would have been stained by the murder of a gallant soldier, who had committed himself to his enemy on their plighted

Art. 7. That the citizens shall be protected in their persons and properties.

Ans. Inadmissible.

Art. 8. That twelve months shall be allowed to all such as do not choose to reside in this country, to dispose of their effects, real and personal, in this province, without any molestation whatever; or to remove to any part thereof as they may choose, as well themselves as families.

Ans. Inadmissible.

Art. 9. That the Indian families now in garrison, shall accompany the king's troops to Savannah, where they will remain prisoners of war until exchanged for an equal number of prisoners in the Creek or Cherokee nations.

Ans. Answered in the second article.

Art. 10. That an express be permitted to go to Savannah with the commanding officer's despatches, which are not to be opened.

Ans. Agreed.

Art. 11. (Additional.) The particular attention of colonel Brown is expected towards the just delivery of all public stores, moneys, &c.; and that no loans be permitted to defeat the spirit of this article.

Signed at Headquarters, Augusta, June 5th, 1781, by

ANDREW PICKENS, Brig. Militia.

HENRY LEE, jun. Lt. Col. Commandant, V.L.

THOMAS BROWN, Lt. Col. commanding the king's troops at Augusta.

faith. Brown was conveyed to Lee's quarters, where he continued until the next day, when himself and a few of his officers were paroled, and sent down the river to Savannah, under the care of captain Armstrong, with a party of infantry, who had orders to continue with lieutenant colonel Brown until he should be placed out of danger. During the few hours' residence in Lee's quarters, the British colonel inquired after his artillery sergeant, who had, a few nights before, deserted from the fort. Upon being told that he was in the quarter guard, he took the first opportunity of soliciting from Lee his restitution; frankly declaring that he was no deserter, but was purposely sent out by him in that character, to destroy by fire the newly erected loghouse, which he plainly discerned to be destructive to his safety, and which his sergeant undertook to do, while pretending to direct our fire with the view of blowing up the magazine of the fort.

This communication showed the danger to which the besiegers were exposed for a few minutes, by the readiness with which lieutenant colonel Lee entered into the plan of the deserter, but which, upon further reflection, he fortunately changed; and demonstrates the great caution with which the offer of aid from deserters ought to be received; especially when coming from a besieged fortress on the point of surrender, and in the care of an experienced and sagacious soldier. The request of lieutenant colonel Brown was granted, and his sergeant with joy rejoined his commander. As soon as the capitulation was signed, preparations for

decamping were begun, and early the next morning, the baggage of the corps under Lee was transported across the Savannah; about noon, the infantry followed; and in the evening of the 6th, Lee joined with his cavalry; proceeding with expedition to Ninety-Six, in obedience to orders from general Greene. Brigadier Pickens remained at Augusta until conveyance for the stores taken there and at fort Galphin could be provided; which being accomplished in a few days, he also marched for headquarters. Without delay, after the British garrison had laid down their arms, did Pickens and Lee despatch intelligence of the event to Greene; who announcing the success in general orders, was pleased to express to the two commandants, and their respective corps, the high sense he entertained of their merit and service, with his thanks for the zeal and vigor exhibited in the execution of the duty assigned to them. Lee pressing forward with despatch, reached Ninety-Six on the forenoon of the 8th. Two routes led south of the enemy to the American headquarters, which had been established on the enemy's right. The officer despatched with the garrison of fort Cornwallis in his charge, mistaking the intended course, took the road nearest to the town, which brought his troops under command of the enemy's batteries for a small distance. Believing that the exhibition was designed with a view to insult the feelings of the garrison, lieutenant colonel Cruger gave orders for the contiguous batteries to open upon this corps, notwithstanding it enveloped his fellow soldiers

taken at Augusta, and was very near chastising the supposed bravado, which in fact was only the error of the conducting officer. Luckily no injury was sustained; but the officer was very severely reprimanded by lieutenant colonel Lee, for the danger to which his inadvertence had exposed the corps.

General Greene had exerted himself, with unremitting industry, to complete the works against the star redoubt; to which single object colonel Koschiusko directed all his efforts. The enemy's left had been entirely neglected, although in that quarter was procured the whole supply of water.* As soon as the corps of Lee entered camp, that officer was directed to take post opposite to the enemy's left, and to commence regular approaches against the stockade. Very soon Lee pushed his ditch to the ground designated for the erection of the battery, under the cover of which the subsequent approaches would be made. In the course of the next day this battery was erected, and lieutenant Finn, with a six pounder, took possession of it. The besiegers advancing closer and closer, with caution

* Koschiusko was extremely amiable, and, I believe, a truly good man, nor was he deficient in his professional knowledge; but he was very moderate in talent,—not a spark of the ethereal in his composition. His blunders lost us Ninety-Six; and general Greene, much as he was beloved and respected, did not escape criticism, for permitting his engineer to direct the manner of approach. It was said, and with some justice too, that the general ought certainly to have listened to his opinion; but never ought to have permitted the pursuit of error, although supported by professional authority.

and safety, both on the right and left, lieutenant colonel Cruger foresaw his inevitable destruction, unless averted by the approach of lord Rawdon. To give time for the desired event, he determined, by nocturnal sallies, to attempt to carry our trenches; and to destroy with the spade whatever he might gain by the bayonet. These rencontres were fierce and frequent, directed sometimes upon one quarter and sometimes upon another: but so judicious had been the arrangements of the American general to counteract these expected attempts, that in no one instance did the British commandant succeed. The mode adopted was nevertheless pursued without intermission; and although failing to effect the chief object contemplated, became extremely harassing to the American army,—whose repose during the night was incessantly disturbed, and whose labor in the day was as incessantly pressed. Ignorant of the situation and prospects of the British general as lieutenant colonel Cruger continued to be, he nevertheless indulged the confidence, that every effort would be made for his relief, and persevered with firmness and vigor in his defence. As soon as the second parallel was finished, general Greene directed colonel Williams, adjutant general, to summon the British commandant; stating to him his relative situation, and assuring him that perseverance in resistance would be vain, and might produce disagreeable consequences to himself and garrison. Cruger returned, by his adjutant, a verbal answer; declaring his determination to hold out to the last extremity, and his perfect discre-

gard of general Greene's promises or threats. Failing in this attempt, our batteries opened from the second parallel, under cover of which Koschiusko pressed forward his approach with indefatigable labor.

Lord Rawdon heard, with deep regret, the loss of Augusta, and was not insensible to the danger which threatened Ninety-Six; but destitute of the means to furnish immediate relief, he was obliged to arm himself with patience, anxiously hoping that every southern gale would waft to him the long expected and much desired reinforcement.

On the 3d of June this event took place, and his lordship instantly prepared to take the field. On the 7th he set out from Charleston for the relief of Ninety-Six, with a portion of the three regiments just arrived from Ireland, and was joined on his route by the troops from Monk's Corner, giving him a total of two thousand men. All his endeavors to transmit information to Cruger having failed, his lordship apprehended, that, pressed by the difficulties to which that officer must be reduced, and despairing of succor, he might be induced to surrender, with a view to obtain favorable conditions for his garrison; to stop which, he renewed his efforts to advise him of the propitious change of his condition, and his consequent advance for his relief.

Greene was informed by Sumpter, on the 11th, of the arrival from Ireland, and of the measures immediately taken by Rawdon to resume offensive operations. Directing Sumpter to keep in his lordship's

front, he reinforced him with all his cavalry, conducted by lieutenant colonel Washington; urging the brigadier to exert every means in his power to delay the advance of the British army. Marion was also ordered to hasten from the lower country, as soon as he should discover the intention of Rawdon to move upon Greene; and brigadier Pickens, just joined from Augusta, was detached to Sumpter.

Our approaches continued to be pushed with unabated diligence, in the expectation and hope that they might be brought to maturity in time to enforce the submission of the garrison, before the British general could make good his long march.

We now began to deplore the early inattention of the chief engineer to the enemy's left; persuaded that had he been deprived of the use of the rivulet in the beginning of the siege, he must have been forced to surrender before the present hour. It was deemed practicable to set fire to the stockade fort, and thus to remove the water defence to the left of the rivulet. In the succeeding day, a dark violent storm came on from the west, without rain. Lieutenant colonel Lee proposed to general Greene to permit him to make the attempt. This being granted, a sergeant with nine privates of the legion infantry, furnished with combustible matter, was directed to approach the stockade in the most concealed direction, under cover of the storm, while the batteries in every quarter opened upon the enemy, and demonstrations of striking at the star redoubt were made, with the expectation of di-

verting his attention from the intrepid party, which, with alacrity, undertook the hazardous enterprise. The sergeant conducted his gallant band in the best manner; concealing it whenever the ground permitted, and when exposed to view moving along upon the belly. At length he reached the ditch with three others; the whole close behind. Here unluckily he was discovered, while in the act of applying his fire. Himself and five were killed; the remaining four escaped unhurt, although many muskets were discharged at them running through the field, before they got beyond the nearest rise of ground which could cover them from danger. After this disappointment, nothing remained but to force our works to maturity, and to retard the advance of the British army. In the evening, a countryman was seen riding along our lines south of the town, conversing familiarly with the officers and soldiers on duty. He was not regarded, as from the beginning of the siege our friends in the country were in the habit of visiting camp, and were permitted to go wherever their curiosity led them, one of whom this man was presumed to be. At length he reached the great road leading directly to the town, in which quarter were only some batteries thrown up for the protection of the guards. Putting spur to his horse, he rushed with full speed into town, receiving the ineffectual fire of our centinels and guards nearest to him, and holding up a letter in his hand as soon as he cleared himself of our fire. The propitious signal gave joy to the garrison, who running to meet their friend, open-

ed the gate, welcoming his arrival with loud expressions of joy. He was the bearer of a despatch from Rawdon to Cruger, communicating his arrival at Orangeburgh in adequate force, and informing him that he was hastening to his relief. This intelligence infused new vigor into the intrepid leader and his brave companions.

It also inspired the indefatigable besieger with additional motives to push to conclusion his preparatives, as he now yielded up every hope heretofore derived from Cruger's ignorance of the movement of the British general, and the forwardness of our works. Major Greene, who commanded in the star with great ability, finding that our third parallel was nearly finished, and that a Mayham tower was erecting which would overlook his parapet, very judiciously covered it with sand-bags, to lessen the capacity derived from superior height, leaving between each bag an aperture for the use of his riflemen. Nor were the approaches on the left less forward than those on the right; they not only were directed against the stockade, but also were carried so near the rivulet, as to render supplies of water difficult and precarious. The fire during the 17th was so effectual, as to induce the enemy to withdraw his guards established between the rivulet and the stockade; and parties of the troops on the left were posted in various points, to annoy the communication with the rivulet. These arrangements succeeded throughout the day completely, and the enemy suffered greatly from this privation, though accomplished

too late to produce material advantage. Rawdon continued to advance by forced marches, and inclining to his right, made a vigorous push to throw himself between Sumpter and Greene.

In this effort he completely succeeded, and thus baffled all the measures adopted by Greene to delay his approach. It became now necessary to hazard assault of the fort, to meet Rawdon, or to retire. The American general was disposed to imitate Cæsar at Alisia; first to beat the relieving army, and then to take the besieged town. But his regular force did but little exceed the half of that under Rawdon, which added to his militia, consisting of the corps of Sumpter, Marion and Pickens, still left him numerically inferior to the British general. Nevertheless confiding in his known superiority of cavalry, he would have given battle to his lordship, could he have left an adequate corps to attend to the garrison. Compelled to relinquish this plan, he determined to storm the fort, although his works were yet unfinished. On the right, our third parallel was completed, two trenches and a mine were nearly let into the enemy's ditch, and the Mayham tower was finished.

On the left, our trenches were within twenty yards of his ditch; and the battery directed by lieutenant Finn, gave to the assailant, in this quarter, advantages which, well supported, ensured success. Greene, anxiously as he desired to conclude his severe toils in triumph, was averse to the unequal contest to which he must necessarily expose his faithful troops, and

would probably have decided on the safe course, had not his soldiers, with one voice, intreated to be led against the fort. The American army having witnessed the unconquerable spirit which actuated their general, as well as the unexpected results of former battles, could not brook the idea of abandoning the siege, without one bold attempt to force a surrender. They recollected, with pain and remorse, that by the misbehaviour of one regiment at the battle of Guilford, and of another at Hobkirk's hill, their beloved general had been deprived of his merited laurels; and they supplicated their officers to intreat their commander to give them now an opportunity of obliterating preceding disgrace. This generous ardor could not be resisted by Greene. Orders were issued to prepare for a storm; and the hour of twelve on the next day (18th June) was appointed for the assailing columns to advance by signal from the centre battery.

Lieutenant colonel Campbell, of the first Virginia regiment, with a detachment from the Maryland and Virginia brigades, was charged with the attack on the left; and lieutenant colonel Lee, with the legion infantry and Kirkwood's Delawares, with that on the right. Lieutenants Duval of Maryland, and Seldon of Virginia, commanded the forlorn hope of Campbell; and captain Rudolph, of the legion, that of Lee. Fascines were prepared to fill up the enemy's ditch, long poles with iron hooks were furnished to pull down the sandbags, with every other thing requisite to facilitate the progress of the assailant. At eleven the third parallel

was manned, and our sharp shooters took their station in the tower. The first signal was announced from the centre battery, upon which the assailing columns entered the trenches; manifesting delight in the expectation of carrying by their courage the great prize in view.

At the second cannon, which was discharged at the hour of twelve, Campbell and Lee rushed to the assault. Cruger, always prepared, received them with his accustomed firmness. The parapets were manned with spike and bayonet, and the riflemen, fixed at the sand-bag apertures, maintained a steady and destructive fire. Duval and Seldon entered the enemy's ditch at different points, and Campbell stood prepared to support them, in the rear of the party furnished with hooks to pull down the sand-bags. This party had also entered the enemy's ditch, and began to apply the hook. Uncovering the parapet now, would have given us victory; and such was the vigorous support afforded by the musketry from the third parallel, from the riflemen in the tower, and from the artillery mounted in battery, that sanguine expectations of this happy issue were universally indulged. The moment the bags in front were pulled down, Campbell would have mounted the parapet, where the struggle could not have been long maintained. Cruger had prepared an intermediate battery with his three pieces, which he occasionally applied to right and left. At first it was directed against Lee's left, but very soon every piece

was applied upon Campbell's right, which was very injurious to his column.

Major Greene, commanding in the star redoubt, sensible of the danger to which he was exposed, if the attempted lodgment upon his front curtain succeeded, determined to try the bayonet in his ditch as well as on his parapet. To captains Campbell and French was committed this bold effort. Entering into the ditch through a sally-port in the rear of the star, they took opposite directions, and soon came in contact, the one with Duval, the other with Seldon. Here ensued a desperate conflict. The Americans, not only fighting with the enemy in front but with the enemy overhead, sustained gallantly the unequal contest, until Duval and Seldon became disabled by wounds, when they yielded, and were driven back with great loss to the point of entry. The few surviving escaped with the hookmen to our trenches, where yet remained Campbell, the sand-bags not being removed. On the left, the issue was very different. Rudolph gained the enemy's ditch, and followed by the column, soon opened his way into the fort, from which the enemy, giving their last fire, precipitately retreated. Measures were in train on the part of Lee, to follow up his blow by passing the rivulet, entering the town, and forcing the fortified prison, whence the left might have yielded substantial aid to the attack upon the star, by compelling Cruger to struggle for the town, or forcing him with all his troops to take refuge in the star; a si-

tuation not long to be held, crowded as he must have been, and destitute of water. The adverse fortune experienced in the assault on the right, made the mind of Greene return to his cardinal policy, the preservation of adequate force to keep the field.

Charmed with the courage displayed in his view, and regretting its disadvantageous application, he sent orders to Campbell to draw off, and to Lee to desist from further advance, but to hold the stockade abandoned by the enemy.

Our loss amounted, during the siege, to one hundred and eighty-five killed and wounded; that of the garrison to eighty-five. Captain Armstrong, of the Maryland line, was the only officer killed on our side, as was lieutenant Roney the only one on their side. After our repulse, Greene sent a flag to lieutenant colonel Cruger, proposing a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of burying the dead; but as to the burial of the dead the proposition was rejected, Cruger not choosing to admit our participation in a ceremonial which custom had appropriated to the victor.

As soon as it was dark, the detachment was withdrawn from the stockade, and preparations were begun for retreat.

On the 19th, Greene communicated to Sumpter the event of the preceding day, advised him of the route of retreat, and ordered the corps in his front, with the cavalry under Washington, to join him with celerity. Taking leave of Mrs. Cruger and Mrs. Greene, and

leaving for the protection of the ladies the usual guard,† until Col. Cruger should be advised of his retreat, and take his measures for their security, the American general withdrew, having two days before sent forward his sick and wounded. During the preceding night, gloom and silence pervaded the American camp: every one disappointed,—every one mortified. Three days more, and Ninety-Six must have fallen; but this short space was unattainable. Rawdon had approached our vicinity with a force not to be resisted, and it only remained to hold the army safe, by resuming that system which adverse fortune had rendered familiar to us. Greene alone preserved his equanimity; and highly pleased by the unshaken courage displayed in the assault, announced his grateful sense of the conduct of the troops, as well during the siege as in the late heroic attack; presaging from the past, the happiest result whenever an opportunity should be presented of contending with

† When general Greene approached Ninety-Six, he found the ladies of lieutenant colonel Cruger and major Greene in a farm-house in the neighborhood. The American general tranquillized the fears of the ladies, and as they preferred continuing where they were, he not only indulged them, but placed a guard at the house for their protection. The guard was left until lieutenant colonel Cruger was apprized of our departure, when he sent the guard with his passport to rejoin our army. Some hours after Greene had withdrawn, one of our light parties, absent some days, returned, and passing by the farm-house, was going directly to our late camp before Ninety-Six, when Mrs. Cruger sending for the officer, communicated what had happened, and instructed him to overtake the retiring general.

the enemy upon equal terms,—to the attainment of which his best exertions would be invariably directed, relying, as he did, upon the same dauntless spirit recently exhibited. Conscious as the army was of having done its duty, it derived consolation from this exhilarating address, and burying in oblivion the grating repulse, looked forward with the anticipation of soon displaying their courage in a fair and decisive battle.

General Greene, moving with celerity, gained the Saluda, where he was joined by his cavalry. Forming his rear-guard of his horse, the legion infantry and Kirkwood's Delawares, he continued his retreat towards Charlotte in North Carolina, and passed successively the Enoree, the Tiger and Broad rivers, his sick and wounded continuing to precede him.

In the morning of the 21st, the British army reached Ninety-Six, having for fourteen days been incessantly pressing forward by forced marches; exposed not only to the privations inseparable from rapid movement through an exhausted country, but also to the southern sun, in the sultry season debilitating and destructive.

Here followed a delightful scene, and one which soldiers only can enjoy. The relieving army was welcomed with the fulness of gratitude due to its exertions and their effect. Responsive to this was the hearty applause bestowed on the garrison, equally merited by the courage and firmness displayed throughout the late trying period. Officer embracing officer, and soldiers mingling with soldiers, gave themselves up to those

gratulations resulting from the happy conclusion of their mutual toils and mutual perils. This pleasing scene lasted only a few hours; for Rawdon, not satisfied with the relief of Ninety-Six, flattered himself with adding to the triumph already gained, by destroying or dispersing the army of Greene. Having replaced his fatigued and sick with a part of the force under Cruger, notwithstanding his long march, notwithstanding the sultry season, he moved in the evening in pursuit of Greene.

Passing the Saluda he pressed forward to the Enoree, on the south side of which his van came up with the American rear under Washington and Lee. Although his lordship had, during his repose in the lower country, continued to strengthen himself with a newly raised corps of horse under major Coffin,* he did not derive, in this excursion, any material good from this accession of force. No attempt was hazarded against the American rear, which, conscious of its superior cavalry, retired slowly, always keeping the British van in view. While at the Enoree, lord Rawdon acquired information which convinced him of the impracticability of accomplishing his enterprise, and induced him to spare his harassed troops unnecessary increase of fatigue. Halting here for the night, the British general retraced his steps next morning to

* The corps was badly mounted,—small meagre horses being the only sort procurable. The best officers and the best riders, thus horsed, cannot stand tolerable cavalry, much less such as then composed our rear.

Ninety-Six. This being made known to Greene, he directed lieutenant colonel Lee with his corps to follow the enemy, for the purpose of obtaining and communicating intelligence. After reaching Ninety-Six, Rawdon prepared to evacuate the post; and having entered into arrangements with the loyalists of that district for the removal of themselves and families into the lines intended to be retained, he adopted a plan of retreat calculated to secure the undisturbed execution of his views. Despatching orders to lieutenant colonel Stuart to advance with his regiment from Charleston, (and to take in his charge a convoy destined for the army) to Friday's ferry on the Congaree, his lordship, leaving at Ninety-Six the major part of his force, took with the residue the direct road for the concerted point of junction.

Cruger was ordered to hasten the preparations necessary for the removal of the loyalists, then to abandon the theatre of his glory, and by taking a route considerably to his lordship's right, to interpose the river Edisto between himself and his enemy, moving down its southern banks to Orangeburgh, where the road from Friday's ferry to Charleston crossed that river. This disposition was advantageous to the column of Cruger, which was the most vulnerable, being heavily encumbered with property of the loyalists, as well as with the public stores. But it would not have availed, had not the distance from Cruger been too great for Greene to overtake him, without much good fortune, before he should place himself behind the Edisto; after

which the course of Cruger's route would expose Greene to the sudden and co-operative attack of Rawdon and lieutenant colonel Stuart. When the determination of the British general to abandon Ninety-Six, and with it all the upper country yet held by him, was communicated to Greene, he immediately drew near to the enemy, in order to seize any advantage which might present itself; previously directing his hospital and heavy baggage at Winnsborough to be removed to Cambden. As soon as the preparations for the evacuation of Ninety-Six and the removal of the loyalists had advanced to their desired maturity, Rawdon separated himself from Cruger and marched to Friday's ferry; inviting, in appearance, the American general to strike Cruger.

For the reasons before assigned this course of operations was avoided, and general Greene decided to pursue Rawdon; and in this decision he was confirmed by the information derived from an intercepted letter from lieutenant colonel Balfour, the commandant of Charleston, to lord Rawdon, stating the reasons which produced the recal of Stuart with his corps, after he had commenced his march towards Friday's ferry, in pursuance of orders from Cornwallis. Lee was accordingly directed to continue close to the British army, and to gain its front upon reaching Friday's ferry, where he would find Sumpter and Marion, ordered to take the same position, with the confident expectation that by their united exertions the advance of lord Rawdon, (uninformed of Stuart's recal,) should he

quit his position on the Congaree, might be retarded until Greene could come up with him. Obeying this order, lieutenant colonel Lee continued on the left flank and rear of the retiring army; when finding that his lordship had halted at Friday's ferry, he prepared in the course of the night to pass from the left to the right flank of the enemy, the Congaree river rendering this change in direction indispensable; as otherwise the enemy's front could not be gained, who was on the south of that river, and Lee's position to the rear of the British being on the north of the river. Well apprized, from his knowledge of the adjacent country acquired when before fort Granby, that only the rich

July settlement south of Friday's ferry could afford
8th. sufficient forage for the British army, Lee determined to avail himself of the probable chance to strike the enemy which would be presented the ensuing morning by the British foragers. In the evening he directed captain Eggleston, of the cavalry, to proceed with thirty dragoons along the enemy's right, and taking with him Armstrong, previously despatched in that quarter with a reconnoitring party, to make in the course of the night a proper disposition of his force for the contemplated purpose. Eggleston immediately joined Armstrong, and repaired to the expected theatre of action, placing himself in a secret and convenient position. Soon after day-light, the next morning, a foraging party, consisting of fifty or sixty dragoons and some wagons, were discovered approaching the very farm to which Eggleston had directed his

attention. As soon as the wagons and escort had advanced within reach of Eggleston, he rushed upon the enemy, broke up the forages, routed the party, and brought off forty-five dragoons prisoners. This handsomely executed stroke was the more agreeable, as Eggleston, by his judicious position and rapid charge, contrived to accomplish his object without any loss. General Greene complimented the captain and party in general orders; and the legion horse derived credit with the enemy, very flattering to its reputation, from the brilliant success of this detachment.

The prisoners being despatched to headquarters, lieutenant colonel Lee pursued his route to the enemy's front, which passed over a difficult defile in a line with the British camp. The infantry, preceding the cavalry, was directed to pass the defile and to occupy the heights on the left to cover the horse, whose passage was tedious, they being compelled to move in single file. The course taken by Lee was too near the enemy, and his cavalry must have suffered considerably had Rawdon been apprized of his movement and of the difficulty of the defile in his route. When the troops in the centre had entered the defile we were alarmed by beating to arms in the camp of the infantry, which was soon followed by their forming in line of battle.

This unexpected event was felt by all, but most by the amiable surgeon* of the infantry, who was at

* Alexander Skinner was a native of Maryland. He was virtuous and sensible; full of original humor of a peculiar cast; and eccentric in mind and manners. In person and in love of good.

that moment leading his horse through the defile. Not doubting but that battle must instantly take place, and believing the wiser course was to avoid, not to meet it, the surgeon turned his horse with a view of getting (as he believed) out of danger; never reflecting in his panic that the passage did not admit the turning of a horse. Ductile to the force of the bridle, the horse attempted to turn about, but was brought upon his head athwart the narrow passage, from which position he could not possibly extricate himself. The troop, which had passed the defile, instantly galloped up the hill and arrayed with the infantry, while the remaining two troops were arrested by the panic of an individual.

cheer, as well as in dire objection to the field of battle, he resembled with wonderful similitude Shakspeare's Falstaff. Yet Skinner had no hesitation in fighting duels, and had killed his man. Therefore when urged by his friends why *he*, who would, when called upon by feelings of honor to risk his life in a single combat, advance to the arena with alacrity, should abhor so dreadfully the field of battle,—he uniformly in substance answered, that he considered it very arrogant in a surgeon (whose province it was to take care of the sick and wounded) to be aping the demeanor and duty of a commissioned officer, whose business was to fight: an arrogance which he cordially contemned, and which he should never commit. Moreover, he would add, that he was not more indisposed to die than other gentlemen; but that he had an utter aversion to the noise and turmoil of battle. It stunned and stupified him. However, when congress should think proper to honor him with a commission, he would convince all doubters that he was not afraid to push the bayonet.

Eggleston, who commanded the troop so unhappily situated, dismounting several of his strongest dragoons, pulled the horse back again lengthways of the defile. He had then space to use his limbs and soon stood upon his feet, and our deranged and distressed cavalry were enabled to pass the defile. This accident interrupted the progress of the horse for ten minutes,—ample time for their destruction, had the enemy been at hand. It turned out that captain Handy, the officer of the day, deviating a little from his course in visiting the sentinels, was seized by a small patrol of the enemy and carried off out of musket fire; there he was stripped of his watch and money, and left upon condition of not stirring until his captors should reach a designated point in view, when he was permitted to return to his corps. It was his return which produced that sudden change upon the hill, which as suddenly alarmed our surgeon, and led to the described occurrence in the defile. The remainder of the cavalry hurried, as they passed, to join their friends; and lieutenant colonel Lee with the last troop at length got over. Finding no enemy, as, from what had passed, was strongly apprehended, the agitating scene concluded with continuance of the march, after some humorous animadversions on the surprised captain and the American Falstaff. Moving in silence, and with much caution, at length the legion reached undisturbed the enemy's front. Here it turned up the road towards the British camp, and Rudolph with the infantry drove in the

piquets at the bridge over the water course which had just been passed.

Having destroyed the bridge, and posting guards along the water course to the river, Lee encamped one mile in the enemy's front, expecting hourly to hear of the advance of the corps under Sumpter and Marion.

Lord Rawdon was not inattentive to the changing condition of affairs. The daring measure executed in his view was truly interpreted. Not joined by Stuart, and unacquainted with the cause of his delay, he determined not to risk the approach of Greene. He accordingly put his army in motion, and despatched his light troops to the river shore, where the creek in his front emptied into the river, and where the meeting of the waters formed a bar. As soon as the light troops made good their passage, the American guards were driven in and the bridge replaced, over which the main body and baggage of the enemy proceeded, forcing Lee before them.

The whole evening was spent in rapid movement; the corps of Lee falling back upon Beaver creek, in the confident expectation of being immediately joined by Sumpter, Marion, and Washington, when a serious combined effort would have been made to stop the progress of the enemy. In this expectation, founded on Greene's despatch, Lee was disappointed: neither Sumpter, Marion, nor Washington appeared, nor was any communication received from either. Lieutenant colonel Lee, not doubting that the wished for junction

would be effected the next morning, determined, if practicable, to establish his night quarters near Beaver creek, on the south side of which the road by the Eutaws and Motte's post from Charleston intersected that from Charleston by the way of Orangeburgh. This spot, too, gave advantages favorable to that effort which it was presumed would follow the union of the three corps.

Rawdon, still uninformed as to Stuart, and feeling his own inferiority, persevered in his determination to avoid any exposure; not doubting that the American general was pressing forward to bring him to action before he could be reinforced. He continued to advance until nine P. M., when he halted for the night: Lee, moving a few miles in his front, took up also his night position. With the dawn of day the British van appeared, and the corps of Lee retired. Repeating their rapid movement this day, this day passed along as had the preceding, till at length the American corps reached Beaver creek and took post behind it.

Not yet had any intelligence been received of or from the militia corps; and here was the last point where the junction was practicable, as Sumpter and Marion were in the eastern country, to Lee's left, and would advance on the road from Motte's post, which here fell into that going to Orangeburgh. Lord Rawdon upon reaching the creek hastened over; and lieutenant colonel Lee, finding his expectations illusive, turned to his left, proceeding down the Congaree;

yielding up any further struggle to hold the enemy's front.

The British general advanced along the Orangeburgh road, and halted at the small village of Orangeburgh, where he was joined on the next day by lieutenant colonel Stuart with the regiment of Buffs and convoy. Informed of the march of Stuart from Charleston with the convoy, Greene ordered Marion and Washington to make an attempt upon this officer, encumbered as he was; not doubting that this service could be performed in time to unite with Lee. Stuart's march was very slow, which, consuming more time than was expected, prevented Marion and Washington from reaching Lee before his passage of Beaver creek. Marion did not succeed against Stuart. Colonel Horree, one of his officers, cut off a few wagons; the only advantage gained by the American corps. On the succeeding day Sumpter, Marion and Washington joined Lee, when the united corps advanced under Sumpter a few miles towards Orangeburgh convenient to the route of the American army. General Greene, on the subsequent day, passed Beaver creek; and, encamping contiguous to the van troops, put himself at the head of his cavalry, commanded by Washington and Lee, accompanied by his principal officers, for the purpose of examining the enemy's position, with a view of forcing it if possible. The reconnoitre was made with great attention, and close to the enemy: for being destitute of cavalry, lord Rawdon had no means to interrupt it. After spending several hours in examin-

ing the British position, general Greene decided against hazarding an assault. The force of the enemy was about sixteen hundred, infantry and artillery, without horse: Greene's army, comprehending every sort, was rated at two thousand, of which near a moiety was militia. Cruger had not joined, being engaged in his march, and in depositing his loyalists in their new homes; but he was daily expected, and would add at least fourteen hundred infantry and some few dragoons to the British force. If, therefore, any attempt was to be made against Rawdon, delay became inadmissible. Some of the officers attending upon Greene, and in whose opinions he properly confided, did not consider the obstacles to assault so serious; and believed that it was necessary to strike the enemy, in order to induce him to relinquish his design of establishing a post at Orangeburgh with the view of holding all the country south of the Edisto and west of the Santee.

But the majority concurred with the general, and the contemplated attack was abandoned.* Two pow-

* Extract of a letter, dated 16th July, 1781, camp High Hills, Santee, from adjutant general Williams to major Pendleton, aide-de-camp to general Greene.

“DEAR PENDLETON,

“After you left us at Ninety-Six we were obliged to retrograde as far as the cross-roads above Winnsborough. Lord Rawdon's return over Saluda induced the general to halt the army, and wait for intelligence respecting his further manœuvres; and hearing a few days after that his lordship was on his march to fort Granby, our army was ordered to march towards that

erful reasons led to this decision. One that the British general was not only in a strong position, but that he

place by way of Winnsborough. Before we could arrive at Congaree, lord Rawdon retired to Orangeburgh; and as he had left a considerable part of his army at Ninety-Six, general Greene detached the cavalry and light infantry to join general Marion, and endeavor to intercept colonel Stuart, who was on his march from Charleston with the third regiment, &c. consisting of about three hundred, conveying bread, stores, &c., of which lord Rawdon's troops were in great want. Stuart however joined his lordship at Orangeburgh; and general Greene, from the information he had received, was encouraged to expect success from an attack upon the British army at that post. Accordingly he collected his troops, and called together the militia and state troops under generals Sumpter and Marion (general Pickens being left to watch the motions of colonel Cruger). A junction of the whole formed a very respectable little army, which marched to a small branch of North Edisto, within four miles of Orangeburgh, where we halted, and lay the 12th instant from about nine o'clock in the morning till six in the afternoon.

“General Greene reconnoitred the position of the enemy, and found it materially different from what it had been represented. The ground is broken, and naturally strong, from the court-house (which is two stories high and built of brick), to a bridge four or five hundred yards distant, the only pass over the Edisto within many miles. The general had every reason to believe what he had soon afterwards confirmed, that colonel Cruger had evacuated Ninety-Six, and was on his march to join lord Rawdon, which might possibly be done before we could force his lordship (if he could be forced at all) to a general action,—the issue of which was not certain. These considerations induced the general rather to offer than to give battle. The enemy declined the opportunity, and put up with the insult. General Greene, therefore, ordered our troops to retire in the afternoon to colonel

had secured his retreat across the Edisto, by occupying with musketry a large brick prison and several other houses commanding the river, to the southern banks of which he could readily retire uninjured, should he think proper to avoid battle until lieutenant colonel Cruger should join. Thus only could partial success be attained, if any, and that no doubt with severe loss. The second, that the cavalry, from the nature of the ground and the disposition of the enemy, could not be brought to take its part in the action; and as ours formed an essential portion of the American army, it was deemed unwise to seek for battle when deprived of this aid. It was very desirable to compel the enemy to relinquish his design of holding the country south of the Edisto by establishing a post at Orangeburgh; but other means might be resorted to productive of this end. One very obvious was adopted by the American general when about to decamp, and which did completely effect his views.

We had often experienced in the course of the

Middleton's plantation, from whence we have proceeded by slow easy marches to this place, and not without leaving behind sufficient detachments to intercept their convoys from below, and to create such a diversion at Monk's Corner, Dorchester, &c. as will very probably oblige his lordship to march to their relief. Indeed I am encouraged to hope that the garrison at Charleston will not be undisturbed. Mischief is meditated against them in other quarters; and I sanguinely trust the issue of this campaign will permanently fix the exalted idea the world has justly conceived of the eminent abilities of our general, and secure durable advantages to the country."

campaign want of food,* and had sometimes seriously suffered from the scantiness of our supplies, rendered more pinching by their quality; but never did we suffer so severely as during the few days' halt here. Rice furnished our substitute for bread, which, although tolerably relished by those familiarized to it from infancy, was very disagreeable to Marylanders and Virginians, who had grown up in the use of corn or wheat bread. Of meat we had literally none; for the few meagre cattle brought to camp as beef would not afford more than one or two ounces per man. Frogs abounded in some neighboring ponds, and on them chiefly did the light troops subsist. They became in great demand from their nutritiousness; and, after conquering the existing prejudice, were diligently sought after. Even the alligator was used by a few; and, very probably, had the army been much longer detained upon that ground, might have rivalled the frog in the estimation of our epicures.

The heat of the season had become oppressive, and the troops began to experience its effect in sickness. General Greene determined to repair to some salubrious and convenient spot to pass the sultry season; and

* Tacitus (*de Moribus Germanorum*) observes that they had a plentiful table instead of pay,—“*Nam epulæ, et quanquam in-compti largi tamen apparatus pro stipendio redunt.*” This cannot be said of us in toto. Like the Germans we had no pay; and instead of plentiful tables, in lieu, our table was not often plentiful, and seldom agreeable.

having selected the High Hills of Santee, a place so called from the eminence of its ground, it became very opportune, while directing his march with the main body to his camp of repose, to detach his light troops against the British posts in the vicinity of Charleston, now uncovered by the concentration of all the enemy's disposable force in Orangeburgh. When, therefore, he decamped on the 13th of July, he ordered Sumpter, Marion and Lee to move rapidly towards Charleston; and, after breaking up the posts at and about Dorchester, to unite at Monk's Corner, for the purpose of dislodging the nineteenth regiment stationed there under lieutenant colonel Coates. This service performed, their several corps would rendezvous at the High Hills of Santee, to which position the general now commenced his march.

The corps took distinct routes, concealing their march, and prepared to fall at the same moment, in different directions, upon the country lying between the Ashley and Cooper rivers. The small post at Dorchester was broken up, and some trivial successes gained by the several corps,—among which the most important was achieved by lieutenant colonel Hampton, commanding Sumpter's cavalry, who falling in with some mounted refugees, dispersed the whole body, and made forty or fifty prisoners. A party of the legion horse was pushed below the quarter house in the neck, from the confidence that in a place so near Charleston an advantageous stroke might be made. But it so happened that on that day none of

the usual visits to the quarter house took place, nor was even a solitary officer picked up in their customary morning rides.

Sumpter hastened towards Monk's Corner, where lay the nineteenth regiment,—an adequate prize for our previously disappointed exertions. Marion joined him on the same day, and Lee, having called in his parties from the neck, followed on the subsequent morning. This officer expected that general Sumpter would have seized the bridge over the Cooper river near Monk's Corner, which afforded a direct route to the militia camp. But lieutenant colonel Coates had very prudently occupied it with a detachment from his regiment, which compelled Lee to take a very circuitous route through deep sands, in the heat of July, to reach Sumpter, then ready to fall upon Coates as soon as he should be joined by Lee. Late in the evening the desired junction took place, and the next morning Monk's Corner was to have been assaulted. Coates had three routes of retreat, either of which led directly to Charleston. Two lay on the east of Cooper river and one to the west. The western offered the readiest route; for by passing the bridge in his possession, he would place Cooper's river on his left and become relieved from water obstruction in his whole progress. It was, however, deemed safer to take the two routes on the east of the river; one of which led over the Cooper, some miles below Monk's Corner, intersecting the western route in Charleston neck, and the other continued on the east of the river, crossing

the same river opposite to the town. The head waters of Cooper river make several branches about Monk's Corner, all having bridges over them. Brigadier Sumpter took the precaution to hold by a detachment from his corps the bridge over that water course in the way of lieutenant colonel Coates, should he take the eastern route, and calculated that the resistance at that bridge would give him time to come up with the enemy. During the night Coates decamped in silence, setting fire to the church which had been used as a magazine, for the purpose of destroying stores which could not be withdrawn, and which he did not choose to leave for the accommodation of his enemy. The fire in the course of some hours penetrated through the roof, and, making then a wide illumination, was descried from our camp.

No doubt existed but that the British regiment had fired the house, and of course that it had considerably advanced in its retreat, notwithstanding the presumed possession of a bridge over which it must pass. The troops were called to arms, and with great celerity moved upon Monk's Corner; where it was discovered that the enemy, for the purpose of consuming his stores, had burnt the church, and that he had retreated on the eastern side of the Cooper. In this direction Sumpter pursued, preceded by the legion, which was supported by the state cavalry under lieutenant colonel Hampton. To our surprise and mortification, no opposition at the bridge had taken place; and indeed our inquiries terminated in the conviction that the detach-

ment destined to occupy that post had abandoned it a few hours after they had been sent to possess it. Hence arose our ignorance of Coates's movement, which could not have occurred had the militia party continued at their post, and to which ignorance the foe owed his escape. Continuing to press the pursuit, the cavalry became considerably advanced before the infantry and the mounted militia under brigadier Marion. When they had reached the point where the roads separate, the British horse (not more than a troop) had taken the route nearest to Cooper river. Expecting that it might be overtaken before it could pass, having only the ferry-boats for its transportation, a detachment from the militia was ordered to pursue. But the attempt proved abortive, the British dragoons having crossed the river some hours before our detachment reached it.

Lee with the cavalry pursued the main body, and drew near to it in the neighborhood of Quinby bridge, about eighteen miles from Monk's Corner. It was much wished to come up with Coates before he crossed that bridge, as it was well known that the stream, without a circuit, was only passable at the bridge, which it was certain the enemy would secure or destroy. As soon as the officer in advance announced view of the enemy, Lee inquired of his guides the distance from the bridge, and heard with great pleasure that it was at least three miles in front. The legion cavalry was now directed to take close order; and captain Eggleston with one troop was detached in the woods to the left to turn the enemy's right, while the

squadron under Lee, supported by the cavalry under lieutenant colonel Hampton, advanced along the road directly towards him. These in our view appeared to be Coates's rear guard, charged with his baggage wagons, and not to exceed one hundred men, and to be all infantry. Upon the approach of the horse in two directions, the commanding officer formed in line; his left on the road, and his right in the woods opposite to Eggleston. This disposition was the very one desired; as a deep swamp lined the margin of the road, in which Lee apprehended the enemy would take post to cover the road and wagons. To obviate this apprehended measure formed the principal reason for throwing Eggleston to the left. The instant the enemy had formed, the charge was sounded, and the horse rushed upon them with drawn swords in full gallop. On our approach the enemy's order to fire was distinctly heard from right to left, which not taking place caused some inquietude, lest it was intentionally reserved to render it more fatal.

Contrary to expectation this was not the case. The suppression of their meditated fire was not a feint; but the line,* terrified at the novel and menacing attitude

* The nineteenth regiment, of which this detachment was a part, was one of the three lately arrived from Ireland, and had not seen service. It is probable such submission would not have ensued had the troops been veteran. Generally speaking, infantry, unless surpassing greatly in number, or aided by the ground, will fall when vigorously charged by horse. If they discharge in toto, they are gone. Holding up the front file fire with charged

of the horse close upon it, hoped to secure their safety by this inoffensive conduct; and, without discharging a single musket, threw down their arms and begged for quarters. Their supplication was cheerfully granted, and like ourselves they escaped unhurt. Not doubting but that Quinby bridge was yet at least one mile in front, the cavalry were brought to order, and, leaving the captured rear in care of a few of the militia horse, hastened to strike the last blow.

They had not proceeded far when a courier was despatched to lieutenant colonel Lee with information that captain Campbell had ordered his men to resume their arms, and this recalled Lee for a few minutes.

At this instant Armstrong with the leading section came in sight of Coates, who, having passed the bridge, was carelessly reposing, expecting his rear guard,—having determined to destroy the bridge as soon as his rear and baggage should have passed it. With this view the planks were mostly raised from the sleepers, lying on them loosely, ready to be thrown into the stream when the rear should get over. Seeing the enemy, with the bridge interposed, which he knew to be contrary to his commandant's expectation, this gallant officer drew up, and sent back for orders—never communicating the unexpected fact that the bridge intervened. Lee, sending his adjutant to the captain, warmly reminded him of the order of the day, which

bayonets, and pouring in the rear fire, best aids their chance of success.

was to fall upon the foe without respect to consequences. Stung with this answer, the brave Armstrong put spur to his horse at the head of his section and threw himself over the bridge upon the guard stationed there with a howitzer. So sudden was this charge that he drove all before him,—the soldiers abandoning their piece. Some of the loose planks were dashed off by Armstrong's section, which, forming a chasm in the bridge, presented a dangerous obstacle. Nevertheless the second section, headed by lieutenant Carrington, took the leap and closed with Armstrong, then engaged in a personal combat with lieutenant colonel Coates, who, placing himself on the side of a wagon which with a few others had kept up with the main body, effectually parried the many sabre strokes aimed at his head. Most of his soldiers, appalled at the sudden and daring attack, had abandoned their colonel and were running through the field, some with, some without arms, to take shelter in the farm house.

Lee now got up to the bridge, where captain O'Neal with the third section had halted; and seeing the howitzer in our possession, and the whole regiment, except lieutenant colonel Coates, flying in confusion, (while the lieutenant colonel with a few, mostly officers, were defending themselves with their swords and calling upon their soldiers for assistance,) he used every effort to recover and replace the planks. The gap having been enlarged by Carrington's section throwing off more planks, O'Neal's horses would not

take the leap; and the creek was deep in water and deeper in mud, so that the dragoons, who had dismounted for the purpose of getting the plank, could not, even though clinging to the studs of the bridge, stop from sinking—there being no foothold to stand upon; nor was it possible to find any firm spot from whence to swim the horses across. In this perplexing condition the victory gained by the gallantry of one troop of dragoons was wrested from them, when to complete it only a passage across the creek, not twenty yards wide, was wanting. Discerning the halt of the horse, the enemy took courage, and the bravest of the soldiers hastening back to their leader soon relieved him. Armstrong and Carrington, compelled to abandon the unequal contest, forced their way down the great road, turning into the woods up the stream to rejoin the corps. Lee continued struggling to replace the planks, until Coates (relieved from Armstrong) repaired with the few around him to defend the bridge, where remained his deserted howitzer. Having only sabres to oppose to the enemy's fire, and those sabres withheld from contact by the interposing chasm, Lee was forced to draw off from the vain contest, after several of his dragoons had been wounded, among whom was doctor Irvin, surgeon of the legion cavalry.*

* Such was doctor Skinner's unvarying objection to Irvin's custom of risking his life, whenever he was with the corps going into action, that, kind and amiable as he was, he saw with pleasure that his prediction, often communicated to Irvin to stop

As soon as he had reached the enemy, Lee despatched the intelligence to brigadier Marion, and to the legion infantry, urging their approach; and now foiled at the bridge, he communicated to Marion his having moved some distance up the creek to a ford, which, from the information derived from his guides, would afford a ready passage. To this place he urged the brigadier to direct his march, assuring him that by their united effort the enemy might still be destroyed.

Marion pressed his march with diligence, bringing with him the legion infantry; and having passed the creek, united with Lee late in the evening, in front of the house, which, in their panic, had been so eagerly sought by the flying British soldiers, and which was now possessed by lieutenant colonel Coates, who had repaired to it with his wagons and howitzer; affording, as it did, the most eligible position he could assume. Posted in the house, the outhouses, and along the yard and garden fences, with his howitzer in front and under cover of the house, lieutenant colonel Coates found himself safe. Marion and Lee, seeing that no point of his position was assailable with probable hope

his practice, (which, contrasted with his own, Skinner felt as a bitter reproach,) was at length realized, when Irvin was brought in wounded; and he would not dress his wound, although from his station he had the right of preference, until he had finished all the privates,—reprehending with asperity Irvin's custom, and sarcastically complimenting him, every now and then, with the honorable scar he might hereafter show.

of success, (destitute, as they were, of artillery,) reluctantly gave up this regiment; and being low down in a neck, within striking distance from Charleston, after all the fatigue of the day they deemed it necessary to retire fifteen miles before they could give rest to their troops.

At this moment Armstrong and Carrington, whose suspended fate had excited painful sensations in the breasts of their friends, happily joined with their shattered sections. Both the officers were unhurt, only one horse killed and one wounded, but some few of the bravest dragoons were killed and more wounded.

Sending the captain with a detachment to the ground of action, for the purpose of bringing off the dead and wounded, Lee followed Marion; who having detached a party to replace the planks of the bridge, took the direct course to it through the field. While we halted here with the legion cavalry until Armstrong should rejoin, one of our wounded dragoons came hobbling out of the swamp, into which he had scrambled when his horse had fallen by the same ball which had shattered the rider's knee. Armstrong now came up, bringing with him sad evidences of his intrepid charge. Some of his finest fellows had fallen in this honorable, though unsuccessful attempt; soldiers who had passed from early life through the war, esteemed and admired. Placing the wounded in the easiest posture for conveyance, and bearing the dead on the pummels of our saddles, we concluded a toilsome sixteen hours in the sadness of grief; not for the loss

of brave soldiers, nobly dying in their country's cause, but because they fell in an abortive attack, rendered so by unforeseen incidents. Had the bridge near Monk's Corner (over which the British passed) been held in conformity to Sumpter's plan and order, Coates would have been overtaken before he arrived at Quinby's. Had the guides been correct in their estimation of the distance of the bridge, when we first saw the enemy's rear, Lee (having taken the rear guard) would have found out some other route to the main body, and have avoided the fatal obstacle. Had Armstrong, referring for further orders, communicated the interposition of the bridge, the warm reply would never have been made, but a cool examination of our relative situation would have followed; the result of which must have been propitious. Coates and his regiment must have fallen; giving increase of fame to our army, with solid good to our cause; and the sad loss would not have occurred. To produce a discomfiture, this series of omission and error was necessary and did take place. Soldiers may and must struggle,—but unless fortune smile their struggle cannot always avail.

As soon as we reached our quarters, one common grave was prepared for the dead, and at the dawn of light the rites of sepulture were performed.

The prisoners and baggage which had been taken were instantly sent off under proper escort, and safely delivered to brigadier Sumpter. With the baggage was taken the regimental military chest, whose contents being divided among the troops, by the brigadier's

order, gave to each soldier one guinea. We gained, on the following day, the neighborhood of Nelson's ferry, where the troops were permitted to repose for twenty-four hours. Resuming our march, we crossed the Santee, and by easy marches joined in a few days the army at the High Hills. Incomplete as was this expedition, the zeal and vigor uniformly exhibited reflected credit on all employed in it; and the general, always disposed to honor merit, testified his grateful approbation in very flattering terms. Armstrong, Carington, and their gallant band, were, as they deserved, distinguished. The troops were placed in good quarters, and the heat of July rendered tolerable by the high ground, the fine air and good water of the selected camp. Disease began to abate, our wounded to recover, and the army to rise in bodily strength. Enjoying this period of rest, the first experienced since Greene's assumption of the command, it was natural to meditate upon the past scenes. Nor was the conclusion of such meditations less instructive than agreeable. The wisdom of the general was manifest; and the zeal, patience and firmness exhibited by the troops could not be denied. It is true, that untoward occurrences had deprived us of two victories, and lost us Ninety-Six; but it was no less true, that the comprehensive views of the general, with his inflexible perseverance, and unvarying activity, had repaired these mortifying disappointments, and had closed the campaign with the successful execution of his object. Defeat had been changed by its consequences into

victory, and our repulse had been followed by accession of territory. The conquered states were regained, and our exiled countrymen were restored to their deserted homes,—sweet rewards of toil and peril. Such results can only be attributed to superior talents, seconded by skill, courage and fidelity. Fortune often gives victory; but when the weak oppose the strong, destitute of the essential means of war, it is not chance but sublime genius which guides the intermediate operations, and controls the ultimate event.

CHAPTER XXX.

LATELY John Champe, sergeant-major of the legion cavalry, who had been for several months considered by the corps as a deserter, returned. This high minded soldier had been selected to undertake a very difficult and perilous project, the narration of which is due to his merit, as well as to the singularity of his progress.

The treason of brigadier Arnold,—the capture of Andre,—with intelligence received by Washington, through his confidential agents in New York, communicating that many of his officers, and especially a major general named to him, were connected with Arnold,—could not fail to seize the attention of a commander less diligent and zealous. It engrossed his mind entirely, exciting sensations the most anxious as well as unpleasant. The moment he reached the army, then under the orders of major general Greene, encamped in the vicinity of Tappan, he sent for major Lee, posted with the light troops some distance in front. This officer repaired to headquarters with celerity, and found the general in his *marqué* alone, busily engaged in writing. As soon as Lee entered, he was requested to take a seat, and a bundle of papers, lying on the table, was given to him for perusal. In these

much information was detailed, tending to prove that Arnold was not alone in the base conspiracy just detected, but that the poison had spread; and that a major general, whose name was not concealed, was certainly as guilty as Arnold himself. This officer had enjoyed, without interruption, the confidence of the commander in chief throughout the war; nor did there exist a single reason in support of the accusation. It altogether rested upon the intelligence derived from the papers before him. Major Lee, personally acquainted with the accused, could not refrain from suggesting the probability, that the whole was a contrivance of sir Henry Clinton, in order to destroy that confidence between the commander and his officers on which the success of military operations depends. This suggestion, Washington replied, was plausible, and deserved due consideration. It had early occurred to his own mind, and had not been slightly regarded; but his reflections settled in a conclusion not to be shaken; as the same suggestion applied to no officer more forcibly than a few days ago it would have done to general Arnold, known now to be a traitor.

Announcing this result of his meditations with the tone and countenance of a mind deeply agitated, and resolved upon its course, Lee continued silent, when the general proceeded: "I have sent for you, in the expectation that you have in your corps individuals capable and willing to undertake an indispensable delicate and hazardous project. Whoever comes forward upon this occasion, will lay me under great obligations

personally, and in behalf of the United States I will reward him amply. No time is to be lost: he must proceed, if possible, this night. My object is to probe to the bottom the afflicting intelligence contained in the papers you have just read; to seize Arnold, and by getting him to save Andre. They are all connected. While my emissary is engaged in preparing means for the seizure of Arnold, the guilt of others can be traced; and the timely delivery of Arnold to me, will possibly put it into my power to restore the amiable and unfortunate Andre to his friends. My instructions are ready, in which you will find my express orders that Arnold is not to be hurt; but that he be permitted to escape if to be prevented only by killing him, as his public punishment is the only object in view. This you cannot too forcibly press upon whomsoever may engage in the enterprise; and this fail not to do. With my instructions are two letters, to be delivered as ordered, and here are some guineas for expenses."

Major Lee replying, said, that he had little or no doubt but that his legion contained many individuals daring enough for any operation, however perilous; but that the one in view required a combination of qualities not easily to be found unless in a commissioned officer, to whom he could not venture to propose an enterprise, the first step to which was desertion. That though the sergeant-major of the cavalry was in all respects qualified for the delicate and adventurous project, and to him it might be proposed without indelicacy, as his station did not interpose the obstacle

before stated; yet it was very probable that the same difficulty would occur in his breast, to remove which would not be easy, if practicable.

Washington was highly pleased with finding that a non-commissioned officer was deemed capable of executing his views; as he had felt extreme difficulty in authorizing an invitation to officers, who generally are, and always ought to be, scrupulous and nice in adhering to the course of honor. He asked the name, the country, the age, the size, length of service, and character of the sergeant.

Being told his name,—that he was a native of Loudon county in Virginia; about twenty-three or twenty-four years of age,—that he had enlisted in 1776,—rather above the common size,—full of bone and muscle;—with a saturnine countenance, grave, thoughtful and taciturn,—of tried courage and inflexible perseverance, and as likely to reject an overture coupled with ignominy as any officer in the corps; a commission being the goal of his long and anxious exertions, and certain on the first vacancy.

The general exclaimed, that he was the very man for the business; that he must undertake it; and that going to the enemy by the instigation and at the request of his officer was not desertion, although it appeared to be so: and he enjoined that this explanation, as coming from him, should be pressed on Champe; and that the vast good in prospect should be contrasted with the mere semblance of doing wrong, which he presumed could not fail to conquer every

scruple. Major Lee assured the general, that every exertion would be essayed on his part to execute his wishes; and taking leave returned to the camp of the light corps, which he reached about eight o'clock at night. Sending instantly for the sergeant-major, he introduced the business in the way best calculated, as he thought, to produce his concurrence; and dilated largely on the very great obligations he would confer on the commander in chief, whose unchanging and active beneficence to the troops had justly drawn to him their affection, which would be merely nominal, if, when an opportunity should offer to any individual of contributing to the promotion of his views, that opportunity was not zealously embraced. That the one now presented to him had never before occurred, and in all probability never would occur again, even should the war continue for ages; it being most rare for three distinct consequences, all of primary weight, to be comprised within a single operation, and that operation necessarily to be entrusted to one man, who would want but one or two associates in the active part of its execution. That the chance of detection became extremely narrow, and that consequently that of success enlarged. That by succeeding in the safe delivery of Arnold, he not only gratified his general in the most acceptable manner, but he would be hailed as the avenger of the reputation of the army, stained by foul and wicked perfidy; and what could not but be highly pleasing, he would be the instrument of saving the life of major Andre, soon to be brought

before a court of inquiry, the decision of which could not be doubted, from the universally known circumstances of the case, and had been anticipated in the general's instructions. That by investigating with diligence and accuracy the intelligence communicated to him, he would bring to light new guilt, or he would relieve innocence (as was most probable) from distrust; quieting the torturing suspicions which now harrowed the mind of Washington, and restoring again to his confidence a once honored general, possessing it at present only ostensibly, as well as hush doubts affecting many of his brother soldiers.

In short, the accomplishment of so much good was in itself too attractive to be renounced by a generous mind; and when connected with the recollection of the high honor which the selection shed upon him, as a soldier he ought not,—he must not pause. This discourse was followed by a detail of the plan, with a wish that he would enter upon its execution instantly. Champe listened with deep attention, and with a highly excited countenance; the perturbations of his breast not being hid even by his dark visage. He briefly and modestly replied, that no soldier exceeded him in respect and affection for the commander in chief, to serve whom he would willingly lay down his life; and that he was sensible of the honor conferred by the choice of him for the execution of a project all over arduous; nor could he be at a loss to know to whom was to be ascribed the preference bestowed, which he

took pleasure in acknowledging, although increasing obligations before great and many.

That he was charmed with the plan. Even its partial success would lead to great good; as it would give peace to the general's mind, and do justice, as he hoped, to innocence. Full success: added powerful and delicious personal excitements, as well as the gratification of the general and army. He was not, he said, deterred by the danger and difficulty which was evidently to be encountered, but he was deterred by the ignominy of desertion, to be followed by the hypocrisy of enlisting with the enemy; neither of which comported with his feelings, and either placed an insuperable bar in his way to promotion.

He concluded by observing, if any mode could be contrived free from disgrace, he would cordially embark in the enterprise. As it was, he prayed to be excused; and hoped that services, always the best in his power to perform, faithfully performed, did entitle his prayer to success. The objections at first apprehended, now to be combatted, were extended to a consequence which had not suggested itself. Lee candidly admitted that he had expected the first objection made, and that only; which had been imparted to the general, who gave to it full consideration, and concluded by declaring, that the crime of desertion was not incurred; as no act done by the soldier at the request of the commander in chief could be considered as desertion; and that an action so manifestly praiseworthy as that to be performed, when known, would dissipate by its

own force the reflections excited by appearance, which no doubt would be acrimonious, leaving the actor in full enjoyment of the future rich rewards of his virtue. That the reflecting mind ought not to balance between the achievement of so much good, and the doing wrong in semblance only. to which major Lee subjoined, that when in consequence of the general's call upon him for a soldier capable and willing to execute a project so tempting to the brave, he considered himself and corps highly honored; and that he should consider himself reduced to a mortifying condition, if the resistance to the undertaking compelled him to inform the general that he must recur to some other corps to provide an agent to execute this necessary and bold enterprise.

He entreated the sergeant to ask himself what must be the sensations of his comrades, if a soldier from some other corps should execute the enterprise, when they should be told that the glory transferred to the regiment of which he was one, might have been enjoyed by the legion, had not sergeant Champe shrunk from the overture made to him by his general, rather than reject scruples too narrow and confined to be permitted to interfere with grand and virtuous deeds. The esprit du corps could not be resisted, and united to his inclination, it subdued his prejudices, and he declared his willingness to conform to the wishes of the general; relying, as he confidently did, that his reputation would be protected by those who had induced

him to undertake the enterprise, should he be unfortunate in the attempt.

The instructions were read to him, and every distinct object presented plainly to his view, of which he took notes so disguised as to be understood only by himself. He was particularly cautioned to use the utmost circumspection in delivering his letters, and to take care to withhold from the two individuals, addressed under feigned names, knowledge of each other; for although both had long been in the confidence of the general, yet it was not known by one that the other was so engaged.

He was further urged, to bear in constant recollection the solemn injunction so pointedly expressed in the instructions to major Lee, of forbearing to kill Arnold in any condition of things.

This part of the business being finished, the major and sergeant's deliberation were turned to the manner of the latter's desertion; for it was well known to both that to pass the numerous patrols of horse and foot crossing from the stationary guards, was itself difficult, which was now rendered more so by parties thrown occasionally beyond the place called Liberty Pole, as well as by swarms of irregulars, induced sometimes to venture down to the very point at Paulus Hook with the hope of picking up booty. Evidently discernible as were the difficulties in the way, no relief could be administered by major Lee, lest it might induce a belief that he was privy to the desertion, which opinion getting to the enemy would involve the life of

Champe. The sergeant was left to his own resources and to his own management, with the declared determination, that in case his departure should be discovered before morning, Lee would take care to delay pursuit as long as was practicable.

Giving to the sergeant three guineas, and presenting his best wishes, he recommended him to start without delay, and enjoined him to communicate his arrival in New York as soon thereafter as might be practicable. Champe pulling out his watch, compared it with the major's, reminding the latter of the importance of holding back pursuit, which he was convinced would take place in the course of the night, and which might be fatal, as he knew that he should be obliged to zigzag in order to avoid the patrols, which would consume time. It was now nearly eleven. The sergeant returned to camp, and taking his cloak, valise and orderly book, he drew his horse from the picket, and mounting him put himself upon fortune. Lee, charmed with his expeditious consummation of the first part of the enterprise, retired to rest. Useless attempt! the past scene could not be obliterated; and, indeed, had that been practicable, the interruption which ensued would have stopped repose.

Within half an hour captain Carnes, officer of the day, waited upon the major, and with considerable emotion told him that one of the patrols had fallen in with a dragoon, who, being challenged, put spur to his horse and escaped, though instantly pursued. Lee complaining of the interruption, and pretending to be

extremely fatigued by his ride to and from headquarters, answered as if he did not understand what had been said, which compelled the captain to repeat it. Who can the fellow that was pursued be? inquired the major; adding, a countryman, probably. No, replied the captain, the patrol sufficiently distinguished him as to know that he was a dragoon; probably one from the army, if not certainly one of our own. This idea was ridiculed from its improbability, as during the whole war but a single dragoon had deserted from the legion. This did not convince Carnes, so much stress was it now the fashion to lay on the desertion of Arnold, and the probable effect of his example. The captain withdrew to examine the squadron of horse, whom he had ordered to assemble in pursuance of established usage on similar occasions. Very quickly he returned, stating that the scoundrel was known, and was no less a person than the sergeant-major, who had gone off with his horse, baggage, arms and orderly book,—so presumed, as neither the one nor the other could be found. Sensibly affected at the supposed baseness of a soldier extremely respected, the captain added that he had ordered a party to make ready for pursuit, and begged the major's written orders.

Occasionally this discourse was interrupted, and every idea suggested which the excellent character of the sergeant warranted, to induce the suspicion that he had not deserted, but had taken the liberty to leave camp with a view to personal pleasure: an example, said Lee, too often set by the officers themselves, des-

destructive as it was of discipline, opposed as it was to orders, and disastrous as it might prove to the corps in the course of service.

Some little delay was thus interposed; but it being now announced that the pursuing party was ready, major Lee directed a change in the officer, saying that he had a particular service in view, which he had determined to entrust to the lieutenant ready for duty, and which probably must be performed in the morning. He therefore directed him to summon cornet Middleton for the present command. Lee was induced thus to act, first to add to the delay, and next from his knowledge of the tenderness of Middleton's disposition, which he hoped would lead to the protection of Champe, should he be taken. Within ten minutes Middleton appeared to receive his orders, which were delivered to him made out in the customary form, and signed by the major. "Pursue so far as you can with safety sergeant Champe, who is suspected of deserting to the enemy, and has taken the road leading to Paulus Hook. Bring him alive, that he may suffer in the presence of the army; but kill him if he resists, or escapes after being taken."

Detaining the cornet a few minutes longer in advising him what course to pursue,—urging him to take care of the horse and accoutrements, if recovered,—and enjoining him to be on his guard, lest he might, by his eager pursuit, improvidently fall into the hands of the enemy,—the major dismissed Middleton, wishing him success. A shower of rain fell soon after

Champe's departure, which enabled the pursuing dragoons to take the trail of his horse; knowing, as officer and trooper did, the make of their shoes, whose impression was an unerring guide.*

When Middleton departed, it was a few minutes past twelve; so that Champe had only the start of rather more than an hour,—by no means as long as was desired. Lee became very unhappy, not only because the estimable and gallant Champe might be injured, but lest the enterprise might be delayed; and he spent a sleepless night. The pursuing party during the night, was, on their part, delayed by the necessary halts to examine occasionally the road, as the impression of the horse's shoes directed their course; this was unfortunately too evident, no other horse having passed along the road since the shower. When the day broke, Middleton was no longer forced to halt, and he pressed on with rapidity. Ascending an eminence before he reached the Three Pidgeons, some miles on the north of the village of Bergen, as the pursuing party reached its summit, Champe was descried not more than half a mile in front. Resembling an Indian in his vigilance, the sergeant at the same moment discovered the party, (whose object he was no stranger to,) and giving spur to his horse, he determined to outstrip his pursuers. Middleton at the same instant put his horses to

* The horses being all shod by our own farriers, the shoes were made in the same form; which, with a private mark annexed to the fore shoes, and known to the troopers, pointed out the trail of our dragoons to each other, which was often very useful.

the top of their speed; and being (as the legion all were) well acquainted with the country, he recollected a short route through the woods to the bridge below Bergen, which diverged from the great road just after you gain the Three Pidgeons. Reaching the point of separation, he halted; and dividing his party, directed a sergeant with a few dragoons to take the near cut, and possess with all possible despatch the bridge, while he with the residue followed Champe; not doubting but that Champe must deliver himself up, as he would be closed between himself and his sergeant. Champe did not forget the short cut, and would have taken it himself, but he knew it was the usual route of our parties when returning in the day from the neighborhood of the enemy, properly preferring the woods to the road. He consequently avoided it; and persuaded that Middleton would avail himself of it, wisely resolved to relinquish his intention of getting to Paulus Hook, and to seek refuge from two British galleys, lying a few miles to the west of Bergen.

This was a station always occupied by one or two galleys, and which it was known now lay there. Entering the village of Bergen, Champe turned to his right, and disguising his change of course as much as he could by taking the beaten streets, turning as they turned, he passed through the village and took the road towards Elizabethtown Point. Middleton's sergeant gained the bridge, where he concealed himself, ready to pounce upon Champe when he came up; and

Middleton, pursuing his course through Bergen, soon got also to the bridge, when, to his extreme mortification, he found that the sergeant had slipped through his fingers. Returning up the road, he inquired of the villagers of Bergen, whether a dragoon had been seen that morning preceding his party. He was answered in the affirmative, but could learn nothing satisfactorily as to the route he took. While engaged in inquiries himself, he spread his party through the village to strike the trail of Champe's horse, a resort always recurred to. Some of his dragoons hit it just as the sergeant, leaving the village, got in the road to the Point. Pursuit was renewed with vigor, and again Champe was descried. He, apprehending the event, had prepared himself for it, by lashing his valise (containing his clothes and orderly book) on his shoulders, and holding his drawn sword in his hand, having thrown away its scabbard. This he did to save what was indispensable to him, and to prevent any interruption to his swimming by the scabbard, should Middleton, as he presumed, when disappointed at the bridge, take the measures adopted by him. The pursuit was rapid and close, as the stop occasioned by the sergeant's preparations for swimming had brought Middleton within two or three hundred yards. As soon as Champe got abreast of the galleys, he dismounted, and running through the marsh to the river, plunged into it, calling upon the galleys for help. This was readily given; they fired upon our horse, and sent a boat to meet Champe, who was taken in and carried on board, and conveyed

to New York with a letter from the captain of the galley, stating the past scene, all of which he had seen.

The horse with his equipments, the sergeant's cloak and sword scabbard, were recovered; the sword itself, being held by Champe until he plunged into the river, was lost, as Middleton found it necessary to retire without searching for it.

About three o'clock in the evening our party returned, and the soldiers, seeing the horse (well known to them) in our possession, made the air resound with exclamations that the scoundrel was killed.

Major Lee, called by this heart-rending annunciation from his tent, saw the sergeant's horse led by one of Middleton's dragoons, and began to reproach himself with the blood of the high prized faithful and intrepid Champe. Stifling his agony, he advanced to meet Middleton, and became somewhat relieved as soon as he got near enough to discern the countenance of his officer and party. There was evidence in their looks of disappointment, and he was quickly relieved by Middleton's information that the sergeant had effected his escape with the loss of his horse, and narrated the particulars just recited.

Lee's joy was now as full as, the moment before, his torture had been excruciating. Never was a happier conclusion. The sergeant escaped unhurt, carrying with him to the enemy undeniable testimony of the sincerity of his desertion,—cancelling every apprehension before entertained, lest the enemy might suspect him of being what he really was.

Major Lee imparted to the commander in chief the occurrence, who was sensibly affected by the hair-breadth escape of Champe, and anticipated with pleasure the good effect sure to follow the enemy's knowledge of its manner.

On the fourth day after Champe's departure, Lee received a letter from him, written the day before in a disguised hand, without any signature, and stating what had passed after he got on board the galley, where he was kindly received.

He was carried to the commandant of New York as soon as he arrived, and presented the letter addressed to this officer from the captain of the galley. Being asked to what corps he belonged, and a few other common questions, he was sent under care of an orderly sergeant to the adjutant-general, who, finding that he was sergeant-major of the legion horse, heretofore remarkable for their fidelity, he began to interrogate him. He was told by Champe, that such was the spirit of defection which prevailed among the American troops in consequence of Arnold's example, that he had no doubt, if the temper was properly cherished, Washington's ranks would not only be greatly thinned, but that some of his best corps would leave him. To this conclusion, the sergeant said, he was led by his own observations, and especially by his knowledge of the discontents which agitated the corps to which he had belonged. His size, place of birth, his form, countenance, color of his hair, the corps in which he had served, with other remarks, in conformity to the

British usage, was noted in a large folio book. After this was finished, he was sent to the commander in chief, in charge of one of the staff, with a letter from the adjutant-general. Sir Henry Clinton treated him very kindly, and detained him more than one hour, asking him many questions, all leading,—first to know to what extent this spirit of defection might be pushed by proper incitements,—what the most operating incitements,—whether any general officers were suspected by Washington as concerned in Arnold's conspiracy, or any other officers of note;—who they were, and whether the troops approved or censured Washington's suspicions;—whether his popularity in the army was sinking, or continued stationary. What was major Andre's situation,—whether any change had taken place in the manner of his confinement,—what was the current opinion of his probable fate,—and whether it was thought Washington would treat him as a spy. To these various interrogations, some of which were perplexing, Champe answered warily; exciting, nevertheless, hopes that the adoption of proper measures to encourage desertion (of which he could not pretend to form an opinion) would certainly bring off hundreds of the American soldiers, including some of the best troops, horse as well as foot. Respecting the fate of Andre, he said he was ignorant, though there appeared to be a general wish in the army that his life should not be taken; and that he believed it would depend more upon the disposition of Congress, than on the will of Washington.

After this long conversation ended, sir Henry presented Champe with a couple of guineas, and recommended him to wait upon general Arnold, who was engaged in raising an American legion in the service of his majesty. He directed one of his aids to write to Arnold by Champe, stating who he was, and what he had said about the disposition in the army to follow his example; which very soon done, it was given to the orderly attending on Champe to be presented with the deserter to general Arnold. Arnold expressed much satisfaction on hearing from Champe the manner of his escape, and the effect of Arnold's example; and concluded his numerous inquiries by assigning quarters to the sergeant,—the same as were occupied by his recruiting sergeants.

He also proposed to Champe to join his legion, telling him he would give to him the same station he had held in the rebel service, and promising further advancement when merited. Expressing his wish to retire from war, and his conviction of the certainty of his being hung if ever taken by the rebels, he begged to be excused from enlistment; assuring the general, that should he change his mind, he would certainly accept his offer. Retiring to the assigned quarters, Champe now turned his attention to the delivery of his letters, which he could not effect until the next night, and then only to one of the two incognita to whom he was recommended. This man received the sergeant with extreme attention, and having read the letter, assured Champe that he might rely on his faithful co-operation

in doing every thing in his power consistent with his safety, to guard which required the utmost prudence and circumspection. The sole object in which the aid of this individual was required, regarded the general and others of our army, implicated in the information sent to Washington by him. To this object Champe urged his attention; assuring him of the solicitude it had excited, and telling him that its speedy investigation had induced the general to send him into New York. Promising to enter upon it with zeal, and engaging to send out Champe's letters to major Lee, he fixed the time and place for their next meeting, when they separated.

Lee made known to the general what had been transmitted to him by Champe, and received in answer directions to press Champe to the expeditious conclusion of his mission; as the fate of Andre would be soon decided, when little or no delay could be admitted in executing whatever sentence the court might decree. The same messenger who brought Champe's letter, returned with the ordered communication. Five days had nearly elapsed after reaching New York, before Champe saw the confidant to whom only the attempt against Arnold was to be entrusted. This person entered with promptitude into the design, promising his cordial assistance. To procure a proper associate to Champe was the first object, and this he promised to do with all possible despatch. Furnishing a conveyance to Lee, we again heard from Champe, who stated what I have related, with the additional

intelligence that he had that morning (the last of September) been appointed one of Arnold's recruiting sergeants, having enlisted the day before with Arnold; and that he was induced to take this afflicting step, for the purpose of securing uninterrupted ingress and egress to the house which the general occupied; it being indispensable to a speedy conclusion of the difficult enterprise which the information he had just received had so forcibly urged. He added, that the difficulties in his way were numerous and stubborn, and that his prospect of success was by no means cheering. With respect to the additional treason, he asserted that he had every reason to believe that it was groundless; that the report took its rise in the enemy's camp, and that he hoped soon to clear up that matter satisfactorily. The pleasure which the last part of this communication afforded, was damped by the tidings it imparted respecting Arnold, as on his speedy delivery depended Andre's relief. The interposition of sir Henry Clinton, who was extremely anxious to save his much loved aid-de-camp, still continued; and it was expected the examination of witnesses and the defence of the prisoner, would protract the decision of the court of inquiry, now assembled, and give sufficient time for the consummation of the project committed to Champe. A complete disappointment took place from a quarter unforeseen and unexpected. The honorable and accomplished Andre, knowing his guilt, disdained defence, and prevented the examination of witnesses by confessing the character in which he

stood. On the next day (the 2d of October) the court again assembled; when every doubt that could possibly arise in the case having been removed by the previous confession, Andre was declared to be a spy, and condemned to suffer accordingly.

The sentence was executed on the subsequent day in the usual form, the commander in chief deeming it improper to interpose any delay. In this decision he was warranted by the very unpromising intelligence received from Champe,—by the still existing implication of other officers in Arnold's conspiracy,—by a due regard to public opinion,—and by real tenderness to the condemned.

Neither Congress nor the nation could have been with propriety informed of the cause of the delay, and without such information it must have excited in both alarm and suspicion. Andre himself could not have been entrusted with the secret, and would consequently have attributed the unlooked for event to the expostulation and exertion of sir Henry Clinton, which would not fail to produce in his breast expectations of ultimate relief; to excite which would have been cruel, as the realization of such expectation depended upon a possible but improbable contingency. The fate of Andre, hastened by himself, deprived the enterprise committed to Champe of a feature which had been highly prized by its projector, and which had very much engaged the heart of the individual chosen to execute it.

Washington ordered major Lee to communicate

what had passed to the sergeant, with directions to encourage him to prosecute with unrelaxed vigor the remaining objects of his instructions, but to intermit haste in the execution only as far as was compatible with final success.

This was accordingly done by the first opportunity, in the manner directed. Champe deplored the sad necessity which occurred, and candidly confessed that the hope of enabling Washington to save the life of Andre, (who had been the subject of universal commiseration in the American camp) greatly contributed to remove the serious difficulties which opposed his acceding to the proposition when first propounded. Some documents accompanied this communication, tending to prove the innocence of the accused general; they were completely satisfactory, and did credit to the discrimination, zeal and diligence of the sergeant. Lee inclosed them immediately to the commander in chief, who was pleased to express the satisfaction he derived from the information, and to order the major to wait upon him the next day; when the whole subject was re-examined, and the distrust heretofore entertained of the accused was for ever dismissed.*

* Copy of a letter from general Washington to major Lee, in his own handwriting.

October 13, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am very glad your letter, of this date, has given strength to my conviction of the innocence of the gentleman who was the subject of your inquiry.

I want

Nothing now remained to be done, but the seizure and safe delivery of Arnold. To this object Champe gave his undivided attention; and on the 19th October, major Lee received from him a very particular account of the progress he had made, with the outlines of his plan. This was, without delay, submitted to Washington; with a request for a few additional guineas. The general's letter,* written on the same day,

I want to see you on a particular piece of business. If the day is fair, and nothing of consequence intervenes, I will be at the marquis's quarters by ten o'clock to-morrow. If this should not happen, I shall be glad to see you at headquarters.

I am, dear sir, your obedient servant,

G. WASHINGTON.

* Copy of a letter from general Washington to major Lee, in his own handwriting.

Headquarters, October 20, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The plan proposed for taking A——d (the outlines of which are communicated in your letter, which was this moment put into my hands without date) has every mark of a good one. I therefore agree to the promised rewards; and have such entire confidence in your management of the business, as to give it my fullest approbation; and leave the whole to the guidance of your own judgment, with this express stipulation and pointed injunction, that he (A——d) is brought to me alive.

No circumstance whatever shall obtain my consent to his being put to death. The idea which would accompany such an event, would be that ruffians had been hired to assassinate him. My aim is to make a public example of him: and this should be strongly impressed upon those who are employed to bring him off. The sergeant must be very circumspect;—too much zeal may create

(20th October) evinces his attention to the minutiae of business, as well as his immutable determination to possess Arnold alive, or not at all. This was his original injunction, which he never omitted to enforce upon every proper occasion.

Major Lee had an opportunity in the course of the week of writing to Champe, when he told him that the rewards which he had promised to his associates would be certainly paid on the delivery of Arnold; and in the mean time, small sums of money would be furnished for casual expenses, it being deemed improper that he should appear with much, lest it might lead to suspicion and detection. That five guineas were now sent, and that more would follow when absolutely necessary.

Ten days elapsed before Champe brought his measures to conclusion, when Lee received from him his final communication, appointing the third subsequent night for a party of dragoons to meet him at

suspicion,—and too much precipitancy may defeat the project. The most inviolable secrecy must be observed on all hands. I send you five guineas; but I am not satisfied of the propriety of the sergeant's appearing with much specie. This circumstance may also lead to suspicion, as it is but too well known to the enemy that we do not abound in this article.

The interviews between the party in and out of the city, should be managed with much caution and seeming indifference; or else the frequency of their meetings, &c. may betray the design, and involve bad consequences; but I am persuaded you will place every matter in a proper point of view to the conductors of this interesting business, and therefore I shall only add, that

I am, dear sir, &c. &c.

G. WASHINGTON.

Hoboken, when he hoped to deliver Arnold to the officer. Champe had, from his enlistment into the American legion (Arnold's corps) every opportunity he could wish, to attend to the habits of the general. He discovered that it was his custom to return home about twelve every night, and that previous to going to bed he always visited the garden. During this visit the conspirators were to seize him, and being prepared with a gag, intended to have applied the same instantly.

Adjoining the house in which Arnold resided, and in which it was designed to seize and gag him, Champe had taken off several of the palings and replaced them, so that with care and without noise he could readily open his way to the adjoining alley. Into this alley he meant to have conveyed his prisoner, aided by his companion, one of two associates who had been introduced by the friend to whom Champe had been originally made known by letter from the commander in chief, and with whose aid and counsel he had so far conducted the enterprise. His other associate was with the boat prepared at one of the wharves on the Hudson river, to receive the party.

Champe and his friend intended to have placed themselves each under Arnold's shoulder, and to have thus borne him through the most unfrequented alleys and streets to the boat; representing Arnold, in case of being questioned, as a drunken soldier whom they were conveying to the guard-house.

When arrived at the boat the difficulties would be

all surmounted, there being no danger nor obstacle in passing to the Jersey shore. These particulars as soon as known to Lee, were communicated to the commander in chief, who was highly gratified with the much desired intelligence. He directed major Lee to meet Champe, and to take care that Arnold should not be hurt. The day arrived, and Lee with a party of dragoons left camp late in the evening, with three led accoutred horses; one for Arnold, one for the sergeant and the third for his associate, never doubting the success of the enterprise, from the tenor of the last received communication. The party reached Hoboken about midnight, where they were concealed in the adjoining wood,—Lee with three dragoons stationing himself near the river shore. Hour after hour passed,—no boat approached. At length the day broke and the major retired to his party, and with his led horses returned to camp, when he proceeded to headquarters to inform the general of the much lamented disappointment, as mortifying as inexplicable. Washington having perused Champe's plan and communication, had indulged the presumption that at length the object of his keen and constant pursuit was sure of execution, and did not dissemble the joy such conviction produced. He was chagrined at the issue, and apprehended that his faithful sergeant must have been detected in the last scene of his tedious and difficult enterprise.

In a few days, Lee received an anonymous letter from Champe's patron and friend, informing him that

on the day preceding the night fixed for the execution of the plot, Arnold had removed his quarters to another part of the town, to superintend the embarkation of troops, preparing (as was rumored) for an expedition to be directed by himself; and that the American legion, consisting chiefly of American deserters, had been transferred from their barracks to one of the transports; it being apprehended that if left on shore until the expedition was ready, many of them might desert. Thus it happened that John Champe, instead of crossing the Hudson that night, was safely deposited on board one of the fleet of transports, from whence he never departed until the troops under Arnold landed in Virginia! Nor was he able to escape from the British army until after the junction of lord Cornwallis at Petersburg, when he deserted; and proceeding high up into Virginia he passed into North Carolina near the Saura towns, and keeping in the friendly districts of that state, safely joined the army soon after it had passed the Congaree in pursuit of lord Rawdon.

His appearance excited extreme surprize among his former comrades, which was not a little increased when they saw the cordial reception he met with from the late major now lieutenant colonel Lee. His whole story soon became known to the corps, which reproduced the love and respect of officer and soldier (heretofore invariably entertained for the sergeant), heightened by universal admiration of his late daring and arduous attempt.

Champe was introduced to general Greene, who

very cheerfully complied with the promises made by the commander in chief, as far as in his power; and having provided the sergeant with a good horse and money for his journey, sent him to general Washington, who munificently anticipated every desire of the sergeant and presented him with his discharge from further service,* lest he might, in the vicissitudes of war, fall into the enemy's hands; when, if recognized, he was sure to die on a gibbet.

* When general Washington was called by president Adams to the command of the army, prepared to defend the country from French hostility, he sent to lieutenant colonel Lee to inquire for Champe; being determined to bring him into the field at the head of a company of infantry.

Lee sent to Loudon county, where Champe settled after his discharge from the army; when he learned that the gallant soldier had removed to Kentucky, where he soon after died.

CHAPTER XXXI.

LORD CORNWALLIS, whom we left at Wilmington, in pursuance of his ultimate decision (taken after much consideration) moved on the 25th of April; eighteen days after Greene had advanced upon Camden. Previous to his march, he communicated to major general Phillips his intention, and his route; designating Petersburg as the place of junction between himself and Phillips. Proceeding towards Halifax, on the Roanoke, the British general preserved (by the rigidity with which he enforced his orders) the country from devastation and private property from spoliation; hoping, by the exercise of his natural moderation and humanity, to give effect to his unremitted exertions to bring all the loyalists of North Carolina into active co-operation with his army. But wisely and perseveringly as he endeavored to realize this favorite object, very partial success followed. The severe chastisement so often experienced by these men, the unceasing vigilance of government, and the success of Greene's operations in South Carolina, were irresistible in their effect. Happily for themselves, happily for their country, these deluded people adhered to a state of quiescence. In this condition of things, the militia were ordered to the field, and some portions of them ac-

tually embodied,—well disposed (as militia always are) to sustain the common cause; but (like militia thus organized always are and ever will be) incapable of executing their wish, or the will of government. Lieutenant colonel Tarleton led, as usual, the advance of Cornwallis, supported by lieutenant colonel Hamilton, (of the North Carolina regiment) well known in that state, and universally esteemed and respected. To the influence and efforts of this officer may, in a great degree, be ascribed the moderation exhibited by these advanced corps* on their march; alike repugnant to the principles, the temper and habits heretofore displayed. During the tedious progress from Cape Fear to the Roanoke, the enemy met no interruption. Even

* Colonel Hamilton had, before the war, resided in Norfolk; where his goodness, hospitality and urbanity had attracted universal esteem. His business leading him into much acquaintance with the inhabitants of North Carolina, he acquired there, as in Norfolk, the general regard. Believing the mother country right in the dispute which led to the war, Hamilton took part with Great Britain, and became a soldier. He raised a regiment of North Carolinians, and both in the field and in the cabinet performed essential services to his general: serving in the South, first under Prevost, afterwards under sir Henry Clinton, and lastly under lord Cornwallis, in whose confidence he stood very high. Not only the native goodness of his heart set Hamilton against those destructive proceedings too often practised by the corps of Tarleton; but he was particularly desirous to preserve the inhabitants of North Carolina safe from insult and injury; in consequence as well of his own acquaintance with many of them, as of his present solicitude to bring the mass of the people into support of the royal measures.

his foraging parties were undisturbed; and the marauders accompanying his army passed and repassed in security, unless detected and apprehended by British guards and British patrols. A general torpor* prevailed throughout the country through which the British general took his course; ascribable, not to the languor of the inhabitants, but to the impotency of government. After reaching Halifax, the British army halted. Here the restrained licentiousness of the unprincipled burst out, and shocking outrages were committed upon our unprotected fellow citizens,—disgraceful to British arms, and degrading to the name of man.†

General Phillips took possession of Petersburg on

* At Swift run, and at Fish creek, parties of our militia skirmished with the British van,—but these attempts were slight and soon crushed. They were the only ones essayed between Wilmington and Halifax, where a more serious effort ensued; but this too was quickly overpowered.

† These enormities being discovered by lord Cornwallis, he followed the light troops about four miles beyond the Roanoke, and halted their march.

“On the arrival of some country people, earl Cornwallis directed lieutenant colonel Tarleton to dismount his dragoons and mounted infantry, and to form them into a rank entire for the convenient inspection of the inhabitants, to facilitate the discovery of the villains who had committed atrocious outrages the preceding evening. A sergeant and one private dragoon were pointed out, and accused of rape and robbery: they were conducted to Halifax, where they were condemned to death by martial law. The immediate infliction of the sentence, exhibited to the army and manifested to the country the discipline and justice of the British general.” (See Tarleton’s Campaigns.)

the 9th of May, extremely ill with a bilious fever, which had afflicted him for several days; and in spite of all medical exertions, it put a period to his life on the 13th; by which event the command of the army devolved upon brigadier Arnold.

Cornwallis leaving Halifax, passed the Roanoke, whence he detached lieutenant colonel Tarleton with his legion to the Meherrion, to hold the fords across that river: lieutenant colonel Simcoe, with his rangers, being at the same time sent forward by general Arnold to the Nottoway, for the like purpose. No interruption was attempted against either detachment: all the force assembled for the protection of the state being with La Fayette in his position near Richmond. Following the advanced corps, Cornwallis passed the Meherrion, then the Nottoway; and on the 20th entered Petersburg.

One month of the best season of the year for military operations, had been nearly expended in the march from Wilmington by one army; while the other, during the like period, occupied itself in the trivial expeditions heretofore described,—as inoperative to effect the great object in view, as they were disgraceful to the British government, and oppressive to individuals.

The union of the two armies gave to the British general a force so far superior to his enemy, as to threaten the destruction of Virginia. Cornwallis did not excel in numbers only; his troops were excellent, with the exception of Arnold's corps. Exclusive of the garrison of Portsmouth, two battalions of light in-

fantry, the Queen's rangers (horse and foot) under lieutenant colonel Simcoe, the seventy-sixth and eightieth British regiments, with that of Hesse (called der Prince Hereditaire), two companies of yagers, and Arnold's American legion, with a well appointed detachment of artillery, composed the force lately under Phillips, and were now united to the tried troops of the South. In addition, a reinforcement was in James river from New York under general Leslie, consisting of the seventeenth and forty-third regiments, British, and two battalions of Anspach. The seventeenth regiment and the Anspach battalions were ordered to Portsmouth, the command of which post was confided to general Leslie, while the forty-third proceeded to join Cornwallis. About this time the British general received a despatch from lord Rawdon, communicating his victory at Hobkirk's hill; and as if nothing should be wanting to stimulate the exertions of his lordship, he was also officially advised of the sailing of a fleet from Cork in Ireland, with three regiments, destined for South Carolina.

The success of Rawdon, and the reinforcement from Ireland, calmed the disquietude heretofore excited in the breast of Cornwallis by general Greene's return to South Carolina; and reproduced the fallacious hope, that while he prostrated Virginia, Rawdon would maintain undiminished his late conquests.

La Fayette still held his position near Richmond, occasionally strengthened by detachments of militia, brought into the field by the unceasing efforts of governor Jefferson.

Baron Steuben, with six hundred levies, was on the south of James river, proceeding to South Carolina to reinforce Greene; and brigadier Wayne, with the Pennsylvania line, (now reduced to eight or nine hundred) was on his march from the Northern army to unite with La Fayette.

The baron was recalled, and directed to take post at the Point of Fork, the depot of most of our remaining military stores; and general Nelson, with two thousand militia in the field, continued with La Fayette; while general Weedon, of the continental line, (now at home, in consequence of the diminution of our force,) was requested to collect a corps of the militia in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, for the purpose of covering the most important and well conducted manufactory of arms in the state, established at Falmouth, a small village on the north of the Rappahannoc, one mile above Fredericksburg, and under the direction of Mr. John Strode,—a gentleman singularly adapted, by his genius and habits, for its superintendence.

La Fayette's force, in his camp below Richmond, did not exceed four thousand, of which three fourths were militia. But in conformity to the system adopted by governor Jefferson, continental officers were substituted, in the higher commands, for those of the militia; which, although not very well relished by those who retired, was highly grateful to the soldiers; who, perceiving the perils before them, rejoiced in being led by tried and experienced men. Such will always

be the effect of acknowledged danger on the mind of man.

La Fayette selected seven hundred and fifty of his best militia marksmen, and dividing them into three corps of light infantry, of two hundred and fifty each, he placed them respectively under the orders of majors Call, Willis, and Dick, regular officers. This arrangement was judicious, and during the campaign its beneficial effect was often felt.

Could the American general have united to this body of infantry an adequate corps of cavalry, he would have very much increased its utility; but of this species of force he was unfortunately almost destitute, although the two states of Maryland and Virginia furnish horses of the best quality. Only the remnant of Armand's corps (not more than sixty), and a troop of volunteer dragoons, under captain Carter Page, late of Baylor's corps, were with him.

Sir Henry Clinton states the force in Virginia, previous to the arrival of lord Cornwallis, to be five thousand three hundred and four. Since his lordship's assumption of the command, general Leslie (as has been mentioned) joined with three regiments from New York, of which the forty-third was added to the army. The field force under Cornwallis cannot be estimated under eight thousand,—more than double of that acting with his adversary. What added vastly to this superiority was the enemy's strength in horse. His dragoons were rated at four hundred, to which were united seven or eight hundred mounted infantry. Dur-

ing four days' halt in Petersburg, which period of rest was necessary to the army from Wilmington, the British general communicated his situation, strength and views to his commander in chief, and gave all requisite directions to the corps of Leslie occupying Portsmouth,—that of Craig, in possession of Wilmington,—and to lord Rawdon, commanding the army of defence in the two southern states. On the 24th of May his lordship moved, taking the route on the south of the Appomattox, with a determination of passing the James river at Westover, the elegant seat of the late colonel Byrd; where he not only could avail himself of maritime aid in the transportation of his army across the river, but might with facility draw to him the forty-third regiment, not yet disembarked. Here general Arnold, having obtained permission to return to New York, left the army. This step has been ascribed to two motives, each of which probably had its influence: the first was a prospect of a very active campaign, in the vicissitudes whereof he might fall into our hands; and the last, his own unpleasant situation among the British officers,—always irksome to him from their objections to his company and control, and now considerably increased by the reluctance of the officers who had served with so much glory and effect in the Carolinas, to receive orders from a traitor.

Nearly three days were occupied in the passage of James river; although unobstructed by any attempt on our side, and although facilitated by every exertion on the part of the British navy, and though all the horses

belonging to the army swam the river, more than two miles wide.

As soon as the rear division had passed, the main body proceeded to White Oak swamp, to which place the light troops under Tarleton and Simcoe had moved the day previous. La Fayette, well informed of the enemy's motions, and prepared for retreat, broke up from his position below Richmond, and fell behind the Chickohominy river, in the direction towards Fredericksburg; for the double purpose of approximating brigadier Wayne, on his march from the north, and of covering the manufactory of arms in the vicinity of Falmouth.

The British general followed with zeal and rapidity, and crossed the Chickohominy at Bottom bridge, manifesting his determination to force La Fayette into battle before his junction with Wayne; which certainly ought to have been his primary object, and might have been effected by his decided superiority in cavalry, augmented by mounted infantry.

La Fayette felt his extreme inferiority, and used every mean in his power to draw to his aid additional reinforcements in horse and foot. To the governor, to Steuben, to Nelson, and to Weedon, he applied with zeal bordering on importunity; and his applications received, as they merited, due respect. But the preparations had been improvidently delayed, and the loss of our military stores at Westham, during Arnold's invasion, deprived us of the necessary arms and equipments; which, with the removal of families and of pro-

perty, prevailing now in every direction, very much limited the effect of the various exertions made to comply with his requests.

During the invasion of Leslie, which followed that under Matthews, governor Jefferson (in pursuance of the full powers with which he had been invested by the general assembly) had brought into the field some legionary corps, under the most approved continental officers of the Virginia line.

Brigadier Lawson, (who commanded one of the two brigades of Virginia militia which behaved so handsomely at the battle of Guilford court-house) was at the head of the strongest of these corps, having under him the lieutenant colonels Monroe,* Bannister and Mercer.† As soon as Leslie abandoned Virginia to join Cornwallis in South Carolina, Lawson's corps was disbanded; by which means the horse commanded by Bannister was lost to the state, when our situation now so pressingly required cavalry.

On receiving La Fayette's request, brigadier Weedon applied to lieutenant colonel Mercer, formerly of Lawson's legion, and who had served from the first year of the war in the celebrated third regiment of Virginia, until the battle of Monmouth. He was then one of the aids of major general Lee; and believing his general's suspension from his command both unjust and unwise, he retired from the profession of arms, for which he was well qualified, and in which he had acquired,

* James Monroe, now secretary of state.

† John Mercer, late governor of Maryland.

by severe and active service, considerable proficiency with personal distinction. This gentleman instantly complied with Weedon's application; and in a few days he raised a troop of dragoons, composed of the youth of the best families in his neighborhood, mounted and equipped at their own expense. With this troop Mercer hastened to the retiring army,—a small but acceptable aid.

La Fayette, adhering to the example and instructions of Greene, continued to retreat; and before Cornwallis reached the Chickohominy, had passed the Pamunkey, the southern branch of York river.

In this position he was overtaken by a detachment of the light troops under lieutenant colonel Tarleton, whose sudden approach compelled him to form his army for battle. Had this movement of Tarleton been intended as a serious operation, it would have been adequately supported, and must have terminated in the destruction or dispersion of the American force; an event full of ill, not only to the suffering state but to the Union.

Wayne and Steuben never could have joined but by crossing the Blue Ridge, and uniting on its western side. Cornwallis seems to have been sure of his meditated victim, if we may judge of his expectation from a paragraph of a letter of his, published in doctor Ramsay's history of the revolution in South Carolina, wherein he says, "the boy cannot escape me." Like all soldiers over confident, he contrived to foil himself. The realization of such expectation was not, indeed,

difficult; as La Fayette had not preserved, on his retreat, the distance from his enemy claimed by his great inferiority.

He was often not more than twenty miles from the British general, who had at his disposal at least one thousand horse and mounted infantry. Putting one soldier behind each of those mounted, he could by an easy exertion, in any twenty-four hours, have placed two thousand veterans, conducted by skilful and experienced officers, close to his enemy; whose attempt to retreat would have been so embarrassed and delayed as to have given time for the main body to have approached. Then La Fayette's destruction would have been as easy as inevitable. Why this plain mode of operation was overlooked and neglected by Cornwallis, did then and does still excite the surprise of all intelligent soldiers conversant with the transaction. Lieutenant colonel Mercer, with his small corps of horse, joined La Fayette in this critical situation, and was very instrumental in discovering that the corps under Tarleton was only a large patrol. The communication of this intelligence repressed those afflicting reflections which the evidence of such impending danger could not fail to create in a leader less penetrating and less anxious than was the gallant La Fayette.

Tarleton did not continue long in his front, during which time one of his exploring parties was so fortunate as to intercept a courier conveying letters from the American general to Greene, Steuben and governor Jefferson. In the letter to Jefferson, the marquis, as

lieutenant colonel Tarleton informs us, " prophetically declared, that the British success in Virginia resembled the French invasion and possession of Hanover* in the preceding war, and was likely to have similar consequences, if the government and the country would exert themselves at the present juncture."

As soon as the British patrolle drew off, La Fayette broke up, and abandoning the protection of Fredericksburg, and the manufactory of arms in its neighbourhood, hastened by forced marches through the western district of Spotsylvania county, across the head

* It is well known that the marshal D'Estrees was opposed, in the preceding war, to the duke of Cumberland in Germany; and that passing the river Weser, he followed the duke step by step; overtook him at Hastenbek, fought him and beat him.

Marshal Richelieu now succeeded D'Estrees, and pressing the late victory, drove the duke upon the mouth of the Elbe, when he surrendered his army by convention; by which means the electorate of Hanover fell into the possession of the French.

The great Frederick, already in the greatest distress, was in consequence of the surrender of the duke of Cumberland, more oppressed; as it enabled the prince of Soubise, at the head of one of the armies closing upon Frederick, to draw a considerable reinforcement from marshal Richelieu. Nevertheless the king of Prussia fell upon Soubise at Rosbach, and gained a signal victory. The Hanoverians, encouraged by this event, exerted themselves greatly; and as the French monarch had not ratified the convention of Closterseven, the army of the duke was considered as relieved from its conditions, and joined to the Hanoverians. Richelieu was speedily forced out of Hanover with considerable loss; and the electorate restored to the king of England.

waters of the Mattapony, the northern branch of York river, to gain the road on which Wayne was advancing. This unavoidable departure from his original system was executed with indefatigable diligence; nor did he ever again, during his retreat, risk himself within twenty miles of his able foe; so thoroughly had Tarleton's late approach convinced him of the peril to which he had been exposed.

Cornwallis persevered in pursuit; but finding that the distance between his adversary and himself daily increased, he halted and turned his mind to inferior objects. He had in the preceding campaign experienced the inanity of pursuing Greene; and forgetting his then and present condition, as well as that of Greene and of La Fayette, he determined to struggle no longer to stop the junction of the latter with Wayne, but to employ his force in cowering the mind of the state, and in destroying all its remaining resources for the maintenance of armed resistance.

To this decision he seems to have been led by his conviction that Wayne, united to La Fayette, diminished so little the relative size of himself and his antagonist, as to forbid his inattention to other objects deemed by himself important, while it would increase the chance of striking his meditated blow against both. Two considerations, entitled to weight, supported this decision. The first grew out of the character of Wayne, which, after junction with La Fayette could not but mix itself in the subsequent operations, he being second in command; and the last arose from the

increase of difficulty in movement, as well as in the procurement of necessary food for man and horse; which, like the first, invited withdraw from further pursuit at present; turning his attention to the execution of such plans, as would manifest to the inhabitants their defenceless condition, and inflame their passions against those entrusted with their safety, who had thus abandoned them to the enemy.

Although the course adopted by the British general varied materially from that which a just estimate of the conjuncture and of his own superiority seemed to dictate, yet it was supported by cogent considerations.

Cornwallis might have pursued his flying enemy with increased vigor, as has been before explained; and this he ought to have done, especially after being informed by Tarleton of the effect of his approach. Pressing La Fayette by forced marches, his two thousand mounted veterans must have overtaken him before Wayne joined; and in the attempt to overtake, by understanding the situation of Wayne, it is possible he might have so operated on La Fayette's anxiety to avoid battle, (by adhering to the intermediate route between Fayette and Wayne) as to have induced the former to fall off to his left, placing himself behind the little mountains of Orange county, and yielding up as well his junction with Wayne, as Wayne and his detachment. This heavy sacrifice would have been justified by the consequent salvation of the army of La Fayette. But should La Fayette's judgment and in-

telligence have enabled him to avoid the keen pursuit, and to have made good his junction with Wayne, his united force was still so inadequate, that he must persevere in retreat, when that operation would not only be rendered more difficult than before from his augmentation in force, but from the peculiar character as well of his brave second as of the brave corps under his command.

Wayne had a constitutional attachment to the decision of the sword, and this cast of character had acquired strength from indulgence, as well as from the native temper of the troops he commanded. They were known by the designation of the line of Pennsylvania; whereas they might have been with more propriety called the line of Ireland.

Bold and daring, they were impatient and refractory; and would always prefer an appeal to the bayonet, to a toilsome march.

Restless under the want of food and whiskey; adverse to absence from their baggage; and attached to the pleasures of the table; Wayne and his brigade were more encumbered with wagons than any equal portion of the army.

The general and his soldiers were singularly fitted for close and stubborn action, hand to hand, in the centre of the army; but very little adapted to the prompt and toilsome service to which La Fayette was and must be exposed, so long as the British general continued to press him.

Cornwallis therefore did not miscalculate when he

presumed that the junction of Wayne would increase, rather than diminish, his chance of bringing his antagonist to action.

Had the British general pressed forward, determining never to stop until he forced his enemy to the last appeal, La Fayette or Wayne must have fallen if severed from each other; and if united both might have been destroyed. The Rappahannoc lay in their rear: this river must be passed, and was in various points fordable unless swelled by fall of rain. If the American army made good its retreat over the Rappahannoc, it never could reach the Potomac without a blow; and that blow, from the enemy's vast superiority of horse, must have been fatal.

The destruction of La Fayette being accomplished, the British general had only to take post on the heights above Stafford court-house, with his left resting on the village of Falmouth, to have secured all the plentiful country in his rear between the two rivers, as well as that on the southern margin of the Rappahannoc; and to have established a convenient communication with such portion of his fleet as he might require to be sent up the Potomac.

This course of operations was however happily omitted, and another was adopted, very unlike the adventurous and decisive policy which had heretofore uniformly distinguished lord Cornwallis.

It appears as if sir Henry Clinton had contemplated a move of the Virginia army to the head of the Chesapeake, to which, it seems, he was encouraged by a

confidence that in Maryland, in Pennsylvania, and in a portion of Virginia on the upper Potomac, he should find a large body of determined friends.

The evidence which supported such conclusion remains unascertained. As far as American information can be relied upon, we may venture to conclude that the British commander in chief was very much misinformed. Some trifling districts in parts of Maryland, and a small portion of the county of Hampshire in Virginia, was believed to be well affected to Great Britain; but if all the disaffected in both states had been united in any one spot they would have presented but an inconsiderable allurements to the formation of a plan like that supposed to be entertained by sir Henry Clinton.

Whatever might have been the British general's intelligence and views, it is very evident, from his letters to lord Cornwallis, that he inclined very much to hold his lordship near to Hampton Roads, for the protection of such of the British navy as should be employed within the capes of Virginia, and with the design of pushing solid operations at the head of the Chesapeake, as soon as every apprehension of interruption from the French navy should cease.

Considerations drawn from due respect to the plan of his chief no doubt contributed to turn lord Cornwallis from the splendid prospect before him.

The British general having decided on his course made two considerable detachments from his army while encamped in the county of Hanover, for the

purpose of destroying our magazines at the Point of Fork,* under the protection of baron Steuben with the raw levys under him, and of seizing the governor and the members of the general assembly of the commonwealth convened at Charlotteville, a small town on the western side of the Rivannah, the northern branch of James river.

Lieutenant colonel Simcoe commanded one of these detachments, composed of the Queen's rangers (horse and foot) and the yagers, amounting to five hundred men; while the other, consisting of the legion and one company of the twenty-third regiment, was placed under the orders of lieutenant colonel Tarleton.

Simcoe was directed to fall upon the baron if practicable; at all events to force him across the Fluvannah, the southern branch of James river, and to destroy our magazines; while Tarleton was charged with the interception of the governor and general assembly, and the destruction of all military stores and other resources necessary for the maintenance of the war on his route.

These enterprising officers took their parts with their accustomed vigor.

Recrossing the North and South Anna branch of the Pamunkey, Simcoe proceeded on the direct route to the Point of Fork, and Tarleton moved on the road to Louisa court-house.

* The Point of Fork is the tongue of land made by the Rivannah and Fluvannah rivers at their confluence, when the united streams take the name of James river.

Cornwallis, with the main body, followed on the route of Simcoe.

The former officer conducted his march with the utmost secrecy; and, by detaining as prisoners all whom he overtook, he concealed his advance from the baron. Although unapprised of the intended real attack upon his post, Steuben became acquainted with the movement of Tarleton. In consequence of this information the baron engaged with diligence in removing our stores of every sort to the southern banks of the Fluvannah; which being done, he passed the river with his corps, carrying all the boats to the south side thereof. Simcoe reached the Point of Fork about the conclusion of the baron's passage over the river, and captured a few of our troops waiting for the return of some of the boats. Chagrined at this disappointment, the British commander determined to recover by stratagem what he had lost by his enemy's foresight. He encamped on the heights opposite to our camp, and by the number of his fires suggested to the baron the probability that the whole British army was only divided from him by the river. Thus impressed, and knowing that the corps of Tarleton was on his left, Steuben believed himself to be in imminent danger, and decided on saving his corps by the sacrifice of his stores. During the night the baron drew off, and, marching diligently, placed himself thirty miles from his foe. As soon as Simcoe perceived the next morning that the baron had decamped, he detached captain Stevenson with a section of light in-

fantry and cornet Wolsey with four dragoons across the river in canoes: the first to destroy our stores, and the second, by mounting his dragoons on such horses as he could procure, to patrol some miles on the route of the baron to preserve the appearance of continuation of pursuit. Wolsey's advance had the desired effect. One of the baron's exploring parties fell in with Wolsey, and presuming that he was the precursor to the light corps, retired precipitately to the baron with information of the occurrence. Our corps was immediately put in motion, and retired still further from the river. Nor would the baron have halted until he reached general Greene, but for orders from Greene directing him to return to Fayette. Most of the arms found were muskets out of repair: they were however destroyed, as were the other military stores, except some brass cannon and mortars, which were mounted on carriages and conveyed to the British headquarters.

Lieutenant colonel Tarleton leaving the neighborhood of Louisa court-house about two in the morning, having rested his corps only three hours, pursued his march with vigor.

Unluckily for Greene's distressed army, Tarleton overtook twelve wagons laden with clothing, under a weak guard, proceeding south. These were instantly possessed, and burnt. The British lieutenant colonel, knowing that his success depended on his activity, continued his march with diligence; but hearing that some of our influential citizens,—refugees from the lower country,—resided at Dr. Walker's, and at Mr.

John Walker's, whose houses were near his route, he injudiciously determined to spare the time necessary for the capture of all who might be found at the two houses. Detaching captain Kinlock with one troop for the purpose of securing those at Mr. John Walker's, he went himself to the doctor's, where he found Mr. John Simms, of Hanover, brother to Patrick Henry, a member of the senate, with other gentlemen.

Captain Kinlock was equally successful.* He surprised and took three of our citizens,—Francis Kinlock, a member of congress from South Carolina, and William and Robert Nelson, brothers to general Nelson, all young and active; and who suspecting the approach of parties of the enemy had taken measures for their safety, which by the address and rapid advance of the British captain were rendered unavailing. This waste of time saved the members of the assembly. Before the British cavalry reached Walker's, Mr. Jouitte, a private gentleman, luckily descried them; and, much to his credit, hastened by a disused road to Charlottesville to alarm the general assembly, believing their capture to be the enemy's object.

Tarleton spent some time in resting his horses, and in paroling such of his prisoners as he chose to indulge with their paroles. Then resuming his march, he ad-

* This officer was a near relation to Francis Kinlock, member of congress. When he left England for America he told their common relations, that he should certainly capture his cousin; which prediction was now verified, improbable as it was.

vanced with ardor upon Charlotteville; not doubting, as he had marched seventy miles in twenty-four hours, that his success would be complete.

Nor could he have been disappointed, had he not halted at Walker's: for active and anxious as was Mr. Jouitte to outstrip the enemy, he would probably have failed but for Tarleton's occupation with a secondary object; or even if he had been so fortunate as to have preceded the enemy, the few minutes' notice would have been insufficient to secure a general escape.

As soon as the British van reached the Rivanna, it pressed forward in full charge through the river, followed by the main body. A small guard posted on the western bank was overpowered, and the enemy with concurring celerity fell upon the town. Jouitte had previously arrived, and the assembly adjourning immediately, its members hastened away. A few of these gentlemen were nevertheless taken, as were several officers and soldiers. All our stores at this place, consisting of four hundred pounds of powder, one thousand stand of arms (manufactured in the armory near Falmouth), a quantity of tobacco, and some clothing provided for the Southern army, were destroyed. The British troops taken at Saratoga were cantoned in the neighborhood of this village, and many of the soldiers were permitted to labor for their own emolument in the vicinity of the barracks. Of these twenty joined the British lieutenant colonel in the few hours he continued in Charlotteville.

The attempt to take the governor, who was at his

house in sight of the town, failed. Apprised of the approach of the dragoons, he very readily saved himself by taking shelter in an adjacent spar of the mountains.

Lieutenant colonel Tarleton leaving Charlottesville in the afternoon, proceeded down the Rivanna towards the Point of Fork, in the neighborhood whereof lord Cornwallis had arrived with the main body.

La Fayette did not intermit retreat until he passed the Rapidan, the southern branch of the Rappahannoc. In a few days afterwards the corps under Wayne, between eight and nine hundred strong, joined him.

Soon after Tarleton's return to lord Cornwallis, his corps was reinforced by the seventy-sixth regiment, commanded by major Needham, and the lieutenant colonel received orders to mount the seventy-sixth, and to prepare for another expedition.* By reference

* Copy of a letter from earl Cornwallis to lieutenant colonel Tarleton.

Jefferson's Plantation, June 9th, 1781.

DEAR TARLETON,

You will proceed with the detachment of cavalry and mounted infantry under your command, before day break to-morrow morning, to Old Albemarle court-house, where you will destroy any stores you may find. If you then hear of no other stores of any consequence on this side the Fluvannah, and the baron Steuben should be still on the other side, you will cross that river, and make it your principal object to strike a blow at baron Steuben; as the corps under his command consists of part of the new leveys, and is the foundation on which the body of the eighteen month's men, lately voted by the province of Virginia, will be formed. It will be of the utmost importance to defeat

to lord Cornwallis's instructions, published in Tarleton's Campaigns, the destruction of our stores at Albemarle Old Court-house, the pursuit and dispersion of the corps of Steuben, and the interception of some light troops believed to be on their march from the army of Greene to reinforce La Fayette, constituted

and destroy it: I shall, therefore, wish you to take every means in your power of effecting this service, if you should see a probability of success. I likewise recommend it to you to destroy all the enemy's stores and tobacco between James river and the Dan; and if there should be a quantity of provisions or corn collected at a private house, I would have you destroy it, even although there should be no proof of its being intended for the public service, leaving enough for the support of the family; as there is the greatest reason to apprehend that such provisions will be ultimately appropriated by the enemy to the use of general Greene's army, which, from the present state of the Carolinas, must depend on this province for its supplies.

I shall proceed by easy marches to Richmond, and it will probably be a business of eight or nine days from this time before I can get up my boats to that place to receive you; so that you may very well employ that time on your expedition. As it is very probable that some of the light troops of general Greene's army may be on their march to this country, you will do all you can to procure intelligence of their route. I need not tell you of what importance it will be to intercept them, or any prisoners of ours from South Carolina.

I would have all persons of consequence, either civil or military, brought to me before they are paroled. Most sincerely wishing you success, and placing the greatest confidence in your zeal and abilities, I am, with great truth and regard,

Dear Tarleton,

Most faithfully yours,

CORNWALLIS.

the objects of the intended enterprise. Lieutenant colonel Tarleton was directed, after completing his expedition, to take the route on the south side of James river to the town of Manchester, where boats would be provided to transport himself and corps across the river to Richmond, to which place the British general intended to proceed.

La Fayette, having effected his junction with Wayne, lost no time in recrossing the Rapidan, and advancing toward his enemy—of whose proceedings he was regularly advised, and whose present position was ascertained. Penetrating into the most prominent of his lordship's designs, the American general took the resolution of interrupting their execution. With this view he moved towards Albermarle Old Court-house, holding himself convenient to the upper country. Cornwallis, apprized as well of the junction of Wayne as of the direction of La Fayette's course of march, did not doubt but that the preservation of the stores at Albermarle Old Court-house, and the safety of the corps of Steuben, alike engaged his adversary's intention. Willing that his antagonist should proceed on his experiment, the British general held back lieutenant colonel Tarleton, who was now ready for the intended expedition, and continued in his position at Jefferson's plantation, convenient to his adversary's presumed route, with a detachment to fall upon him in his progress. La Fayette's discernment and activity baffled completely these views. Turning into a difficult and unfrequented road, which not only shorten-

ed his distance to the point in view, but threw him further from the enemy, he crossed the Rivannah before the British general was acquainted with his having reached it; and taking post behind Mechunck's creek, sat down on the direct route from the British camp to Albermarle Old Court-house. Here he was reinforced by colonel Clarke, one of the heroes of King's Mountain, with his brave rifle militia. The expedition, for the execution of which Tarleton was prepared, was relinquished; and the British general, drawing in his van corps, fell back on the ensuing day towards Richmond.

Notwithstanding the junction of Wayne, and the succeeding reinforcement under Clarke, the British general continued to possess a decided superiority of force, not only in quality but in number. Steuben was still at a distance from La Fayette, and the destruction of the last would not fail in being followed by that of the first.

What reasons could operate on lord Cornwallis to induce him now to retire, when so many considerations urged his advance, remain unascertained. Certainly he must have acted in obedience to orders which have never yet been fully promulgated.

He was the same general who had attacked Gates at the head of a very superior army, and who afterwards fought Greene, though nearly double his number. In both instances he risked his own destruction, and, although victorious in the issue, was upon both occasions on the threshold of ruin.

Now when victory was certain, when serious injury to himself was impracticable, and when his vast power in horse assured to him the complete improvement of success, he resigns his spirit of enterprise, and permits his inferior foe to enjoy undisturbed repose.

This change in conduct must be ascribed to the interference of his superior; and Cornwallis' letter of the 26th of May,* to the British commander in chief, satisfactorily evinces that his present operations were

* Copy of a letter from earl Cornwallis to sir Henry Clinton.

Byrd's plantation, James river, 26th May, 1781.

The arrival of the reinforcement has made me easy about Portsmouth for the present. I have sent general Leslie thither with the seventeenth regiment and the two battalions of Anspach, keeping the forty-third with the army. I shall now proceed to dislodge La Fayette from Richmond; and, with my light troops, to destroy any magazines or stores in the neighborhood, which may have been collected either for his use or general Greene's army. From thence I propose to move to the neck of Williamsburgh, which is represented as healthy, and where some subsistence may be procured; and keep myself unengaged from operations which might interfere with your plan for the campaign, until I have the satisfaction of hearing from you. I hope I shall then have an opportunity to receive better information than has hitherto been in my power to procure, relative to a proper harbor and place of arms. At present I am inclined to think well of York. The objections to Portsmouth are, that it cannot be made strong, without an army to defend it; that it is remarkably unhealthy, and can give no protection to a ship of the line. Wayne has not yet joined La Fayette; nor can I positively learn where he is, nor what is his force. Greene's cavalry are said to be coming this way; but I have no certain accounts of it.

intended to be extremely limited, being subordinate to some grand design conceived by sir Henry Clinton to be executed within the year. The retreat of the British general was soon known in the American camp, and La Fayette put his army in motion. Pleasing as was this unexpected turn in the enemy's course, the American general continued to follow with undiminished circumspection, holding his main body between twenty and thirty miles in the rear of the foe, and exploring his front and flanks with his cavalry and riflemen. Lieutenant colonel Tarleton, with the legion strengthened by the seventy sixth regiment, was charged with the rear and one flank of the retiring army, while its other flank was committed to Simcoe at the head of the queen's rangers.

Cornwallis, secure from insult or surprise, had the force and views of La Fayette encouraged such attempts, proceeded by slow and convenient marches, without making a single effort to strike his following enemy. On the 15th of June the British general reached Westham, and on the subsequent day he entered Richmond, where he halted.

La Fayette, observing his usual distance, continued to follow in the British rear; and, during the enemy's halt in Richmond, took a strong position on Allen's creek, in the county of Goochland, twenty-two miles from Cornwallis, detaching his light troops close to the enemy's advanced posts—the one at Westham, commanded by Simcoe, and the other at the Meadow Bridge, under the orders of lieutenant colonel Tarleton.

On the 18th, Tarleton believing, from the intelligence he had acquired, the position of the corps under brigadier Muhlenbergh—posted some little distance in front and to the left of the main body—vulnerable, made a sudden movement from the Meadow Bridge to beat up his quarters. But, secret as was his advance, the brigadier gained timely information of his approach; and, falling back upon La Fayette, met a detachment under general Wayne sent to his support. As soon as Tarleton discovered the movement of Muhlenbergh, he returned to his post. While engaged in this operation, lieutenant colonel Mercer with his troop of horse passed in the enemy's rear, and reconnoitred, by order of his general, the position of lord Cornwallis encamped on the heights of Richmond. On his return Mercer fell in with one of Tarleton's patrols of horse, who were pursued, taken, and safely conveyed to the American camp.

This was the only advantage of the sort as yet obtained by our army during the preceding active operations.

The British general halted but a few days in Richmond, and resumed his march for Portsmouth, in pursuance of sir Henry Clinton's instructions, as are plainly to be inferred from the letter of lord Cornwallis of the 26th of May. Taking the direct route to Williamsburgh, and consulting as heretofore, by his mode of march, the ease of his troops, he entered Williamsburgh on the 25th.

La Fayette while in his camp above Richmond was joined by the baron with his corps of levys, about six hundred. This accession of force increased his army to between four and five thousand, of which two thousand one hundred were regulars, and fifteen hundred of these were veteran troops. The residue were composed of different corps of militia, better fitted for service than usual, as most of the higher grades were filled by continental officers. Still we were inferior in numbers to the enemy by a third, and very deficient in cavalry, in which the British general continued to excel. Informed of Cornwallis' resumption of retreat, La Fayette followed, and passing through Richmond reached on the third evening New Kent court-house, from which place the British general had moved in the morning of the previous day.

From hence the American headquarters were transferred to Tyre's plantation, twenty miles from Williamsburgh.

During this march no attempt was made by either general to disturb the other; a game of all others the most to be desired by La Fayette, as the campaign was wasting without improvement by his superior foe. While in his camp before Williamsburgh, the British general learnt that we had some boats and stores on the Chickahominy river. Hither he detached lieutenant colonel Simcoe with his corps and the yagers to destroy them. This service was promptly performed: but the American general, having discovered from his exploring parties the march of Simcoe,

detached on the 26th lieutenant colonel Butler, of the Pennsylvania line, the renowned second and rival of Morgan at Saratoga. The rifle corps under the majors Call and Willis, and the cavalry, which did not in the whole exceed one hundred and twenty effectives, composed Butler's van. Major M'Pherson, of Pennsylvania, led this corps; and having mounted some infantry behind the remnant of Armand's dragoons, overtook Simcoe on his return near Spencer's plantation, six or seven miles above Williamsburgh. The suddenness of M'Pherson's attack threw the yagers into confusion; but the Queen's rangers quickly deployed, and advanced to the support of the yagers.

Call and Willis had now got up to M'Pherson with their riflemen, and the action became fierce. Lieutenant Lollar, at the head of a squadron of Simcoe's hussars, fell on Armand's remnant and drove it out of line, making lieutenant Bréso and some privates prisoners. Following his blow, Lollar turned upon our riflemen, then pressing upon the Queen's rangers, and at the same moment captain Ogilvie, of the legion cavalry,—who had been sent that morning from camp with one troop for the collection of forage,—accidentally appeared on our left flank. The rifle corps fell back in confusion upon Butler, drawn up in the rear with his continentals. Satisfied with the repulse of the assailing troops, lieutenant colonel Simcoe began to retire; nor was he further pressed by Butler, as Cornwallis had moved with the main body on

hearing the first fire, to shield Simcoe. La Fayette claimed the advantage in this rencontre, and states his enemy's loss to be sixty killed and one hundred wounded; whereas lord Cornwallis acknowledges the loss of only three officers and thirty privates, killed and wounded. Among the former was lieutenant Jones, a much admired young officer.

What was our loss in killed and wounded does not appear in the report of La Fayette; but three officers and twenty-eight privates were taken.

Here was a second opportunity presented of striking our army, and like the first it was not seized. Nothing was more feasible, as Cornwallis had moved his whole force, than for him to have turned Simcoe's horse and foot upon Butler. Following close in the rear, La Fayette must have sacrificed this corps, or risked battle. The latter would have taken place, as Wayne had moved to support Butler, and would have reached our advance about the time of the suggested movement upon our light corps.

The British general returned to Williamsburgh, preparing for his passage of James river; and La Fayette resumed his position at Tyre's plantation, waiting the motions of Cornwallis.

Sir Henry Clinton, from the moment he perused Washington's letters, imparting to Congress the result of his conference with count Rochambeau, (which had been intercepted by one of the British general's parties,) seems to have been persuaded that a formidable combined attack upon New York by the

allies was not only contemplated, but certain; and as early as the 11th of June, he communicated his conviction of such a measure to earl Cornwallis, and required him to occupy some salubrious situation about Williamsburgh or York Town, calculated for the defensive, and convenient to desultory maritime expeditions up the rivers of Virginia, for the destruction of our remaining stores and resources. As soon as this was accomplished, earl Cornwwallis was ordered to return to sir Henry the Queen's rangers, the remnant of the seventeenth dragoons, two battalions of light infantry, two of Anspach, the forty-third and seventy-sixth or eightieth regiments.

It appears that subsequent to the issue of this order, the British commander in chief,* availing himself of water conveyance, contemplated striking at Philadelphia with the corps to be detached by Cornwallis, as it proceeded to New York, for the purpose of destroying the continental supplies collected in that city.

No doubt earl Cornwallis, feeling himself bound to give effect to his general's views, did not risk any operations which might produce delay in his movement to Portsmouth, which seems to have been the place preferred by himself for the embarkation of the troops demanded; whereas sir Henry Clinton's instructions pointed out Williamsburgh or York as the place of arms in his judgment best calculated to answer the intended purposes. Certainly lord Cornwallis might

* See his letter, page 237.

and ought to have adopted the plan proposed by Clinton; as it was very easy to have withdrawn the garrison from Portsmouth, a post held contrary to his lordship's advice; to have brought it up to him either on James or York river, and in the same transports to have forwarded the required corps to New York. Nor would this operation have consumed the time which his passage of James river and move to Portsmouth must spend. He might too have combined with this system the destruction of La Fayette, hitherto omitted, and required from him by the most powerful considerations.

Believing the course originally adopted as that most likely to effect with celerity the object of the commander in chief, Cornwallis, after some deliberation as to its change, persevered.

Halting eight or nine days in Williamsburgh, his lordship decamped on the 4th of July, having, after examining the river at Burwell's ferry and James City island, decided to pass it at the latter place. On the same evening he reached the island, and the British advance, consisting of the Queen's rangers under lieutenant colonel Simcoe, passed the river. On the 5th, the wheel carriages of every sort were transported across; as were, on the subsequent day, the baggage and bat horses. Cornwallis meant to have passed with the army on the 7th.

La Fayette did not doubt the intention of his adversary, and was much inclined to fall upon his rear when a major part of the army should have passed or was

passing the river. To enable him to manage this delicate manœuvre with accuracy and precision, every effort was essayed by La Fayette's exploring parties to understand distinctly every step taken by his lordship. Lieutenant colonel Mercer being, among others, employed with his troop of dragoons in this service, made, during the night of the 3d, a circuitous march, and gained by the dawn of day the right flank of the enemy. Mercer discovered that the British general had just moved, and very quickly advised his commander of the event.

La Fayette put his army in motion on the same afternoon, and receding from his former caution, sat down on the evening of the 5th within eight miles of the foe. A dangerous adventure, but in its issue safe, so turned was Cornwallis from his pristine manner.

On the morning of the 6th the American general prepared to advance, believing that the hour was at hand for his meditated blow, as he had been accurately informed of the passage of troops on the 4th, and the continued crossing and recrossing of the boats ever since.

Mercer, with a party of his troop, preceded our army for the purpose of procuring intelligence; and coming suddenly upon the mansion of Greenspring,* saw a negroe with a knapsack on his back, by whom he was told that lieutenant colonel Tarleton quartered there, and was in the spring-house in the yard; and

* The seat of sir William Berkeley, formerly governor of Virginia; and afterwards of Philip Ludwell, one of the king's council.

that lord Cornwallis was at the church, not more than one mile in front. Satisfied, with what he had snatched from the negroe, as well of the danger which awaited his party, as of the proximity of the British army, Mercer turned his horse to retire; when he found himself nearly closed up by brick walls in his rear, and at the same time saw a party of the enemy's dragoons pressing forward to intercept him. Changing his course, he avoided the brick obstruction, and threw himself at a greater distance from his pursuers. Thus he happily escaped, and in a few minutes rejoined his troop, concealed in a distant wood;—whence he repaired toward the army, to communicate the intelligence to the general.

About eleven o'clock he met him advancing at the head of his troops, prepared for battle, and sanguine in the expectation that he should get up in time to fall upon the remains of the enemy on this side of the river.

The intelligence derived from Mercer produced a pause, and excited doubts as to the conduct to be pursued. At length La Fayette determined to proceed as far as Greenspring, the place which Mercer had visited in the morning, and where he acquired the information just imparted.

On approaching the house we learned that the enemy had moved towards the island; and two intelligent though young dragoons now rejoined, who had been sent to the river with glasses, to attend to the passage of the enemy across it.* The report of these faithful

* One of whom was Ludwell Lee, esq.

but inexperienced soldiers concurred in supporting the opinion heretofore entertained; and which, though subdued for a time by Mercer's intelligence, still existed. In fact, it comported with the inclination of officers and soldiers; and brigadier Wayne, disquieted as he always was by losing a chance of battle, declared his conviction that the intelligence received from lieutenant colonel Mercer applied only to a covering party, which would not fail to escape if our advance was longer delayed.

The American commander, indulging his desire to finish his toilsome and cautious operations by a happy blow, came into the opinion of his gallant second, and began to make his final arrangements for close pursuit.

The British general, sage and experienced, had presumed that the opportunity which his crossing of James river could not fail to present, would be seized by his enemy for the indulgence of that ardor natural to the season of youth, and which the enterprising La Fayette never ceased to feel, although he had effectually controlled it. He heard with pleasure that his adversary was drawing near, and took his measures to encourage the adventurous spirit which seemed now to sway him, with the resolution of turning it to his advantage. He held his troops compact, covering as little ground as possible in his march and in his camp; and gave orders for his piquets to fall back with the appearance of alarm and confusion, as soon as they should be seriously struck.

The ground in front of Greenspring, where by this time the whole American army had arrived, is low, wet and sunken, reclaimed by ditches which intersect it in various directions. This sunken ground runs parallel with the house for a considerable distance above and below, and is nearly a quarter of a mile wide. As soon as you pass through it you enter the road from Williamsburgh, on which the enemy marched, and which runs for a considerable distance parallel with the low ground. From the house to the road, across the low ground, a causeway had been formed by the proprietor of Greenspring, and presented the only practicable route for troops. La Fayette must pass along this causeway on his advance upon the island; and every step he proceeded after leaving it, put him more and more in the power of his prepared enemy.

The American general, by design probably, did not move from Greenspring until the hour of three in the afternoon; inasmuch as the remaining part of the evening gave sufficient daylight for the execution of his plan, if only a strong covering party of the enemy should be found on this side of the river; and the quicker darkness approached the more acceptable, should he stumble upon Cornwallis and his army.

The rifle corps under Call and Willis, preceded by a patrol of dragoons, formed our front, and after crossing the low ground, halted in a wood contiguous to the road. The cavalry of Armand and of Mercer, led by major M'Pherson, followed the rifle corps, supported by the continental infantry under Wayne.

Steuben, with the militia, formed the reserve, and continued on the ground at Greenspring, severed from the acting corps by the low ground. This disposition manifests that La Fayette calculated only on meeting with a covering party easy of conquest; as otherwise he would never have interposed the difficult defile* described between the two divisions of his force.

As soon as the column reached the road, the rifle corps were thrown upon our flanks, and the horse continued to advance on the road.

We had not advanced a mile before our van patrol of horse received a desultory fire from the enemy's yagers, and fell back upon M'Pherson. This officer communicated the occurrence to the commander, who answered by ordering lieutenant colonel Mercer and himself to leave the cavalry and to take charge of the rifle corps. Mercer led that on the right, and M'Pherson that on the left on the left flank. We very soon approached the enemy's piquets, which were briskly attacked, and losing some of their men killed, wounded and taken, fell back in confusion upon the legion horse, drawn up in an open field three hundred yards behind the front piquets. Our cavalry now came up; that of

* La Fayette moved from Greenspring at three; and so much time was consumed in passing this defile, that his main body did not get up with the enemy, encamped not more than one mile and a half distant, until near sunset; which effect shows, in a military point of view, the disadvantages eventually accruing from the interposition of this defile.

Armand joined M'Pherson, and the Virginia troop joined Mercer.

Emboldened by their successful onset, Mercer and M'Pherson continued to advance, and took post in a ditch under cover of a rail fence. From hence was plainly discerned a line of infantry posted on the flanks of the horse. Our rifle corps recommenced fire, and were soon afterwards joined by major Galvan, with a battalion of the continental infantry, who was followed by major Willis, of Connecticut, with another battalion of infantry, and captain Savage with two field pieces. Galvan, Mercer and M'Pherson maintained the conflict with spirit against the enemy, now advancing in body under lieutenant colonel Yorke, supported by three pieces of artillery.

The conflict was keenly maintained for some minutes, when the rifle corps broke. Lieutenant colonel Mercer, having his horse killed, remounted another, and drawing off his troop of dragoons, fell back upon Wayne, who was formed in close order in the adjacent wood. Galvan and Willis, with their light infantry, retired soon after the rifle corps dispersed; as did also captain Savage with our two pieces. Cornwallis pressed forward in two lines, his right wing under lieutenant colonel Yorke, pushing the light infantry, while his left under lieutenant colonel Dundas advanced upon Wayne; who never indisposed to try the bayonet, gave orders to charge, which, though often repeated, was from the thickness of the wood and his own close order unexecuted, and the

battle continued warmly maintained by a close and hot fire. La Fayette early in the action began to apprehend that the expected covering party would turn out to be the British army, and took his measures to ascertain the fact. He became soon convinced from his own examination that he had been entirely mistaken, and immediately hastened to draw off his troops. Wayne was now closely engaged, and his flanks nearly enveloped. He was ordered to fall back to our second line of continentals, arrayed a half a mile in his rear. This was instantly executed through the favour of a dark night, with the loss of our two field pieces; and Wayne having joined the second line, our whole detachment continuing to retire, recrossed the ravine, and proceeded with the reserve six miles in the rear of Greenspring; where La Fayette, finding the enemy did not pursue, encamped for the night.

We lost of our continentals one hundred and eighteen, in killed, wounded and prisoners, of which ten were officers. Our loss of rifle militia was never ascertained. The British suffered much less, having lost only five officers and seventy privates.

The marquis's postponement of his march to the evening was in its effect most fortunate. One hour more of the light of day must have produced the most disastrous conclusion. Lord Cornwallis in his official letter, considers one half hour only, to have been enough for his purpose. No pursuit was even attempted on the part of the conqueror, but he returned immediately after the battle closed to his camp.

At the break of day lieutenant colonel Tarleton, with his cavalry and some mounted infantry, by the order of the general, followed our army; and captain Champagne, with three companies of light infantry, moved to support him.

After passing the defile in front of Greenspring, Tarleton fell in with one of our patrols of mounted riflemen, which he drove in upon La Fayette, killing some and wounding others. The marquis was still in the position he had taken the night before; and had Cornwallis moved at the same hour with his cavalry, he might have inflicted the heavy blow, from whose crush we had so happily escaped the evening before. But after some consultation, after the action, upon the course to be pursued, he concluded it expedient to pass the river and hasten to Portsmouth, for the purpose of embarking the troops called for by the commander in chief. During the 7th and 8th, the British army crossed to the southern shore; and on the 9th lord Cornwallis detached lieutenant colonel Tarleton, with his cavalry and eighty mounted infantry, to New London in the county of Bedford, adjoining the Blue Ridge, and at least two hundred miles from any possible support: This perilous expedition was planned for the purpose of destroying some collections of stores said to be in that district for the army of Greene, and for the interception of some of the light troops believed to be moving from the southern army to the assistance of La Fayette. Tarleton passed through Petersburg on the 9th, and proceeded with expedition to Prince Ed-

ward, where he expected to find our principal magazines. He was disappointed;—all our stores at this place had been for some time forwarded to the South.

Continuing his march, he soon reached Bedford county, where he halted for two days, but met with no stores of any consequence, nor could he learn of the advance of any of the light troops from the South. On the contrary he was informed, that general Greene was before Ninety-Six, pursuing with his whole force the object of his movement into South Carolina.

Turning towards the seaboard, the British officer returned unhurt on the 15th day from his departure, and joined lord Cornwallis in the county of Suffolk; where his lordship, having detached the reinforcement required by the commander in chief to Portsmouth for embarkation, waited for the rejunction of the light corps. As soon as this took place the British general moved to Portsmouth, and encamped with his infantry in front of his works; the cavalry passed Elizabeth river, and were cantoned in the county of Princess Ann, where wholesome and abundant subsistence for man and horse was to be found on every plantation.

La Fayette received, on the day after his repulse, a handsome squadron of dragoons under captain Moore from the town of Baltimore; and retired with most of his army to the forks of York river, having dismissed all his militia.

Thus was concluded the summer campaign of lord Cornwallis in Virginia. For eight or nine weeks he

had been engaged in the most active movements, at the head of an army completely fitted for the arduous scenes of war, warmly attached to its general, proud in its knowledge of its own ability, and ready to encounter every danger and difficulty to give success to its operations. The inferiority of La Fayette in number, in quality, in cavalry, in arms and equipment, has been often recurred to and cannot be doubted.

Yet strange when the primary object of the British general must have been the annihilation of our army in Virginia, he never struck it in whole or in part, although manœuvring in his face in an open country, and remote from support of every sort except occasional aids of militia.

Such omission on the part of lord Cornwallis is inexplicable. More than once he had fair opportunities to compel battle; and that only was necessary, with his vast superiority, to have produced the ruin of his antagonist.

The American general had great difficulties to surmount, as well as to guard against his formidable foe, pressing him on his retreat. Wayne directing his most efficient aid, was far to his right; and the baron Steuben, with the Virginia levies, was as far on his left. The public stores deposited in several magazines accessible to the enemy; and the great body of the inhabitants below the mountains, flying from their homes with their wives, their children, and the most valuable of their personal property, to seek protection in the mountains. The state authorities, executive and

legislative, like the flying inhabitants, driven from the seat of government; chased from Charlottesville; and at length interposing the Blue Ridge between themselves and the enemy to secure a resting place at Staunton. In this period of gloom, of disorder, and of peril, La Fayette was collected and undismayed. With zeal, with courage, and with sagacity, he discharged his arduous duties; and throughout his difficult retreat was never brought even to array but once in order for battle.

Invigorating our counsels by his precepts; dispelling our despondency by his example; and encouraging his troops to submit to their many privations, by the cheerfulness with which he participated in their wants; he imparted the energy of his own mind to the country, and infused his high toned spirit into his army. His efforts were crowned with success; and even the erroneous determination to risk the elite of his force for the purpose of capturing a supposed covering party of the hostile army, when occupied in passing James river, was repaired by the celerity with which he discovered his mistake, and with which he curtailed its ills. To La Fayette, to his able second, general Nelson, to his cavalry, to his rifle corps, to his officers and his soldiers in mass, much praise is due; nor was it withheld by their comrades in arms, by their enemy, and by the nation.

Now, for the first time throughout the war, did ever doubt attach to the merits of the British general. In the North and in the South, in the cabinet and in the

field, he stood pre-eminent; the bulwark of Great Britain,—the dread of America.

When in command of mighty means, and in the heart of that state whose prostration he uniformly viewed as the first pre-requisite to the subjugation of the South, that he should content himself with burning tobacco, destroying a portion of our scattered stores, and chasing our governor from hill to hill, and our legislature from town to town, comports neither with his past fame nor with his then duty. The destruction of La Fayette ought to have been his sole object until finished.

To it every other good appertained; and this was certainly in his power during his retreat, and even when he covered himself behind Mechunck's creek to save the stores at Albermarle old court-house. But admit that this presumption is extravagant; we cannot err when we assert, that by following up the blow at James' island, he must have renewed the catastrophe of Camden in the lawns of Greenspring. A second army would have been annihilated; and that too when on its fate hung the safety of Virginia, of the South, if not of the United States.

Had Cornwallis acted as he ever had done until he took command of the hostile army at Petersburg, he would have moved after snatching some refreshment, and a few hours repose; he would have fallen upon the left flank of La Fayette; he would have forced him upon the Chickahominy, which for many miles skirted his right, and compelled him to surren-

der or to die in the last effort. For some cause not yet clearly known, a very different conduct was pursued; as derogatory to the high fame of this distinguished soldier, as it was in its consequences injurious to his country and destructive to himself and army.

A careful examination of the commander in chief and lord Cornwallis's correspondence exhibits two facts; first, that sir Henry Clinton was very much disposed to pursue, with the army of Virginia, operations at the head of the Chesapeake, in the neighbourhood of Baltimore, or in the Delaware Neck; and secondly, that earl Cornwallis did not accord with his chief in such application of the force under his orders, preferring the destruction of Virginia to any other object. This material difference in view and judgment laid the foundation for that languor in exertion which marks every step of Cornwallis in Virginia, until his manly resolve to take care of his army by crossing York river, when he found Clinton's promised relief illusory.

Knowing it to be his duty to support, and not to direct, the serious intention expressed by sir Henry Clinton of pressing solid operations in the upper Chesapeake, which we may fairly infer (from his letter written six days after he reached Virginia) were known to his lordship before he left Westover, induced him to adopt a contracted scale of conduct, lest he might delay, if not mar his chief's design. He found himself now the mere puppet of the commander in chief, and not the carver and executor of his own plans, limited by general principles necessary to se-

cure unity in design and correspondency in execution. This change in official character produced the subsequent change so apparent in his conduct. In his letter (above alluded to) of the 26th of May, dated "Byrd's plantation, north of James river," is the following paragraph: "I shall now proceed to dislodge La Fayette from Richmond, and with my light troops destroy any magazines or stores in the neighbourhood, which may have been collected either for his use or for general Greene's army. From thence I propose to move to the neck of Williamsburgh, which is represented as healthy, and where some subsistence may be procured, and keep myself unengaged from operations which might interpose with your plan of the campaign, until I have the satisfaction of hearing from you."

It is evident from this letter that it was an answer to instructions found among general Phillips's papers, delineating the plan of the campaign; or to a letter which met Cornwallis at Petersburg, explaining the views of the commander in chief.

To the tenor of this answer Cornwallis's conduct corresponded. He did dislodge La Fayette from Richmond; he did destroy all the stores in that neighbourhood, and even some more remote; and he did afterwards return to Williamsburgh.

It is true that he employed some few days in pursuit of La Fayette; but confining himself in point of time, he did not persevere in pressing that object lest it might consume more time than was compatible with the ul-

terior views of the commander in chief. In sir Henry Clinton's letter of the 11th of June,* when comparing

* Extract of a letter from sir Henry Clinton to earl Cornwallis, dated

New York, June 11, 1781.

“ Respecting my opinions of stations in James and York rivers, I shall beg leave only to refer your lordship to my instructions to, and correspondence with, general Phillips and Arnold; together with the substance of conversations with the former, which your lordship will have found among general Phillips' papers, and to which I referred you in my last despatch. I shall, therefore, of course, approve of any alteration your lordship may think proper to make in these stations.

“ The detachments I have made from this army into Chesapeake, since general Leslie's expedition in October last, inclusive, have amounted to seven thousand seven hundred and twenty-four effectives; and at the time your lordship made the junction with the corps there, there were under major general Phillips' orders, five thousand three hundred and four: a force, I should have hoped, would be sufficient of itself to have carried on operations in any of the southern provinces of America; where, as appears by the intercepted letters of Washington and La Fayette, they are in no situation to stand against even a division of that army.

“ I have reason to suppose the continentals, under La Fayette, cannot exceed one thousand; and I am told by lieutenant colonel Hill, of the ninth regiment, that about a fortnight ago he met at Fredericktown the Pennsylvania line, under Wayne, of about the same number; who were so discontented, that their officers were afraid to trust them with ammunition. This, however, may have since altered; and your lordship may possibly have opposed to you from fifteen hundred to two thousand continentals, and (as La Fayette observes) a small body of ill armed peasantry, full as spiritless as the militia of the southern provinces, and without any service.

the force under Cornwallis and under La Fayette, he says, "I should have hoped you would have quite

"Comparing, therefore, the force now under your lordship in the Chesapeake, and that of the enemy opposed to you, (and I think it clearly appears that they have for the present no intention of sending thither reinforcements,) I should have hoped you would have quite sufficient to carry on any operation in Virginia, should that have been advisable at this advanced season.

"By the intercepted letters inclosed to your lordship in my last despatch, you will observe, that I am threatened with a siege in this post. My present effective force is only ten thousand nine hundred and thirty-one. With respect to that the enemy may collect for such an object, it is probable they may amount to at least twenty thousand, besides reinforcements to the French, (which, from pretty good authority, I have reason to expect,) and the numerous militia of the five neighboring provinces. Thus circumstanced, I am persuaded your lordship will be of opinion, that the sooner I concentrate my force the better. Therefore, (unless your lordship, after the receipt of my letter of the 29th of May and the 8th instant, should incline to agree with me in opinion, and judge it right to adopt my ideas respecting the move to Baltimore, or the Delaware neck, &c.) I beg leave to recommend it to you, as soon as you have finished the active operations you may now be engaged in, to take a defensive station, in any healthy situation you choose, (be it at Williamsburgh or York Town); and I would wish, in that case, that, after reserving to yourself such troops as you may judge necessary for ample defensive, and desultory movements by water, for the purpose of annoying the communications, destroying magazines, &c., the following corps may be sent to me in succession, as you can spare them: two battalions of light infantry; forty-third regiment; seventy-sixth or eightieth regiments; two battalions of Anspach; Queen's rangers, cavalry and infantry; remains of the detachment of the seventeenth light dragoons; and such proportion of artillery as can be spared, particularly men."

sufficient force to carry on any operation in Virginia, should that have been advisable at this late season."

The concluding words plainly show that he considered it too late to press operations in Virginia, as they would interfere with what he deemed more important. In this same letter, the British chief communicates the prospect of a combined attack upon New York, and demands a reinforcement from the army in Virginia. "By intercepted letters inclosed to your lordship in my last despatch, you will observe I am threatened with a siege in this post. My present effective force is only ten thousand nine hundred and thirty one: with respect to that the enemy may collect for such an object, it is probable they may amount to at least twenty thousand, besides reinforcements to the French (which from pretty good authority I have reason to expect,) and the numerous militia of the five neighboring provinces. Thus circumstanced, I am persuaded your lordship will be of opinion that the sooner I concentrate my force the better.

"Therefore (unless your lordship, after the receipt of my letter of the 29th of May and 8th of June, should incline to agree with me in opinion, and judge it right to adopt my ideas respecting the move to Baltimore, or the Delaware neck, &c.) I beg leave to recommend it to you, as soon as you have finished the active operations you may now be engaged in, to take a defensive station in any healthy situation you choose (be it at Williamsburgh or York Town); and I would wish, in that case, that after re-

serving to yourself such troops as you may judge necessary for ample defensive, and desultory movements by water, for the purpose of annoying the enemy's communications, destroying magazines, &c., the following corps may be sent to me in succession as you can spare them."

The letters above mentioned, of the 29th May and 8th June, were (as we infer from lord Cornwallis's correspondence) never received, or probably the confidence they breathe might have induced his lordship to venture to appropriate his time and measures as his own judgment should direct. In which case the army of La Fayette would have experienced a more determined and persevering pursuit.

Conforming his whole conduct to the plan of his commander in chief, he followed his enemy only over the North Anna, a branch of the Pamunkey; and as soon as he completed some secondary objects he fell back to Williamsburgh, and from thence interposed the James river between himself and La Fayette, for the purpose of hastening the required detachment to Clinton; the demand for which was repeated by a letter dated the 28th of June. It results clearly from this cursory review of facts, that lord Cornwallis, from the moment he assumed the command of the army in Virginia (20th of May), considered himself as the mere executor of plans devised by his principal; and that he consequently never ventured to engage in measures, whose execution might in any degree interrupt the completion of sir Henry Clinton's designs.

This control paralyzed all his efforts, and he no longer displayed that decision and fire which had before marked his military career.

After passing James river, Cornwallis seems to have indulged his natural bias, by detaching lieutenant colonel Tarleton to the county of Bedford. This daring enterprise emanated from his unceasing desire to cramp the exertions of Greene, by destroying all the stores intended to supply the pressing wants of our army in the South; and from his determination never to permit any of Greene's light troops to join La Fayette, some of whom he now believed were approaching the Dan to reinforce the army in Virginia.

It is very surprising that La Fayette, who' had just manifested his anxiety to strike his adversary, even at the risk of the loss of his army, should not have now indulged the same propensity, when the present opportunity so forcibly invited the attempt; which was not only practicable, but exempt from much hazard.

The reinforcement of horse just received under captain Moore, must have augmented his cavalry to two hundred: Tarleton had with him about the same number of dragoons. The bat and other horses with the army, and such as might be readily procured in the neighborhood of the camp, would have enabled La Fayette to mount four or five hundred infantry, two upon a horse. Tarleton had with him but eighty mounted infantry. With this force a skilful officer (and

the American general had many) could not have been disappointed in intercepting the British detachment.

But La Fayette contented himself with sending a body of infantry under Brigadier Wayne across James river, whose corps was not fitted to the enterprise, and who therefore could not with his means effect the object, unless lieutenant colonel Tarleton had improvidently thrown himself into his lap.

Sir Henry Clinton, discovering lord Cornwallis's aversion to the establishment of a post on the Chesapeake, and determined to fix one there, countermanded the move of the reinforcement heretofore required, and repeated his directions for the selection and fortification of a permanent post, convenient for desultory maritime expeditions up the Chesapeake and its numerous rivers, and capable of protecting line of battle ships.

It appears that the British admiral on the American station had experienced the disadvantages which flowed from the navy's occupying the usual stations during the freezing months, and was consequently anxious of wintering his fleet further south. He says, in his letter to lord Cornwallis, dated 12th July, off Sandy Hook, "That there is no place for great ships, during the freezing months, on this side of the Chesapeake, where the great ships will be in security, and at the same time capable of acting; and in my opinion they had better go to the West Indies, than to be laid up in Halifax during the winter;" and he goes on to recommend Hampton Roads as the proper place.

Earl Cornwallis, yielding further opposition to the

will of sir Henry Clinton, sent his engineer and some captains of the navy to examine Old Point Comfort, which appears to have been the site preferred for the intended post, both by the general and admiral.

The report of these officers was unfavourable;* and

* Copy of the report of lieutenant Sutherland, engineer, dated Billy, ordnance transport, Hampton Roads, July 25, 1781.

MY LORD,

Agreeably to your orders, I have examined the ground on Old Point Comfort with as much accuracy as I possibly could; and for your lordship's better information, I have made a survey of the ground, upon which is laid down the width and sounding of the channel. I beg leave to offer what appears to me, respecting the situation of a work on that spot.

The ground where the ruins of fort George lie is the fittest for a work, but at the same time must be attended with many inconveniences.

The level of the ground there is about two feet higher than the high water mark; which, from its very short distance to the deep water, must soon be destroyed by a naval attack.

The great width and depth of the channel give ships the advantage of passing the fort with very little risk. I apprehend one thousand five hundred yards is too great a distance for batteries to stop ships, which is the distance here. Ships that wish to pass the fire of the fort, have no occasion to approach nearer.

Nor do I imagine a fort built there could afford any great protection to an inferior and weak fleet, anchored near the fort, against a superior fleet of the enemy; which must have it in their power to make their own disposition, and place our fleet between them and the fort; the channel affording no bay for the security of ships under cover of a fort.

The time and expense to build a fort there must be very considerable, from the low situation of the ground, which must

lord Cornwallis, coinciding in the same opinion, selected York and Gloucester, not far above the mouth of York river, instead of Old Point Comfort.

To this place he repaired with the first division of his army; and disembarking it early in August, took possession of both posts. After occupying these, his lordship directed brigadier O'Hara, commanding at Portsmouth, to destroy the works there, and to join him with the rear division of the army. This was done with all convenient despatch, and the whole British force concentrated in the position of York and Gloucester before the 23d. Cornwallis, as soon as he landed the first division of the army, engaged in tracing the lines of the necessary works on both sides of the river; and committing the direction of the post of Gloucester to lieutenant colonel Dundas, continued himself in that of York.

While with zeal and assiduity he pressed forward the completion of his fortifications with his infantry, and at the same time employed his cavalry in collecting cattle and forage, he held his army ready to move

necessarily cause the soil to be moved from a great distance to form the ramparts and parapets; and every other material must be carried there, as the timber on the peninsula is unfit for any useful purpose.

These are the remarks which have occurred to me on examining the ground and situation of a work on Old Point Comfort, for the protection of the harbor and fleet; which I humbly submit to your lordship.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ALEXANDER SUTHERLAND.

upon La Fayette, should he think proper to approach him.

The American general, as soon as he was advised of the possession of the post on York river by the enemy, broke up from his camp on Pamunkey, and recalled Wayne from the southern side of James river, whither he had been detached to intercept Tarleton, and where he had been continued in conformity to the orders of the commander in chief; who, as soon as he decided to turn his force upon the enemy in Virginia, apprized La Fayette of his intention, and commanded him to take measures for the interruption of lord Cornwallis's retreat, should that general discover the intended blow, and attempt to elude it by gaining North Carolina.

The Queen's rangers, under Simcoe, held the post of Gloucester; while lieutenant colonel Tarleton, with his legion, occupied the front of that of York. These officers displayed their habitual activity in traversing and foraging the country on both sides of the river, and in dispersing all the militia collected in their neighborhood. They took extensive sweeps in pursuit of their objects; there being no force nearer to Simcoe than a detachment of volunteer militia under lieutenant colonel John Taylor, formerly of Hazen's regiment, who had established himself near Gloucester courthouse, for the protection of that quarter of the country; and none nearer to Tarleton, than a small body of militia at Chiswell's Ordinary, on the Fredericksburg road. Taylor baffled every attempt to strike his corps;

but the officer at Chiswell's was not so fortunate. Tarleton fell upon him very unexpectedly, and broke up his post, but with very little loss.

Brigadier Weedon being again called to take command of a portion of the militia, repaired by order to Gloucester court-house, early in September, with several small detachments, where he relieved lieutenant colonel Taylor.

As there were among our militia many soldiers who had served out their terms of enlistment in the army, Weedon judiciously directed those individuals to be thrown into one corps, and placed it under the command of lieutenant colonel Mercer; who had, during the preceding period of the campaign, served with his troop of dragoons in the army of La Fayette. This officer* selected appropriate characters to the subordinate stations; and making up two hundred effectives, rank and file, he was detached in front of the militia.

Weedon having arranged his corps, advanced to Dixon's mills about the middle of the month, where he continued; exerting every means in his power to confine the enemy's foragers to a small circle, the chief object in view on the Gloucester side of the river.

* Mercer having resigned his commission in the army, (as has been mentioned,) and not being an officer in the militia, the court of the county of Stafford, in which he was born, recommended him (as is required by the constitution of the state of Virginia) to the executive, who conferred on him the commission of lieutenant colonel.

CHAPTER XXXII.

1781.
August
1st. **T**HE period of tranquillity, and of rest, still continued in the camp of Greene, undisturbed by the din of war.

Worn down as were the troops, nothing could be more comfortable than was this interval of peace; and its enjoyment was not less grateful than universal, with the single exception of him who most required and most deserved it. Greene's anxious mind and faithful heart rejected participation in the comfort himself had given.

Virginia was overpowered by the foe; North Carolina agitated by intestine feuds, promoted by the countenance and excitement of the British garrison still possessing Wilmington; and a portion of the two southern states, with their respective metropolis, in the hands of the enemy, to be wrested from him only by battle.

With his small means, to uphold Virginia, to restore North Carolina, and confine the British force in South Carolina and Georgia, to Charleston and Savannah, called for unceasing efforts of mind and body. He gave both without reserve; and finally determined, first to liberate North Carolina, by carrying the garrison of Wilmington; then to pass into the enemy's

country south of the Congaree, and compel him to give it up; afterwards to hasten to Virginia with the elite of his force, uniting to it the army of La Fayette,

and once more to face lord Cornwallis. In pursuance of these arrangements, he gave orders on the 2d to lieutenant colonel Lee, to hold himself in readiness, with his legion, Kirkwood's Delawares, and Handy's Marylanders. To prevent suspicion of his intention, Washington, with his cavalry, was directed to pass the Wateree; Marion, with his militia, was detached to the country on the Cambahee, which river makes the southern boundary of the Charleston district; and other demonstrations were made, indicating the design of entering into the territory occupied by the British. The general aimed his blow against Wilmington, upon the persuasion that the enterprise could not fail, if concealed to the moment of execution; and this he deemed practicable from its distant situation, in itself sufficient to lull the vigilance of the garrison; from the sultry season, forbidding military effort; from the attachment of the country through which the course selected for the march passed; and from the facility with which that attachment might be applied to subserve the object. Minute intelligence respecting the enemy and his defences, as well as boats for the passage of the Cape Fear river, remained to be procured before the expedition could commence. Lee despatched captain Rudolph, with a small party from the legion infantry, to acquire the one and to collect the other.

This officer quitting camp in the night, soon reached the pine barrens; and continuing his course through the woods to the Pedee, passed that river and approached with celerity the country south of the Cape Fear. Concealing himself in the friendly family to which he was introduced, he engaged, with his usual diligence and caution, in the execution of his mission. So favorable was his report, as to confirm the sanguine expectations before entertained of complete success. Boats, though chiefly canoes, were procurable in sufficient number to pass the infantry, and the horse could swim. Major Craig still commanded the British garrison; an officer well qualified for the trust, being circumspect as well as brave; but his garrison consisted only of three hundred men, many of them in the hospital, and the whole inadequate to man his extensive works. With good reason, therefore, was it concluded, that a concealed and sudden approach was alone necessary to accomplish the object. The day was fixed for the march of Lee and his final orders were made out. His movement was disguised by the ostensible pretext of hastening to secure a convoy, given out to be on its way from Virginia, which might be taken or destroyed by the loyalists of North Carolina, when passing through their neighborhood: in concurrence with which pretence, Lee was ordered to proceed in the direction of Camden until he reached the course carrying him through the pine barren into the tract of country inhabited by well affected citizens. At this period information was

received from general Washington, indicating the probability that the French West India fleet would visit our coast during the autumn, and intimating the propriety of being prepared in every quarter for instant co-operation; as its place of arrival was uncertain, and its continuance with us would be necessarily short. In consequence of this information, general Greene changed his plan, believing it most eligible to devote his means towards the accomplishment of the immediate liberation of South Carolina and Georgia; persuaded that as soon as the British general should be apprized of the probability of a visit from the French fleet, the garrison would be withdrawn from Wilmington, and thus the state of North Carolina would be relieved, without risk of repulse, or loss of life. This change in measures, too, was extremely agreeable to governor Rutledge, just returned from the North to resume the duties of his station, delighted with the prospect of seeing his state completely freed by the expected naval assistance, and desirous that the force of Greene should be held for that end primarily.

The detachment under Lee, prepared for service, was discharged; and captain Rudolph directed to return, holding nevertheless secret his visit to Cape Fear.

General Greene, though induced to depart from the minor object in his plan of operations, adhered to the general system; believing it the wiser policy to depend as little as possible on the aid of friends.

Repeating his orders to the marquis La Fayette,

urging his unvarying adherence to the most cautious conduct, and communicating his intention of hastening to his support, as soon as the state of affairs in South Carolina would permit,—he now turned his entire attention to the British army, still encamped on the south of the Congaree, between Motte's and the Santee.

The season yet continued extremely hot; but our wounded were recovered, our sick restored to health, and the month of August wasting away. Orders were issued preparatory to movement, and on the 21st the American general decamped from the benign hills of Santee,* for the avowed purpose of seeking his enemy. Lieutenant colonel Cruger joined at Orangeburgh, soon after Greene, (finding Rawdon unassailable with hope of success) had retired from its vicinity. Lord Rawdon having accomplished the evacuation of Ninety-Six, removed the loyalists of that quarter within the British lines; and concentrating his force at Orangeburgh, upon general Greene's retirement to his summer quarters, relinquished the command of the army to lieutenant colonel Stuart, and returned to Charleston, with the view of embarking for England,—long intended, but heretofore delayed by the critical posture of affairs.

* The soldiers of Greene's army may truly call these hills benignant. Twice our general there resorted, with his sick, his wounded and worn down troops; and twice we were restored to health and strength, by its elevated dry situation, its pure air, its fine water, and the friendly hospitality of its inhabitants.

Stuart did not establish a post, as was expected, at Orangeburgh; but moving his whole force towards the Santee, sat down near the confluence of its two branches, about fifteen miles from his adversary, on the opposite side of that river.

Previous to the breaking up from the High Hills of Santee, an occurrence had taken place in Charleston which deeply affected the feelings of the American general and army. The affair would probably have led to a war of extermination, had not the fast approach of peace arrested the progress of a system, deliberately adopted by Greene, and ardently maintained by every individual of his army.

Isaac Hayne,* a highly respectable citizen of South Carolina, had taken part with his country from the commencement of the war, and served as a private in the militia during the siege of Charleston. After the

* So extremely beloved was this citizen by his neighbors that when a company of volunteers was levied near his residence in the beginning of the war, Hayne was called unanimously to the command of it.

He obeyed the call, and fulfilled the duties of his station honorably to himself and beneficially to his soldiers.

The regiment to which the company was attached being destitute of field officers, Hayne was named as colonel. He did not succeed, owing to some intrigues believed to be practised in favor of his competitor, which so disgusted captain Hayne that he resigned his commission and returned to the ranks, where by his exemplary zeal and obedience he very much advanced the discipline of the regiment, and highly contributed to its subsequent utility.

surrender of that place, Hayne returned to his seat west of the Edisto, under the protection of the fourth article of capitulation. "The militia now in the garrison," says the answer to that article, "shall be permitted to return to their respective homes as prisoners on parole; which parole, as long as they observe it, shall secure them from being molested in their property."

We have before mentioned the extraordinary proclamation of sir Henry Clinton, which ordered all our militia prisoners on parole, not taken by capitulation, or in confinement, at the surrendering of Lincoln, to become British subjects, or return instantly to the commandant of Charleston. Although the prisoners taken at the surrender of that city were excepted in the proclamation, the popularity and patriotism of Hayne notwithstanding marked him as the first victim of its tyranny.

Colonel Ballingall, of the royal militia in the district of Hayne's residence, waited on him, from personal respect, and communicated the orders he had received. Hayne asserted his inviolability under the capitulation of Charleston; represented that the small-pox was then raging in his family; that all his children were ill with the disease; that one of them had already died, and his wife was on the verge of dissolution. Finding the remonstrance unavailing, he declared to Ballingall that no human force should remove him from the side of his dying wife. A discussion followed, which terminated in a written stipulation, by which

Hayne engaged to "demean himself as a British subject so long as that country should be covered by the British army."

In a civil war no citizen should expect or desire neutrality. Whoever attempts to place himself in that condition misunderstands human nature, and becomes entangled in toils always dangerous—often fatal. By endeavoring to acquire, with the most virtuous motive, a temporary neutrality, Hayne was unwisely led into a compact which terminated in his ruin.

Pursuing his first object, the care of his sick wife and children, Hayne repaired to Charleston, presented himself to brigadier Patterson with the written agreement of Bellingall, and solicited permission to return home. This indulgence, he presumed, could not be denied, being consistent with his late compact and his view in executing it. The request, however, was peremptorily refused; and Hayne was told, that he "must either become a British subject, or submit to close confinement." The latter alternative was most agreeable to his inclination; but that tender devotion to his family, which had induced him to repair to Charleston, urged his acceptance of the former. To his friend, Dr. Ramsay, who was then a prisoner with the enemy, he communicated the conflicting emotions of his mind.* Tranquillized by the interview, he re-

* "If the British would grant me the indulgence, which we in the day of our power gave to their adherents, of removing my family and property, I would seek an asylum in the remotest corner of the United States rather than submit to their govern-

turned to the commandant, and completed his error by a formal acknowledgment of allegiance to the British king—openly excepting, however, to the clause which required his support of government with arms. Patterson the commandant, and Simpson the intendant of police, assured him, that such service would never be required; and added, “when the regular forces cannot defend the country without the aid of its inhabitants, it will be high time for the royal army to quit it.” Thus this amiable citizen proceeded from delusion to delusion, until he placed himself in a fallacious security, which subsequent incidents turned to his destruction.

Hayne hastened to his family, happy in the expectation of preserving it through the prevailing pestilence. But in this hope he was sorely disappointed; for his wife and a second child soon fell victims to the fatal malady. These afflictions did not limit his misfortunes: inasmuch as he was interdicted from enjoying even

ment; but as they allow no other alternative than submission or confinement in the capital, at a distance from my wife and family, at a time when they are in the most pressing need of my presence and support, I must for the present yield to the demands of the conquerors. I request you to bear in mind, that, previous to my taking this step, I declare that it is contrary to my inclination, and forced on me by hard necessity. I never will bear arms against my country. My new masters can require no service of me but what is enjoined by the old militia law of the province, which substitutes a fine in lieu of personal service. That I will pay as the price of my protection. If my conduct should be censured by my countrymen, I beg that you would remember this conversation, and bear witness for me, that I do not mean to desert the cause of America.”

the political quietude he had attempted to secure. He was occasionally required to bear arms in the regal service; and, uniformly refusing to obey, on the ground of his exception at the time of subscribing the declaration of allegiance, he was threatened with close confinement.

In this situation Mr. Hayne was found when Greene had forced the enemy from the upper country, and restored to the Union the whole of Carolina east of the Santee and north of the Congaree. A detachment of Marion's militia under colonel Harden, passing to the west of the Edisto for the protection of their own homes, reached the neighborhood of Hayne. Well knowing his worth and influence, they were extremely anxious to procure his aid. Paul Hamilton,* one of this party, and an intimate friend of Hayne, called on him to solicit co-operation. Hayne frankly stated the change which had taken place in his political condition; and, believing himself bound by the declaration of allegiance, refused to concur with his friends in supporting a cause the success of which was the ardent wish of his heart. Hamilton then asked the accommodation of a few horses, in which resource Hayne was known to abound. Hayne refused the request; and informed his friend, that the moment he heard of Harden's approach he ordered all his horses to be removed, lest assistance might be obtained in violation of his plighted faith. Yet he assured Hamilton,

* Present secretary of the navy.

that whenever he should find the royal authority unable to afford its promised protection, he should consider himself absolved from the extorted allegiance, and would with joy enrol himself with the defenders of his country.

Thus did Hayne scrupulously adhere to a contract, which was never obligatory,—having been coerced by the duress of power, and in palpable violation of the capitulation of Charleston.

Soon after this occurrence, the British were driven below the Edisto; and nearly the whole country between that river and the Stono inlet fell under the protection of the American arms. Every person in the recovered country believed himself released from those obligations, which the late condition of affairs had imposed: for it was justly thought that the allegiance due to a conqueror ceased with his expulsion from the subdued territory. Under this correct impression, Hayne with many others repaired to the American camp. His merit attracted immediate attention; and the militia of his district, by an election in camp, honored him with the command of a regiment.

Taking the field immediately, colonel Hayne conducted (in the month of July), an expedition into the enemy's territory. Some of his mounted militia penetrated the neck of Charleston, and, near the quarter-house, captured general Williamson; who had been as active in supporting the royal authority since the surrender of Lincoln, as he had been firm and influen-

tial in opposing it prior to that event. Lieutenant colonel Balfour, successor of brigadier Patterson, put his cavalry in motion to recover Williamson. This detachment fell suddenly on the camp of Hayne; but was handsomely received and repelled by colonel Harden, who did not deem it prudent to push his success by pursuit.* Colonel Hayne, (attended by his second, lieutenant colonel M'Lachlin, and a small guard,) had unfortunately gone to breakfast with a friend, about two miles from camp. The house was on the Charleston road; and the negligent guard having left its post in search of fruit,† colonel Hayne was unapprised of the enemy's approach until he saw them a few rods from the door. Being very active and resolute, he pushed for his horse, mounted, and forced his way through the foe. To pass a fence in his route, he put spur to his horse, who unfortunately fell in leaping, and the entangled rider was overtaken by his pursuers. M'Lachlin, being cut off from his horse, fell sword in hand, bravely contending against the surrounding enemy.

* From the character of major Harden it is to be presumed that the inferiority of his force forbad this measure, or it would have been resorted to.

† One of the thousand instances during the war of the waste of American life by confidence in militia, and among the numerous evidences in favor of a classification of our militia, by which measure we should obtain defenders worthy of the high trust reposed in them.

Colonel Hayne was conveyed to Charleston, and lodged in the prison of the provost. The purity of the prisoner's character, and his acknowledged kindness to the unfortunate in his power, plead against the severity which the commandant was disposed to exercise: nevertheless the most rigorous course was pursued with relentless pertinacity.

Soon after he was confined in the provost, colonel Hayne received an official letter from the town major, stating that "a board of general officers would assemble the next day, for his trial." In the evening of the following day, the same officer informed him, that "instead of a council of general officers, a court of inquiry would be held to determine in what view he ought to be considered; and that he should be allowed pen, ink and paper, and counsel." On the 29th of July, two days after this intelligence, the town major directed his adjutant to acquaint colonel Hayne, "that in consequence of the court of inquiry, held as directed, lord Rawdon and colonel Balfour have resolved on his execution, on Tuesday, the 31st instant, at six o'clock; for having been found under arms, and employed in raising a regiment to oppose the British government, after he had become a subject and accepted the protection of government at the reduction of Charleston."

The prisoner, now for the first time informed of the charge exhibited against him, addressed the following letter to the two British officers, who were about to imbrue their hands in his blood.

To lord Rawdon and colonel Balfour.

“ MY LORD AND SIR,

“ On Thursday morning I had the honor of receiving a letter from major Frazer, by which he informed me, that a council of general officers would be assembled the next day for my trial; and on the evening of the same day, I received another letter from the same officer, acquainting me, that instead of *that*, a court of inquiry would sit for the purpose of deciding under what point of view I ought to be considered. I was also told, that any person whom I should appoint, would be permitted to accompany me as my counsel. Having never entertained any other idea of a court of inquiry, or heard of any other being formed of it, than of its serving merely to precede a council of war, or some other tribunal, for examining the circumstances more fully, except in the case of a spy; and Mr. Jarvis, lieutenant marshal to the provost, not having succeeded in finding the person who had been named for my counsel, I did not take the pains to summon any witnesses, though it would have been in my power to have produced many; and I presented myself before the court without any assistance whatever. When I was before that assembly, I was further convinced that I had not been deceived in my conjectures. I found that the members of it were not sworn, and the witnesses were not examined upon oath; and all the members, as well as every person present, might easily have perceived, by the questions which I asked, and by the whole tenor of my conduct, that I had not the

least notion that I was tried or examined upon an affair on which my life or death depended.

“ In the case of spies, a court of inquiry is all that can be necessary, because the simple fact whether the person is or is not a spy, is all that can be the object of their researches; and his having entered the lines of the enemy’s camp or garrison, subjects him to military execution. As that accusation neither is nor can be made against me, I humbly conceive that the information I received, that the court would make inquiry concerning what point of view I ought to be considered under, could not be taken as a sufficient notice of their having an intention to try me then; but could only be thought to signify, that they were to take it into consideration whether I ought to be looked upon as a British subject or as an American: that in the first case I should undergo a legal and impartial trial; in the second, I should be set at liberty on my parole. Judge then, my lord and sir, of the astonishment I must have been in, when I found they had drawn me by surprise into a proceeding tending to judgment, without my knowing it to be such; and deprived me of the ability of making a legal defence, which it would have been very easy for me to have done, founded both in law and in fact;—when I saw myself destitute of the assistance of counsel and of witnesses; and when they abruptly informed me, that after the procedure of the court I was condemned to die, and that in a very few days. Immediately upon receiving this notice, I sent for the lawyer whom I had

originally chosen for my counsel. I here inclose his opinion concerning the legality of the process held against me; and I beg that I may be permitted to refer myself to him. I can assure you with the utmost truth, that I had and have many reasons to urge in my defence, if you will grant me the favor of a regular trial; if not, which I cannot however suppose from your justice and humanity, I earnestly intreat that my execution may be deferred, that I may at least take a last farewell of my children, and prepare for the dreadful change. I hope you will return me a speedy answer; and am, with respect,

“ISAAC HAYNE.”

To this representation the town major returned the following answer. “I have to inform you, that your execution is not ordered in consequence of any sentence from the court of inquiry; but by virtue of the authority with which the commander in chief in South Carolina and the commanding officer in Charleston are invested: and their resolves on the subject are fixed and unchangeable.”

Disdaining further discussion with relentless power, Hayne merely solicited a short respite, to enable him for the last time to see his children. The request was granted in the following communication from the town major. “I am to inform you, that in consequence of a petition signed by governor Bull and many others, as also of your prayer of yesterday, and the humane treatment shown by you to the British prisoners who fell

into your hands, you are respited for forty-eight hours; but should general Greene offer to expostulate in your favor with the commanding officer, from that moment this respite will cease, and you will be ordered to immediate execution."

After the delivery of this message, the amiable American enjoyed the comfort of seeing his family and conversing with his friends. During this interesting, this awful period, he discovered a dignified composure; and in his last evening declared, that "he felt no more alarmed at death, than at any other occurrence which is necessary and unavoidable." Very different, indeed, were the feelings of his friends. Mrs. Peronneau, his sister, accompanied by his children, all clad in the deepest mourning, and manifesting the torture of their heart-rending agony, waited on lord Rawdon, and on their knees supplicated him to spare the victim! But his lordship's "resolve was fixed and unchangeable!" Anxious to terminate a life of truth in the formalities of honor, colonel Hayne solicited, in a second letter to the stern duumvirate, permission to die like a soldier. He then arranged the preceding correspondence; and on the morning of his execution presented the packet to his son (a boy of thirteen years) and directed him to "deliver it to Mrs. Edwards, with my request to forward it to her brother in congress. Go then to the place of my execution,—receive my body, and see it decently interred with my forefathers." This done, he embraced him, imploring the divine blessing on his orphan children. Dressed with his accustomed neat-

ness, accompanied by a few friends, he marched with unruffled serenity through a weeping crowd to the place of execution. He had flattered himself with the presumption that his last request would be granted: quickly the sight of the gibbet announced the fallacy of this hope. For a moment he paused, but immediately recovering his wonted firmness, moved forward. At this instant a friend whispered his confidence that "you will now exhibit an example of the manner in which an American can die." "I will endeavor to do so," was the reply of the modest martyr. Never was intention better fulfilled: neither arrogating superiority, nor betraying weakness, he ascended the cart, unsupported and unappalled. Having taken leave of his friends, and commended his infant family to their protection, he drew the cap over his eyes, and illustrated by his demeanor, that death in the cause of our country, even on a gallows, cannot appal the virtuous and the brave.

The proceedings in this case exhibit a prevarication and precipitance, no less disreputable to the authors than repugnant to the feelings of humanity. The unfortunate captive is first informed, that a court martial will be convened for his trial; next, that a court of inquiry will determine the proper mode of procedure, before whom he will be allowed the assistance of counsel; then, without this assistance, that he is doomed to death, in consequence of the deliberations of the latter tribunal; and lastly, that the bloody sentence does not emanate from this authority, but is

the inflexible decree of the two military commanders. Had the discovery of truth and execution of justice been the sole objects in view, those who well knew what was English law, liberty and practice, could not have erred. Colonel Hayne was certainly either a prisoner of war, or a British subject. If the latter, he was amenable to the law, and indisputably entitled to the formalities and the aids of trial: but if the former, he was not responsible to the British government, or its military commander, for his lawful conduct in the exercise of arms. Unhappily for this virtuous man, the royal power was fast declining in the South. The inhabitants were eager to cast off the temporary allegiance of conquest: it was deemed necessary to awe them into submission by some distinguished severity; and Hayne was the selected victim!

As soon as this tragical event was known to general Greene, he addressed colonel Balfour, demanding an explanation of the daring outrage. The commandant replied, that "the execution of colonel Hayne took place by the joint order of lord Rawdon and himself; but in consequence of the most explicit directions from lord Cornwallis 'to put to death all those who should be found in arms, after being at their own request received as subjects, since the capitulation of Charleston, and the clear conquest of the province in the summer of 1780; more especially such, as should have accepted of commissions, or might distinguish themselves in inducing a revolt of the country.' To his

lordship, therefore, as being answerable for the measure, the appeal will more properly be made.”*

The order of lord Cornwallis, as avowed by the com-

* Extract of a letter from lieutenant colonel Balfour to major general Greene, dated Charleston, September 3, 1781.

“ I come now to that part which has respect to the execution of colonel Hayne; on which head I am to inform you it took place by the joint order of lord Rawdon and myself, in consequence of the most express directions from lord Cornwallis to us, in regard to all those who should be found in arms, after being at their own request received as subjects, since the capitulation of Charleston and the clear conquest of the province in the summer of 1780; more especially such as should have accepted of commissions, or might distinguish themselves in inducing a revolt of the country. To his lordship, therefore, as being answerable for this measure, the appeal will more properly be made, and on such appeal, I must not doubt, every fit satisfaction will be tendered; but as the threat in your letter is of a nature which may extend in its consequences to the most disagreeable and serious lengths, I cannot dismiss this subject without some general remarks, still referring for the particular justification to the opinion and decision of lord Cornwallis, immediately under whom I have the honor to act.

“ And first I must conceive, without adverting to the particular cause of dispute between Great Britain and this country, that on the subjection of any territory, the inhabitants of it owe allegiance to the conquering power, (in the present case a voluntary acknowledgment was given, and consequent protection received;) and that on any account to recede from it, is justly punishable with death, by whatever law, either civil or military, is then prevalent.

“ To justify retaliation, I am convinced you will agree, a parity of circumstances in all respects is required; without such, every shadow of justice is removed, and vengeance only points to indiscriminate horrors.”

mandant of Charleston, engaged the serious attention of Greene; who determined to resist, with all his power, the cruel and sanguinary system. The officers of the American army entered with zeal into the views of their leader; and urged, in a unanimous address, the propriety of retaliation. "Permit us to add," says the concluding paragraph of that manly paper, "that while we lament the necessity of such a severe expedient, and commiserate the sufferings to which individuals will be necessarily exposed; we are not unmindful that such a measure may, in its consequences, involve our own lives in additional danger. But we had rather forego temporary distinctions, and commit our lives to the most desperate situation, than prosecute this just and necessary war on terms so unequal and dishonorable." Greene was highly gratified with the cordial support, spontaneously pledged by his army; and, soon after his departure from the High Hills, issued a proclamation, severely arraiging the execution of colonel Hayne, declaring his determination to "make reprisals for all such inhuman insults, and to select for the objects of retaliation officers of the regular forces, and not the deluded Americans who had joined the royal army."

The inhabitants of Carolina, whom the enemy had expected to intimidate by the wanton sacrifice of Hayne, discovering the generous and determined spirit of the American general and army, discarded the apprehensions at first excited, and flocked to the standard of their country. Emulating the ardor and decision of

the regular troops, they were ready to subject themselves to all the perils to which they might be eventually exposed in the just cause of retaliation.

The British officers and soldiers were not unmindful of the changed condition of the war. The unpleasant sensations arising from this state of things naturally produced a serious examination of the cause; and the inquiry was not calculated to inspire confidence.

The feelings which it excited received a considerable addition from the representation which, by permission of the American general, was now made by two British subalterns, taken prisoners shortly after the execution of colonel Hayne was known in the American camp; and who, as soon as captured, were committed to the provost by order of general Greene. Apprehending that they would become the first victims of the barbarous policy introduced by their commanders, they addressed their friends in Charleston, describing their condition, announcing their probable fate, and referring to that clause in the American general's proclamation, which confined his menaced retaliation to British officers only.

The honorable and reflecting of both armies perceived, that the justice of the sentence was at least questionable; that inconsistency and passion had marked the proceedings. Nor did it escape observation, that colonel Balfour, when attempting to shield himself and coadjutor under cover of instructions, withheld their *date*. This suppression naturally excited a belief, that the orders of lord Cornwallis were previous to

Greene's recovery of that part of Carolina in which Hayne resided. Although his instructions might have comprehended the case of the ill fated American, while the country around him was subject to the royal power; yet after the reconquest by Greene, they could not be applied with justice. The extraordinary condition which accompanied the respite, corroborated this conjecture. It was generally asked, if the decision be really conformable with the instructions of Cornwallis, why should Greene's expostulation be prohibited? The interposition of the American general could not prevent the execution of the sentence, if correct; but would lead to a discussion with his lordship, which might demonstrate its injustice,—an event to be courted, not avoided, by honorable men, dispensing death at their pleasure. It occasioned no little surprise, that lord Rawdon, who had been deemed scrupulously observant of the nice bearings of honor, should have provoked a system of retaliation, in the unpleasant consequences of which he could not participate, being about to depart for ever from the theatre of action!

All these considerations, combined with the actual condition of two of their comrades, produced a meeting of the British officers in Charleston, who presented a memorial to the commandant, expressing their dissatisfaction at the changed condition of the war.

It was reported and believed that the memorial was answered by an assurance, that the late sanguinary precedent should never be repeated; which not only

calmed the just apprehensions of the British army, but seems to have influenced the future conduct of British commandants.

When the execution of Hayne was known in England, it became a topic of animadversion. The duke of Richmond introduced the subject in the house of lords, by "moving an address to the king, praying that his majesty would give directions for laying before the house the several papers relative to the execution of Isaac Hayne." His grace prefaced the motion with a succinct and correct narrative of the capture, condemnation and execution of the American colonel; and charged the procedure with 'illegality,' 'barbarity,' and 'impolicy.' He read to the house an extract from the proclamation of general Greene, in which the execution was "reprobated as a cruel and unjustifiable murder, and severe retaliation was threatened on the persons of British officers. His grace called on the house to institute an immediate and effectual inquiry, as the only mean of securing their own officers from the dangers which hung over them; and of rescuing the British nation from the opprobrious charges of cruelty and barbarity, under which it labored in all the states in Europe." The motion was strenuously opposed by the lord chancellor, the lords Walsingham and Stormount. They argued that "as his majesty's ministers had declared that no information had been received relative to the facts alluded to, it was inconsistent with the dignity and gravity of the house to proceed to a formal inquiry on vague and uncertain surmises;

that it was still less candid and equitable, on such slight grounds, to call in question the characters of brave, deserving, absent officers. But were the facts true and authentic, these lords contended, that colonel Hayne, having been taken in arms after admission to his parole, was liable to instant execution, without any other form of trial than that necessary to identify the person." The earl of Huntingdon, uncle to lord Rawdon, acquainted the house, that "he had authority from the earl Cornwallis to declare, that this had been the practice in several cases under his command in North Carolina." The doctrine of the ministerial lords was denied, with great confidence, by the earls Shelburne and Effingham. It was asserted by the former, "from circumstances within his own knowledge, that the practice in the late war was totally different. A great degree of ignominy and stricter confinement were the consequences of a breach of parole: the persons guilty of that offence were shunned by gentlemen; but it had never before entered into the head of a commander to hang them." The earl of Effingham remarked, that "the practice of granting paroles was a modern civility of late date, not yet prevalent in all countries; and that the lord chancellor's quotation from Grotius related to spies, and not to prisoners who had broken their paroles." The motion of the duke of Richmond was rejected by a large majority; twenty-five lords voting in favor of the address, and seventy-three against it.*

* See Gentleman's London Magazine for 1782.

The arguments, in opposition to the motion, are certainly feeble. Want of official information was a good reason for postponement, but not for rejection. If the principles of public law, relative to spies, can be applied to prisoners who violate their paroles, they were inapplicable to the case of Hayne; who was condemned for "being found in arms after he had become a subject." Nor is the doctrine of the earl of Shelburne entirely correct. "Modern civility" has indeed meliorated the severities of war, by accommodating prisoners with paroles. Sometimes the indulged captive is permitted to return to his country; at others, he is restrained to a particular town or district; and in either case, he is required to remain neuter until officially exchanged. Ignominy justly follows the violation of parole in regard to limits; but the breach of it by resumption of arms is invariably and rightly punished with death. Had Hayne been guilty of this offence, his execution would have been indisputably just: but the virtuous American neither was nor could be charged with infraction of parole, by resumption of arms. The parole, under which he retired to his seat after the capitulation of Charleston, was completely revoked by the order to repair to that city, and by the surrender of his person to the British commandant. He was then permitted to return to his family, not as a prisoner on parole, but as a British subject; of which character the reconquest by Greene entirely divested him, and restored him to his country, his liberty, and duty.

The ship, in which lord Rawdon embarked for

England, was captured by some of the French cruisers, and brought into the Chesapeake. Soon afterwards the propitious termination of the siege of York placed in our hands the earl Cornwallis. Washington had it now in his power to execute the intention of Greene; but the change in the demeanor of the British commanders, and the evident and fast approach of peace, rendered the severe expedient unnecessary. He therefore indulged his love of lenity, and conformed his conduct to the mild temper of the United States; forgiving an atrocity, which, at any other period of the war, would not have been overlooked.

Relieved as must have been lord Rawdon and colonel Balfour, not more by the decision of the house of lords, than by the clemency of the American commander in chief, they could not, with propriety, infer from either circumstance, justification of their conduct. The rejection of the duke of Richmond's motion grew out of considerations foreign to the real merits of the subject; and the lenity of Washington may be truly ascribed to an unwillingness to stain the era of victory and returning amity with the blood even of the guilty.

Had this principle, as amiable as wise, governed lord Rawdon and colonel Balfour, their fame would not have been tarnished by the blood of an estimable individual, wantonly and unnecessarily shed. How unlike the conduct of these commanders was that of the American chieftain to the unfortunate Andre! At a period of the war, when a strict and stern execution

of martial law was indispensable, the interposition of sir Henry Clinton in behalf of an acknowledged spy was received by Washington with patience and with tenderness; and every argument, which the British general and his commissioners could suggest, was respectfully weighed. But in the closing of the war, when true policy and the mild tenets of christianity alike urged oblivion and good will, lord Rawdon and colonel Balfour hurried an innocent untried American to the gallows, and cruelly interdicted previous communication to his general!

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE deliberate resolve of Greene, guarantied by the solemn and spontaneous pledge of his officers, changed the character of the war, and presented death to the soldier in the most ignominious form. Death, in the field of battle, has no terror for the brave: to expire on the gibbet shocks every noble and generous feeling.

Major Andre's letter, when condemned as a spy, emphatically delineates this horror; and paints in vivid colors, sensations common to every soldier.*

* Copy of a letter from major Andre to general Washington, dated

Tappan, October 1, 1780.

SIR,

Buoyed above the terror of death, by the consciousness of a life devoted to honorable pursuits, and stained with no action that can give me remorse, I trust that the request I make to your excellency at this serious period, and which is to soften my last moments, will not be rejected.

Sympathy towards a soldier will surely induce your excellency, and a military tribunal, to adapt the mode of my death to the feelings of a man of honor.

Let me hope, sir, that if aught in my character impresses you with esteem towards me; if aught in my misfortunes marks me as the victim of policy, and not of resentment; I shall ex-

Nevertheless the army exhibited on its march the highest spirit, with zealous anxiety to reach the foe; and conscious of the justice of the measure adopted by their general, with one feeling cheerfully submitted to its consequences.

Proceeding by easy marches, Greene crossed the Wateree near Cambden; but still separated from the enemy by the Congaree, he was obliged to make a long and circuitous march to gain its southern bank, which placed him safe from the possibility of insult while in the act of passing the river.

Copies of the proclamation heretofore issued were distributed throughout the country, as well as forwarded to the hostile headquarters, and to Charleston; that the enemy, being duly apprised of the determination of the American general, might without delay arrest its execution by suitable explanation and atonement. No attempt of this sort was made, and no doubt remained that the menaced retaliation would take effect as soon as fit subjects for its application should fall into our hands.

Having reached the neighborhood of Friday's ferry, the army passed the Congaree at Howell's; having

perience the operation of these feelings in your breast, by being informed that I am not to die on a gibbet.

I have the honor to be,

your excellency's most obedient,
and most humble servant,

JOHN ANDRE,

Adjutant-general to the British army.

been joined by brigadier Pickens, with his militia, and by lieutenant colonel Henderson, of the South Carolina line, with a small body of state infantry lately raised.

The two armies being now on the same side of the river, lieutenant colonel Lee, with his legion and the corps of Henderson, was detached in advance, followed by the main body in supporting distance.

Greene continued to pursue his march with unvarying attention to the ease and comfort of his troops; preserving unimpaired their strength by withholding them from exposure to the mid-day sun, which continued to be keen and morbid.

As the van approached Motte's, the exploring cavalry under captain O'Neal fell in with a light party of the enemy detached for the purpose of procuring intelligence. These were all killed or taken. From the prisoners we learnt that colonel Stuart, when informed of Greene's passage of the Wateree and movement towards Friday's ferry, broke up from his long-held position near M'Cleod's, and retired down the Santee for the purpose of meeting a convoy from Charleston, and of establishing himself near Nelson's ferry on that river, which information was forthwith communicated to the general. Persevering in his plan of forcing the enemy to confine himself to the region bordering on the sea, after a few days halt in the vicinity of Motte's waiting for the junction of brigadier Marion, then on his return from the Edisto, he again advanced. Lieutenant colonel Lee, still preceding the army, soon found that Stuart had set down at the Eutaw Springs,

forty miles below his late position, where the convoy from Charleston had arrived. This intelligence was despatched to Greene, who was disposed to stimulate further retreat; his sole object being the recovery of the country, and which, though determined to effect, he preferred doing without further waste of blood. Lee was accordingly instructed to announce rather than conceal the advance of the American army, in order that Stuart might, if he chose, fall back a second time. During our march on the 5th and 6th the van corps met with not a single individual, excepting two dragoons from the enemy's camp, one each day, bearing a flag, with despatches for the American general. These dragoons successively confirmed the continuance of Stuart at the Eutaws; adding that there was no appearance of change in position, and that when they left camp, it was believed that general Greene was still near Motte's post. Instead of receiving the despatches and sending them on as was customary, Lee ordered the British dragoons to proceed to the army, with the view that if general Greene continued to prefer annunciation of his approach to the enemy that the same might be effectually done by the immediate return of the flags, with orders for their proceeding to Stuart. Inasmuch as no attempt had been made to conceal the advance of the American army, Greene could not suppose that Stuart remained ignorant of the fact; and, therefore, in the course of the day dismissed the flags, sending them back to lieutenant colonel Lee without any special directions; know-

ing from the discretion appertaining to the officer in advance, that he would consequently be governed in his disposal of them by intervening occurrences. The same uninterrupted quietude continuing during the seventh, Lee became convinced, strange as it appeared, that the British leader was uninformed of our proximity; and, therefore, determined to retain the flags. This was accordingly done, and he took post in the evening at Laurens's farm,* within eight miles of the British camp. Greene having reached Bendell's plantation, within seventeen miles of the enemy, encamped for the night, determining to advance at an early hour the ensuing morning. It was well ascertained that the British troops were forced to forage at a distance, and that occasionally parties were detached for the collection of vegetables as well as of forage;

* This farm belonged to Henry Laurens, one of the most respectable, honorable and distinguished statesmen of our country. He had for many years been a member of congress, and was president of that body in a very trying period of the war. He was afterwards appointed minister plenipotentiary to the United Provinces, and was unfortunately captured on his voyage by a British cruiser. On landing in England, he was sent to London, when he was immediately committed to the tower: From this confinement, and its eventual consequence, death upon a gibbet, he was relieved by the surrender of the army of lord Cornwallis; from which era the enemy relinquished every hope of subjugation, and turned his attention with diligence to the conclusion of peace.

Laurens went from England to France, where he assisted in the negotiations which were terminated by the treaty of peace.

Lee consequently determined to take every precaution to prevent any communication during the night, believing it probable that he might in the morning fall in with some of the detachments employed in procuring supplies. The same dead calm continued: nobody was seen moving in any direction,—a state of quiet never before experienced in similar circumstances. While Stuart spent the night perfectly at ease, from his ignorance of passing events, the American general was preparing for battle.

Our whole force, including the reinforcements from North Carolina (which joined us at the High Hills) under general Sumner, the corps of Marion and of Pickens, with that lately formed in South Carolina under lieutenant colonel Henderson, amounted to two thousand three hundred men, of which the continentals (horse, foot and artillery), made about sixteen hundred.

Lord Rawdon, as has been before mentioned, led to the relief of Ninety-Six an army of two thousand,*

* Extract from Tarleton's Campaigns,—“There appears to be an error in this statement of the force marched from Charleston. Lord Rawdon, in his letter of the 5th, to earl Cornwallis, says, he should move on the 7th of June towards Ninety-Six with the troops at Monk's Corner, and the flank companies of the three regiments lately arrived. Therefore it seems more probable that lord Rawdon's whole force did not exceed two thousand men, viz. the garrison withdrawn from Cambden; lieutenant colonel Watson's corps; major M'Arthur's reinforcement; and the flank companies of colonel Gould's brigade.” Add to this the regulars of the garrison of Ninety-Six (four hundred) and the flank companies under Majoribanks, between two and three hundred.

to which was annexed the garrison of that place under lieutenant colonel Cruger, part of which only was now with Stuart.

The effective force of the hostile armies may be fairly estimated as nearly equal, each about two thousand three hundred. A portion of both armies, and that too nearly equal, had never as yet been in action; so that in every respect the state of equality was preserved, excepting in cavalry, where the advantage, both in number and quality, was on our side.

The night passed in tranquillity; and, judging from appearances, no occurrence seemed more distant than the sanguinary battle which followed.

Greene advanced at four in the morning in two columns, with artillery at the head of each, lieutenant colonel Lee in his front and lieutenant colonel Washington in his rear.

While moving with much circumspection, in the well grounded expectation that we should fall upon the British picquets unperceived, captain Armstrong, conducting the reconnoitring party, communicated to Lee the approach of a body of the enemy. This occurred about eight o'clock in the morning, four miles from the British camp. Forwarding this intelligence to the general, and presuming that the descried foe, consisting of horse and foot, must be the van of the enemy, Lee halted, waiting for the approximation of our main body.

The legion infantry were drawn up across the road, the cavalry in open wood on its right, and Henderson with his corps in thick wood upon its left. Shortly the British appeared, following Armstrong. The action opened, and the enemy were soon forced in front, while the horse, making a rapid movement under major Eggleston, gained the rear. The infantry was destroyed, several killed, and about forty taken with their captain; the cavalry, flying in full speed as soon as they saw the legion dragoons pressing forward, saved themselves, as did the foraging party following in the rear, consisting of two or three hundred without arms.*

Pressing forward, we soon got in view of another body of the enemy, with whom the action recommenced. Lieutenant colonel Lee, advising the general of this occurrence, requested the support of artillery to counteract that of the enemy now opening. Quickly colonel Williams, adjutant general, brought up captain Gains with his two pieces in full gallop, who untimbering took his part with decision and effect.

During this rencontre both armies formed: The American having, as before mentioned, moved in two columns, each composed of the corps destined for its respective lines, soon ranged in order of battle.

The North Carolina militia under colonel Malmedy, with that of South Carolina, led by the brigadiers

* The rooting party, being unarmed, hastened back to the British camp upon the first fire, and therefore escaped.

Marion and Pickens, making the first, and the continentals making the second line: lieutenant colonel Campbell with the Virginians on the right; brigadier Sumner with the North Carolinians in the centre; and the Marylanders, conducted by Williams and Howard, on the left, resting with its left flank on the Charleston road. Lee with his legion was charged with the care of the right, as was Henderson with his corps with that of the left flank. The artillery, consisting only of two threes and two sixes, commanded by the captains Gains and Finn, were disposed the first with the front and the last with the rear line; and Baylor's regiment of horse, with Kirkwood's infantry of Delaware, composed the reserve, led by lieutenant colonel Washington.

The British army was drawn up in one line, a few hundred paces in front of their camp, (tents standing,) with two separate bodies of infantry and the cavalry posted in its rear, ready to be applied as contingencies might point out.

The Buffs* (third regiment), composed its right, resting with its flank on the Charleston road; the remains of several corps under lieutenant colonel Cruger the centre; and the sixty-third and sixty-fourth

* This regiment was one of the three which had lately arrived from Ireland, and had never before been in action; yet, nevertheless, fought with the most determined courage. The regiment of Maryland, under lieutenant colonel Howard, was opposed to it; and such was the obstinacy with which the contest was maintained, that a number of the soldiers fell transfixed by each other's bayonet.

(veterans) the left. On the Eutaw branch, which runs to the British camp, right of the Charleston road, was posted major Majoribanks at the head of the light infantry, making one battalion,—his right on the branch, and his left stretching in an oblique line towards the flank of the Buffs. This branch issued from a deep ravine, between which and the British camp was the Charleston road, and between the road and the ravine was a strong brick house. The artillery was distributed along the line, a part on the Charleston road, and another part on the road leading to Roache's plantation, which passed through the enemy's left wing.

The front line of the American army, following close in the rear of the two pieces under captain Gains, began now to be felt by the van, who, diverging to the right and left, firing obliquely, took post on the flanks agreeably to the orders of battle.

The militia advancing with alacrity, the battle became warm, convincing lieutenant colonel Stuart, unexpected as it appears to have been, that Greene was upon him. The fire ran from flank to flank; our line still advancing, and the enemy, adhering to his position, manifesting a determination not to move.

The sixty-third and the legion infantry were warmly engaged, when the sixty-fourth, with a part of the centre, advanced upon colonel Malmedy, who soon yielding, the success was pushed by the enemy's left, and the militia, after a fierce contest, gave way,—leaving the corps of Henderson and the legion infantry engaged, sullenly falling back.

Greene instantly ordered up the centre of the second line under brigadier Sumner, to fill the chasm produced by the recession of the militia, who came handsomely into action, ranging with the infantry of the legion and the corps of Henderson, both still maintaining the flanks with unyielding energy. The battle being reinstated grew hotter, and the enemy, who had before gained ground, fell back to his first position. Stuart now brought into line the corps of infantry posted in the rear of his left wing, and directed major Coffin with his cavalry to take post on his left; evincing a jealousy of that flank where the woods were open and the ground opportune for cavalry, in which we excelled. In this point of the action, lieutenant colonel Henderson received a ball, which stopped his further exertion. His corps, however, soon recovered from the effect produced by his fall; and, led on by lieutenant colonel Hampton, continuing to act well its part, the American line persevered in advance, and the fire became mutually destructive. Greene, determining to strike a conclusive blow, brought up the Marylanders and Virginians; when our line became dense, and pressing forward with a shout the battle raged with redoubled fury.

The enemy, sensible that the weight of our force was bearing upon him, returned our shout, and sustained himself nobly from right to left. Majoribanks now for the first time was put in motion, which being perceived, lieutenant colonel Washington with the reserve was commanded to fall upon him, and at the

same moment the line was ordered to hold up its fire and to charge with bayonet. The air again resounded with the shouts of the advancing Americans; the enemy answering by pouring in a close and quickly repeated fire. As we drew near, lieutenant colonel Lee, at the head of his infantry, discerning that we outstretched the enemy's line, ordered captain Rudolph to fall back with his company, to gain the enemy's flank, and to give him a raking fire as soon as he turned it. This movement was executed with precision, and had the happiest effect. The enemy's left could not sustain the approaching shock, assailed in front as it was in flank, and it instantly began to give way, which quickly afterwards took place along the whole line, in some parts of which the hostile ranks contended with the bayonet, many individuals of the Marylanders and of the Buffs having been mutually transfixed.

The conquering troops pressed the advantage they had gained, pursuing the foe, and possessed themselves of his camp, which was yielded without a struggle. Washington promptly advanced to execute the orders he had received, and made a circuit to gain the rear of Majoribanks, preceded by lieutenant Stuart* with the leading section. As he drew near to the enemy, he found the ground thickly set with black jack, and almost impervious to horse. Deranging as was this unlooked for obstacle, Washington with his dauntless cavalry forced his way, notwithstanding

* Colonel Philip Stuart, now a member of congress from Maryland.

the murderous discharge of the enemy, safe behind his covert. Human courage could not surmount the obstruction which interposed, or this gallant officer with his intrepid corps would have triumphed. Captain Watts, second in command, fell, pierced with two balls. Lieutenants King and Simmons experienced a similar fate; and Washington's horse being killed, he became entangled in the fall, when struggling to extricate himself he was bayoneted and taken. Lieutenant Stuart was now dismounted, being severely wounded, and his horse killed close to the hostile ranks; nor did a single man of his section escape, some being killed and the rest wounded. The gallant young Carlisle, from Alexandria, a cadet in the regiment, was killed, and half the corps destroyed; after which the residue was drawn off by captain Parsons, assisted by lieutenant Gordon.

This repulse took place at the time the British line gave way. Majoribanks, although victorious, fell back to cover his flying comrades; and major Sheridan, with the New York volunteers, judiciously took possession of the brick house before mentioned for the same purpose; while, with the same view, major Coffin, with the cavalry, placed himself on the left, in an open field west of the Charleston road.

In our pursuit we took three hundred prisoners and two pieces of artillery: one taken by captain Rudolph, of the legion infantry, and the other by lieutenant Duval, of the Maryland line, who was killed,—a young officer of the highest promise. As soon as we entered

the field, Sheridan began to fire from the brick house. The left of the legion infantry, led by lieutenant Manning, the nearest to the house, followed close upon the enemy still entering it, hoping to force his way before the door could be barred. One of our soldiers actually got half way in, and for some minutes a struggle of strength took place,—Manning pressing him in, and Sheridan forcing him out. The last prevailed, and the door was closed. Here captain Barry, deputy adjutant general, the brother of the celebrated colonel S. Barry, and some few others, were overtaken and made prisoners. Lieutenant colonel Lee, finding his left discomfited in the bold attempt, on the success of which much hung, recalled it; and Manning so disposed of his prisoners, by mixing them with his own soldiers, as to return unhurt; the enemy in the house sparing him rather than risking those with him.

At this point of time lieutenant colonel Howard, with a part of his regiment, passed through the field towards the head of the ravine, and captain Kirkwood appeared approaching the house on its right. Majoribanks, though uninjured, continued stationary on the enemy's right, as did Coffin with the cavalry on the left. Sheridan, from a few swivels and his musketry, poured his fire in every direction without cessation.

During this period, Stuart was actively employed in forming his line; difficult in itself from the severe battle just fought, and rendered more so by the consternation which evidently prevailed. The followers of the army, the wagons, the wounded, the timid, were

all hastening towards Charleston; some along the road in our view, others through the field back of the road, equally in view; while the staff were destroying stores of every kind, especially spirits, which the British soldiers sought with avidity.

General Greene brought up all his artillery against the house, hoping to effect a breach, through which he was determined to force his way; convinced that the submission of the enemy in the house gave to him the hostile army. At the same moment lieutenant colonel Lee (still on the right) sent for Eggleston and his cavalry, for the purpose of striking Coffin, and turning the head of the ravine; which point was properly selected for the concentration of our force, too much scattered by the pursuit, and by the allurements which the enemy's camp presented. Here we commanded the ravine, and might readily break up the incipient arrangements of the rallying enemy; here we were safe from the fire of the house, and here we possessed the Charleston road. While Lee was halted at the edge of the wood, impatiently waiting for the arrival of his horse, he saw captain Armstrong (the leading officer for the day) approaching, and not doubting that the corps was following, the lieutenant colonel advanced into the field, directing Armstrong to follow.

He had gone but a little way, when the captain told him that only his section was up, having never seen the rest of the corps since its discomfiture on the left some time before. This unlooked for intelligence was

not less fatal to the bright prospect of personal glory, than it was to the splendid issue of the conflict.* Not a single doubt can be entertained, had the cavalry of the legion been in place, as it ought to have been, but that Coffin would have been carried, which must have been followed by the destruction of the British army. Our infantry were getting into order, and several small bodies were sufficiently near to have improved every advantage obtained by the cavalry. Howard, with Oldham's company, had just recommenced action between the house and the head of the ravine; and our troops on the right were in motion for the same ground, not doubting the destruction of Coffin, who only could annoy their flank. The recession of Lee, and the retirement of Howard, who was at this instant severely wounded, nipped in the bud measures of offence in

* When lieutenant colonel Lee took charge of his infantry, general Greene was pleased to direct that the cavalry of the legion should be placed at his disposal. It accordingly followed, at a safe distance, in the rear of the infantry.

Being sent for at this crisis (as has been related) only one troop appeared. Major Eggleston had been previously ordered into action, and had been foiled, by encountering the same sort of obstacle experienced by Washington, as was afterwards ascertained.

To this unfortunate and unauthorized order, may be ascribed the turn in this day's battle. Had the legion cavalry been all up at this crisis, Coffin would have been cut to pieces, the enemy's left occupied in force, the route already commenced completed, and Stuart would have been deprived, by the change in our position, of the aid derived from the brick house; and his army must in consequence have laid down their arms.

this quarter; while, on the left, the house remained in possession of Sheridan, the weight of our metal being to light to effect a breach.

This intermission gave Stuart time to restore his broken line, which being accomplished, he instantly advanced, and the action was renewed. It soon terminated in the enemy's repossession of his camp, followed by our retreat, with the loss of two field pieces, and the recovery of one of the two before taken by us.

Satisfied with these advantages, colonel Stuart did not advance further; and general Greene (after despatching lieutenant colonel Lee with a proposition to the British commander, the object of which was to unite with him in burying the dead,) drew off; persuaded that he had recovered the country, the object in view, as well as that a more convenient opportunity for repetition of battle would be presented on the enemy's retreat, which he was convinced could not long be deferred.

The battle lasted upwards of three hours, and was fiercely contested, every corps in both armies bravely supporting each other. The loss was uncommonly great,—more than one fifth of the British and one fourth of the American army being killed and wounded, as stated in the official returns, which intelligent officers of both armies considered short of the real loss sustained. The enemy made sixty prisoners, all wounded;—we took about five hundred, including some wounded left in his camp by colonel Stuart when he retired. Of six commandants of regiments bearing

continental commissions, Williams and Lee were only unhurt. Washington, Howard and Henderson were wounded; and lieutenant colonel Campbell, highly respected, beloved and admired, was killed.

This excellent officer received a ball in his breast, in the decisive charge which broke the British line, while listening to an interrogatory from lieutenant colonel Lec, then on the left of the legion infantry, adjoining the right of the Virginians, the post of Campbell. He dropped on the pommel of his saddle speechless,* and was borne in the rear by Lee's orderly dragoon, in whose care he expired, the moment he was taken from his horse. Many of our officers of every grade suffered, militia as well as continentals; among whom was brigadier Pickens, who was wounded.

The conclusion of this battle was as unexpected to both armies as it was mortifying to ours. The splendor which its beginning and progress had shed upon our arms became obscured, and the rich prize

* Doctor Ramsay has represented the death of this highly respected officer differently, from information which no doubt the doctor accredited.

But as the writer was personally acquainted with the transaction, he cannot refrain from stating it exactly as it happened. The Virginians had begun to fire, which was not only against orders, but put in danger Rudolph and his party, then turning the enemy's left. To stop this fire, lieutenant colonel Lee galloped down the line to Campbell, and while speaking to him on the subject, the lieutenant colonel received his wound, of which he soon expired without uttering a word.

within our grasp was lost. Had our cavalry contributed their aid, as heretofore it never failed to do, a British army must have surrendered to Greene on the field of battle. But they were unfortunately brought into action under difficulties not to be conquered; one corps cut to pieces, and the other dispersed, in effect the same; and the critical moment passed, before it concentrated. Had the infantry of the reserve preceded the cavalry of the reserve, Washington would have avoided the unequal contest to which he was exposed; and by patiently watching for the crisis, would have fallen upon Majoribanks when retiring to shield the enemy's broken line. Had Eggleston not been drawn from his post by orders officiously communicated to that officer as from the general, when in truth he never issued such orders, Lee would have been joined by his cavalry, ready to inflict the last blow, so clearly within his power. Both these untoward incidents were necessary to stop us from the signal victory courting our acceptance, and both occurred.

The honor* of the day was claimed by both sides, while the benefits flowing from it were by both yielded to the Americans: the first belonged to neither and the last to us.

Congress expressed their sense of the conduct of the general and of the merit of the army, presenting their thanks to Greene, and to every corps who fought under him on that day; presenting him at

* See Appendix, Q and Q.

the same time with a British standard, and a gold medal emblematical of the battle.*

* By the United States in Congress assembled, October 29th, 1781.

Resolved, That the thanks of the United States in Congress assembled, be presented to major general Greene, for his wise, decisive and magnanimous conduct in the action of the 8th of September last, near the Eutaw Springs, in South Carolina; in which, with a force inferior in number to that of the enemy, he obtained a most signal victory.

That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be presented to the officers and men of the Maryland and Virginia brigades, and Delaware battalion of continental troops, for the unparalleled bravery and heroism by them displayed, in advancing to the enemy through an incessant fire, and charging them with an impetuosity and ardor that could not be resisted.

That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be presented to the officers and men of the legionary corps and artillery, for their intrepid and gallant exertions during the action.

That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be presented to the brigade of North Carolina, for their resolution and perseverance in attacking the enemy, and sustaining a superior fire.

That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be presented to the officers and men of the state corps of South Carolina, for the zeal, activity and firmness by them exhibited throughout the engagement.

That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be presented to the officers and men of the militia, who formed the front line in the order of battle, and sustained their post with honor, propriety, and a resolution worthy of men determined to be free.

Resolved, That a British standard be presented to major gene-

Not a spring nor a rivulet was near, but that in possession of the enemy; and the water in our canteens had been exhausted early in the battle. The day was extremely sultry, and the cry for water was universal.

Much as general Greene wished to avail himself of the evident advantage he had gained, by setting down close to Stuart, he was forced to relinquish it, and to retire many miles to the first spot which afforded an adequate supply of water. There he halted for the night, determined to return and renew the battle.

Marion and Lee were to move on the 9th, and turn the enemy's left, with the view of seizing the first strong pass on the road to Charleston, below the Eutaw Spring, as well to interrupt colonel Stuart when re-

ral Greene, as an honorable testimony of his merit, and a golden medal emblematical of the battle and victory aforesaid.

That major general Greene be desired to present the thanks of Congress to captains Pierce and Pendleton, major Hyrne and captain Shubrick, his aids de camp, in testimony of their particular activity and good conduct during the whole of the battle.

That a sword be presented to captain Pierce, who bore the general's despatches, giving an account of the victory; and that the board of war take order herein.

Resolved, That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be presented to brigadier general Marion, of the South Carolina militia, for his wise, gallant and decided conduct in defending the liberties of his country; and particularly for his prudent and intrepid attack on a body of British troops, on the 30th day of August last; and for the distinguished part he took in the battle of the 8th of September.

Extract from the minutes,

CHARLES THOMPSON, Secretary.

treating, as to repel any accession of force which might be detached from the garrison of Charleston, to reinforce the army; while the general continued in his camp, actively engaged in preparing arrangements for the conveyance of the wounded to the High Hills. Marion and Lee, approaching the enemy's left, discovered that he had been busily employed in sending off his sick and wounded, and that he was hastening his preparations to decamp. Despatching a courier to Greene with this information, the light troops made a circuit to fall into the Charleston road near Ferguson's swamp, and to take post on its margin; being an eligible position for the accomplishment of the object in view.

In our march we received intelligence that a detachment from Monk's Corner, led by major M'Arthur, was hastening to join Stuart. It was now deemed advisable to recede from the original purpose, and by a rapid, though circuitous movement, to gain a more distant position, with the view of striking at M'Arthur so far below the Eutaws as to put him out of possibility of support from Stuart; the commencement of whose retreat was momentarily expected. To accomplish this arduous move in time, every exertion was made. Fatigued as were the troops by their active service during the preceding day, with the long morning's march through deep sand, and scorching heat, yet did they gain the desired ground within the allotted time.

But this oppressive march was useless. Stuart hurried his preparations, and commencing his retreat on

the evening of the 9th, had brought his first division within a few miles of M'Arthur, when the light troops reached their destined point. Thus situated, to fight M'Arthur became rash; as it could not be doubted but that he could and would maintain the action, until reinforced by Stuart. Marion and Lee were compelled to recede from their purpose, and taking post at some distance in the woods, on the right flank of Stuart, waited until the main body passed, hoping to strike successfully his rear guard.

In the course of the morning of the 10th, the junction of M'Arthur was effected below Martin's tavern, and the British army continued moving towards Monk's Corner, which is one day's march from Charleston.

Gaining the rear of Stuart, the legion dragoons were directed to fall upon the cavalry attached to the rear guard. This was handsomely executed by the van under captain O'Neal: he made most of the rear party prisoners, two or three escaping to the infantry by the fleetness of their horses.

So evident was the dismay* which prevailed, that

* After the battle, lieutenant colonel Stuart ordered all the arms belonging to the dead and wounded to be collected, which was accordingly done. When the army had marched off the ground, this pile of arms was set on fire by the rear guard. Many of the muskets being loaded, an irregular discharge took place, resembling the desultory fire which usually precedes battle. The retreating army at once presumed that Greene was up, and had commenced his attack on its rear. Dismay and confusion

lieutenant colonel Lee, not satisfied with this advantage, determined to persevere in pursuit with his cavalry; hoping to find some fit opportunity of cutting off the rear guard, with a portion of their wagons conveying the wounded.

Following until late in the evening, picking up occasionally the fatigued who had fallen behind, and the stragglers; he received intelligence from some of the last taken, which determined him not longer to postpone his blow. Detaching Eggleston with one troop on his right, to fall upon the flank, Lee, at the head of the other two troops, moved along the road to force the enemy in front. As soon as Eggleston had gained the desired situation the charge was sounded, and the cavalry rushed upon the enemy. Unluckily the wood, through which Eggleston passed to the road, was thickly set with black jack. It became more difficult as you came nearer the road, and the rear officer of the enemy forming his guard en potence, gave the assailants a

took place; wagoners cut their horses from the wagons and rode off, abandoning their wagons.

The followers of the army fled in like manner, and the panic was rapidly spreading, when the firing in the rear ceased. Colonel Washington, who had been taken, though indulged with his parole, was accompanied by two officers. These gentlemen abandoned the colonel and galloped off, not liking present appearances; but as soon as the mistake was discovered returned to their prisoner. Washington, after his exchange, communicated these facts to his friend major Pendleton, aid-de-camp to general Greene.

warm reception, flying the moment he delivered his fire, yielding up several wagons.

Eggleston and his troop were roughly handled; his horse being killed,—himself happily escaping although five balls pierced his clothes and equipments: an unexpected issue, and which would not have taken place, had not the ground arrested his progress. Lee's squadron was very little injured, having none of the impediments to encounter, which accidentally interfered with Eggleston. The success turned out to be useless, for the miserable wounded, more miserable by increase of pain with increase of march, supplicated so fervently to be permitted to proceed, that lieutenant colonel Lee determined not to add to their misery, and to his trouble; but taking off his own wounded returned to Marion, leaving the wagons and the wounded to continue their route.

Greene did not reach the abandoned camp in time to fall upon Stuart; and so expeditious was his progress, that every endeavour to come up with him with the main body was nugatory.

The British army took post at Monk's Corner, and general Greene returned to Eutaw Spring. Here he found some of the enemy's wounded,—left because their condition forbad moving,—with some of his own in the same situation. The necessary arrangements being made for the care and comfort of these unfortunate individuals, the American general proceeded by easy marches to our favorite camp, the High Hills of Santee.

This retirement from the field became indispensable; not only because of our diminished force from the severe battle lately fought, but disease had resumed its wasting havock, brought on by the forty-eight hours' hard service; throughout which we were exposed to the sultry sun during the day, and to the heavy dew during the night. Never had we experienced so much sickness at any one time as we did now; nor was it confined to new levies, as was customary, but affected every corps; even those most inured to military life, and most accustomed to the climate. Nearly one half of the army was disabled by wounds or fever, and among the last some of the best officers who had escaped in the action. General Greene happily enjoyed his usual health, and softened our misery by his care and attention. Litters were provided for those most afflicted, and all the comforts which the country afforded were collected, and reserved for the exclusive use of the sick and wounded. On the 18th we reached the High Hills, when permanent arrangements were adopted for the accommodation of the wounded, and to check the spread of disease, and for the plentiful supply of wholesome provisions. Marion and his militia, being habituated to the swamps of Pedee, were less affected by the prevailing fever, and continued on the south of the Congaree, to protect the country from the predatory excursions of the enemy.

The British army did not escape the insalubrity of the season and climate, and like its enemy, was held

quiet in quarters; their chief attention too being called to the restoration of the sick and wounded.

Upon lord Rawdon's sailing for Europe, Cornwallis appointed major general Leslie, then serving under him in Virginia, to the command of the British troops in the Carolinas and Georgia; but this officer did not reach Charleston for some weeks after the battle of the Eutaws.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

A NEW scene now opened upon the American theatre. The expectation announced by the commander in chief to the general in the South, previous to our decampment from the High Hills of Santee, became confirmed in the course of the last month. Admiral count De Barras, the French naval commander on this station, communicated officially to general Washington, the resolution taken by the count De Grasse, commanding the French fleet in the West Indies, of sailing from Cape François, in St. Domingo, for the bay of Chesapeake, on the 3d of August, with a powerful fleet, having on board three thousand land forces. Charmed with the prospect of being enabled at length to act with the vigor congenial with his disposition, Washington hastened his preparations to invest New York, as soon as the expected fleet of his most christian majesty should arrive. Nothing was wanting but one decisive stroke to put an end to the war, which his daily experience of the embarrassments attendant upon all the measures of congress, convinced him was at this time indispensable to our final success. The nation was absolutely wearied out; voluntary enlistments to fill up our ranks, had long since yielded to the enrolment of drafts from the militia for

short periods of service, and this last resort had proved very inadequate. Reduced as had been our number of regiments, in consequence of the insufficiency of the annual supply of men, yet they remained incomplete. When Washington took the field in June, his whole force (including the army under La Fayette, the garrison of West-Point, and a detachment of the New York line under brigadier Clinton, posted on the frontier of that state,) amounted to something more than eight thousand. His effective force, ready to act under his immediate orders, is rated at four thousand five hundred. Such was the humble condition of the main army, after the most judicious, active and persevering efforts of the commander in chief throughout the preceding winter and spring, supported by congress, to bring into the field a respectable force.

Diminutive as was our army in size, yet our capacity to subsist it was more so. Occasionally its separation became inevitable, to secure daily food; and therefore we may congratulate ourselves that our ranks were not crowded. The four Eastern states, upon this, as upon many previous urgent occasions, took effectual measures to provide and to transport all the necessary supplies within their reach; these consisted of meat, salt and liquor. Bread was still wanting; and this was procurable only from Pennsylvania and Maryland, so completely exhausted were the two states of New York and New Jersey; having been, from 1776, the continued seat of war.

The wicked and stupid system of coercion had been

pushed to its extreme, and was at length necessarily abandoned; having become as unproductive as it had always been irritating. We had no money; as our paper notes (so called) had lost every semblance of coin, except the name, and the credit of the United States had become the general topic of derision.

Tender laws had been enacted to uphold it; but the more we attempted to compel the coy dame, the faster she retired from our embrace. Our credit became extinct; and having nothing but depreciated paper to offer in payment, poverty and distrust overspread the land.

In this distressing crisis congress came to the wise resolution of stopping further emission of paper, and substituted an annual requisition on the states for the means of supporting the war. Even this last resource failed to produce the intended effect, the states neglecting the calls of the federal head. Confusion and disorder had reached its height; and Washington himself, the last to despond, began to apprehend that we should fail in profiting of the effectual and timely aid proffered by our ally, through our own incapacity and impotence.

Soon after congress adopted the resolution above mentioned, the finances of the nation were committed to the superintendence of an individual;—a wise reform, too long delayed.

Robert Morris, of Philadelphia, a member of congress from Pennsylvania, possessing a mind penetrating and indefatigable,—who had passed from early

life through the various grades of commercial pursuits, as distinguished by his enterprise and system, as by the confidence which his probity and punctuality had established,—was happily selected to fill this arduous station.

Compelled by the confusion and want which every where existed, he entered upon the duties of his office sooner than he intended; having on his acceptance stipulated for a limited suspension, with the view of completing satisfactorily the various prerequisite arrangements.

Discarding, therefore, considerations forcibly applying to his own reputation in this threatening conjuncture, he immediately assumed his new station, giving his entire attention to the restoration of credit. Promulgating his determination to meet with punctuality every engagement, he was sought with eagerness by all who had the means of supplying the public wants. The scene changed; to purchase now, as heretofore to sell, was considered the favor bestowed. Faithfully performing his promise, our wants began to disappear, and the military operations no longer were suspended by failure of the necessary means.

To aid his efforts he very soon proposed to congress the formation of a national bank, which expedient was immediately adopted; and this institution became a convenient and powerful engine in his hands, enabling him to smooth the difficulties in his way. Nor was he less sagacious than fortunate in his measures to bring into use the annual contribution of Pennsylvania to

the federal treasury, by undertaking to pay for the state the requisitions of congress, on being authorized to receive the taxes imposed by the legislature to meet the demand. This masterly negotiation secured bread to the troops, the last important supply yet wanting, after the patriotic and successful efforts of the four New England states to furnish the other articles.

Strong in his personal credit, and true to his engagements, the superintendant became stronger every day in the public confidence; and unassisted, except by a small portion of a small loan* granted by the court of Versailles to the United States, this individual citizen gave food and motion to the main army; proving by his conduct, that credit is the offspring of integrity, economy, system and punctuality.

The apprehensions which had retarded for a time the contemplated movements of the army vanishing, Washington crossed from the western to the eastern side of the Hudson river, having previously directed the count de Rochambeau, commanding the French army, to move from Rhode Island. As the count approached the confines of the state of New York, an officer was despatched to him, changing his direction with a view to bring him in timely support of an enterprise on the eve of execution against some of the enemy's posts on

* Six millions of livres tournaiss, a part of which was applied to the purchase of clothing for our army, and the balance was drawn by bills on Paris.

York Island. The French general very cordially and zealously pressed forward to contribute the desired aid; but the projected plan proving abortive, Washington fell back to the North river, where he was joined by the French army at Dobbs' ferry on the 6th of July.

It having been settled to strike at New York, (in a conference which ensued between the allied generals, soon after the decision of the cabinet of Versailles to co-operate by sea in the course of the following autumn, was known,) all the measures hitherto adopted pointed to this object. Of themselves they were sufficiently significant to attract the attention of sir Henry Clinton; and he accordingly sent orders to lord Cornwallis, to detach a considerable portion of his army to his support. Before this order was executed, sir Henry Clinton received a reinforcement of three thousand men from England, which induced him to counteract his requisition for a part of the army in Virginia, and to direct Cornwallis to place himself safe in some strong post on the Chesapeake during the approaching storm, ready to resume offensive operations as soon as it should blow over. Deficient as Washington was in the presumed strength of his army, and apprized that sir Henry Clinton, although holding in New York only four thousand five hundred regulars (exclusive of his late reinforcement), could augment his force with six thousand of the militia in the city and its environs; he began to turn his attention to a secondary object, lest he might find the first im-

practicable. The army of Cornwallis was the next in order as in consequence. He therefore advised La Fayette, in Virginia, of the probability of such results; directing him to take his measures in time to prevent Cornwallis's return to North Carolina, should his lordship, apprehending the intended blow, attempt to avoid it by the abandonment of Virginia.

Washington, now at the head of the allied army, for the first time during the war held a force capable of continued offence.

His effective strength was not more than nineteen thousand;* but this body might be greatly augmented

* Congress had demanded from the states an army of thirty-seven thousand men, to assemble in January. In May our whole force, from New Hampshire to Georgia, did not exceed ten thousand; nor had we adequate supplies of provisions and clothing even for this small force.

“ Instead of having magazines filled with provisions, we have a scanty pittance scattered here and there in the different states. Instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores, they are poorly provided, and the workmen all leaving them. Instead of having the various articles of field equipage in readiness to deliver, the quartermaster general is but now applying to the several states (as the dernier resort) to provide these things for their troops respectively. Instead of having a regular system of transportation established upon credit,—or funds in the quartermaster's hands to defray the contingent expenses of it,—we have neither the one nor the other; and all that business, or a great part of it, being done by military impressment, we are daily and hourly oppressing the people, souring their tempers, alienating their affections. Instead of having the regiments completed to the new establishments, (and which ought to have been so by the

by the militia of New Jersey, New York and Connecticut, as well as by the garrison of West-Point, and by the corps under brigadier Clinton, still on the frontiers of the state. Nor can it be doubted but that he would have received every possible aid to his operations, as the great boon for which he fought came into our possession by the fall of New York. Fixed in his resolution to bring to submission the first or second army of the enemy, he pressed forward his preparations for carrying New York (the object preferred) as soon as the naval co-operation appeared. With this view, he took his measures with the governors of the adjacent states for such auxiliary force as he might require; and he placed his army in convenient positions to act in unison either against New York or Staten Island. The latter was certainly that which claimed primary attention; as its possession by the allies gave a facility to naval co-operation against the city and harbor, as important to a combined effort, as tending to hasten the surrender of the British army.

— day of —, agreeably to the requisitions of congress), scarce any state in the Union has, at this hour, one eighth part of its quota in the field; and there is little prospect, that I can see, of ever getting more than half. In a word, instead of having every thing in readiness to take the field, we have nothing. And instead of having the prospect of a glorious offensive campaign before us, we have a bewildered and gloomy prospect of a defensive one; unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships, land troops and money from our generous allies: and these at present are too contingent to build upon." Extract from Washington's Journal, published in Marshall's Life of Washington.

Sir Henry Clinton was not unmindful of the course selected by his enemy. He strengthened his corps on Staten Island, he strengthened his post at Paulus Hook, and he held in the city a portion of his disposable force ready to reinforce either station which the progress of his adversary might render expedient. Washington, persevering in his decision to bring to his aid the navy of our ally in the commencement of his assault, determined first to possess Staten Island. He therefore drew large bodies of his troops from the east of the Hudson, and pushed all the preliminary preparations for vigorous operations against that island. Connecticut, (always true to her principles,) with the virtuous Trumbull at her head, was ready to fill up with her hardy sons, the chasm in the line of force east of the Hudson; and Washington had so often experienced the zeal and fidelity of that brave and virtuous people, that he did not hesitate in reducing his force opposite to York Island in order to strengthen himself in New Jersey.

This state had been roused to a higher pitch of enthusiasm in our just cause, by the predatory incursions often repeated in the Sound since the expedition of sir Henry Clinton for the relief of Rhode Island. She sent her fat beeves to feed us, and her willing sons to fight by our sides.

Safe on the east of the Hudson, Washington continued to augment his strength on the west.

This course of action was not only adapted to his present object, but was supported by the consideration

that if events should compel him to relinquish his design on New York, he would be more conveniently situated to press the destruction of the enemy in Virginia.

In accordance with his original design, the commander in chief continued to increase his means of commencing his operations with the reduction of Staten Island. Magazines of flour had been collected in the vicinity of Springfield, in Jersey; to which place, about the middle of August, the line of that state, with Hazen's regiment, was detached, to cover the depot, and to hasten the completion of houses and ovens then preparing to supply bread for the troops moving towards the Hudson, for the purpose of crossing into Jersey to the scene of action. The boats destroyed by Simcoe had been replaced; and all others which could be procured were now collected at places convenient to Staten Island, mounted on wheels, ^{August.} ready for instantaneous conveyance, when requisite to transport the army to the intended attack. The last division of the allies crossed the Hudson on the 25th, and assembling in the neighborhood of Paramus, halted, waiting apparently only for the arrival of the French fleet to advance upon Staten Island.

Late communications with admiral count de Barras evincing that the Chesapeake had been selected by the count de Grasse as his point of destination, and the short period allotted by that officer for his continuance on our coast, more and more impressed Washington with the probability that he might be compelled to

relinquish his first object, and content himself with the second. Therefore, while seriously preparing to strike at New York, he never lost sight of placing himself in the most convenient condition to hasten to Virginia, should he be compelled to abandon that design.

The force to be employed in the South, in the event of such a change in his plan, had now passed the Hudson, with its van near Springfield,—detached thither, as has been mentioned, for the ostensible purpose of protecting our magazine of flour; but in case Washington decided to turn his arms against Cornwallis, the advance of this corps had the double effect of confirming the apprehensions of sir Henry Clinton as to New York, and of placing it nearer to Virginia. He repeated his orders to La Fayette to take measures to arrest Cornwallis, should he attempt to retreat to the South; and at the same time addressed governor Jefferson, urging him to exert all his powers in preparing certain specified aids of men, provisions, wagons, and implements, which the conjuncture demanded.

Never was a game better played; and the final decision taken by the commander in chief to proceed against Cornwallis, grew out of three considerations, every one of which was weighty. The French admiral preferred the unfortified bay of Chesapeake to the fortified bason of New York for co-operation; the time appropriated for the absence of his fleet from the West Indies comported more with undertaking the facile enterprise against lord Cornwallis, than the stubborn operation against New York; and the expected reinforce-

ments of the army had in a great degree failed. When too the situation of the United States was brought into view,—which was thoroughly understood by Washington,—no doubt could remain of the propriety of changing the scene of action from New York to Virginia. Year after year had the hope been indulged of receiving adequate naval aid: at length its approach was certain. To apply it unsuccessfully would be productive of every possible ill; and our debility forbade hazarding such an issue, great as might be the gain. Necessarily, therefore, did the commander in chief relinquish his first object.

This change was communicated to count de Barras, who, keeping his fleet in readiness, sailed on the 25th with his squadron for the Chesapeak, expecting to find there the count de Grasse, having in his care all the heavy ordnance and military stores for the intended operations.

Pursuant to his plan, the count de Grasse left Cape François early in August with twenty-nine sail of the line, taking under convoy a very large fleet of merchantmen, richly laden, destined for Europe. As soon as the French admiral had placed his charge in safety, he steered with twenty-eight sail of the line for the bay of Chesapeak, trusting the fleet of merchantmen to the protection of one of his ships of the line and a few frigates.*

* To this admirable and judicious decision of the count de Grasse we owe the propitious event which followed, and which led to peace and independence.

Very

Although the British admiral in the West Indies, sir G. B. Rodney, had by his activity, courage and success acquired distinguished renown; and although advised by the British ministry of the intended visit of the French fleet to the coast of America; he seems to have neglected or underrated the effect of such an attempt. Led to it probably by the persuasion that de Grasse never would trust the rich fleet in his care across the Atlantic to a single ship of the line and a few frigates; but that he would guard it with an adequate convoy, which would necessarily bring his force to a size within the control of the squadron under admiral Graves, reinforced by that now committed by sir George to admiral Hood, with orders to hasten to the Chesapeak; thus evincing his knowledge of the intention of his adversary. Hood lost not a moment in executing his orders, and with press of sail shaped his course, at the head of fourteen sail of the line, for the bay of Chesapeak, where he arrived on the 25th—the very day count de Barras left Rhode Island, and the last division of the American army, intended to act against Cornwallis, crossed the Hudson.

Finding the Chesapeak empty, he continued along our coast, looking as he passed into the Delaware,

Very properly did congress take care of the relatives of the count when lately so oppressed with adversity. Sir G. B. Rodney was completely deceived: for he would not for a moment believe that the French admiral would risk such a valuable fleet with such slight protection, and therefore detached only fourteen sail of the line to our coast, which secured to our ally the naval ascendancy so essential to our success.

which, like the Chesapeake, was unoccupied, and on the 28th arrived at Sandy Hook. Admiral Graves, thus strengthened, although he had with him but five ships of the line fit for service, put to sea on the same day; hoping either to fall in with count de Barras,—of whose departure from Rhode Island he was just apprized,—or with the French West India fleet, before the intended junction could be effected. Most ruinous would have been the consequence had fortune favored his attempt; especially should he have approached de Barras, conducting not only a very inferior squadron, but having in his care all the military supplies requisite for the investiture of the British army in Virginia.

He met with neither. De Barras having very judiciously baffled such object by going far out to sea, and de Grasse having arrived in the Chesapeake on the 30th, long before the British admiral reached the latitude of the capes of Virginia.

As soon as he anchored he was boarded by an officer from La Fayette, announcing his situation and that of the enemy. The count immediately detached four ships of the line to block up York river, and employed some of his frigates in conveying the marquis St. Simon, with the French reinforcement under his orders, up James river for the purpose of joining La Fayette.

On the 5th of September the van of the British fleet appeared off Cape Henry. De Grasse waited only to ascertain its character, doubtful whether it might not be the expected squadron from Rhode

Island. Signals unanswered demonstrated that the fleet was British, and every moment brought into view additional strength.

The doubt as to character being removed, the French admiral took his part with decision and gallantry. He slipped cable and put to sea, determined to bring his enemy to battle. This was not declined, although Graves had but nineteen ships of the line to contend against twenty-four.

The opinion of the day was unfavorable to the conduct of the British admiral, reprehending with asperity his mode of entering into battle. Hood with his (the van division) leading handsomely in a compact body, was closing fast with the adverse fleet, when the admiral hoisted the signal to tack, throwing Hood off and putting Drake with the rear division ahead. It was contended that, excelling in seamanship, and inferior in number of ships, he ought to have supported Hood; inasmuch as he would thus have brought on action close in with the coast, which would have lessened the effect of the superior strength to which he was opposed: whereas, by the course adopted, he indulged his adversary in gaining sea room, the object in view, indispensable to the full application of his superior force.

If the suggestion be correct, truly may be ascribed the heavy disaster which ensued to this deviation from the tract of genius. It is thus on sea as well as on land, that nations suffer by not searching for superior talents when they stake themselves on the conduct of an individual.

France and England have for centuries fought by sea and by land. Each preserves its ancient system, improved by experience, adhering however to first principles long established. At sea the French strive to disable the vessel by destroying the masts and rigging. The English, on the contrary, aim at the hull and press into close action, boarding as soon as possible.

The French theory seems to be supported by reason. For by diminishing the means of motion, which appears material, the ship is rendered unfit for effective action and thrown out of line; we are consequently led to conclude that victory ought to follow the French system; but experience, the correcter of human calculations, proves the fallacy of this conclusion.

England has always beaten France at sea, and for a century past a drawn battle upon that element, with equality of force, seems to be the utmost glory attainable by the latter. The English possess an advantage growing out of their extensive commerce, which must ever secure to that nation naval superiority, so long as such a state of commerce shall continue. The British sailor is unequalled in Europe, nor will he be ever matched but by the American seaman, who like him is formed in the same manner.

It is singular but true that the British genius seems latterly more to excel on the water than on the land. Whether this be the result of her insular situation, which points to the ocean as the proper theatre for

private and public exertion, or whether it be accident, remains wrapt in doubt; but for a long period there has been a striking disparity in the achievements of her admirals and generals, and this disparity has become more striking during the present war.

Formerly she could boast of her Marlborough, her Peterborough, and her Wolfe: latterly not a single soldier has appeared entitled to the first rank. Yet she abounds in good officers, and her soldiers equal any on earth. Cornwallis stands first in the last age; but his exploits do not place him along the side of Marlborough. Lord Rawdon's early service gave high promise of future eminence; but he has been permitted to waste his talents in retirement.

France on the other hand shines on land. In every period of her history we find her marshals, consummate in the art of war, sustaining by their genius the splendor of her arms.

It is, perhaps, happy for the human race that neither nation is alike great on both elements, or the civilized world would again be brought under the yoke of one master.*

Both fleets were now standing on the same tack, the British holding what the sailor's call the weather-gage.† About four in the afternoon the leading divi-

* "And it came to pass in those days there went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus that all the world should be taxed." St. Luke, ii. 1.—Give to the emperor of France the British fleet, and we shall soon read and feel a similar decree.

† A technical term, which signifies the keeping of the windward of your object.

sions, with a few ships of the centre, bore down upon each other, and fought with that determined courage which rivalry and discipline seldom fail to produce. These were roughly handled, the remainder never exchanging a ball. The approach of night put an end to this partial engagement; which, although the adverse fleets continued for four days near to each other, was not renewed. Drake's division suffered considerably, so much so as to be deemed incapable of further action until refitted. One ship was so much damaged as to be abandoned and burnt. The French fleet did not suffer equally; and, having the wind for four days after the battle, might have readily re-engaged.

Drawing off, de Grasse returned into the bay on the 10th, where he found his squadron from Rhode Island safely moored, with the fleet of transports bearing the battering cannon and other necessary implements of war. Admiral Graves, notwithstanding his crippled condition, approached the capes, when, finding the bay occupied by the whole naval force of the enemy, he bore away for New York.

This battle, like most fought at sea, being indecisive, both sides, as is common in such cases, claimed the victory. The British supported their claim by the acknowledged fact, that the French admiral might at pleasure have renewed the action, and declining to do so, they contended he necessarily admitted his defeat. Whereas the French maintained their title by the equally acknowledged fact, that they fought for the

undisturbed possession of the Chesapeake; its possession being necessary to the capture of a British army, the object which brought them to the American coast; and that this possession was yielded by the enemy's return into port. Nor can a doubt exist, if title to victory rests upon the accomplishment of the end proposed by hazarding battle, that the French admiral's pretensions upon this occasion are completely supported; and, with his superiority of force, it was scarcely to be expected that a different result could have occurred.

CHAPTER XXXV.

PURSUING in appearance, with unrelaxed effort, those measures which indicated an attempt upon Staten Island, and continuing to point the march of his troops towards that place to the last moment, Washington suddenly turned his back upon New York, directing his course for the Delaware,—having under him a detachment from the American army, consisting of Scammel's light infantry of the New England line, Anget's regiment of Rhode Island, Hazen's regiment, two regiments from the line of New York, the residue of the Jersey line, and Lamb's regiment of artillery, amounting altogether to two thousand effectives, with the French army under count Rochambeau.

Sir Henry Clinton seems to have been so thoroughly persuaded that New York was the sole object of his foe, as to have adhered to such conviction until he was assured that the van division of the allied army had actually passed the Delaware. Then he discovered that the army in Virginia was the intended victim; but, instead of instantly taking measures for its relief, he fell with fury upon Connecticut,* vainly presum-

* A strong corps was placed under general Arnold, who embarking at New York went up the Sound. He landed at New London, where we had a considerable collection of naval stores.

ing that he would thereby recal Washington from the South.

Never was a military commander more completely deceived, whether we regard sir Henry Clinton's conception of his enemy's design, or the measures adopted with the view of frustrating that design when discovered.

It did not require any great cast of mind to have known that New York or Virginia must be the destined object; inasmuch as the only force which could effectually co-operate with the navy of our

This town is situated on the west side of New Thames, and was defended by two forts, one called fort Trumbull, and the other fort Griswold. On the appearance of Arnold, fort Trumbull was evacuated, and the garrison drawn into fort Griswold, where lieutenant colonel Ledyard commanded with only one hundred and sixty men.

Lieutenant colonel Eyre, at the head of nearly three regiments, summoned Ledyard to surrender, which being refused, Eyre advanced with fixed bayonets. Never during the war was more gallantry displayed, than on this occasion, both by the assailant and the assailed. At length the British made a lodgment in our ditch, and forced their way by the bayonet through the embrasures. Eyre was killed, as was major Montgomery, second in command, and nearly two hundred privates were killed and wounded. The intrepid Ledyard, being overpowered, delivered his sword to the conqueror, who, to his eternal disgrace, plunged it into the bosom of his conquered antagonist. This bloody example was followed, and the carnage was continued by the slaughter of the greater part of the garrison. The town and every thing in it was consumed by fire, believed by the Americans to be done intentionally, but ascribed to accident by the enemy.

ally was the army of Washington and the army of count Rochambeau; one of which was encamped on the Hudson and the other at Rhode Island. The meaning of naval aid was to bring into effectual action our land force.

That effectual co-operation could not take place in the South: for there our force was not adequate of itself, and could not be reinforced in time by the march of troops from the Hudson. The army in Virginia, though nearest to South Carolina, could not be moved without giving up the state. This simple and concise view manifests that New York or Virginia only could be comprehended in the concerted plan; and it could not be doubted, from our insufficient force, that one of the two, and not both, would employ our entire strength.

This being clearly settled, as it ought to have been, in the mind of the British general, what ought he to have suspected? and what ought he to have done? Certainly to have prepared in both points to baffle the attempt.

Instead of being over anxious for his own security, he ought to have been less attentive to himself, and more regardful of Cornwallis. The post of New York was by nature strong, and had been annually strengthened, since its possession for six years, as experience directed or leisure permitted.

Lord Cornwallis had no fortifications but those which he could contrive in a few weeks with a diminished force; obliged at the same time to attend to

an enemy near to him, now almost equal in number, and to procure food and forage. He ought, therefore, to have commanded the primary attention of Clinton, at least so far as to have placed him as safe as it was practicable, with due regard to those operations intended to be pursued as soon as the limited suspension should cease.

Instead of ordering Cornwallis to take post at Old Point Comfort, or some other suitable position on the bay of Chesapeak, he ought to have directed him to have selected a situation on one of its rivers convenient to the resumption of offensive war upon the departure of the French fleet, and safe as to himself in case the naval ascendancy of his enemy upon our coast should render retreat necessary. If necessary, it was only practicable by returning to North Carolina; and, therefore, the southern margin of James instead of that of York river was the ground to which earl Cornwallis ought to have repaired, and very probably would have selected had his instructions permitted him a choice. City Point was sufficiently convenient to the resumption of offence, and was convenient to North Carolina whenever retreat became unavoidable. The force to be dreaded was that under Washington; and as soon as Cornwallis learnt that the combined army was passing the Delaware, he had only to fall back upon the Roanoke, and the mighty effort would have been baffled. La Fayette and the marquis St. Simon never could have effected a junction—(Cornwallis at City Point)—but on the north side of James river; and

that junction was not very readily to be accomplished in the peninsula made by James and York rivers, his lordship having, as he would have, an easy and adequate boat conveyance across the James river.

The safe route of junction was circuitous. St. Simon landing at West Point on York river, from thence might, without chance of being struck, have united with La Fayette in the vicinity of Richmond; or passing the river there, proceeded to Petersburg, had the American general taken that position for the purpose of arresting Cornwallis's retreat. The progress of St. Simon could not have been concealed from the British general, nor could that of the commander in chief, as well as the disposition made by La Fayette. In his camp at City Point he would with ease have outstripped the two first, and, forcing La Fayette from his front, made good his passage of the Roanoke, before, strengthened by St. Simon, he could have approached him. Even had they closed upon him, he was nearly equal to them both, and at the head of troops veterans in war, inured to hard service, and familiar with battle.

Washington, finding the enemy out of reach,* would have necessarily retraced his steps; and the French admiral, foiled in his expectations, would have returned as soon as St. Simon could have reached the fleet.

Had a Turenne or a Marlborough, a Condé or

* Washington's solicitude to take care of West Point was unceasing, and would have infallibly recalled him to its vicinity, as soon as he despaired of overtaking Cornwallis.

a Wolfe* commanded at New York, City Point or Flowery Hundred, and not Little York, would have been the position of the hostile army in Virginia.

September. The allied army pressed its march with all possible despatch; and the van division reaching Elkton, embarked in transports collected for its conveyance. The centre division continued its march to Baltimore, where it also embarked; and the remainder of the troops and some of the baggage proceeded by land through Alexandria and Fredericksburg.

Washington, having finished his arrangements for the movement to Virginia, hastened to the theatre of action, accompanied by the count Rochambeau.

He arrived at Williamsburg, now the headquarters of La Fayette, on the 14th; and proceeding to Hampton, attended by the generals Rochambeau, Knox, Chatelleaux, and Du Portail, went on board the *Ville de Paris*, when the plan of siege was concerted with the count de Grasse. Some difficulty occurred in preventing the count from quitting the Chesapeake to block up the enemy's fleet in the harbor of New York, a measure which seems to have fastened itself upon the admiral's mind.

* This superior soldier fell in the important victory which he gained on the Heights of Abraham, in the year 1759, when he was thirty-six years of age. Had he lived he would have been fifty-two in the beginning of our war, and very probably would have been placed at the head of the forces sent to America. His letter, written a few days before his death, portrays his vast genius, and it is inserted in the appendix for the edification of my military readers. See Appendix R.

This decision was founded upon information he had just received of the arrival of admiral Digby with six ships of the line, which induced him to conclude that he should be soon visited a second time by his enemy; and, therefore, he determined to quit the Chesapeake, preferring to hold the hostile fleet in its own port rather than to be shut up himself.

There seems to be a palpable contradiction in the conduct of the admiral when late close to his enemy off the capes of Virginia and his present decision. He held the wind, as has been mentioned, for four days after the action; which, though not a decisive circumstance, was certainly favorable to him, and yet he would not renew the battle; but wisely determining to avoid hazarding the great object in view, drew off from his crippled adversary and regained the Chesapeake. Now when the preparations for the execution of the concerted enterprise were concluding, and the commander in chief had reached the ground ready to begin his work, the count adopts the very measure he had before renounced, and goes in quest of his reinforced enemy—vainly presuming that he would shut him up in port, putting to hazard the sure and splendid prospect before him, and converting eventually certain triumph into disgrace if the British admiral, by his superior seamanship, by the shift of wind or any other of the incidents common to war, should cut him off from the Chesapeake; an event much to be apprehended had the contemplated movement been attempted.

Washington received with surprise and regret the annunciation of the count's intention; and, discerning in it every possible ill, with no probable good, resisted the project with his whole weight. He prevailed: and the count, relinquishing imaginary naval triumph off Sandy-Hook, took a permanent station with his fleet in the bay; resolved not to hazard with the hope of success off New York a victory within his grasp, as splendid and as powerful in its effects. To strengthen his station the admiral, having disembarked a body of marines, commenced the erection of a battery for heavy ordnance on Old Point Comfort, which is the northern promontory of James river.

The weight of Washington's character, as well as the soundness of his judgment, are both illustrated by this circumstance. The count, from what followed, seems to have been peculiarly attached to the line of conduct then contemplated, and which he renounced in obedience to the judgment of Washington. Soon after his return to the West Indies, he invested (in conjunction with the marquis de Bouille, commanding the army of France) the island of St. Christopher.

Having landed the marquis and his army, he anchored his fleet, consisting of thirty-two ships of the line, in Basseterre road. Admiral Hood, who had fought him under Graves, hearing of the descent upon St. Christopher, sailed at the head of twenty-two ships of the line with a determination to relieve the island if practicable. As soon as Hood appeared off Basseterre

road, de Grasse left his anchorage ground, standing out for sea to avail himself of his superior force. Hood, delighted with the movement of his adversary, continued in line of battle, as if ready to engage; drawing further and further from the shore until he had decoyed the French admiral to the desired distance, when with press of sail he passed him with his whole fleet unhurt, and seized the anchorage ground which de Grasse had left.

Thus actually happened what Washington's penetrating mind suggested as possible, and which taking place in the Chesapeake would have given safety to the falling army.

The last division of the allied army arrived on the 25th, four weeks from the day our rear passed the Hudson river, and debarking at Burrell's ferry upon James river joined in the neighborhood of Williamsburgh.

Our whole force being now collected, the allied army moved on the 28th, in four columns, and sat down in front of the enemy, two miles from him; the Americans forming its right and the French its left.

Lord Cornwallis, adhering to his instructions, had directed his whole attention and labor to the completion of his fortifications in his position at York and Gloucester. These were by no means perfected, and consequently still engaged his unwearied exertions.

On the side of York, which is a small town on the southern banks of the river whose name it bears, more remarkable for its spacious and convenient harbor than

for its strength of ground in a military point of view, batteries had been erected to co-operate with the naval force in the protection of the harbor, and a line of circumvallation had been cut in front of the town, beginning on a small gut which falls into the river on its upper side, and terminating in a deep ravine below the town. This line was defended by redoubts and batteries, united by communications and strengthened by fosses and abbatis; and the heights on the opposite side of the gut or creek were fortified, commanding thoroughly the gorge of land made by the river and the creek.

In front of the intrenchments surrounding the town, the last resort of the British general, was another line of redoubts and field works, judiciously arranged to co-operate with the army in battle, should the allies determine to force it to withdraw from the field.

Gloucester Point, opposite to York Town, was also fortified; not only as a necessary appendage to York, and contributing to the protection of the harbor, but as it was convenient to a fertile country where forage for the cavalry might be abundantly procured, and afforded the most likely point of junction for the promised relief. Here the works were finished, and the post was committed to lieutenant colonel Dundas with a few infantry and all the cavalry.

Under cover of the outer range of protection Cornwallis was encamped, flattering himself in the presumption that his enemy, trusting to his superior numbers and solicitous to hasten his submission,

would attempt by storm to dislodge him. He entertained the hope that, supported as he was by his redoubts and flèches, he should be able to withstand the assault; and might, by the intervention of some of those lucky incidents which often happen in battle, strike his enemy so seriously as to retard considerably if not defer for ever his approaches. No opportunity was allowed for the indulgence of this expectation; and the character of Washington forbad much reliance in such hope, as he was never known to commit to the caprice of fortune what was attainable by obedience to the mandate of reason.

In the course of the evening a messenger arrived from sir Henry Clinton with despatches to his lordship, dated the twenty-fourth, communicating the result of a council of war, held on that day, consisting of the general and flag officers, wherein "it was agreed that upwards of five thousand troops should be embarked on board the king's ships; that every exertion should be made both by the army and navy to relieve him; and that the fleet, consisting of twenty-three sail of the line, might be expected to start on the 5th of October." Strong as was this assurance, it derived additional strength from the postscript, announcing the arrival of admiral Digby; inasmuch as having determined to hazard the fleet and army, such determination became fortified by the accession of strength where it was most wanted.

Cornwallis yielding to assurances too solemn to be slighted, as well as conforming to the spirit of his or-

ders, renounced his intention of disputing the advance of his adversary; and, giving up his fortified camp, retired in the night to his town position,—never doubting that the promised relief would “start”* on the appointed day, and well assured that if it did, he should be able to sustain himself until it appeared; when presuming that a general battle would ensue, he considered it to be his duty in the mean time to preserve rather than cripple his force.

* Copy of a letter from sir Henry Clinton to earl Cornwallis, dated

New York, September 24, 1781.

MY LORD,

I was honored yesterday with your lordship’s letter of the 16th and 17th instant; and, at a meeting of the general and flag officers held this day, it is determined that above five thousand men, rank and file, shall be embarked on board the king’s ships, and the joint exertions of the navy and army made in a few days to relieve you, and afterwards co-operate with you.

The fleet consists of twenty-three sail of the line, three of which are three deckers. There is every reason to hope we start from hence the 5th of October. I have received your lordship’s letter of the 8th instant.

I have the honor to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

P. S. Admiral Digby is this moment arrived at the Hook, with three sail of the line.

At a venture, without knowing whether they can be seen by us, I request, that, if all is well, upon hearing a considerable firing towards the entrance of the Chesapeak, three large separate smokes may be made parallel to it; and if you possess the post of Gloucester, four.

I shall send another runner soon.

H. CLINTON.

His lordship's conclusion was certainly correct, disastrous as was the consequence of his mistaken confidence.

This nocturnal movement did not pass unperceived by our guards; and lieutenant colonel Scammel, officer of the day, put himself at the head of a reconnoitring party with the dawn of light, to ascertain its character and extent. Advancing close to the enemy's position, he fell in with a detachment of the legion dragoons, who instantly charged our party.

In the rencontre Scammel was mortally wounded and taken. He soon expired. This was the severest blow experienced by the allied army throughout the siege: not an officer in our army surpassed in personal worth and professional ability this experienced soldier.

He had served from the commencement of the war in the line of his native state (Massachusetts); and when colonel Pickering, adjutant general of the army, succeeded general Greene as quartermaster general, lieutenant colonel Scammel was selected by the commander in chief to fill that important and confidential station,—from which post he had lately retired, for the purpose of taking an active part, at the head of a battalion of light troops, in the meditated operation.

When the allies moved from Williamsburgh, general Choise (of the army of count Rochambeau) attended by the infantry of the duke de Lauzun's legion, which had disembarked on the 23d, was detached across York river to take command of the corps of investiture in front of Gloucester Point, with orders

to stop effectually the supplies still partially collected from the country by the enemy.

General Choisé reached on the next day the camp of Weedon, and took the command of the combined troops.

The duke de Lauzun, with his cavalry, had reinforced general Weedon some days before. Joined now by his infantry, and strengthened by a select battalion under lieutenant colonel Mercer, this corps composed (under the orders of the duke) the van of Choisé, who prepared forthwith to establish himself close to Gloucester. He was again reinforced by one thousand of the French marines; which, added to the legion of Lauzun (about seven hundred, horse and foot,) and to the militia of Weedon, gave a total of three thousand five hundred effectives. On the evening of the 2d of October, the post of Gloucester was strengthened by lieutenant colonel Tarleton, with his legion and mounted infantry. Lieutenant colonel Dundas moved with the dawn on the morning of the 3d, at the head of a great portion of his garrison, to make a grand forage. The wagons and bat horses were loaded three miles from Gloucester before ten o'clock, when the infantry covering them commenced their return. On the same morning, and at an early hour, the corps of Choisé was put in motion, for the execution of his plan of close investiture. Count Dillon, with a squadron of Lauzun's dragoons and Mercer's infantry, took the York river road; while general Choisé, with the main

body of his infantry, seconded by brigadier Weedon, and preceded by the duke de Lauzun with the remainder of his cavalry, moved on the Severn road. These two roads unite in a long lane, nearly four miles from Gloucester, with inclosed fields on each side. Passing through the lane, you arrive at an open field on your right and a copse of wood on your left, lining the road for half a mile, where it terminated at a small redoubt facing the road.

Choisè, in his advance, was informed that the enemy's cavalry were in front; and being desirous of striking them, he pressed forward with his horse, ordering Dillon and lieutenant colonel Mercer to hasten their junction with him. The rapid push of the cavalry left the main body of our infantry far in the rear; Mercer's corps only was in supporting distance.

Dillon, with his cavalry, met the general, with the duke de Lauzun, at the mouth of the lane. The united body of dragoons advanced down the lane, through which the British cavalry had just passed, proceeding leisurely towards camp, to give convenient time for the foraging party's return to Gloucester, when lieutenant Cameron, commanding the rear guard, communicated the appearance of the French dragoons. This was soon confirmed by the approach of our van; upon which the main body of the enemy's horse halted and formed in the wood. Lieutenant colonel Tarleton advanced with a part of his horse upon us, and was instantly charged by the French cavalry, when one of

the enemy's horses was wounded by a spear,* and plunging overthrew Tarleton's horse.

The main body of the British horse pressed forward to support their commandant, but could not force the French dragoons. Falling back they were pursued by our cavalry, and took shelter under cover of their infantry, arrayed in the wood on one side, and along a post and rail fence on the other side of the road.

This line of infantry opened their fire, and Choise in his turn receded, but slowly, and in good order. The infantry pressing forward under cover of the wood, and incessantly delivering their fire, galled us considerable; when the French general discovering the corps of Mercer just emerging out of the lane, threw himself by a rapid move into its rear, and faced about to renew the conflict.

Tarleton having rallied his cavalry, hastened up to the infantry, still advancing in the woods, and resting his right flank upon its left, came forward in point of time just as Mercer entered through the lane into the field. Mercer instantly deployed, stretching his left into the woods, and opened his fire upon the horse opposite to his right, and upon the infantry in front of his left.

No regular corps could have maintained its ground more firmly than did this battalion of our infantry. It brought the enemy to pause, which was soon followed

* A part of the duke de Lauzun's regiment (called hulans) were armed with spears.

by his retreat. When Tarleton drew off, the corps of Mercer had expended nearly all its cartridges. Choisé established himself on the contested ground, and commenced a rigid blockade of the post of Gloucester, which continued to the end of the siege.

Lieutenant Moir, of the infantry, was killed within a few paces of our line; besides whom the enemy lost eleven rank and file, as stated by lieutenant colonel Tarleton, who puts down our loss at two officers and fourteen privates.

Choisé's infantry not having yet got up, he did not think proper to renew the attack without them, inasmuch as the enemy's whole force might be readily brought to sustain the retreating corps.

General Washington, in his orders of the 4th, speaks in handsome terms of the behaviour of this portion of the allied troops, and returns his thanks to the cavalry of the duke de Lauzun, and to the grenadiers of Mercer, which constituted the whole of our force engaged. Lieutenant colonel Tarleton is extremely mistaken when he supposed that the main body of the investing corps was up. The infantry of Lauzun were the first which approached; they joined in thirty or forty minutes after the enemy retreated, followed by the marines and the militia under Weedon.

As soon as the retirement of Cornwallis from his outer position was discovered on the subsequent morning, Washington occupied by a forward movement the abandoned ground, ready to open trenches whenever the ordnance and other requisite implements

arrived at camp. Indefatigable as were his exertions to hasten their conveyance from the transports lying in James river, only six miles from him, it never was accomplished until the 6th of October, the day after that assigned by sir Henry Clinton for the departure of the armament from Sandy Hook destined to relieve the besieged army.

The course of our first parallel being ascertained, the working detachment took its post with the fall of night, covered by the requisite guards. Commanded to preserve profound silence, (which order, applying so forcibly to every man's safety, was implicitly obeyed,) no discovery of our beginning labors took place until the light of day showed them, when by the zeal of the troops they had nearly covered themselves. Cornwallis now opened his batteries, but so well improved had been the night as to render his fire unavailing. Our soldiers sinking themselves lower and lower, we completed our first parallel with a loss short of thirty killed and wounded, which fell chiefly upon our left. Before the 10th our batteries and redoubts appeared along the fosse, many of them mounted, which opening in succession, soon began to manifest the superiority sure to accrue to the besieger possessing adequate means, and conducting those means with sagacity and diligence. The slender defences opposed to us began to tumble under the demolishing fire. The loss of time sustained in bringing our cannon six miles, was amply compensated by the effects of the wise determination to put the issue of the siege on

heavy metal. Cornwallis still looked with undiminished confidence for the promised relief, and wisely adhered to his plan, saving his troops for the battle to be fought as soon as sir Henry Clinton should reach him. Yet he exerted himself to counteract our approach, by repairing in the night the dilapidations of the day, and by opening new embrasures throughout his line in support of his defences. All our batteries on the first parallel being completed, and mounted in the true style, (weight and not number the standard,) the fire on the 11th and 12th tore to pieces most of the enemy's batteries, dismounting their ordnance in every direction.

So powerful was the effect of our first parallel, that our shells and red hot balls in this range of destruction reached even the small navy in the harbor, setting fire to and destroying the *Charon*, the largest ship, (a forty-four gun frigate,) with three transports.

Cornwallis saw his fate from this first display of our skill and strength, and if left to his own means, would have resorted to his own mind for safety; but not doubting that the promised relief must soon arrive, he determined, as was his duty, to await the timely interposition of his commander.

Washington discovering the effect of his first parallel, could he have depended on the French superiority at sea, would probably have spared the labor which afterwards ensued: for Cornwallis was now destroyed, unless relieved, or unless his own genius could effect his deliverance. The American general therefore con-

tinued to urge his operations, and in the night of the 11th opened his second parallel. The same order was given, commanding silence; and its observance being more cogent from the increased proximity to the enemy, (now within three hundred instead of six hundred yards,) our trench was nearly completed before the dawn of day; manifesting to the British general how far we surpassed, in this second effort, that zeal displayed in our first attempt, great as it was. Surprised at the unexpected condition in which he found himself, he urged with redoubled vigor the repairs wherever requisite, and strengthened his advanced works. This was the morning of the seventh day since sir Henry Clinton was to "start" with his relief "navy and army." Cornwallis continued to believe in the assurance, and with unappalled courage determined to maintain his lines. His battery and his two front redoubts opened, and during this day his fire most injured us. Many of our soldiers were killed and wounded. Nevertheless our parallel advanced, and our batteries began to show themselves, yet his two redoubts continued their fire with severe effect.

Washington determined to silence them with the bayonet, and accordingly on the 14th directed two detachments to be held ready; the right from the corps of La Fayette, and the left as the count de Rochambeau should designate. La Fayette conducted in person the assault on our right, and the baron de Viomenil that of our left. Major Campbell, with sixty men, (as was afterwards ascertained,) defended the first, and

lieutenant colonel Johnson, with one hundred and twenty men, defended the second redoubt. Lieutenant colonel Hamilton, (who had been aid-de-camp to the commander in chief from 1776 until lately,*) con-

*. An unhappy difference had occurred in the transaction of business between the general and his much respected aid, which produced the latter's withdraw from his family. A few days preceding this period, Hamilton had been engaged all the morning in copying some despatches, which the general, when about to take his usual rounds, directed him to forward as soon as finished.

Washington finding on his return the despatches on the table, renewed his directions in expressions indicating his surprise at the delay; and again leaving his apartment, found, when he returned, the despatches where he had left them. At this time Hamilton had gone out in search of the courier, who had been long waiting, when accidentally he met the maquis La Fayette, who seizing him by the button (as was the habit of this zealous nobleman) engaged him in conversation; which being continued with the marquis's usual earnestness, dismissed from Hamilton's mind for some minutes the object in view. At length breaking off from the marquis he reached the courier, and directed him to come forward to receive his charge and orders. Returning he found the general seated by the table, on which lay the despatches. The moment he appeared, Washington, with warmth and sternness, chided him for the delay; to which Hamilton mildly replied, stating the cause; when the general, rather irritated than mollified, sternly rebuked him. To this Hamilton answered, "If your excellency thinks proper thus to address me, it is time for me to leave you." He proceeded to the table, took up the despatch, sent off the express, packed up his baggage, and quitted headquarters.

Although Washington took no measures to restore him to his family, yet he treated him with the highest respect; giving to him the command of a regiment of light infantry, which now forme part of La Fayette's corps. In

ducted the van of La Fayette, as did ——— that of Viomenil. Having removed to their respective posts as soon as it was dark, they advanced to the attack by signal at an early hour in the night.

Hamilton, with his own and Gimat's corps of light infantry, rushed forward with impetuosity. Pulling up the abbatis and knocking down the palisades, he forced his way into the redoubt; having detached lieutenant colonel Laurens, (aid-de-camp to the commander in chief,) with two companies of light infantry, to gain the rear, and enter in that quarter. The resistance of the enemy was instantly overpowered: the major, with every man of his guard, except six or seven, were

In the arrangements for the assault of the redoubt, La Fayette had given his van to his own aid-de-camp, lieutenant colonel Gimat; but it being Hamilton's tour of duty, he remonstrated to the marquis upon the injustice of such preference. La Fayette excused himself by saying, that the arrangements made had been sanctioned by the commander in chief, and could not be changed by him. This no doubt was true; but Washington did not know that any officer had been called to command out of tour.

Hamilton, always true to the feelings of honor and independence, repelled this answer, and left the marquis, announcing his determination to appeal to headquarters. This he accordingly did do, in a spirited and manly letter. Washington, incapable of injustice, sent for the marquis, and inquiring into the fact, found that the tour of duty belonging to Hamilton had been given to Gimat. He instantly directed the marquis to reinstate Hamilton, who consequently was put at the head of the van, which he conducted so advantageously to the service and so honorably to himself.

This anecdote was communicated to the writer by lieutenant colonel Hamilton, during the siege of York Town.

killed or taken, and experienced that marked humanity from the conqueror so uniformly displayed by the Americans in victory. This too when the horrid and barbarous outrage committed at fort Griswold in Connecticut, (in the late operations of sir Henry Clinton in that state,) was fresh in our memory. Only eight of the enemy were killed, while our own loss was nine killed and thirty-two wounded: among the latter was captain Stephen Olney, of the Rhode Island regiment, whose zeal and intrepidity upon this, as upon every other occasion, had placed him high in the esteem of the general and army. La Fayette instantly despatched major Barbour, one of his aids, to the baron de Viomenil, communicating his success. The baron, ready for the assault, was waiting to give time to the ax and fascine men to cut down the palisades and fill up the fosse; when, astonished at the intelligence received, he announced it in a loud voice to his troops, ordering them to advance. This was done with the ardor of Frenchmen; and although here the resistance was much more formidable,—the enemy being double in number, and apprized of our approach,—still the intrepidity of the assailants was irresistible. The commandant escaped, leaving half his force (about sixty) in our possession; of these eighteen were killed. Our loss was severe, being one hundred killed and wounded. Thus did Viomenil honor the bill drawn upon him by La Fayette.*

* Louis XV, after gaining the battle of Fontenoy, despatched M. de la Tour with the intelligence to his ally the great

Washington was highly gratified with the splendid termination of this double assault, and was very liberal in his compliments to the troops engaged; nor did he omit to avail himself of the opportunity which it presented of cherishing that spirit of concord, good will and mutual confidence between the allied troops, so essential to the common cause. He thus concludes his order of thanks: "The general reflects with the highest degree of pleasure on the confidence which the troops of the two nations must hereafter have in each other. Assured of mutual support, he is convinced there is no danger which they will not cheerfully encounter,—no difficulty which they will not bravely overcome."

Nothing could exceed the vigor with which our operations were pushed, so completely had Washington infused into the mass of the troops his own solicitude to bring the siege to a conclusion. Before daylight the two redoubts were included in our second parallel, which was now in great forwardness.

Cornwallis saw with amazement the fruit of our night's labor, and was sensible of his condition. Ten days had elapsed since the promised armament was to

Frederick. La Tour reached the king of Prussia passing at the head of his army the defiles of the mountains in Upper Silesia, near the village of Friedburgh; where in a few hours he attacked the Austrian army, and gained a signal victory, which he announced to the king of France by M. de la Tour in the following words: "The bill of exchange which you drew on me at Fontenoy, I have paid at Friedburgh." Voltaire.

have sailed, and as yet it had not appeared off the Capes, nor had his lordship been informed of the cause of the unexpected and torturing delay. Persuaded that his relief could not be remote, he determined for once to depart from the cautious system enjoined by his expectation of succor, and to resort to his habit of bold enterprise; hoping that by retarding our advance he should still give time for the arrival of succor. On the 15th of October he ordered lieutenant colonel Abercrombie to hold himself in readiness with a detachment of three hundred and fifty men from the guards and light infantry, for the purpose of possessing himself of two of our redoubts nearly finished.

At four in the succeeding morning Abercrombie advanced upon our lines, detaching lieutenant colonel Lake with the guards against one, and major Armstrong with the light infantry against the other redoubt.

The British rushed upon us with determined courage, and both officers completely succeeded; driving out the French, who occupied the redoubts, with the loss of one hundred men killed and wounded.

This success was of short duration; for the support moving up from the trenches soon gained the lost ground, the enemy relinquishing the redoubts and hastening to his lines. We found our cannon spiked, but being done in much hurry the spikes were readily drawn, and before the evening the redoubts were finished and opened upon the enemy. Deriving no solid good from this his only sortie for the purpose of retarding our approach, and still ignorant of the cause

of Clinton's delay, Cornwallis was brought to the alternative of surrendering or of attempting his escape. Incapable of submitting, so long as such an event might possibly be avoided, he prepared with profound secrecy to pass his army in the night to Gloucester, garnishing the works with his convalescents, leaving behind his baggage of every sort, his sick, wounded, shipping and stores.

To lieutenant colonel Johnson, the officer selected still to hold York, a letter was delivered addressed to general Washington, commending to his humanity his abandoned comrades.

As soon as he passed the river, the British general determined to envelope Choisé with his whole force, and seizing all the horses in his enemy's possession, to mount his army and to press forward by forced marches, preceded by his numerous cavalry, the corps of Simcoe and the legion of Tarleton, about four hundred. Horses were to be taken every where as he passed, until his whole force was mounted. He intended to keep a direct course to the upper country, with the view of leaving it doubtful whether his ultimate object was New Jersey or North Carolina; hoping thus to distract the motions of his adversary, if not to draw him to one point of interception, when he might take his decision as circumstances should warrant.

This bold conception bespoke the hero, and was worthy of its author. Nor can it justly be deemed so desperate as was generally conceived. Washington

could not possibly in time seize the northern and southern route; and without availing himself of horses, he never could overtake his foe. This aid could not have been instantly procured; and when procured must have been limited to a portion of his force. It is probable he might, with all the horses in the camp and in the neighborhood, have mounted four thousand men in four days;* more could not have been collected in time. He could readily, by the aid of water conveyance at his command, with prosperous gales, have transported his major force to the head of the Chesapeake, so as to have brought it in contact with the retreating foe on the confines of the Delaware, should Cornwallis have taken the northern route; but he must and would have calculated on the interposition of sir Henry Clinton, who certainly would have moved through New Jersey to Easton, on the Delaware, ready to support the retreating army.

The American army under Heath would have followed Clinton, but in this condition of things our prospect could not be considered cheering. Clinton and Cornwallis marching in a straight line to each other, Heath upon their upper flank, and the army from the Chesapeake on the lower flank, placed our whole

* This would have comprehended all the horses in camp to be spared from other indispensable services, as well as all to be afforded by the country; and no doubt, upon such an occasion, every horse in the neighborhood and along the route of march would have been proffered, and indeed such a collection in four days could not be effected but by great exertions.

force in hazard. Washington would not have risked such a game.

No hope could be indulged that troops would assemble from the country through which the enemy passed, capable of serious opposition; so that Washington might calculate upon his march being interrupted and delayed. We had seen Arnold the year before with nine hundred men seize the metropolis of Virginia, and return to his shipping, twenty-five miles below, uninjured. We had afterwards seen Simcoe possess himself of the Point of Fork, high up James river, unhurt; and Tarleton in Charlotteville, not far from the Blue Ridge, almost capturing the governor and legislature of the state. What chance then could exist of stopping Cornwallis by any intermediate force from the country? Passing the Potomac, this expectation, faint always, considerably diminished. In the part of Maryland through which his course lay, a considerable portion of the people had been ever considered affected with an ardent attachment to the British government; and Pennsylvania, the next state in his progress, whose union with Maryland might have yielded a force destructive to the enemy, held a population averse to war. A great body of its citizens, from religious principles, resist not at all; another portion was certainly inclined rather to aid than oppose the British general; the remainder, not more than one half, solid, sincere and resolute in our cause, were scattered over that extensive state, and consequently could not have been embodied in season. It is therefore probable that

the enemy could not have been stopped by the militia; for in addition to the above causes there was a want of arms and ammunition in all the lower country; and the riflemen west of the mountains were too remote to be brought to act in time.

Should the British general find his enemy's chief efforts directed to occlude him from the north, he would turn to the south; and what here stood in his way? In a very few days he would reach North Carolina, and in a few more he would encamp on the Cape Fear in the midst of his friends.*

From this view of the country it is evident that Cornwallis would have made good his retreat, unless overtaken by Washington. Every exertion would have been essayed by the commander in chief, and our willing countrymen would have contributed with alacrity to support the man of their heart. Yet difficulties stubborn and constant must be surmounted. But we will presume that these were overcome, and that Washington, detaching Rochambeau with the army of France up the Chesapeake, should be enabled to mount in time a superior force, and follow upon the heels of the British general.

This is the most flattering situation we could expect. He would not, could not, overtake him south of the Potomac, if shaping his course northwardly; nor

* We have just narrated the expedition of colonel Fanning, proving conclusively the incapable condition of the well affected of North Carolina; and general Greene was south of the Santee, too distant to interpose.

could he overtake him north of the Dan, if proceeding to the south. Whenever he did approach him action would ensue; and thus Cornwallis would be brought to a field battle, with a force rather inferior to his enemy. How much more to be desired was such change to him than his present condition. Victory gave him safety, and victory was not impossible. He fought and destroyed Gates; he fought and forced Greene out of the field with a greater disparity of force against him. The issue of the action would decide his fate. If adverse he was destroyed; if successful he was safe. Who then, comparing his lordship's present condition with the worst that could befall him in the execution of his heroic decision, can withhold his admiration of a determination so bold and wise.

Early in the night the first division of the army passed unperceived to Gloucester, the other division ready to embark for the same shore as soon as the boats returned. This done, the arduous attempt would have commenced by falling upon De Choisé. But Providence had decreed otherwise: a furious storm suddenly arose, and forced the returning boats down the river considerably below the town. Day appeared before the boats reached their destination; and the forenoon was occupied in bringing back the division which had passed. Disconcerted as was his lordship by this uncontrollable difficulty, he nevertheless continued to make head against his enemy with his divided force; cutting new embrasures to remount his dismounted guns, and expending his last shells in maintaining the unequal contest.

Our second parallel was now completed; and
its numerous batteries, stored with heavy ord-
nance, opened with the day. Shattered as had been the
enemy's defences, they could not afford for many hours
even shelter to the troops, much less annoyance to the
assailant. In every direction they were tumbling under
our destructive fire; and it was evident, even to the
common soldier, that the town was no longer tenable.
Washington had only to order his troops to advance to
bring his foe to unconditional submission; nor would
this measure have been postponed longer than the next
day had any event occurred, rendering it advisable.
No intelligence was as yet received of the progress of
sir Henry Clinton; and it appeared from subsequent
information that he was still in New York.

Without the hope of timely succor, and foiled in the
bold attempt to cut his way to safety, the British general
had no alternative left, but to surrender upon the
best terms he could obtain. Taking this mortifying
decision, he beat a parley, and proposed by letter ad-
dressed to the commander in chief, a cessation of hos-
tilities for twenty-four hours, that commissioners, mu-
tually appointed, might meet and arrange the terms of
surrender. Washington lost no time in reply; declaring
his "ardent desire to spare the further effusion of
blood, and his readiness to listen to such terms as were
admissible;" but he added, that as he could not per-
mit the waste of time in fruitless discussion, he re-
quired, that previous to the appointment of the com-
missioners, his lordship would submit in writing the

basis of his proposed surrender; to give time for which, hostilities should continue suspended for two hours. Cornwallis acceded to the requisition of Washington, and without delay proposed the basis of his surrender of the two posts of York and Gloucester, with the naval force appertaining to them. This produced a correspondence,* which was concluded on the

* Copy of the Correspondence.

Earl Cornwallis to general Washington.

York, Virginia, October 17, 1781.

SIR,

I propose a cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours; and that two officers may be appointed by each side, to meet at Mr. Moore's house, to settle terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester.

CORNWALLIS.

General Washington to earl Cornwallis.

Camp before York, October 17, 1781.

MY LORD,

I have the honor of receiving your lordship's letter of this date.

An ardent desire to save the effusion of human blood will readily incline me to listen to such terms, for the surrender of your posts and garrisons at York and Gloucester, as are admissible.

I wish, previous to the meeting of the commissioners, that your lordship's proposals, in writing, may be sent to the American lines; for which purpose, a suspension of hostilities, during two hours from the delivery of this letter, will be granted.

G. WASHINGTON.

Earl Cornwallis to general Washington.

York, 17th October, 1781.

SIR,

I have been this moment honored with your excellency's letter dated this day.

The time limited for sending my answer will not admit of en-

following day in accordance with the principles fixed by Washington. Commissioners were immediately

tering into the detail of articles; but the basis of my proposals will be, that the garrisons of York and Gloucester shall be prisoners of war, with the customary honors; and for the convenience of the individuals which I have the honor to command, that the British shall be sent to Britain, and the Germans to Germany, under engagements not to serve against France, America, or their allies, until released, or regularly exchanged. That all arms and public stores shall be delivered up to you; but that the usual indulgence of side arms to officers, and of retaining private property, shall be granted to officers and soldiers; and that the interest of the several individuals in civil capacities and connected with us, shall be attended to.

If your excellency thinks that a continuance of the suspension of hostilities will be necessary to transmit your answer, I shall have no objection to the hour that you may propose.

I have the honor to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

General Washington to earl Cornwallis.

Camp before York, 18th October, 1781.

MY LORD,

To avoid unnecessary discussions and delays, I shall at once, in answer to your lordship's letter of yesterday, declare the general basis upon which a definitive treaty of capitulation may take place.

The garrisons of York and Gloucester, including the seamen, as you propose, shall be received prisoners of war. The condition annexed, of sending the British and German troops to the parts of Europe to which they respectively belong, is inadmissible. Instead of this they will be marched to such parts of the country as can most conveniently provide for their subsistence; and the benevolent treatment of the prisoners, which is invariably observed by the Americans, will be extended to them. The

appointed: the viscount de Noailles, of the army of Rochambeau, and lieutenant colonel Laurens, aid-de-

camp, same honors will be granted to the surrendering army as were granted to the garrison of Charleston.

The shipping and boats in the two harbors, with all their guns, stores, tackling, furniture, and apparel, shall be delivered in their present state to an officer of the navy appointed to take possession of them.

The artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public stores of every denomination, shall be delivered, unimpaired, to the heads of the departments to which they respectively belong.

The officers shall be indulged in retaining their side arms; and the officers and soldiers may preserve their baggage and effects, with this reserve, that property taken in the country will be reclaimed.

With regard to the individuals in civil capacities, whose interest your lordship wishes may be attended to, until they are more particularly described, nothing definitive can be settled.

I have to add, that I expect the sick and wounded will be supplied with their own hospital stores, and be attended by British surgeons, particularly charged with the care of them.

Your lordship will be pleased to signify your determination, either to accept or reject the proposals now offered, in the course of two hours from the delivery of this letter, that commissioners may be appointed to digest the articles of capitulation, or a renewal of hostilities may take place.

I have the honor to be, &c.

G. WASHINGTON.

Earl Cornwallis to general Washington, dated

York, 18th October, 1781.

SIR,

I agree to open a treaty of capitulation upon the basis of the garrisons of York and Gloucester, including seamen, being prisoners of war, without annexing the condition of their being sent to Europe; but I expect to receive a compensation in the articles

camp to the commander in chief, on the part of the allies; lieutenant colonel Dundas, with major Ross, aid-de-camp to lord Cornwallis, on the part of the enemy. The commissioners met; but not agreeing definitively, a rough draft of the terms prepared were submitted to the respective generals in chief. Washington, always indisposed to risk the accidents of fortune, adhered to his decision already announced of preventing the waste of time; and therefore transmitted the next morning a fair copy of the terms to lord Cornwallis, declaring his expectation, that they would be of capitulation for the surrender of Gloucester in its present state of defence.

I shall, in particular, desire that the Bonetta sloop of war may be left entirely at my disposal, from the hour that the capitulation is signed, to receive an aid-de-camp to carry my despatches to sir Henry Clinton. Such soldiers as I may think proper to send as passengers in her, to be manned with fifty men of her own crew, and to be permitted to sail, without examination, when my despatches are ready; engaging on my part, that the ship shall be brought back and delivered to you, if she escapes the dangers of the sea; that the crew and soldiers shall be accounted for in future exchanges; that she shall carry off no officer without your consent, nor public property of any kind. And I shall likewise desire that the traders and inhabitants may preserve their property, and that no person may be punished or molested for having joined the British troops.

If you choose to proceed to negotiation on these grounds, I shall appoint two field officers of my army to meet two officers from you at any time and place that you think proper, to digest the articles of capitulation.

I have the honor to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

ratified on the part of his lordship before the hour of eleven; and that his troops would lay down their arms at two in the afternoon.

Perceiving that it was in vain longer to contend, the British general assented to the terms presented.* Two

** Articles of Capitulation.*

Article 1st. The garrisons of York and Gloucester, including the officers and seamen of his Britannic majesty's ships, as well as other mariners, to surrender themselves prisoners of war to the combined forces of America and France. The land troops to remain prisoners to the United States; the naval to the naval army of his most christian majesty.

Answer. Granted.

Article 2d. The artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public stores of every denomination, shall be delivered, unimpaired, to the heads of departments appointed to receive them.

Answer. Granted.

Article 3d. At twelve o'clock this day the two redoubts on the left flank of York to be delivered; the one to a detachment of the American army, the other to a detachment of French grenadiers.

Answer. Granted.

The garrison of York will march out to a place to be appointed in front of the posts, at two o'clock precisely, with shouldered arms, colors cased, and drums beating a British or German march. They are then to ground their arms, and return to their encampments, where they will remain until they are despatched to the places of their destination. Two works on the Gloucester side will be delivered at one o'clock to a detachment of French and American troops appointed to possess them. The garrison will march out at three o'clock in the afternoon: the cavalry, with their swords drawn, trumpets sounding; and the infantry in the manner prescribed for the garrison of York. They are likewise to return to their encampments until they can be finally marched off.

Article

points had been strenuously insisted on by lord Cornwallis: the first, that his army should be sent to Eu-

Article 4th. Officers are to retain their side arms. Both officers and soldiers to keep their private property of every kind, and no part of their baggage or papers to be at any time subject to search or inspection. The baggage and papers of officers and soldiers taken during the siege to be likewise preserved for them.

Answer. Granted.

It is understood, that any property, obviously belonging to the inhabitants of these states, in the possession of the garrison, shall be subject to be reclaimed.

Article 5th. The soldiers to be kept in Virginia, Maryland, or Pennsylvania, and as much by regiments as possible, and supplied with the same rations of provisions as are allowed to soldiers in the service of America. A field officer from each nation, to wit, British, Anspach, and Hessian, and other officers on parole in the proportion of one to fifty men, to be allowed to reside near their respective regiments, to visit them frequently, and be witnesses of their treatment; and that their officers may receive and deliver clothing and other necessities for them; for which passports are to be granted when applied for.

Answer. Granted.

Article 6th. The general, staff, and other officers not employed as mentioned in the above articles, and who choose it, to be permitted to go on parole to Europe, to New York, or any other American maritime post at present in the possession of the British forces, at their own option; and proper vessels to be granted by the count de Grasse to carry them under flags of truce to New York within ten days from this date, if possible; and they to reside in a district, to be agreed upon hereafter, until they embark.

The officers of the civil department of the army and navy to be included in this article. Passports, to go by land, to be granted to those to whom vessels cannot be furnished.

Answer. Granted.

Article

rope, upon the condition of not serving against the United States or France until exchanged; and the

Article 7th. The officers to be allowed to keep soldiers as servants, according to the common practice of the service. Servants, not soldiers, are not to be considered as prisoners, and are to be allowed to attend their masters.

Answer. Granted.

Article 8th. The Bonetta sloop of war to be equipped, and navigated by its present captain and crew, and left entirely at the disposal of lord Cornwallis from the hour that the capitulation is signed, to receive an aid-de-camp to carry despatches to sir Henry Clinton, and such soldiers as he may think proper to send to New York; to be permitted to sail without examination, when his despatches are ready.

His lordship engages, on his part, that the ship shall be delivered to the order of the count de Grasse, if she escapes the dangers of the sea; that she shall not carry off any public stores. Any part of the crew that may be deficient on her return, and the soldiers, passengers, to be accounted for on her delivery.

Answer. Granted.

Article 9th. The traders are to preserve their property, and to be allowed three months to dispose of or remove them; and those traders are not to be considered as prisoners of war.

Article 9th. Answered. The traders will be allowed to dispose of their effects, the allied army having the right of pre-emption. The traders to be considered as prisoners of war upon parole.

Article 10th. Natives or inhabitants of different parts of this country, at present in York or Gloucester, are not to be punished on account of having joined the British army.

Article 10th. Answered. This article cannot be assented to, being altogether of civil resort.

Article 11th. Proper hospitals to be furnished for the sick and wounded. They are to be attended to by their own surgeons on parole; and they are to be furnished with medicines and stores from the American hospitals.

second, security for our citizens who had joined the British army. Both were peremptorily refused; but the last was in effect yielded by permitting his lordship to send a sloop of war with his despatches to sir

Answered. The hospital stores now in York and Gloucester shall be delivered for the use of the British sick and wounded. Passports will be granted for procuring them further supplies from New York, as occasion may require; and proper hospitals will be furnished for the reception of the sick and wounded of the two garrisons.

Article 12th. Wagons to be furnished to carry the baggage of the officers attending the soldiers, and to surgeons when travelling on account of the sick, attending the hospitals at public expense.

Answer. They are to be furnished if possible.

Article 13th. The shipping and boats in the two harbors, with all their stores, guns, tackling, and apparel, shall be delivered up in their present state to an officer of the navy appointed to take possession of them, previously unloading the private property, part of which had been on board for security during the siege.

Answer. Granted.

Article 14th. No article of capitulation to be infringed on pretence of reprisals; and if there be any doubtful expressions in it, they are to be interpreted according to the common meaning and acceptance of the words.

Answer. Granted.

Done at York in Virginia, October 19th, 1781.

CORNWALLIS.

THOMAS SYMONDS.

Done in the trenches before Yorktown, in Virginia, October 19th, 1781.

G. WASHINGTON.

LE COMTE DE ROCHAMBEAU.

LE COMTE DE BARRAS,

en mon nom et celui du Comte de Grasse.

Henry Clinton free from search. Availing himself of this asylum for the individuals with him, obnoxious to our government, they were safely conveyed to New York.

At two o'clock in the evening the British army, led by general O'Hara, marched out of its lines with colors cased, and drums beating a British march.

The author was present at this ceremony; and certainly no spectacle could be more impressive than the one now exhibited. Valiant troops yielding up their arms after fighting in defence of a cause dear to them, (because the cause of their country) under a leader who, throughout the war, in every grade and in every situation to which he had been called, appeared the hector of his host. Battle after battle had he fought; climate after climate had he endured; towns had yielded to his mandate, posts were abandoned at his approach; armies were conquered by his prowess; one nearly exterminated, another chased from the confines of South Carolina beyond the Dan into Virginia, and a third severely chastised in that state on the shores of James river. But here even he, in the midst of his splendid career, found his conqueror.

The road through which they marched was lined with spectators, French and American. On one side the commander in chief, surrounded by his suit and the American staff, took his station; on the other side, opposite to him, was the count de Rochambeau in like manner attended. The captive army approached, moving slowly in column with grace and precision. Universal silence was observed amidst the vast con-

course, and the utmost decency prevailed: exhibiting in demeanor an awful sense of the vicissitudes of human life, mingled with commiseration for the unhappy. The head of the column approached the commander in chief;—O'Hara, mistaking the circle, turned to that on his left for the purpose of paying his respects to the commander in chief, and requesting farther orders; when quickly discovering his error, with much embarrassment in his countenance, he flew across the road, and advancing up to Washington, asked pardon for his mistake, apologized for the absence of lord Cornwallis, and begged to know his further pleasure. The general feeling his embarrassment, relieved it by referring him with much politeness to general Lincoln for his government. Returning to the head of the column, it again moved under the guidance of Lincoln to the field selected for the conclusion of the ceremony.

Every eye was turned, searching for the British commander in chief, anxious to look at that man, heretofore so much the object of their dread. All were disappointed. Cornwallis held himself back from the humiliating scene; obeying sensations which his great character ought to have stifled. He had been unfortunate, not from any false step or deficiency of exertion on his part, but from the infatuated policy of his superior, and the united power of his enemy, brought to bear upon him alone. There was nothing with which he could reproach himself; there was nothing with which he could reproach his brave and faithful army: why not then appear at its head in the day of misfor-

tune, as he had always done in the day of triumph? The British general in this instance deviated from his usual line of conduct, dimming the splendor of his long and brilliant career.

The post of Gloucester, falling with that of York, was delivered up on the same day by lieutenant colonel Tarleton, who had succeeded to the command on the transfer of lieutenant colonel Dundas to the more important duties assigned to him in the defence of York. Previous to the surrender, Tarleton waited upon general Choisé and communicated to that officer his apprehensions for his personal safety if put at the disposal of the American militia. This conference was sought for the purpose of inducing an arrangement, which should shield him from the vengeance of the inhabitants. General Choisé did not hesitate a moment in gratifying the wishes of Tarleton. The legion of Lauzun and the corps of Mercer were selected by the general to receive the submitting enemy, while the residue of the allied detachment was held back in camp. As soon as the ceremony of surrender was performed, lieutenant colonel Hugo, of the legion of Mercer, with his militia and grenadiers took possession of the redoubts, and protected the hostile garrison from those outrages so seriously, though unwarrantably, anticipated by the British commandant. It would have been very satisfactory to have been enabled to give the reasons which induced this communication from lieutenant colonel Tarleton, but Choisé did not go into the inquiry, and they remain unascertained.

Indubitably they did not grow out of the American character or habit. Rarely in the course of the war were the rights of humanity violated, or the feelings of sympathy and commiseration for the unfortunate suppressed by the Americans; and a deviation from our general system ought not now to have been expected, as the commander in chief was present, and the solemnity of a capitulation had interposed. We look in vain to this quarter for the cause of this procedure; and therefore conclude that it must have arisen from events known to the lieutenant colonel himself, and applying to the corps under his command.

By the official returns it appears that the besieging army, at the termination of the siege, amounted to sixteen thousand men,—five thousand five hundred continentals, three thousand five hundred militia, and seven thousand French. The British force in toto is put down at seven thousand one hundred and seven; of which only four thousand and seventeen, rank and file, are stated to have been fit for duty.

The army, with every thing belonging to it, fell to the United States; while the shipping and all its appurtenances were allotted to our ally. The British loss, including officers, amounted to five hundred and fifty-eight; while ours did not exceed three hundred.

We obtained an excellent park of field artillery, all of brass. At any other period of the war no acquisition could have been more acceptable.

The commander in chief, in his orders of congratulation on the happy event, made his cordial acknow-

ledgments to the whole army, which was well deserved; as in every stage of the service it had exemplified unvarying zeal, vigor and intrepidity. On the count de Rochambeau, the generals Chatelleux and Viomenil, high applause was bestowed for the distinguished support derived from them throughout the siege; and governor Nelson of Virginia received the tribute of thanks so justly due to his great and useful exertions. The generals Lincoln, la Fayette, and Steuben, are named with much respect. General Knox, commanding the artillery, and general du Portail, chief of engineers in the American army, are particularly honored for their able and unremitting assistance.

On the very day in which lord Cornwallis surrendered, sir Henry Clinton left Sandy Hook, with the promised relief; originally put down at four thousand, afterwards at more than five thousand, now seven thousand; made up of his best corps, escorted by admiral Digby, who had succeeded Graves, with twenty-five sail of the line, two ships of fifty guns, and eight frigates. Such want of precision must always blast military enterprise. Why it happened, remains unexplained; but there seems to have been, in all expeditions of the same sort, either from English ports or from those of the colonies, the same unaccountable dilatoriness, uniformly producing deep and lasting injury to the nation.

After a fine passage the fleet appeared on the 24th off the capes of Virginia, where sir Henry Clinton received intelligence of the fall of his army. Continuing some days longer off the mouth of the Chesapeake to

ascertain the truth, his information became confirmed; when further delay being useless he returned to New York.

In the mean time de Grasse continued on his anchorage ground with thirty-six sail of the line, and the usual proportion of frigates, hastening preparations for his departure.

Why sir Henry Clinton should have ever encouraged his general in Virginia to expect relief seems unaccountable. The project adopted, too late, by Cornwallis of escaping north or south, was much more feasible than the plan of relief so confidently relied upon by the British general in chief. How were twenty-five ships of the line to force their way into the bay of Chesapeake, occupied by a superior hostile fleet? But admitting the improbable event; what then would ensue? Sir Henry, with his seven thousand men, would disembark up the bay so as to approach Gloucester point, or he would land in the vicinity of Hampton; from whence the road to York is direct, and the distance not more than one day's march. To land at the former place would be absurd, unless the French fleet was annihilated,—an indecisive action, though unfavorable to France, could not produce the desired end. It was scarcely possible for such inferiority of naval force to have struck so decisive a blow.

The route to Gloucester was therefore not eligible; as the York river intervening, sure to be occupied by the French fleet, would sever the two armies. That by the way of Hampton, or from James river, was occlu-

ded by only one obstacle, and that obstacle was insurmountable. Sixteen thousand bayonets interposed; twelve thousand five hundred of which were in the hands of regulars, all chosen troops.

Cornwallis, with his small force, could not leave his lines; if he did, Washington, moving towards Clinton, would have only to turn upon his lordship as soon as he ventured from his intrenched camp, and in one hour he must have destroyed him. Clinton next in order must infallibly fall. Acting upon the opposite principle, Cornwallis would continue in his position, and Washington would attack Clinton on his advance, midway between Hampton and York, or between his point of debarkation on James river and our lines; the issue would be the same, though the order would be reversed: Clinton would be first destroyed, and Cornwallis would then surrender.

The further the inquiry is pursued the more conspicuous will the want of due foresight and wise action in the British commander in chief appear. The moment he was informed by his government that he might expect a French fleet upon our coast in the course of the autumn, he ought to have taken his measures as if he had been assured of the maritime superiority which happened. Thus acting, should the presumed event happily fail, he was safe; should it unhappily be realized, he would have been prepared to meet it.

Relying upon the superiority of the British navy, he seems never to have reflected that the force of controllable accidents might give that superiority to his

enemy. Had he for a moment believed that the care of the spoils of Saint Eustatius could have benumbed the zeal of sir G. B. Rodney, commanding in chief the naval force of Great Britain in our hemisphere, he might have pursued a safer course. Or if he had conceived it possible that a storm might have torn to pieces one fleet, injuring but little the other, (an occurrence which sometimes happens) he would have discerned the wisdom of relying upon himself for safety; and consequently would have ordered Cornwallis to have taken post on the south of James river, ready to regain North Carolina should it become necessary. But never presuming upon the interposition of any incident giving to France a naval ascendancy upon our coast, he took his measures upon common-place principles, following the beaten tract, and fell an easy prey to his sagacious adversary; who, to prevent the interference of any occurrence impeding the progress of his views, made ready in time to take his part as circumstances might invite, and to press forward to his end with unslackening vigor. Sir Henry Clinton was—like most of the generals who appeared in this war—good, but not great. He was an active, zealous, honorable, well bred soldier; but Heaven had not touched his mind with its ætherial spark. He could not soar above the ordinary level; and though calculated to shine in a secondary sphere, was sure to twinkle in the highest station: When presidents, kings, or emperors confide armies to soldiers of common minds, they ought not to be surprised at the disasters which

follow. The war found general Gage in chief command in America; confessedly better fitted for peace. He was changed for sir William Howe; who, after two campaigns, was withdrawn, or withdrew. Sir Henry Clinton succeeded; and when peace became assured, sir Guy Carleton, afterwards lord Dorchester, took his place. By a strange fatality the soldier best qualified for the arduous duties of war, was reserved to conduct the scenes of returning peace. This general was and had been for many years governor of Canada. He defended Quebec against Montgomery; where he gave strong indications of a superior mind by his use of victory. Instead of detaining his enemy (fellow subjects, as he called them) in prison ships; committing them to the discretion of mercenary commissaries for food and fuel, and to military bailiffs for safe keeping, Carleton paroled the officers, expressing his regret that they should have been induced to maintain a cause wrong in principle, and fatal to its abettors in issue; and sent home the privates, giving to all every requisite aid for their comfortable return, enjoining them never to take up arms a second time against their sovereign; as thereby they would forfeit the security and comfort which he had presented, as well as violate their own peace of mind, by cancelling a contract founded in the confidence of their truth.

Commiserating the delusion under which they had acted, he encouraged their abandonment of the new doctrines; anathematizing with bitterness the arts, intrigues, and wickedness of their rebellious leaders,

against whom, and whom only, the thunderbolt of power ought, in his judgment, to be hurled.

The effect of such policy was powerful. General Greene, from whom the information is derived, expressed his conviction that the kindness of Carleton was more to be dreaded than the bayonet of Howe; and mentioned as an undeniable fact, that in the various districts to which our captured troops returned, not excepting the faithful state of Connecticut, the impressions made by the relation of the treatment experienced from him produced a lasting and unpropitious effect.

Here is exhibited deep knowledge of the human heart,—the ground work of greatness in the art of war. When we add the honorable display of patriotism evinced by the same officer, in his support of the expedition under lieutenant general Burgoyne, intruded by the minister into an important command which the governor of Canada had a right to expect, and subjoin that when a colonel at the head of a regiment in the army under Wolfe, before Quebec, he was the only officer of that grade entrusted by that great captain with a separate command, America may justly rejoice in the misapplication of such talents, and Great Britain as truly lament the infatuation of her rulers, who overlooked a leader of such high promise.

Cornwallis, in his official letter, representing his fall, gave serious umbrage to sir Henry Clinton; so difficult is it to relate the truth without offence, when communicating disaster resulting from the improvidence,

or incapacity of a superior. That the reader may judge of this last act of the most distinguished general opposed to us in the course of the war, his lordship's letter has been annexed.*

General Greene, as has been mentioned, hoping that as soon as the army of Virginia was brought to submission the French admiral might be induced to extend his co-operation further south, had sent to the commander in chief lieutenant colonel Lee with a full and minute description of the situation and force of the enemy in the Carolinas and Georgia.

This officer arrived a few days before the surrender; and having executed his mission, was detained by the commander in chief to accompany the expedition, which he anxiously desired to forward conformably to the plan of general Greene.

The moment he finished the great work before him he addressed himself to the count de Grasse, urging his further aid if compatible with his ulterior objects. The French admiral was well disposed to subserve the views of Washington; but the interest of his king and his own engagements forbad longer delay on our coasts. Failing in the chief object of his address, Washington informed the admiral of his intention to reinforce the army in the South, dilating upon the benefits inseparable from its speedy junction with general Greene, and his hope that the conveyance of the reinforcements to Cape Fear river would not be inconvenient. This proposition was cheerfully adopted, and the corps destined

* See Appendix, N.

for the South, were put under the direction of the marquis la Fayette, with orders to possess himself of Wilmington, situated fifteen miles up the Cape Fear, still held by major Craig, and from thence to march to the southern headquarters. It so happened, that the count found it necessary to recede from his promise; so that general Greene, much as he pressed naval co-operation, which could not fail in restoring the three southern states completely, was not only disappointed in this his fond expectation, but was also deprived of the advantage to be derived from the facile and expeditious conveyance of his reinforcement as at first arranged.

The army of Rochambeau was cantoned for the winter in Virginia: the brigades of Wayne and Gist were detached to the south under major general St. Clair: the remainder of the American army was transported by water to the head of the Chesapeake, under major general Lincoln, who was ordered to regain the Hudson river; and the detachment with lieutenant Simon re-embarked, while the French admiral returned to the West Indies.

Thus concluded the important co-operation of the allied forces; concerted at the court of Versailles, executed with precision on the part of count de Grasse, and conducted with judgment by the commander in chief. Great was the joy diffused throughout our infant empire. Bon fires, illuminations, feasts, and balls, proclaimed the universal delight; congratulatory addresses, warm from the heart, poured in from every quarter,

hailing in fervid terms the patriot hero; the reverend ministers of our holy religion, the learned dignitaries of science, the grave rulers and governors of the land, all tendered their homage; and the fair, whose smiles best reward the brave, added, too, their tender gratitude and sweet applause.

This wide acclaim of joy and of confidence, as rare as sincere, sprung not only from the conviction that our signal success would bring in its train the blessings of peace, so wanted by our wasted country, and from the splendor with which it encircled our national name, but from the endearing reflection that the mighty exploit had been achieved by our faithful, beloved Washington. We had seen him struggling throughout the war with inferior force against the best troops of England, assisted by her powerful navy; surrounded with difficulties; oppressed by want; never dismayed, never appalled, never despairing of the commonwealth. We have seen him renouncing his own fame as a soldier, his safety as a man; in his unalloyed love of country, weakening his own immediate force to strengthen that of his lieutenants; submitting with equanimity to his own consequent inability to act, and rejoicing in their triumphs because best calculated to uphold the great cause entrusted to his care; at length by one great and final exploit under the benign influence of Providence, lifted to the pinnacle of glory, the merited reward of his toils, his sufferings, his patience, his heroism, and his virtue. Wonderful man! rendering it difficult by his conduct throughout life to decide whether he most excelled in goodness or in greatness.

Congress testified unanimously their sense of the great achievement.* To Washington, de Grasse, Ro-

* By the United States, in Congress assembled, October 29th, 1781.

Resolved, That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be presented to his excellency general Washington, for the eminent services which he has rendered to the United States, and particularly for the well concerted plan against the British garrisons in York and Gloucester; for the vigor, attention, and military skill with which the plan was executed; and for the wisdom and prudence manifested in the capitulation.

That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be presented to his excellency the count de Rochambeau, for the cordiality, zeal, judgment and fortitude, with which he seconded and advanced the progress of the allied army against the British garrison in York.

That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be presented to his excellency count de Grasse, for his display of skill and bravery in attacking and defeating the British fleet off the bay of Chesapeake; and for his zeal and alacrity in rendering, with the fleet under his command, the most effectual and distinguished aid and support to the operations of the allied army in Virginia.

That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be presented to the commanding and other officers of the corps of artillery and engineers of the allied army, who sustained extraordinary fatigue and danger, in their animated and gallant approaches to the lines of the enemy.

That general Washington be directed to communicate to the other officers and the soldiers under his command the thanks of the United States in congress assembled, for their conduct and valor on this occasion.

Resolved, That the United States, in Congress assembled, will cause to be erected at York, in Virginia, a marble column, adorned with emblems of the alliance between the United States and

chambeau, and to their armies, they presented the thanks of the nation, the most grateful reward which

his most christian majesty, and inscribed with a succinct narrative of the surrender of earl Cornwallis to his excellency general Washington, commander in chief of the combined forces of America and France, to his excellency the count de Rochambeau, commanding the auxiliary troops of his most christian majesty in America, and his excellency the count de Grasse, commanding in chief the naval army of France in the Chesapeake.

Resolved, That two stands of the colors taken from the British army under the capitulation of York, be presented to his excellency general Washington, in the name of the United States, in congress assembled.

Resolved, That two pieces of field ordnance, taken from the British army under the capitulation of York, be presented by the commander in chief of the American army to count de Rochambeau; and that there be engraved thereon a short memorandum, that congress were induced to present them from consideration of the illustrious part which he bore in effectuating the surrender.

Resolved, That the secretary of foreign affairs be directed to request the minister plenipotentiary of his most christian majesty, to inform his majesty, that it is the wish of Congress that count de Grasse may be permitted to accept a testimony of their approbation, similar to that to be presented to count de Rochambeau.

Resolved, That the board of war be directed to present to lieutenant colonel Tilghman, in the name of the United States, in Congress assembled, a horse properly caparisoned, and an elegant sword in testimony of their high opinion of his merit and ability.*

November

* Lieutenant colonel Tench Tilghman had served from the year 1776 in the character of aid-de-camp to the commander in chief, was highly beloved and respected, and was honored by Washington with bearing to congress his official report of the surrender of the British army in Virginia.

freemen can bestow, or freemen receive; and passed a resolution to erect a monument of marble on the ground of victory, as well to commemorate the alliance between the two nations as this the proud triumph of their united arms. Nor did they stop here. Desirous that the chiefs of the allied forces should carry with them into retirement some of the trophies of their prowess, they presented to the commander in chief two of the standards taken from the enemy, to the admiral two field pieces, and a like number to the general of the French troops. They concluded, by dedicating the 30th of December for national supplication and thanksgiving to Almighty God in commemoration of his gracious protection, manifested by the late happy issue of their councils and efforts, themselves attending in a body divine worship on that day.

November 7th, 1781.

Resolved, That the secretary of foreign affairs be directed to prepare a sketch of emblems of the alliance between his most christian majesty and the United States, proper to be inscribed on the column to be erected in the town of York, under the resolution of the 29th day of October last.

Resolved, That an elegant sword be presented in the name of the United States, in Congress assembled, to colonel Humphreys, aid-de-camp of general Washington, to whose care the standards taken under the capitulation of York were consigned, as a testimony of their opinion of his fidelity and ability, and that the board of war take order therein.

Extract from the minutes.

CHARLES THOMPSON, Secretary.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

AS soon as it was ascertained that the count de Grasse would not take under convoy the troops destined to reinforce the southern army, general St. Clair was ordered to prepare for immediate motion; and lieutenant colonel Lee was directed to return with the despatches of the commander in chief. Hastening to the south, the lieutenant colonel proceeded with expedition to the High Hills of Santee,—still the headquarters of the southern army. General Greene finding himself baffled in the expectation he had indulged, of being sufficiently strengthened to complete the restoration of the South, which he had so happily, in a great degree, accomplished; nevertheless, determined, though reduced by battle and by disease, to remain inactive no longer than the season rendered it necessary. The autumn in South Carolina is extremely debilitating as well as prolific in the production of disease. Prepared to move, he only waited for the commencement of the cool season. The general was well apprized of the effect of the late hard fought battle; which, notwithstanding the enemy's claim to victory, had broken the force and spirit of the British army. Nor was he unmindful in his calculations of the relative condition of the two armies, that this operative

battle had been fought by his infantry only; the horse under Washington, although very much shattered, had not in the smallest degree contributed to the issue of the action; while that of the legion had by a manœuvre only aided the van in the morning rencontre: a circumstance well known to the enemy, and which could not be overlooked in his estimate of the past and of the future. The American general being convinced that he was in effect the conqueror, he conformed his plan and measures to this character.

In the severe conflict during the last ten months, the districts between the Santee and the Pedee, and between the Wateree and Congaree, having been successively the seat of war, their cultivation had been neglected. The product of the soil was scanty, and of that little, all not concealed for the subsistence of the inhabitants had been taken by the armies. The only country from which Greene could draw supplies was that on the Lower Pedee, and this was so distant as to render the conveyance to camp extremely inconvenient, which added to the insecurity of the route of transportation, from its exposure to the enemy's maritime interruption. It fortunately happened that subsistence for man and horse was most abundant in the quarter of the state to which the general was desirous of transferring the war. Although he had confidently expected that the commander in chief would have succeeded in prevailing on the French admiral to continue in our waters long enough for the execution of the plan submitted by him to Washington, neverthe-

less he sedulously applied himself in preparing for the partial accomplishment of his object with his own means, in case of disappointment. In North Carolina, Wilmington remained in the possession of the enemy. In South Carolina he had only Charleston and the contiguous islands, and the isthmus formed by the rivers Cooper and Ashley, with a portion of the country lying between the last river and the Edisto. But in Georgia, Savannah and a larger space of country were in their uncontrolled possession.

With the requested aid the American general could not have been disappointed in the entire liberation of the three states; without this aid, he flattered himself with being able, by judicious and vigorous operations, to relieve North Carolina and Georgia.

To this object he turned his attention, and for this purpose he determined to place himself intermediate to Charleston and Savannah. The district south of the Edisto fitted his views in point of locality; and having been since 1779 exempt in a great degree from military operations, agriculture had been cherished, and the crops of rice in particular were tolerably abundant. This substitute for bread, however unpalatable to Marylanders and Virginians, of whom Greene's army was principally composed, is nourishing to man, and with the Indian pea, which grows luxuriantly in South Carolina and Georgia, affords nutritious forage for horse. He put his army in motion (on the 18th of November), and soon after he crossed the Congaree, left the main body under the orders of colonel Wil-

liams, who was directed to advance by easy and stated marches to the Four Holes, a branch of the Edisto, while the general himself, at the head of the light troops, took a circuitous route to the same place. Correspondency in the movement of the two corps being preconcerted, Williams proceeded on the direct route to the Four Holes; and Greene advanced by forced marches upon Dorchester, where the enemy had established a post, garrisoned at present by four hundred infantry, all their cavalry, not exceeding one hundred and fifty, and some militia. This post (if surprised) could be readily carried, and such a result was not improbable. If not surprised, the general flattered himself, unless the enemy had recovered from the despondency which followed the battle of the Eutaws, that he would abandon it; and if disappointed in both these expectations, he considered himself as amply compensated for this movement, by his own view of a part of the country to which he meant to extend his operations.

The cavalry, preceding the light infantry in various directions, occupied an extensive front, for the purpose of precluding communication of our approach; which it was intended to conceal from the inhabitants as well as from the enemy, lest some of the disaffected might inform him of our advance. We marched in paths through woods and swamps seldom trod by man; and wherever we could not avoid settlements, all the inhabitants capable of conveying information were secured. Notwithstanding these precautions, and our active ca-

valry, the enemy received advice of our approach sometime in the night preceding the morning intended for the meditated blow.

The commanding officer drew in his outposts, and concentrated his force in Dorchester, keeping in his front a few patrols to ascertain and report our progress. Lieutenant colonel Hampton, at the head of the state horse, (a small corps which had, with honor to itself and effect to its country, shared in the dangers of the latter part of the campaign with our army,) fell in with one of these, and instantly charging it, killed some, wounded others, and drove the rest upon the main body. The British cavalry sallied out in support, but declining combat, soon retired.

Disappointed in the hoped-for surprise, the general continued to examine the enemy's position, desirous of executing by force, what he hoped to have accomplished by stratagem. In the course of the day the presence of Greene became known to the foe, who instantly prepared for departure. He destroyed his stores of every sort, fell back in the night down the isthmus, and before daylight (the return of which he seemed to have dreaded) established himself at the Quarterhouse, seven miles from Charleston. General Greene pursued his examination of the country at his leisure, which being finished he returned to the army, now encamped on the Four Holes.

After a few days he passed the Edisto, and sat down at the Round O, which is situated between that river and the Ashepoo, about forty or fifty miles from

Charleston, and seventy miles from the confluence of the Wateree and Congaree; fifteen miles beyond which, on the east of the Wateree, in a straight line, are the High Hills of Santee.

Taking immediate measures for the security of the country in his front, he detached brigadier Marion with his militia to the east of Ashley river, with orders to guard the district between that river and the Cooper; and he sent lieutenant colonel Lee down the western side of the Ashley, directing him to approach by gradual advances St. John's Island, and to place himself in a strong position within striking distance of it.

Previous to this the enemy had evacuated Wilmington by which North Carolina became completely restored to the Union. Shut up as were the British troops in Charleston and its isthmus, major Craig with the garrison from Wilmington, some additional infantry and the cavalry, had been detached to St. John's Island, where most of the cattle collected for the British army were at pasture, where long forage was procurable for the cavalry, where co-operation with the garrison of Charleston might be convenient, and whence infantry might be readily transported along the interior navigation to Savannah.

To repress incursions from this post, as well as to inhibit the conveyance of supplies from the main to the island became the principal object of Lee's attention.

The advance of Marion and Lee being, by the general's order, simultaneous, they gave security to their contiguous flanks from any attempt by land, although

they were divided by the Ashley; it being not inconvenient to apprize each other of any movement of the enemy on either side of the river. This co-operation was enjoined by the general, and punctually executed by the two commandants. The first day's march brought these detachments to the country settled by the original emigrants into Carolina. The scene was both new and delightful. Vestiges, though clouded by war, every where appeared of the wealth and taste of the inhabitants. Spacious edifices, rich and elegant gardens, with luxuriant and extensive rice plantations, were to be seen on every side. This change in the aspect of inanimate nature, could not fail to excite emotions of pleasure, the more vivid because so rare. During our continued marches and countermarches, never before had we been solaced with the prospect of so much comfort. Here we were not confined to one solitary mansion, where a few, and a few only, might enjoy the charms of taste and the luxury of opulence. The rich repast was wide spread; and when to the exterior was added the fashion, politeness and hospitality of the interior, we became enraptured with our changed condition, and the resolve of never yielding up this charming region but with life became universal. To crown our bliss, the sex shone in its brightest lustre. With the ripest and most symmetrical beauty, our fair compatriots blended sentimental dignity and delicate refinement, the sympathetic shade of melancholy, and the dawning smile of hope; the arrival of their new guests opening to them the prospect of happier times.

The rapture of these scenes was as yet confined to the light troops. The general continuing in his position at the Round O, subsisting upon the resources of the country in that neighborhood and in his rear, reserved all the surplus food and forage within the advanced posts for the future support of his army. Decamping from the Round O, he moved on the route taken by his van; when the main body participated in the gratifications which this pleasing district, and its more pleasing possessors, so liberally bestowed. After some marches and countermarches, brigadier Marion took post between Dorchester and Biggin's bridge, and lieutenant colonel Lee at M'Queen's plantation, south of Ashley river. The main body encamped at Pompon, in the rear of Lee. Here general Greene began to enter more particularly into his long meditated design of relieving the state of Georgia, by forcing the enemy to evacuate Savannah.

We have before mentioned that major, now lieutenant colonel Craig, had taken possession of St. John's Island, with a respectable detachment. Lee was ordered, when detached towards that island, to take measures for ascertaining with exactness the strength and position of Craig, with his customary precautions against surprise, and his manner of discharging the duties which his situation imposed. This service was undertaken with all that zeal and diligence which the mandates of a chief so enlightened and so respected, and an enterprise more brilliant than all the past exploits in the course of the southern war, could claim.

Some weeks were assiduously devoted to the acquiring of a clear comprehension of this arduous and grand design, with an exact knowledge of the complicated means necessary to its execution: in the mean time, demonstrations were made and reports circulated, exhibiting a settled plan in the general of passing Ashley river, to be ready to fall upon Charleston as soon as the reinforcement under St. Clair, now approaching, should arrive. About this time Greene's attention to the leading object of his measures was diverted by accounts from the West, announcing an irruption of the Cherokee tribe of Indians on the district of Ninety-Six; which having been as sudden as it was unexpected, had been attended with serious injury. Several families were massacred, and many houses were burnt. Brigadier Pickens, (whose name we have often before mentioned, and always in connection with the most important services,) had, after his long and harassing campaign, returned home with his militia. The moment he heard of the late incursion, he again summoned around him his well tried warriors. To this officer the general resorted, when he was informed of this new enemy. Among the first acts of general Greene's command in the South, was the conclusion of a treaty with this tribe of Indians, by which they had engaged to preserve a state of neutrality so long as the war between the United States and Great Britain should continue. What is extraordinary, the Cherokees rigidly complied with their engagement during the past campaign, when the success of lord Cornwall-

lis, with the many difficulties Greene had to encounter, would have given weight to their interference. Now, when the British army in Virginia had been forced to surrender, and that acting in South Carolina and Georgia had been compelled to take shelter in the district of country protected by forts and ships, they were so rash as to listen to exhortations often before applied in vain. Pickens followed the incursors into their own country; and having seen much and various service, judiciously determined to mount his detachment, adding the sword* to the rifle and tomahawk. He well knew the force of cavalry, having felt it at the Cowpens, though it was then feebly exemplified by the enemy. Forming his mind upon experience, the straight road to truth, he wisely resolved to add to the arms, usual in Indian wars, the unusual one above mentioned.

* John Rogers Clarke, colonel in the service of Virginia against our neighbors the Indians in the revolutionary war, was among our best soldiers, and better acquainted with the Indian warfare than any officer in our army. This gentleman, after one of his campaigns, met in Richmond several of our cavalry officers, and devoted all his leisure in ascertaining from them the various uses to which horse were applied, as well as the manner of such application. The information he acquired determined him to introduce this species of force against the Indians, as that of all others the most effectual.

By himself, by Pickens, and lately by Wayne, was the accuracy of Clarke's opinion justified; and no doubt remains, but in all armies prepared to act against the Indians, a very considerable proportion of it ought to be light cavalry.

In a few days he reached the country of the Indians, who, as is the practice among the uncivilized in all ages, ran to arms to oppose the invader, anxious to join issue in battle without delay. Pickens, with his accustomed diligence, took care to inform himself accurately of the designs and strength of the enemy; and as soon as he had ascertained these important facts, advanced upon him. The rifle was only used while reconnoitring the hostile position. As soon as this was finished, he remounted his soldiers and ordered a charge: with fury his brave warriors rushed forward, and the astonished Indians fled in dismay. Not only the novelty of the mode, which always has its influence, but the sense of his incapacity to resist horse, operated upon the flying forester.

Pickens followed up his success, and killed forty Cherokees, took a great number of prisoners of both sexes, and burnt thirteen towns. He lost not a soldier, and had only two wounded. The sachems of the nation assembled in council; and thoroughly satisfied of their inability to contend against an enemy who added the speed of the horse* to the skill and strength of man, they determined to implore forgiveness for the

* The Indians, when fighting with infantry, are very daring. This temper of mind results from his consciousness of his superior fleetness; which, together with his better knowledge of woods, assures to him extrication out of difficulties, though desperate. This temper of mind is extinguished, when he finds that he is to save himself from the pursuit of horse, and with its extinction falls that habitual boldness.

past, and never again to provoke the wrath of their triumphant foe. This resolution being adopted, commissioners were accordingly appointed, with directions to wait upon general Pickens, and to adjust with him the terms of peace. These were readily listened to, and a treaty concluded, which not only terminated the existing war, but provided against its renewal, by a stipulation on the part of the Cherokees, in which they engaged not only to remain deaf to the exhortations of the British emissaries, but that they would apprehend all such evil doers, and deliver them to the governor of South Carolina, to be dealt with as he might direct.

The object of the expedition being thus happily accomplished, general Pickens evacuated the Indian territory and returned to South Carolina, before the expiration of the third week from his departure, without losing a single soldier.

Pickens' despatches, communicating the termination of the Cherokee hostilities, were received by Greene just as he was about to enter upon the execution of his meditated enterprise. All the requisite intelligence had been acquired, the chances calculated, the decision taken, the plan concerted, and the period proper for execution* fast approaching.

* Only one or two nights in a month suited, as it was necessary that the tide of ebb should be nearly expended about midnight, the proper hour of passing to the island; and it was desirable to possess the advantage of moonlight after we entered the island. Besides, then the galley crews were most likely

Lieutenant colonel Craig, with his infantry, was posted at a plantation not far from the eastern extremity of the island. The cavalry were cantoned six or seven miles from the infantry, at different farm-houses in its western quarter. At low water the inlet dividing St. Johns from the main was passable by infantry at two points only, both familiar to the enemy. That at the western extremity of the island was full of large rocks, and could be used only in the day, it being necessary carefully to pick your route, which in the deep water was from rock to rock. About midway between the eastern and western extremities was the other, where no natural difficulty occurred, and in the last of the ebb tide the depth of water was not more than *waist high*. This was guarded by two galleys, the one above and the other below it, and both within four hundred yards of each other, as near to the ford as the channel would permit.

Lee's examination of their position, together with his observations of the manner in which the captains of the galleys performed night duty, suggested the practicability of passing between the galleys with infantry unperceived. As soon as general Greene became satisfied that this difficulty could be surmounted, he determined to hazard the attempt if a proper place for the cavalry to swim across, could be ascertained. But the deep marshes which lined the shores seemed at first likely to prevent the approach

to be at rest; and we had sufficient time before daylight to execute our various arrangements.

of the horse. At length major Eggleston, commanding the legionary cavalry, discovered a practicable route some distance below the galleys. He ordered one or two of his dragoons to swim to the opposite shore in the night to select firm ground, and to erect small stakes as beacons to guide the cavalry where first to strike the shore of the island. This was duly executed, and reported accordingly to the general.

The day was now fixed for making the attempt, and preparatory orders were issued. Lieutenant colonel Lee, with the light corps acting under him, being insufficient in strength, a detachment of infantry from the army was made ready and placed under lieutenant colonel Laurens, who was ordered to join Lee at a given point, when on his march to the theatre of action.

The plantation on which lieutenant colonel Craig had encamped, was intersected by many ditches, as was usual in the cultivated grounds of South Carolina near the sea. One of these stretched along the front of the British camp, about one hundred yards distant from it, which afforded sufficient space for the infantry of Craig to display in line, and which the assailants did not doubt the lieutenant colonel would seize as soon as he should discover their advance.

To compensate in some measure for the advantage which the ground afforded to the enemy, the infantry of the attacking corps was rendered superior by one fifth to that to be assaulted.

Lieutenant colonel Craig, although to all appearance

protected from annoyance by his insulated situation, did not neglect the necessary precautions for his safety; nor did he permit any relaxation in discipline, or any diminution of vigilance. The chance of surprising him was not encouraging; but being very desirable and possible, it was determined that it should be attempted. On the road leading from the ford, protected by the galleys, Craig had placed a picquet, about a mile from the galleys; and two miles further on was another, at the point where the road last mentioned ran longitudinally through the island. On the left of this point of intersection, Craig was encamped, three or four miles from it towards Charleston; and on the right of the same point were the cavalry, a few miles distant towards the western extremity of the island. Our plan was as follows. As soon as the infantry should effect its passage into the island, an officer of cavalry, who had been directed for the purpose to accompany lieutenant colonel Lee, was then to return to major Eggleston with orders for the cavalry to pass to the island, and wait for the infantry near to the road of march, which took a direction inclining to the landing place of the horse.

The first picquet was to be approached with the utmost secrecy, and then to be forced with vigor by the van, which was ordered to spread itself for the purpose of preventing the escape of any individual; and the cavalry had directions to take measures to intercept every person who might endeavor to pass in their direction. We flattered ourselves with possess-

ing the picquet without much resistance; and knowing that Craig was too remote to hear the firing, should any occur, we hoped by the interception of every fugitive to stop all communication with him.

The second picquet was to be avoided, which with proper care was feasible; when the infantry, supported by one troop of horse, was to advance upon Craig, while Eggleston with the residue of the dragoons would fall upon the enemy's cavalry. Succeeding in both points, the main body could not escape the meditated surprise, which would give to us an easy victory: failing in arresting every individual of the post, or in evading the last picquet, Craig would be advised of our approach, and would be prepared to receive us. In the latter event, we intended, by turning one of his flanks, in case he threw himself into the ditch,—of which, from our knowledge of his character, no doubt could exist,—to force him to change his front; and we were so thoroughly satisfied with the character of our troops as to assume it as a fact, that no corps, even of equal force, could execute the manœuvre in our face without being destroyed. In this opinion Greene concurred, and on its accuracy was rested the issue of the enterprise. However such a conclusion may wear the appearance of arrogance, it does not merit the reproach. The veteran troops in the Southern army had attained the highest grade of discipline. Every soldier as well as officer was conscious of his acquirements, and had experienced their good effect. They also knew that victory was not only

the sure reward of every man's doing his duty in battle, but they were convinced that each man's personal safety was promoted by the same course.

Thus persuaded, they were habitually actuated by the determination of confiding entirely in their leader, their discipline, and their valor. Such troops will generally succeed, and, upon this occasion, could scarcely fail: for the major part of Craig's infantry had long been in garrison at Wilmington, where they never had seen an enemy in arms; and his cavalry were known to be very inferior to the American horse, and were separated from the infantry. To reckon, therefore, upon victory, did not manifest presumption; but only showed that Lee and Laurens duly appreciated the advantages they possessed, and were willing to stake their reputation and lives on the correctness of the estimate they had formed of them.

The day appointed for the execution of the enterprise now arrived (21st December). Lieutenant colonel Laurens moved with his detachment from the main body towards the Ashley river, for the ostensible purpose of passing the river and taking post in the neighborhood of Dorchester. Halting near Bacon's bridge until late in the evening, he countermarched, as if returning to camp, when after nightfall he turned to his left, taking the route prescribed for his junction with Lee. The latter officer moved in the same evening from his position at M'Queen's plantation, and about nine P. M. reached the rendezvous, where he was met with precision by Laurens. The troops halt-

ed, and took the last meal for twenty-four hours; after which they were called to arms and were made acquainted with the destined object. They were told, that the enterprise before them was replete with difficulties; that the most powerful of the many which attended it would be met at the threshold; that this was to be encountered by the infantry, and could be overcome only by profound silence and strict obedience to orders. Success in the first step would in all probability lead to complete victory; inasmuch as the enemy was inferior in number, divided in position, and safe, in his own presumption, from his insular situation. That the plan of operations had been approved by the general; and the troops now united had been honored by his selection of them for the purpose of concluding the campaign in a manner worthy of the zeal, courage and patience displayed by the army in all preceding scenes. They were assured that every difficulty had been well weighed; the best intelligence with the best guides had been procured; and that they could not be disappointed in reaping a rich harvest of glory, unless the commandants had deceived themselves in their estimate of their intrepidity and discipline. A burst of applause ensued from the ranks, evincing the delight which all felt in knowing that victory was certain, unless lost by their misbehaviour.

The disposition for battle was now made. The infantry was arrayed in two columns: that of Lee forming the right, that of Laurens the left. The cavalry were also divided into two squadrons: one third under

Armstrong was attached to the infantry; while the other two thirds, under Eggleston, were appropriated to strike at the enemy's dragoons, with orders as soon as they were secured to hasten to the support of the infantry.

Every necessary arrangement having been made, we resumed our march; and, after a few miles move, the cavalry filed to our left to gain its station on the river. Within an hour from this separation, we got near to the marsh, which on this side lines the river in the place where the infantry was to pass. Here the infantry again halted and deposited their knapsacks, and the officers, dismounting, left their horses. Dr. Skinner, of the legion infantry, who considered fighting as no part of his business, was indulged in his request of being intrusted with the charge of the baggage. The detachment again moved; every man in his place; and every officer enjoined to take special care to march in sight of his preceding section, lest in the darkness of the night a separation might happen.

After some time our guides informed us that we were near the marsh. This intelligence was communicated from section to section, and the columns were halted, as had been previously concerted, that every officer and soldier might pull off boots and shoes to prevent the splashing which they produced when wading through water, to be resumed when we reached the opposite shore. The order was instantly and cheerfully executed by the troops. Entering on the marsh, we moved very slowly, every man exerting

himself to prevent noise. The van, under Rudolph, reached the shore, and proceeded, in conformity to orders, without halting into the river. Lee coming up with the head of the column, accompanied by lieutenant colonel Laurens, halted and directed a staff officer to return and see that the sections were all up. We now enjoyed the delightful pleasure of hearing the sentinels from each galley crying "*all is safe*," when Rudolph with the van was passing between them.

No circumstance could have been more exhilarating, as we derived from it a conviction that the difficulty most to be apprehended would be surmounted, and every man became persuaded from the evidence of his own senses, that an enemy assailable only in this way would be found off his guard, and, therefore, that victory was certain. At this moment the staff officer returned with information that the rear column was missing. Laurens immediately went back to the high land with some of the guides and staff officers to endeavor to find it. The affliction produced by this communication is indescribable. At the very moment when every heart glowed with anticipations of splendid glory, an incident was announced which menaced irremediable disappointment.

Hour after hour passed; messengers occasionally coming in from Laurens, and no intelligence gained respecting the lost column. At length the tide, which was beginning flood when the van passed, had now risen so high as to compel the recal of Rudolph, even had not the morning been too far spent to admit per-

severance in the enterprise. A sergeant was sent across the inlet with orders for the return of the van, and the column retired.

Rudolph found the water, which had not reached the waist as he passed, up to the breast as he returned. Nevertheless every man got back safe; the tallest assisting the lowest, and the galley sentinels continuing to cry "all safe." We soon regained our baggage, where large fires were kindled, and our wet troops dried themselves. Here we met general Greene, who had, in conformity with his plan, put his army in motion to draw near to the theatre of action, lest a body of troops might be pushed across the Ashley to intercept the attacking corps in its retreat from the island; and with a view of compelling the galleys to abandon their station that Lee might retire on the next low tide where he had passed, it being the most convenient route. He received with regret the unexpected intelligence, rendered the more so, as he was well assured that the enemy would learn the intended enterprise, and, therefore, that it could never be again attempted.

As soon as the day broke, the last column,—which had been completely bewildered, and was, if possible, more unhappy at the occurrence than were its chagrined comrades,—regained the road taken in the night, and was now discerned by those who had been searching for it. Laurens returned with it to our baggage ground, most unhappy of the unhappy.

On inquiry it was ascertained that the leading sec-

tion, instead of turning into the marsh, continued along the road, which led to a large plantation. Here the error was discovered, to which was added another. Instead of retracing his steps, the senior officer, from his anxiety to rejoin without delay, took through the fields under the guidance of a negroe, it being the nearest route, and again got lost, so very dark was the night; nor was he even able to reach the road until directed by day light.

Thus was marred the execution of an enterprise surpassed by none throughout our war in grandeur of design, and equalled by few in the beneficial effects sure to result from its successful termination. Censure attached no where; for every precaution had been adopted to guard against the very incident which did occur, and, dark as was the night, the troops had nearly completed the most difficult part of the march without the least interruption. The officer of the leading section of Laurens' column was among the most attentive and trust-worthy in the army, and yet the blunder was committed by him which led to our disappointment. The whole corps lamented the deranging occurrence, especially Laurens, who reproached himself with having left his column, presuming the accident would not have happened had he continued in his station. This presumption may be correct, as that officer was singularly attentive to his duty; and yet his absence being necessary, it could not be better supplied than it was. The passage of the river was the essential point, that on which the expedition hung, and Laurens

being second in command, it was deemed prudent,—as lieutenant colonel Lee would necessarily pass with the front column for the purpose of directing those measures intended to be applied against the enemy's picquet the moment our rear reached the island,—that lieutenant colonel Laurens should repair to the river, and there continue to superintend the troops as they entered into the water, lest the sections might crowd on each other and thus increase the noise, a consequence to be dreaded and guarded against; or, by entering too high up or too low down the stream, miss the ford and get into deep water.

Laurens left his column by order to give his personal superintendence to this delicate operation; and, therefore, was entirely exempted from any participation in the production of the unlucky accident which occurred.

General Greene assuaged the sorrow which the baffled troops so keenly felt by thanking them as they arrived for the exemplary manner in which they had conducted themselves, and for the ardent zeal they had displayed in the abortive attempt to execute the enterprise committed to their skill and courage. He lamented the disappointment which had occurred, but declared it to be owing to one of those incidents which so often take place in war, and against which upon this occasion every precaution had been adopted which prudence could suggest. He attributed the accident to the darkness of the night, and, by commending all, forbad the censure of any. Not satisfied

with this oral declaration to the troops, the general, on his return to camp, addressed a letter to each of the lieutenant colonels, repeating his thanks to them and to their respective corps.

How often do we find military operations frustrated by the unaccountable interposition of accident, when every exertion in the power of the commander has been made to prevent the very interruption which happens? No doubt these incidents generally spring from negligence or misconduct; and, therefore, might be considerably diminished, if not entirely arrested, by unceasing attention. When the van turned into the marsh, Lee, as has been mentioned, halted to give a minute or two for taking off boots and shoes, and did not move until lieutenant colonel Laurens, who had been sent for, came up and informed him that every section was in place. From this time Laurens continued with Lee, and in the very short space which occurred before the leading section of Laurens reached the point of turning into the marsh did the mistake occur which put an end to our much desired enterprise. Lieutenant colonel Lee believing the intervention of mistake impracticable, as the sections were all up, and as the march through the marsh would be slower than it had been before, did not direct one of his staff, as he had done heretofore, to halt at the point where the change in the course of the route occurred. This omission cannot be excused. This precaution, although now neglected in consequence of the official communication then received that the sec-

tions were all in place, and the short distance to the marsh,—the experience of this night proves that however satisfactorily the march may have been conducted, and however precisely in place the troops may be, yet that no preventive of mistake should be neglected. Had the practice been followed at the last change of course, which had uniformly taken place during the previous march, the fatal error would not have been committed, and this concluding triumph to our arms in the South would not have been lost.

The state of Georgia might probably have been recovered by the effects of this severe blow; as the northern reinforcement soon after joined us, and general Leslie would have found it necessary for the security of Charleston to have replaced the troops lost on St. John's Island, which could not be so conveniently done as by drawing to him the garrison of Savannah. Hitherto Greene had struggled to recover the country far from the ocean: now he contemplated its delivery even where British troops were protected by British ships, but was baffled by this night's accident. The spirit of disaffection,* which had always

* Lord Rawdon to Earl Cornwallis, May 24th, 1781.—“Lieutenant colonel Balfour was so good as to meet me at Nelson's. He took this measure that he might represent his circumstances to me. He stated that the revolt was universal, and that, from the little reason to apprehend this serious invasion, the old works in Charleston had been in part levelled, to make way for new ones which were not yet constructed; that its garrison was inadequate to oppose any force of consequence; and that the defection of the town's people showed itself in a thousand instan-

existed among the inhabitants of Charleston, had been vigilantly watched by the British commander, as he was no stranger to its prevalence. When lord Rawdon evacuated Cambden, this spirit became so formidable in consequence of the success of the American arms in the South, as to induce his lordship to continue with his army at Monk's Corner until the arrival of three regiments from Ireland enabled him to leave behind an adequate force for the security of that city during his resumption of offensive operations. Subsequent events promoted this disposition, and the capture of the army under earl Cornwallis gave to it full energy. Nor can it be doubted that, had Greene succeeded in destroying the corps under lieutenant colonel Craig, this spirit would have been turned to his co-operation, in case general Leslie had been so imprudent as to rely upon his reduced garrison for the defence of Charleston after the junction of our reinforcement from the North. We may, therefore, safely pronounce that general Greene did not err in his calculations of restoring Georgia to the Union in the event of his success against Craig, and we sincerely lament that his bold design should have been frustrated by the derangement which occurred.

The army resumed its position at Pompon, and the light corps returned to its camp at M'Queen's. In a

ces. I agreed with him in the conclusion to be drawn from thence, that any misfortune happening to my corps might entail the loss of the province."

very few days our intended enterprise became suspected by the enemy, and excited merited attention. The British general made a change in his position; and reducing his force in St. John's island, drew it near to its eastern point.

Greene, baffled as he unfortunately had been in his well-digested plan, began to take other measures for the purpose of effecting his favorite object. He meditated a movement into the isthmus, on which stands Charleston, connected with an attempt to float a detachment down the Ashley in the night to enter the town in that quarter at the hour fixed for his assault upon the enemy's lines.

As the scheme presented great and numerous difficulties, it was never to be executed unless a more attentive examination should justify the attempt. A British galley, for some purpose not known to us, was stationed high up the Ashley, and obstructed the desired inspection of that part of the rivers. Greene expressed his wish that it should be destroyed, if to be done without too great a sacrifice. Captain Rudolph, of the legion infantry, was advised by his commandant of the general's wish, and requested to discover the state of discipline on board the galley, and to devise a plan for its seizure. This officer gave his immediate attention to the project. While Rudolph was pursuing his object, lieutenant colonel Lee became informed of the enemy's design to beat up his quarters at M'Queen's. As soon as this information was received he drew in all his parties, including Rudolph, and fell back in the night three miles nearer to the army, where

he established himself in a position so well secured by rice ditches as to place the corps safe from nocturnal attack. The hostile detachment moved from Charleston about noon, drawing near to Ashley river before sunset. Early in the night it resumed its march, but did not reach M'Queen's, having lost its way in consequence of the darkness of the night. Lee returned early in the morning to his relinquished position, presuming that he should find his disappointed adversary retreating hastily; and hoping that he should be able to derive some advantage from the perplexity to which he would be soon driven by fresh and vigorous troops. Finding that the enemy had not advanced as far as M'Queen's, he proceeded towards Bacon's bridge, where halting, he learnt the misdirection of the enemy, and returned to his former position.

The country between Dorchester and the quarter-house had been occasionally visited by our light parties, which impinged upon the domain claimed by the once army of South Carolina, now garrison of Charleston. A well concerted enterprise was projected by the commandant to repress the liberties taken by our light parties. Infantry was detached in the night to occupy specified points, and cavalry followed in the morning, some for co-operation with the infantry, and others for the seduction of our light parties. It so happened that captain Armstrong, of the legion cavalry, had been sent to Dorchester by general Greene in the preceding night for the purpose of conferring with a spy from Charleston. On the approach of morning Armstrong advanced to Dorchester; and meeting the party of dra-

goons sent forward for the purpose of decoying any of the American detachments traversing this quarter, he rushed upon it. In obedience to order the enemy, though superior in number, fled. Armstrong was one of the most gallant of the brave, too apt to bury in the confidence he reposed in his sword, those considerations which prudence suggested. Eager to close with his flying foe, he pursued vehemently, and fell into the snare spread for his destruction. The moment he discovered his condition he turned upon his enemy and drove at him in full gallop. The bold effort succeeded so far as to open a partial avenue of retreat, which was seized by his subaltern and some of the dragoons. They got off; but Armstrong and four privates were taken; the first and only horse officer of the legion captured during the war.

Previous to this the northern reinforcement under major general St. Clair having arrived, brigadier Wayne was ordered to Georgia; having under him lieutenant colonel White, who had lately joined the army with the remains of Moylan's regiment of dragoons. Wayne proceeded without delay, and in a few days crossed the Savannah river at the Two Sisters' ferry. A small corps of Georgia militia, encamped in the vicinity of Augusta, was directed to fall down to Ebenezer, the station selected by the brigadier for the rendezvous of his troops. Here he was shortly reinforced by lieutenant colonel Posey,* of the Virginia

* The same officer who so gallantly seconded brigadier Wayne in his assault of Stony Point.

line, at the head of three hundred continentals from the army of general Greene.

The immediate object of this motion into Georgia was to protect the country from the incursions of the garrison of Savannah. With that design was connected the expectation that the insufficiency of the British force in that town to man its extensive works would probably present an opportunity of carrying the post by a nocturnal assault. Wayne was accordingly ordered, while engaged in executing the first, to give due attention to the accomplishment of the last object.

As soon as the advance of the American detachment was known in Savannah, brigadier general Clarke, who commanded the royal forces in Georgia, directed his officers charged with his outposts to lay waste the country with fire, and to retire with their troops and all the provisions they could collect into Savannah. This order was rigidly executed, and the district circumjacent to the capital was devastated. In consequence whereof Wayne found it necessary to draw his subsistence from South Carolina, which added to the difficulties daily experienced in providing for the main army.

The country heretofore the seat of war in South Carolina, was literally without food; and its distressed inhabitants, with the utmost difficulty, procured enough

Posey commanded the column with which the brigadier marched in person, and was by his side when Wayne received the ball which fortunately only grazed the crown of his head; but which laid him prostrate for a few moments.

for bare support. That into which Greene had advanced was relatively well supplied; but still it might be justly considered a gleaned country. It had furnished the British post at Orangeburg during the summer: it had also supplied the army of lord Rawdon when advancing upon Ninety-Six, and when retiring thence, and had always contributed considerably to the maintenance of the troops and inhabitants in Charleston.

The crop, originally small in consequence of the habitual neglect of agriculture in a state of war, had been much exhausted by the previous drains from it before the arrival of Greene, and was, after that event, the sole resource to our army in South Carolina, and the principal one to that sent to Georgia under Wayne. This real scarcity was increased by the waste which always accompanies compulsory collection of subsistence; a practice yet necessarily continued, as the civil authority had been but lately restored.

The battle of the Eutaws evidently broke the force and humbled the spirit of the royal army; never after that day did the enemy exhibit any symptom of that bold and hardy cast which had hitherto distinguished them.

Governor Rutledge being persuaded that the happy period had at length arrived for the restoration of the government, issued a proclamation in a few weeks after the battle of the Eutaws, convening the general assembly at Jacksonborough, a small village upon the Edisto river, about thirty-five miles from Charleston. Invested with dictatorial powers, the governor not only

issued writs for the intervening elections, but also prescribed the qualifications of the electors.

The right of suffrage was restricted to those inhabitants who had uniformly resisted the invader, and to such who, having accepted British protections, had afterwards united with their countrymen in opposition to the royal authority before the 27th day of September; in the early part of which month the battle of the Eutaws had been fought. The exchange of prisoners which had previously taken place, liberated many respectable and influential characters too long lost to the state.

These citizens had now returned, and were ready to assist with their counsel in repairing the desolation of war. This period presents an interesting epoch in the annals of the South. From all quarters were flocking home our unfortunate maltreated prisoners. The old and the young, the rich and the poor, hastened to their native soil; burying their particular griefs in the joy universally felt in consequence of the liberation of their country.

They found their houses burnt, their plantations laid waste, their herds and flocks destroyed, and the rich rewards of a life of industry and economy dissipated. Without money, without credit, with debilitated constitutions, with scars and aches, this brave and patriotic groupe gloried in the adversity they had experienced, because the price of their personal liberty and of national independence. They had lost their wealth, they had lost their health, and had lost the props of

their declining years in the field of battle; but they had established the independence of their country; they had secured to themselves and posterity the birth-right of Americans. They forgot past agony in the delight of present enjoyment, and in the prospect of happiness to ages yet unborn. From this class of citizens the senators lately chosen were chiefly selected. On the appointed day the assembly convened at Jacksonborough, when governor Rutledge, in a long interesting and eloquent speech, opened the session. The incipient proceedings of the assembly present authentic information of the havoc of the war and of the distress of the country, and convey the pleasing testimony of the mild and amiable disposition which swayed even in this day of wrath and irritation the legislature of South Carolina.

The length of the governor's speech forbids its entire insertion: extracts of it are given, with the answer of the senate, which will sufficiently exemplify the justice of the preceding observations, as do the consequences of the amiable policy pursued by the legislature demonstrate that beneficence in the sovereign is the readiest cure which can be applied to heal the wounds of discord and of war.

“Honorable gentlemen of the Senate, Mr. Speaker,
and gentlemen of the house of Representatives,

“Since the last meeting of a general assembly, the good people of this state have not only felt the common calamities of war, but from the wanton and savage manner in which it has been executed, they have ex-

perienced such severities as are unpractised, and will scarcely be credited by civilized nations.

“ The enemy, unable to make any impression on the northern states, the number of whose inhabitants, and the strength of whose country, had baffled their repeated efforts, turned their views to the southern, which, a difference of circumstances afforded some expectation of conquering, or at least of distressing. After a long resistance, the reduction of Charleston was effected by the vast superiority of force with which it had been besieged. The loss of that garrison, as it consisted of the continental troops of Virginia and the Carolinas, and of a number of militia, facilitated the enemy's march into the country, and the establishment of strong posts in the upper and interior parts of it; and the unfavorable issue of the action near Cambden induced them vainly to imagine, that no other army could be collected which they might not easily defeat. The militia commanded by the brigadiers Marion and Sumpter, whose enterprising spirit and unremitted perseverance under many difficulties are deserving of great applause, harassed and often defeated large parties; but the numbers of those militia were too few to contend effectually with the collected strength of the enemy. Regardless therefore of the sacred ties of honor, destitute of the feelings of humanity, and determined to extinguish, if possible, every spark of freedom in this country, they, with the insolent pride of conquerors, gave unbounded scope to the exercise of their tyrannical disposition, infringed their public en-

gements, and violated the most solemn capitulations. Many of our worthiest citizens were, without cause, long and closely confined, some on board of prison-ships, and others in the town and castle of St. Augustine.

“ But I can now congratulate you, and I do so most cordially, on the pleasing change of affairs, which, under the blessing of God, the wisdom, prudence, address and bravery of the great and gallant general Greene, and the intrepidity of the officers and men under his command, has been happily effected. A general who is justly entitled, from his many signal services, to honorable and singular marks of your approbation and gratitude. His successes have been more rapid and complete than the most sanguine could have expected. The enemy compelled to surrender or evacuate every post which they held in the country, frequently defeated and driven from place to place, are obliged to seek refuge under the walls of Charleston, or in the islands in its vicinity. We have now the full and absolute possession of every other part of the state; and the legislative, executive and judicial powers, are in the free exercise of their respective authorities. The interest and honor, the safety and happiness of our country, depend so much on the result of your deliberations, that I flatter myself you will proceed in the weighty business before you, with firmness and temper, with vigor, unanimity, and despatch.

JOHN RUTLEDGE.”

“ The address of the honorable the Senate in answer to the governor’s speech.

May it please your Excellency,

“ We beg leave to return your excellency the thanks of this house for your speech.

“ Any words which we might adopt would convey but a very faint idea of the satisfaction we feel on the perfect reestablishment of the legislative, executive and judicial powers in this state.

“ It is with particular pleasure that we take the earliest opportunity to present to your excellency our unfeigned thanks for your unwearied zeal and attention to the real interest of this country, and to testify our entire approbation of the good conduct of the executive since the last meeting of the general assembly.

“ We see and revere the goodness of Divine Providence in frustrating and disappointing the attempts of our enemies to conquer the southern states; and we trust that by the blessing of the same Providence on the valor and intrepidity of the free citizens of America, their attacks and enterprises will continue to be repelled and defeated.

“ We reflect with pleasure on the steady resolution with which Charleston was defended by a small body of brave men against such a vast superiority of force; and we gratefully acknowledge the meritorious conduct and important services of the officers and privates of the militia, who stood forth in the hour of danger; whose coolness, perseverance and ardor, under a complication of difficulties, most justly entitle them to the applause of their country.

“ We flatter ourselves that the blood which the enemy spilled, the wanton devastation which has marked their progress, and the tyrannical system that they have invariably pursued, and which your excellency hath so justly and pathetically described to us, will rouse the good people of this state, and will animate them into a spirit to protect their country, to save their rights and liberties, and to maintain at all hazards their independency.

“ It is with inexpressible pleasure that we receive your excellency's congratulations upon the great and glorious measures of the campaign, on the happy change of affairs and the pleasing prospect before us; and we assure your excellency that we concur most sincerely with you in acknowledging and applauding the meritorious zeal, and the very important services which have been rendered to this state by the great and gallant general Greene, and the brave and intrepid officers and men under his command, and to whom we shall be happy to give the most grateful and singular testimonies of our approbation and applause.

“ We are truly sensible of the immense advantage which the United States derive from the magnanimous prince, their ally. We have the most perfect confidence on his royal word, and on the sincerity of his friendship; and we think ourselves much indebted to that illustrious monarch for the great and effectual assistance which he hath been pleased to give the confederated states, and by whose means they have been enabled to humble the pride of Britain, and to establish their independency upon the most permanent basis.

“The importance of the several matters which your excellency hath recommended to our consideration is so evident that we shall proceed to deliberate upon them with all possible despatch; and we flatter ourselves that our business will be carried on with temper, firmness, and unanimity.

J. L. GERVAIS, President.”

During this session a law was passed, prescribing a mode of providing for the subsistence of the army by the civil authority. No regulation was more requisite; as the military process was grating to our fellow citizens, wasteful of the resources of the country, inconvenient to the army, and repugnant to the feelings of soldiers, who believed themselves to be in heart as in name the defenders of liberty. Resort to compulsion had been forced upon the general by necessity, though in every way objectionable; and which ought never to be tolerated for a moment when avoidable. In pursuance of power invested by this law, the governor appointed William Hiott agent for the state. This gentleman executed the duties of his station with intelligence, zeal, and diligence; and very much contributed to our support, without offence to the husbandmen, and with very little aid from the army.

But such was the real scarcity of the primary articles of subsistence, that with all the exertions (and they were great) of the agent, want continued to haunt occasionally the camp, which compelled general Greene to contribute, upon some occasions, his assistance to the authority of the laws.

Brigadier Marion, although a colonel in the line of South Carolina, had been chosen a member of the legislature; and before he sat out for Jacksonborough, had selected a station for his militia near the Santee river, remote from Charleston. His absence from his command, notwithstanding the distance of the selected position, inspired the enemy with the hope that a corps which had heretofore been invulnerable might now be struck. A detachment of cavalry was accordingly prepared for the meditated enterprise, and placed under the orders of lieutenant colonel Thompson. This officer having passed the Cooper river near Charleston, late in the evening, proceeded towards the Santee. Observing the greatest secrecy, and pushing his march with diligence, he fell upon the militia camp before the dawn of day, and completely routed the corps. Some were killed, some wounded, and the rest dispersed, with little or no loss on the part of the British. Major Benson, an active officer, was among the killed.

Thompson hastened back to Charleston with his detachment; and Marion, returning from Jacksonborough, reassembled his militia.

Captain Rudolph, who had been charged with the destruction of the British galley in the Ashley river, although often interrupted by other duties, had never intermitted his attention to that object. Early in March, sometime after the dispersion of the militia near the Santee, the captain presented his plan to lieutenant colonel Lee, who communicated it to the general. It was founded on the facility he had discovered with

which boats going to market with provisions passed the galley.

Rudolph proposed to place in one of these boats an adequate force, disguising himself in a countryman's dress, and disguising three or four of his soldiers in the garb and color of negroes. The boat was to be stored with the usual articles for Charleston market, under the cover of which he concealed his armed men; while himself and his four negroes should conduct the boat. His plan was approved; and lieutenant Smith, of the Virginia line, who had been very instrumental in acquiring the intelligence on which the project was grounded, was united to the captain in its execution. Every thing being prepared with profound secrecy, Rudolph and Smith embarked with their parties at a concealed landing place, high up the Ashley, on the night of the 18th of March. Between three and four in the morning, Rudolph got near to the galley, when the centinel hailed the boat. He was answered in the negro dialect that it was a market boat going to Charleston, and asked permission to proceed. In reply the boat was ordered to hale along side, as the captain of the galley wished to purchase some provisions. Rudolph obeyed; and as soon as he got along side threw some of his poultry on deck, his disguised negroes at the same time taking fast hold of the galley.

On a signal from Rudolph, Smith and his soldiers rose and boarded the galley. The centinel and a few others were killed: some escaped in the darkness of the night by throwing themselves into the river; and the captain with twenty-eight sailors were captured.

The galley mounted twelve guns besides swivels, and was manned with forty-three seamen. Rudolph did not lose a man; and after taking out such stores as he found on board the galley he burnt her, and returned to his place of embarkation.

Thus the tone of enterprise continued high and vigorous on our side, while low and languishing with the enemy. The novelty of this successful attempt attracted notice in Charleston: and such was the state of despondency which prevailed in its garrison as to give currency to opinions calculated still further to depress the humbled spirit of the British soldier. When it was found that even their floating castles, the pride and bulwark of Englishmen, were successfully assailed by landmen, the water quarter of the town, which was accessible by water, necessarily became an object of jealousy. Every alarm in the night excited dire apprehensions: sometimes Greene was moving to force their lines, at other times he was floating down the Ashley; and in one way or another he was ever present to their disturbed imaginations.

But such fears were illusory. After a critical examination of the enemy's situation, no point was found vulnerable; and the general was obliged to relinquish any attempt on Charleston. He nevertheless indulged a hope that Wayne might discover an opening to strike the port of Savannah, where the garrison amounted scarcely to one thousand men, too small for the extensive works before that town; and he held ready therefore a chosen corps to reinforce Wayne whenever requisite.

At this juncture treason had found its way into our camp. The inactivity which had succeeded the preceding series of bold and vigorous service was a fit season for recollection of grievances long endured, and which, being severely felt, began to rankle in every breast. Hunger sometimes pinched, at other times cold oppressed, and always want of pay reminded us as well of the injustice of our government as of our pressing demands upon it. The Pennsylvania line had joined the army; the soldiers of which being chiefly foreigners, were not so disposed to forget and to forgive as were our native troops. Even heretofore this line had pushed their insubordination so far as to abandon in a body the commander in chief, to drive off their officers, to commit the eagles to base hands, and to march under the orders of leaders elected by themselves.

They justified this daring mutiny by referring to their contract of enlistment, which they alleged had been violated; and it must be admitted that this allegation was too well founded. Soldiers who had enlisted for three years had been detained after the period of their service expired, under the pretext that they had enlisted for the war. As soon as this injustice was redressed, and some pecuniary accommodation rendered, all not entitled to their discharge returned to their duty.

The violation of contract is always morally wrong; and however it may sometimes yield present good, it is generally overbalanced by the subsequent injury.

The government which is under the necessity of resorting to armed men, enlisted for a term of service, to protect its rights, ought to take care that the contract of enlistment is fair as well as legal, and that it be justly executed; or they afford a pretext for incalculable ills, which, though often avoided from the force of circumstances, is sometimes productive of irreparable misfortunes to the nation. Every effort was made at the time by the enemy to turn this menacing occurrence into the deepest injury; but the fidelity of the revolting troops remained invulnerable; the best possible apology for their previous conduct.

The present mutiny was marked by a very different character. It was grounded on the breach of allegiance, and reared in all the foulness of perfidy. Greene himself was to be seized and delivered to the enemy. How could treason ascend higher?

A serjeant in the Pennsylvania line took the lead in this daring conspiracy; a soldier heretofore much esteemed, and possessing talents adapted to the enterprise. No doubt exists but that he and his associates held continual correspondence with the enemy, and that an arranged plan had been concerted for the protection of the mutineers by the co-operating movements of the British force.

The vigilance and penetration of Greene could neither be eluded nor overreached. He well knew that the soldiers were discontented; nor was he insensible to the cause of their complaints. But he confided in the rectitude of congress, and in the well tried fidelity

of that portion of the army which had so often fought by his side. He nevertheless dreaded the effects of the wiles of the artful and wicked when applied to the inflammable mass around him.

To the enemy's camp and to that section of his troops most likely to forget self-respect and patriotism, he directed his close and vigorous attention. From both he drew information which convinced him that his apprehensions were not groundless. Redoubling his exertions, as well to discover the plan and progress of the conspirators as to thwart their designs, he learnt that the serjeant, supposed to be the leader, had, by indulging unwarily the free declaration of his sentiments, subjected himself to martial law, and alarmed all the faithful soldiers, who, though prone to unite in the declarations of the wrongs they had suffered, and of their determination to obtain redress, had never entertained a thought of executing their views by the prostitution of military subordination, much less by the perpetration of the blackest treason, of the basest ingratitude. Greene, acting with his usual decision, ordered the arrest and trial of the serjeant. This order was immediately executed; and the prisoner being by the court martial condemned to die, the sentence of the court was forthwith carried into effect. (22d April.)

Some others, believed to be associates with the serjeant, (among whom were Peters and Owens) domestics in the general's family, were also tried; but the testimony was not deemed conclusive by the court. Twelve others deserted in the course of the night and got safe to Charleston.

Thus the decisive conduct of the general crushed instantly this daring conspiracy; and the result proved, as often happens, that although the temper of complaint and of discontent pervaded the army, but few of the soldiers were in reality guilty of the criminal intentions which were believed at first to have spread far through the ranks.

While the arrests and trials were progressing in our camp, and while general Greene continued to watch the movements of the enemy, they disclosed a spirit of adventure, which had been for some months dormant. Large bodies of horse and foot were put in motion; some of which, in the course of the night, approached us with unusual confidence. This boldness tended to confirm the suspicions before entertained that the enemy was not only apprized of the intentions of our mutineers, but had prepared to second their designs. General Greene, feeling his critical situation, contented himself for the present with detaching select parties to hover around the enemy for the purpose of observing his motions, with the determination to strike his adversary as soon as he should find his army restored to its pristine discipline and character. On the morning after
24th. the execution of the traitor, captain O'Neal of the legion cavalry fell in with a body of the enemy's horse under major Frazer.

O'Neal being very inferior in strength to his antagonist, retired, and was vigorously pursued by Frazer. During his flight he perceived a second body of the enemy in possession of his line of retreat. He was now

compelled to change his course; and with the utmost difficulty escaped himself, after losing ten of his dragoons. Frazer had advanced as high as Stan's bridge, the place assigned for the reception of that portion of the conspirators who had undertaken to betray the person of their general. On his return he was met by O'Neal, not far from Dorchester. This was the sole adventure resulting to the enemy in a conjuncture from which he expected to derive signal benefits.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE unexpected events which had occurred in the preceding campaign, when known in England, attracted universal attention, and produced a determination to put a period to the war in America. In accordance with this resolution instructions were forwarded to the commander in chief of the royal forces, who conformed his subsequent measures to the change in the system of administration: further waste of life being in his opinion unnecessary. His lieutenant in South Carolina, major general Leslie, proposed to general Greene a cessation of hostilities. This proposition was rejected by the American general, as his powers did not reach the subject. He consequently communicated the same to congress, who alone could give the requisite authority to act on the subject.

General Leslie finding his pacific overture unavailing, was compelled to pursue measures to obtain supplies for his troops, although sure to produce the sacrifice of individuals in both armies; a sacrifice which he anxiously desired to avoid. For this purpose incursions into our territory were occasionally attempted; sometimes with success, but generally the British detachments were forced to regain their lines without the accomplishment of their views.

This little warfare, always irksome, unless the prelude to grand operations, was peculiarly so to troops enured to the most interesting scenes of war, and conscious that those scenes could never be renewed. Men of the sword only can appreciate this condition of war, the most revolting to every real soldier. Inquietude and ill humor could not fail to prevail, especially in the American camp; where want of clothes, want of food, and empty purses, were superadded. Amid these a new cause of uneasiness was excited. Lieutenant colonel Laurens, who became a prisoner on the fall of Charleston, had been exchanged by congress out of course, which was much disrelished by our officers in the hands of the enemy; as they considered every departure from the usage of war not only unjust in principle but cruel to themselves in application. This usage secures to every prisoner his exchange in turn; and undoubtedly, as a general rule, is unexceptionable. Deviations from it ought rarely to be admitted, and then only from a strong cause. In support of the present deviation it was contended that the war raged in South Carolina, Laurens's native country; that his acknowledged talents would therefore be singularly useful in that theatre; and moreover, that he was aid-de-camp to the commander in chief, and consequently was an exception to the general rule. No doubt these arguments are forcible, and will always have weight with the sovereign. They did not however tranquillize the sensations which the occurrence had excited. Lieutenant colonel Laurens, after joining the southern army,

continued in the family of general Greene, waiting for some change of circumstances which might enable the general to fix him permanently in the line of service. This Greene was very desirous of effecting; not only because the resolution of congress authorizing his exchange called indirectly for it, but the commander in chief required it from his own conviction of the worth and capacity of this excellent officer.

Notwithstanding these high authorities, notwithstanding his own inclination and Laurens's reputation, stubborn difficulties interposed, not to be readily vanquished. Officers of the highest merit, who had served under himself from his accession to the command of the southern army, to whom he owed, and to whom he felt, every obligation which a general can owe or feel, must be supplanted or overlooked to make way for the desired appointment.

Lieutenant colonel Lee had become incapable from his ill health of continuing in command of the light troops, and had obtained leave of absence. This contingency produced a vacancy which the general had the clear right of supplying at his will. The occurrence offered some relief to the embarrassment into which the resolution of congress and the wishes of the commander in chief had involved general Greene; but as the vacant station was the most desirable within his gift, because the most honorable, the preferment of an officer who had not shared in the arduous struggle just closed, to the many who had, in every vicissitude of his eventful campaign, covered themselves with glory,

did not comport with justice, and could not escape animadversion. To smooth the difficulties which intervened, the general had associated Laurens with lieutenant colonel Lee in the expedition against St. John's island, hoping that the brilliancy of the presumed success, would cover the substitution of the second for the first, as soon as that officer should retire. But unfortunately the attempt failed, and the general lost the aid which he expected to derive from the magic power of victory. In this perplexing situation some of general Greene's confidential advisers did not hesitate to urge him to recede from his purpose, upon the ground of the superior pretensions of officers, whose services imposed upon him primary attention. Nor would this counsel have been unavailing had not the general been persuaded that his omission to employ lieutenant colonel Laurens would be considered as disrespectful to the commander in chief. One of Greene's aid-de-camps had been for some time at headquarters; and from this gentleman was derived the information which led to the above conclusion. He had heard insinuations in the family of Washington which lisped these sentiments. It was more than once suggested that the general of the South had been less communicative than was expected; and even allusions to the conduct and fate of Gates were occasionally made, which clearly imported the possibility, if not probability, that the conqueror in the South, like the conqueror in the North, might become the rival of the commander in chief. In justice to general Washington it was ac-

knowledge that sentiments of this sort never fell from his lips, or in his presence. Nevertheless when those around him ventured to hold such language, it could not but inspire unpleasant feelings in the breast of Greene.

General Greene determined, at every hazard, to afford no just cause for such unjust suspicions. He declared his conviction that Washington himself would spurn such insinuations, unless his mind should have been previously poisoned by artful and designing men, possessing his esteem and confidence.

He lamented that the motives which actuated his conduct must, from their nature, be concealed; as he was persuaded that the very officers themselves, whom he apparently neglected, would approve the course in the then stage of the war, when every opportunity for the acquirement of military reputation was probably finally closed.

In consequence of this resolution, as soon as lieutenant colonel Lee took leave, the general new modelled the light corps,* giving to it additional strength. By

* Headquarters, camp near Bacon's bridge.

General Gist will take command of the light troops, which will consist of the following corps, viz.

The cavalry of the legion, and the cavalry of the third and fourth regiments, under the command of colonel Baylor.

The infantry of the legion, the dismounted dragoons of the third regiment, the Delaware regiment, and one hundred men properly officered, fit for light infantry service, under major Beall, to be immediately detached from the line, and the whole of the infantry to be commanded by lieutenant colonel Laurens.

General

this arrangement he was warranted in calling a general officer to its direction, and consequently avoided those just complaints which must have arisen among his lieutenant colonels, had the command been continued in that grade, and had any other than a lieutenant colonel of his own army been honored with it.

Brigadier Gist, of the Maryland line, who had lately reached headquarters, was placed at the head of the augmented corps, having under him colonel Baylor, of the third regiment of dragoons, who had also lately joined, and lieutenant colonel Laurens. The first commanded the cavalry, and the last the infantry.

However judicious the course adopted by general Greene to give effect to the wishes of the commander in chief had been, disagreeable consequences nevertheless ensued. In the reorganization of the light corps, the cavalry of the third regiment and of the legion had been united; as had been the infantry of the legion with Kirkwood's Delawares, for the purpose of forming a command for lieutenant colonel Laurens.

The separation of the horse and foot of the legion now for the first time took place, and gave considerable umbrage and inquietude to the officers and sol-

General Gist will make such further arrangements as he may find necessary; but that the service may be accommodated as much as possible to the constitution of the cavalry corps, whenever the cavalry of any corps are ordered out, and infantry are wanted, the infantry belonging to such corps will march with it.

Extract from the general orders of the 13th June, 1782.

Jos. HARMAR, lieut. col. deputy adjutant general.

diers. The first considered the constitution of the corps sacrificed, and the last had been so long habituated to fight side by side, that they were very unwilling to commute approved and beloved comrades for any others, however brave.

The legion officers gave vent to their feelings in a remonstrance to the general, couched in terms not the most loyal. Greene replied with moderation, firmness and dignity, and adhered to his adopted system. This was followed by the resignation of every officer in the legion, a result as unexpected as inconvenient. The general lamented the rash step, but did not condescend by any relaxation in his measures, or remodification of the light troops, to avert it. He, however, reminded the remonstrants of their right of appeal to Congress, who would no doubt correct the proceedings of their generals, whenever they might invade the rights or cancel the privileges of any portion of the troops submitted to their direction. The officers had acted under the impulse of first impressions, which, though honest, are not always correct. Passion had now subsided, and the temerity of their conduct became exposed to their view. They cheerfully seized the opportunity presented by the general's suggestion, withdrew their resignations, and committed their case to the controlling power of Congress.

The inhabitants of the state of South Carolina had been for several months in the peaceable enjoyment of legal government, with the exception of the metropolis, and a small range of country upon the Little Pedee

river. A major Ganey, with his band of royalists, resided here; and, insulated as they were, still resisted. Brigadier Marion had, in June 1781, entered into a formal treaty with Ganey and his associates, by which they were pardoned for past offences (both numerous and atrocious,*) secured in their estates and in the rights of citizenship, upon the condition that they would return to the rightful owners all plundered property; that they would renounce for ever allegiance to his Britannic majesty, and demean themselves hereafter as became peaceable citizens. This treaty† was

* Among the many murders and burning of houses perpetrated by this banditti, that of colonel Kobb was singularly atrocious. A party of them, led by a captain Jones, surprised the colonel on a visit to his family. He defended his house, until he was induced, by the promise of personal safety, to surrender as a prisoner of war; when he was immediately murdered in the presence of his wife and children, and his house burnt.

† Articles of treaty between general Marion, in behalf of South Carolina, and major Ganey, and the inhabitants under his command, which were included in the treaty made the 17th day of June, 1781.

Article 1st. Major Ganey, and the men under his command, to lay down their arms as enemies to the state, and are not to resume them again until ordered to do so, in support of the interests of the United States, and of this state in particular.

Art. 2d. We will deliver up all negroes, horses, cattle, and other property, that have been taken from this or any other state.

Art. 3d. We will demean ourselves as peaceable citizens of this state, and submit ourselves to be governed by its laws, in the same manner as the rest of the citizens thereof.

Art. 4th. We do engage to apprehend and deliver up all per-

now renewed, with the condition that such of the royalists as preferred removing into the British lines might do so, and take with them their property.

sons within our district, who shall refuse to accede to these terms, and contumaciously persist in rebellion against this state.

Art. 5th. We will deliver up, as soon as possible, every man who belongs to any regular line in the American service, and every inhabitant of North Carolina, of this, or any other state, who have joined us since the 17th of June, 1781, when the former treaty was made, or oblige them to go out of the district; and whenever they return, to take and deliver them into safe custody in any gaol within the state.

Art. 6th. Every man is to sign an instrument of writing, professing his allegiance to the United States of America, and the state of South Carolina in particular; and to abjure his Britannic majesty, his heirs, successors and adherents; and promise to oppose all the enemies of the United States, and the state of South Carolina in particular.

Art. 7th. All arms, ammunition, and other warlike stores, the property of the British, to be delivered up.

Art. 8th. The above seven articles, being agreed on, they shall have a full pardon for treasons committed by them against the state, and enjoy their property, and be protected by the laws thereof.

Art. 9th. Such men who do not choose to accede to these articles, shall have leave to go within the British lines, and to march by the 25th instant, and be safely conducted, with such of their wives and children as may be able to travel, and carry or sell their property, except cattle, sheep and hogs, which they may dispose of, but not carry with them. Such women and children who cannot be removed, may remain until the 1st day of September next. The officers to keep their pistols and side arms; all other arms to be disposed of, and not carried with them. Each field officer and captain to retain one horse, not exceeding twelve

The wise and forgiving policy which dictated the course pursued by Marion, was attended with the happiest consequences. Bitter enemies were converted into warm friends; and many of these reclaimed citizens enrolled themselves in the corps of Marion, ready to fight by the sides of their countrymen, whose lives they had sought by night and by day from the fall of Charleston to the period of this treaty.

During these transactions in South Carolina, brigadier Wayne pursued with vigor his operations in Georgia. At the head of a force equal only to half of that opposed to him, he nevertheless exhibited that daringness of character which marked his military life. The signal chastisement inflicted by major general Grey at the Paoli, in the campaign of 1777, with some minor admonitions, had, it is true, subjected this natural propensity in some degree to the control of circumspection. While in command before Savannah, his orders, his plans, his motions, all bespoke foresight and vigilance; and although he played a hazardous game, he not only avoided detriment or affront, but added to the honor of our arms. The pacific

in the whole; and no other person to take with him any more horses, that may be fit for dragoon service, within the British lines.

We have agreed to the before-mentioned nine articles, and have signed the same at Birch's mill, on Pedee, this 8th day of June, 1782.

FRANCIS MARION, Brigadier General, State of
South Carolina.

MICAJAH GANEY, Major of Loyalists, Pedee.

policy lately adopted by the British general, and to which brigadier Clarke invariably adhered, contributed not a little to a result so favorable to our views.

The British general rarely sent detachments into the country, and only once in considerable force: never with the view of provoking resistance, but always with the expectation of accomplishing his object by the secrecy and celerity of his measures. About the middle of May he received information of an intended trading visit from some of his Indian friends, then considerably advanced on their route to Savannah. To protect this party from the corps under Wayne, to which it was exposed in its progress, lieutenant colonel Brown (who had been exchanged soon after his surrender of Augusta) was detached by brigadier Clarke on the 19th, with three hundred and fifty infantry and a squadron of cavalry. Brown advanced as far as Ogeachy to meet the Indians; but being disappointed, he moved early in the morning of the 21st, to regain Savannah. It appears that a dispute having arisen between the warriors of the Overhill Creeks, from which tribe this trading party came, had occasioned a delay for a few weeks; otherwise the Indians would have reached Ogeachy the very evening Brown arrived there.

Wayne discovered, on the 20th, that a detachment of the enemy had passed from Savannah to the Ogeachy; and he took his measures forthwith to intercept it on its return. With this view his corps (about five hundred effectives, mostly infantry, with three grass-

hoppers,) were put in motion. The van consisted of one company of light infantry and a section of dragoons, under the orders of captain Alexander Parker. This officer was directed to hasten his march through woods and swamps, and to seize a causeway on which Brown must necessarily pass. Parker was ordered, whenever he met the enemy, to reserve his fire, and to fall upon him with sword and bayonet. Wayne followed with the main body, to support his van. About ten in the forenoon captain Parker reached the causeway, when he discovered a small patrol of cavalry in his front. Each advancing, the two parties soon met, when captain Parker accosted the leading file, and demanded the countersign. Confounded or deceived, the British officer, instead of falling back upon Brown, approached Parker in the attitude of friendship. He now discovered his mistake, but too late to extricate himself, and was with his patrol taken, except one dragoon, who got back to colonel Brown, moving in column to sustain his van, with his cavalry in front.

Lieutenant Bowyer, who commanded our horse, was ordered to charge, which was executed with decision. Bowyer was supported by Parker with his infantry. The British cavalry were thrown into confusion; and, as Brown's whole force was in column on the causeway, from whence there was no moving to the right or left, the substitution of his infantry for his cavalry became impracticable, and the British colonel was obliged to fall back. This was accomplished without loss, as general Wayne did not get up in

time to improve the advantage gained by Parker. Two of our van were killed and three were wounded. We took major Alexander, second in command, and eighteen dragoons, with their horses and furniture. Wayne had been delayed by the swamps, which in the South invariably present stubborn difficulties to the march of troops.

As soon as he reached Parker he pursued the enemy; but all his endeavours to renew the action proved abortive, and Brown made good his retreat to Savannah.

The Indians, whom lieutenant colonel Brown expected to meet, would have rendered his corps superior to that under Wayne, when the encounter might have terminated differently. General Wayne seems either to have been unapprized of this intended junction, or to have disregarded it; for he pressed forward to strike his foe, regardless of ground or number. The occasional fortuitous success of such conduct encourages the ardent soldier to put himself upon his fortune and his courage,—overlooking those numerous, sure and effectual aids to be drawn from accurate intelligence and due circumspection. Fortune at length forsakes him, no prop remains to support him but his courage, and he falls the victim of his own presumption; honored for his bravery, but condemned for his temerity.

Some weeks before general Clarke made this attempt to secure the safe entry of his Indian friends into Savannah, Wayne had intercepted a trading party of the Creeks on their way to the British garrison. Of

these the American general detained a few as hostages, and permitted the rest to return to their own country. This generous treatment seems to have inspired apprehensions in Savannah, that its effect would diminish the British influence among the Creeks; an event deprecated by the enemy in case of continuance of the war, which, though improbable, might nevertheless happen. Therefore it was thought proper to prevent, by suitable succor, the interruption of this second visit. To that end Brown had been detached. Not only, as has been seen, did the effort fail, but it was followed by a disaster very unpleasant to the enemy, and in its conclusion pregnant with cause of regret to ourselves.

Guristersigo, a principal warrior among the Creeks, conducted the party of Indians lately expected by Clarke. Although he did not arrive at the appointed rendezvous so as to meet Brown, he reached it in the latter part of the succeeding month.

This warrior, accompanied by his white men, his guides, passed through the whole state of Georgia unperceived, except by two boys, who were taken and killed; and having reached the neighborhood of Wayne on the 23d of June, he determined to strike at a picquet of the American corps stationed, as he was informed, at Gibbons' plantation, directly on the route to and not far distant from Savannah.

There were two plantations so called, in the same range of country, both of which were occasionally stations for our troops. At this time Wayne himself

with the main body occupied one, while the other was on the same day (22d) held by a picquet guard. Not only to avoid Wayne, but to carry this picquet, became the object of Guristersigo; and he acquired through his white conductors the requisite intelligence, with negro guides for the execution of his purpose.

Wayne, in pursuance of a system adopted to avoid surprise (of which the Indian chief was uninformed), moved every night; and consequently the calculation that he would be on the 23d where he had been on the 22d was unfounded. The reverse was the fact, which would undoubtedly have been perceived by Guristersigo had he been acquainted with the custom of the American general, and his plan of attack would have been modified accordingly. Decamping from Gibbons' late in the evening of the 22d, Wayne exchanged positions with his picquet, and thus fortunately held the very post against which the Indian warrior had pointed his attack.

Here the light infantry under Parker (who had been for several days close to Savannah) joined, and being much harassed by the late tour of duty, was ordered by the brigadier to take post near to his artillery, in the rear. Knowing but one enemy (the garrison of Savannah) Wayne gave his entire attention to that quarter; and conscious, from his precautions, that no movement could be made by the enemy in Savannah without due notice, he forbore to burden his troops with the protection of his rear, because in his opinion unnecessary. A single sentinel only from the quarter-

guard was posted in the rear, on the main road leading through the camp to Savannah, and the very road which Guristersigo meant to take.

Soon after nightfall the Indian chief at the head of his warriors emerged from the deep swamps, in which he had lain concealed, and gained the main road. He moved in profound silence, and about three in the morning reached the vicinity of our camp; here he halted, and made his disposition for battle. Believing that he had to deal with a small detachment only, his plan of attack was simple and efficient. Preceded by a few of the most subtle and daring of his comrades, directed to surprise and kill the sentinel, he held himself ready to press forward with the main body upon the signal to advance. This was not long delayed. His wily precursors having encompassed our sentinel, killed him, when Guristersigo, bounding from his stand, fell with his whole force upon our rear. Aroused from sleep, the light infantry stood to their arms, and the matrosses closed with their guns.

But the enemy was amongst them; which being perceived by Parker, he judiciously drew off in silence and joined the quarter-guard behind Gibbons' house at headquarters. The general had about this time mounted, and, concluding that the garrison of Savannah was upon him, he resorted to the bayonet, determined to die sword in hand. Orders to this effect were given to Parker and despatched to lieutenant colonel Posey, commanding in camp, distant a few hundred yards. Captain Parker, seconded by the

quarter-guard, advanced upon the foe; and Posey moved with all possible celerity to support the light troops, but did not arrive in time to share in the action. Wayne, participating with his light corps in the surrounding dangers, was now dismounted, his horse being killed; the light troops, nevertheless, continued to press forward, and Parker drove all in his way back to our cannon, where the Indian chief with a part of his warriors were attempting to turn our guns to their aid. Here Guristersigo renewed the conflict, and fought gallantly; but the rifle and tomahawk are unavailing when confronted by the bayonet in close quarters. We soon recovered our artillery, and Guristersigo, fighting bravely, was killed. Seventeen of his warriors and his white guides fell by his side, the rest fled.

Now it was discovered that the assailing foe was not from Savannah. Although surprised at the extraordinary occurrence, Wayne adapted with promptitude his measures to the occasion, and, scattering his troops in every direction, pursued the flying Indians. Twelve of them were taken, and after a few hours captivity were put to death by order of the general. One hundred and seventeen pack horses, laden with peltry, fell into our hands; and although every exertion was made to capture the surviving Indians, they all got back to their distant country. Our loss was small, not exceeding twelve killed and wounded.

This bold and concluding scene, though highly honorable to the unlettered chief, did not surpass

those which preceded it in the progress of his daring enterprise. The accuracy of the intelligence obtained respecting the interior of Georgia, the geographical exactitude with which he shaped his course, the control he established over his rude band—repressing appetite for plunder when opportunity for gratification hourly occurred—and the decision with which he made his final arrangements, alike merit applause. Guristersigo died as he had lived, the renowned warrior of the Over-hill Creeks.

Wayne behaved with his accustomed gallantry. Not doubting but that general Clarke with his whole force from Savannah was upon him, he determined to cut his way to victory, or to die in the midst of his enemy. To this end was his order to captain Parker; to this end was his order to lieutenant colonel Posey; and to this end was his own conduct and example. It is true the American general was surprised; but if a surprise can be overlooked, this is the one. Who could suppose that an Indian warrior would be found bold enough to relinquish his safe and distant forests to traverse longitudinally the state of Georgia, and to force his entry through an investing army into Savannah. If the comprehensive and searching mind had, in its prying into all possible adventures, presumed upon such an attempt, it would scarcely have been brought to conclude, that the enterprise could have remained undiscovered until the edge of the Indian tomahawk was felt in our camp.

However military critics may be disposed to with-

hold censure in consequence of the novelty and singularity of the late enterprise, yet, like every other incident in war, it demonstrates that the general who is contented with the inadequate protection of his camp, not only places himself at the disposal of fortune, but invites disaster. This would probably have been the result now, had not the Indian chief been turned from his right course by taking our cannon, and thus gave time to recover by valor what had been lost by want of due caution.

As soon as general Wayne had buried the dead, and taken care of the wounded, he changed his ground as usual; and finding that he had an enemy in rear as well as in front, he became more circumspect in his future arrangements.

This was the last rencontre in Georgia. General Clarke held his troops safe within his fortifications, prepared to evacuate Savannah whenever he should receive orders to that effect, which he knew could not be long deferred.

Wayne continued in the neighborhood of the enemy pursuing his desultory game, and watching with unceasing vigilance his adversary's motions. Early in July he was visited by a deputation of merchants from Savannah, under the protection of a flag of truce, for the purpose of ascertaining on what conditions the British subjects might be permitted to remain with their property, for a given term, after the evacuation of the city, which event might be daily expected in consequence of orders recently received.

General Wayne informed the deputation, that whenever the British garrison should withdraw, he would protect the persons and property of all who might remain; but that the ultimate disposal of the one and of the other belonged to the civil authority of the state, to which he would communicate the purport of their application. This answer being made known to the merchants and other inhabitants wishing to remain in Savannah, they, by permission of the British general, sent a second deputation to the American headquarters, with the view of fixing definitively the conditions on which they might be indulged in their desire.

In the mean time general Wayne had consulted governor Martin, who, soon after the American detachment entered Georgia, removed with his council of state to Ebenezer, for the purpose of extending the limits of the civil authority. In pursuance of the governor's instructions, the American general gave assurances to the inhabitants, that all who chose to remain should be protected in person and property, and should be allowed sufficient time to dispose of their property and to adjust their affairs, when they might depart in manner and form most agreeable to themselves. Major Habersham, a respectable officer in the line of Georgia, was employed by general Wayne in the conclusion of this business, and seems to have afforded facility to the arrangements by the confidence reposed in his personal character.

Satisfied with the assurance given, many of the British subjects discontinued their preparations for

removal, and were found in the town when entered by Wayne. They received the promised protection, and pursued, without molestation, their customary occupations. As soon as the loyalists had finished their arrangements with the American general, brigadier Clarke completed his begun evacuation (on the 11th July) and general Wayne on the same day took possession of Savannah, which had been for more than three years occupied by the enemy.

The spontaneous restoration of Georgia to the United States confirmed the expectation which prevailed, that the further prosecution of the war in America had been relinquished by his Britannic majesty, which would necessarily be soon followed by the recal of the royal army and fleet.

Previous to this event lieutenant colonel Carrington rejoined. While at the High Hills of Santee this officer, although at the head of the quarter master general's department, was permitted by the general to repair to the main army, in consequence of a vacancy in the line of artillery by the resignation of colonel Proctor, of Pennsylvania. Carrington was considered as entitled to the vacancy, and took command of the regiment on its arrival in Virginia, with part of the allied army. But inasmuch as congress had not established the mode of promotion in the cavalry and artillery, his continuance in the command of the regiment was uncertain; and therefore general Greene determined that, though absent, he should govern the department through his deputy, for the purpose of securing his

future services, should his expectation of promotion fail. On captain Crump, of the Virginia line, second in the department, the important trust devolved during the absence of his principal, who discharged its various duties with intelligence and effect. When the siege of York terminated, Carrington, disappointed in his expected promotion, repaired to Philadelphia by order of general Greene for the purpose of concerting measures with the superintendant of finance, for the future subsistence and clothing of the southern army. Mr. Morris entered with alacrity into the proposed application of a portion of the funds* under his direction to this desirable object. In pursuance whereof general Greene was empowered to contract for the requisite supplies, payable in specie; by which arrangement, the irksome and wasteful system heretofore pursued was superseded, and the cheering prospect of regular subsistence and comfortable clothing was presented to the long suffering army of the South.

The evacuation of Savannah was followed in the same month (August) by the meeting of the general assembly of Georgia at Augusta, when the exercise of the civil authority was completely re-established throughout the state. Brigadier Wayne having, soon after the withdraw of the royal forces, detached lieutenant colonel Posey to the main army, now proceeded to South Carolina with the remainder. General Greene, concentrating his troops, drew nearer to Charleston, and directed his operations to the single object of pre-

* See Carrington's letter.

venting the enemy from deriving any subsistence from the country.

August.

The intention of evacuating Charleston was now announced in general orders by the British general; who, however, continued to exert his force in procuring the provisions necessary not only for the daily support of the army and loyalists, but also for their maintenance until the first should be established in their future quarters, and the last transplanted to their intended settlements. Small parties were therefore occasionally detached from Charleston in various directions through those parts of the country remote from the American army, for the purpose of collecting and transporting rice, corn, and meat, to the British headquarters. Sometimes these parties succeeded; but generally they were compelled to return without effecting the object of their incursion.

Major general Leslie soon perceived the precariousness of this resource; to remedy which, and to stop the further effusion of blood, now unnecessary as to the main object of the war, notwithstanding the rejection of his pacific overture some time before, addressed general Greene by letter,* (August) expressing the motives and object of his military inroads, and proposing to discontinue them, on condition of being permitted to purchase from the country such supplies as might be necessary during his continuance in Charleston. The civil authority was necessarily consulted on Leslie's proposition by the American gene-

* See letter.

ral. So manifold and interesting were the advantages to our army from agreeing to the enemy's proposal, that deliberation seemed to border upon absurdity. The American soldiers were covered by tattered garments, destitute of shoes, and scarcely furnished with blankets. Winter was approaching, when privations now tolerable would become intolerable; and every effort had been vainly essayed to procure clothing on the credit of the specie funds appropriated by the superintendant of finance in the preceding spring, to the use of the southern army, which, by the proposed intercourse, might have been readily obtained from Charleston. Imperiously, as was the general urged by these considerations to avail himself of the opportunity within his grasp, he was constrained to forego it. The government of South Carolina entertained the belief, that the British army, on the evacuation of Charleston, would be transferred to the West Indies. Connected with this opinion was the conviction that the proposed purchase of provisions was not so much intended to meet present wants, but to amass magazines for the support of the British forces contending against our ally in that quarter. To accommodate the enemy in the accomplishment of this object was deemed dishonorable and perfidious; therefore it was determined to endure present ills rather than tarnish the national character: the proposition of general Leslie was accordingly rejected.

Sensibly as did the American army feel this unexpected termination of the enemy's overture, not a mur-

mur was heard in its ranks. Trained to suffer when required so to do by authority, the officers and soldiers exemplified upon this occasion their immutable disposition to forget their own wants in their zeal to uphold the cause and character of their country.

The punctilious observance of the obligations of treaties and scrupulous obedience to the injunctions of honor cannot be too much applauded; yet it will scarcely be contended that compliance with the proposal of general Leslie either violated the treaty between the United States and his most christian majesty, or trenched upon the principle of honor; nor can it be denied that it subserved the cause of humanity. The British general's letter candidly expressed his situation, amicably showed his unwillingness to shed more blood, now culpable because useless, but at the same time frankly announced that unless he could be supplied with provisions in the manner proposed, he must obtain them by force.

How easy would it have been for the governor and general, with their past solicitude, to observe the stipulations of treaties, and to avoid even in appearance the violation of honor, to have accepted the enemy's proposition on the express condition that the subsistence to be procured should be limited to present support, and to that of the approaching voyage, declaring that any attempt to transcend the specified limits should cancel the contract. The limitations which a temperate examination of the enemy's overture would have suggested never came into view; and in the overstrained

anxiety to avoid possible injury to France, the absolute advantages, comfort to our suffering soldiers, and stoppage to human slaughter, were neglected. This mistaken decision was soon followed by its natural, and with as deeply lamented, consequences.

Foiled in accomplishing his object in the way desired, the British general prepared to resume his suspended incursions into the country, determined to effect by force the procurement of those supplies which he had flattered himself with obtaining by purchase. Supported by marine co-operation applicable with readiness to all the circumjacent country by the facilities of its interior navigation, and possessing the contiguous islands, with strong detachments from his army, general Leslie proceeded to the execution of his determination, fearless of consequences, but lamenting the necessity of wasting human life in useless battle.

A detachment of light infantry, attended by armed vessels, passed along the interior navigation, and having reached Combahee river, began to collect and convey provisions to the transports which accompanied the expedition for the purpose of transporting to Charleston whatever might be procured. General Greene, never doubting Leslie's execution of his menace, held his light corps ready to counteract any attempt he might make. As soon therefore as he became apprized of the movement of the British detachment, he directed brigadier Gist to advance in pursuit. Gist was soon in motion, and after a long and rapid march gained the neighborhood of the enemy, then at Page's Point, on

the Combahee. At this moment lieutenant colonel Laurens, commanding the infantry under Gist, joined, having, as soon as informed of the march of the light troops, left his sick bed to hasten to the field of battle. Laurens no sooner overtook the corps than, by permission of the brigadier, he put himself at the head of the American van. Discovering that the enemy were preparing to retire, he determined, with his inferior force, though out of supporting distance, to commence the attack. This bold decision was gallantly executed; but incapable of making any serious impression from the inadequacy of his force, he fell in the vain attempt at the head of his intrepid band, closing his short and splendid life in the lustre of heroism. Gist now got up with the main body, and took one of the vessels from the enemy returning to Charleston.

The British general finding himself foiled in his expectations, henceforward discontinued these predatory inroads, and confined his exertions in the collection of provisions to the islands along the coast, and to the country contiguous to the interior navigation, remote from the American camp.

Preparations for the evacuation of Charleston progressed, but not with the celerity expected. This excited apprehensions among the owners of the numerous bodies of negroes within the enemy's lines, that with the withdraw of the army would be carried off their slaves. They made known their apprehensions to governor Matthews, who addressed a letter to general Leslie on the subject, and reminded him of the act of

confiscation passed by the legislature, from the operation of which had been exempted all debts due to British merchants, and claims on real estates by marriage settlement. These two funds, added to that arising from the confiscation of estates, furnished a valuable resource; and the governor assured general Leslie that he would apply them in remunerating his fellow citizens for their negroes, if removed with the retiring army.

This annunciation seriously affected the loyalists in Charleston, and especially the mercantile portion of them, ever alive to the feelings of interest. They soon beset the British general, who was always inclined to do right and to diminish the evils of war. Leslie, in reply to the governor, proposed negotiation, with the view of reconciling the opposite interests of the adverse parties. Commissioners were accordingly appointed with full powers to treat upon the subject. The honorable William Gerrard, on the part of the state, and Alexander Wright and James Robertson, on the part of the loyalists. The discussion which ensued terminated in a compact on the 10th of October, to the following effect.

“ That all the slaves of the citizens of South Carolina now in the power of the honorable major general Leslie shall be restored to their former owners as far as is practicable; except such slaves as may have rendered themselves particularly obnoxious on account of their attachment and services to the British troops, and such as had specific promises of freedom. That

the faith of the state is hereby solemnly pledged that none of the debts due to British merchants, or to persons who have been banished, or whose estates have been confiscated, or property secured by family settlements fairly made, or contracts relative thereto, shall now, or at any time hereafter, be arrested or withheld by the executive authority of the state; that no act of the legislature shall hereafter pass for confiscating, or seizing the same, in any manner whatever, if it is in the power of the executive to prevent it; and that its whole power and influence within its public and private capacity shall at all times be exerted for that purpose.

“ That the same power shall be allowed for the recovery of the debts and property hereby protected and secured, by the parties or their representatives in the courts of justice or otherwise, as the citizens of the state may be or at any time were entitled to, notwithstanding any act of confiscation or banishment, or any other disability whatsoever; and that the same may be remitted to any part of the world they may think proper, under the same and no other regulations than the citizens of the state may be subject to.

“ That no slaves, restored to their former owners by virtue of this agreement, shall be punished by the authority of the state for having left their masters and attached themselves to the British troops; and it will be particularly recommended to their respective owners to forgive them for the same.

“ That no violence or insult shall be offered to the

persons or houses of the families of such persons as are obliged to leave the state for their adherence to the British government, when the American army shall take possession of the town, or at any time afterwards, as far as it is in the power of those in authority to prevent it.

“ That Edward Blake and Roger Parker Saunders, esquires, shall be permitted to reside in Charleston on their parole of honor to assist in the execution of the first article of this compact.”—*Ramsay*.

In pursuance of this contract all minor measures were punctiliously adopted for its consummation. The two American commissioners were duly accredited and received in Charleston.

But the very first embarkation of the retiring enemy evinced that matured consideration of the preceding compact produced its violation by the party which had proposed it. Leslie began to remove the loyalists; for a portion of whom St. Augustine had been selected as a retreat. A fleet for their transportation was accordingly prepared; and when they embarked two hundred negroes accompanied them. The American commissioners remonstrated against this infraction of the compromise entered into, to superintend the honorable fulfilment of which they not only had been appointed by the governor of the state, but had been admitted into Charleston by the general. The remonstrance produced the debarkation of a small part of the negroes on board; but when the commissioners asked for per-

mission to restore this small part to their owners, by forwarding them to the assigned post for their reception without the British lines, the request was denied and justified by the following letter.

To Edward Blake and Roger P. Saunders, Esquires.

Headquarters, October 18, 1782.

GENTLEMEN,

“ General Leslie was much surprised on finding that a large patrol from general Greene’s army, two days ago, came down so near our advanced post on Charleston Neck as to carry off three soldiers, who were a little way in the front. At the time this little act of hostility was committed Mr. Ferguson and another person were at Accabee; where, I believe, they still remain, in expectation of the negroes to be delivered up, without any sanction but that of the agreement entered into. I am directed to observe, that if a line of conduct on the part of general Greene, so different from ours, is adopted; it must of course put an end to the pacific intentions general Leslie means to follow, in regard to this province, during the short time he is to remain in it.

“ He wishes you will inform governor Matthews that he expects the soldiers taken away will be returned, and that the governor will take proper measures to have this requisition complied with. Until this is done, general Leslie must be under the necessity of putting a stop to the further completion of the agreement.”

“ (Signed) S. WEYMS, deputy adjutant general.”

The inability of the British general to secure the faithful execution of the compact might have been perceived by him before its ratification; inasmuch as the effectuation of its material conditions depended on the will of the state legislature, more apt to oppose than to fulfil executive recommendations. If, however, this inability was not discovered until after ratification, better would it have been to have declared the fact, than to have resorted to a flimsy and irrelevant pretext for abrogation of a contract.

However, the British general seems to have preferred resorting for his justification to an expedient not less defective in reason than incompatible with his fair and honorable character.

No suspension of military operations had ever been suggested, much less stipulated. How then the capture of British soldiers, by an American patrol, could be construed into a violation of the contract entered into with the governor of the state, is not discernable.

But pretexts, the most trivial, will be embraced by power when disposed to forget right, in furtherance of its will. Such appears to have been the present temper of the British general; and the contract lately sought by himself, and well calculated to stop the spread of injustice, was annulled.

The American commissioners forwarded the letter received from the British adjutant general to governor Matthews, who replied as follows:

“ October 19th, 1782.

“ SIR,

“ I was a few minutes ago favored with a letter from Messrs. Blake and Saunders, inclosing one to them from major Weyms, written by your authority. As I do not like a second-hand correspondence, I therefore address myself immediately to you. I addressed a letter to you this morning, by which you will find that I was not even then without some apprehension of the intended evasion of the compact entered into on the 10th instant; but on the receipt of major Weyms' letter, no room was left me for doubt; which obliges me, without giving further trouble to those engaged in the business, and introducing further altercation between us, to declare, that I look upon that agreement as dissolved, and have accordingly ordered my commissioners immediately to quit your lines. But before I take my final leave of you, permit me to make one or two observations on major Weyms' letter, as probably the whole correspondence between us may one day be brought to public view.

“ On the 12th instant I wrote to you, to know whether persons going to Accabee to bring off the negroes when brought there, should be protected from your armed parties; and further, to permit me to send a party of militia to guard the negroes remaining unclaimed to some part of the country where they could be supplied with provisions. To this letter I have received no answer, which has obliged me to use the precaution of giving flags to all persons who have ap-

plied to go to Accabee; as I could on no principle look on that ground as neutral, until it had been mutually agreed on as such. Indeed I was led to believe the contrary was intended on your part, both by your tedious silence and detachments from your army making excursions as far as Ashley ferry; which was absolutely the case the morning of the day that the party from general Greene's army took the soldiers you so peremptorily demand of me; and if I am rightly informed, hostilities were commenced by your party. Be that as it may, I conceive it of little consequence; as either party had a right to commence hostilities on hostile ground; and between enemies every spot must be considered as such, until mutually agreed upon to be otherwise. Besides, it is a well known fact, that there is not a day but some of your armed parties are on that very ground which you affect to hold neutral.

“ With regard to Messrs. Ferguson and Waring remaining at Accabee unmolested, I hold myself under no manner of obligation to you for this forbearance; as I informed you they were there under the sanction of a flag; that they were to remain there for the purpose of receiving the negroes sent out by the agents in Charleston. They were therefore authorized to continue there, till you signified the contrary to them. Flags from you have remained within half a mile of our lines for several days on private business, without the least molestation whatever. Besides, sir, if your reasoning, as far as it applies to those gentlemen, prove any thing, it proves too much; be-

cause on the same principle, the other two commissioners being in Charleston, ought to make that neutral ground also, notwithstanding no stipulation for that purpose had been entered into. I never interfere with general Greene's military plans, therefore the paragraph which relates to his operations ought to have been addressed to him; but I believe he pays as little regard to threats as I do."

With this letter ceased every effort to give effect to the contract between the governor and general Leslie. The American commissioners returned home, and the negroes seduced and taken from the inhabitants of South Carolina in the course of the war, remained subject to the disposal of the enemy. They were successively shipped to the West Indies; and it is asserted, upon the authority of the best informed citizens of South Carolina, that more than twenty thousand slaves were lost to the state in consequence of the war; of which not an inconsiderable portion was appropriated by British officers, and sold for their benefit in the West Indies.

Preparations for the embarkation of the enemy continued, but so tardily, that general Greene himself, who never yielded entirely to the opinion that peace was near at hand, began to doubt the sincerity of those pacific professions which accompanied general Leslie's annunciation of his intended evacuation of Charleston. His presumption of the enemy's perseverance in the war, and intimate knowledge of the distressed condition of his army for clothing of every sort, could not

fail more and more to excite the sensibility of a commander justly regarded as the father of his soldiers.

From the return of lieutenant colonel Carrington, after his visit to the superintendant of finance, general Greene had endeavored without intermission to negotiate a contract for the supply of the army with provisions, and to secure winter clothing for the troops, the want of which became every day more pressing. Vain were all his efforts to accomplish the first, although supported by the executive authority of the state, and seconded by the active exertions of the quartermaster general; who was authorised by the general to pledge the specie funds appropriated by the superintendant of finance to the southern service, to those who might contract for the supply either of provisions or clothing.

The devastation of the country, the neglect of the culture of the soil, and the bankrupt condition of the numerous class of individuals heretofore opulent and influential, prevented the acceptance of his overtures by any, although repeatedly proffered and zealously pressed. But however disinclined to relax his endeavors to substitute the regular and cheap system of feeding his troops by special contract, instead of the wasteful mode of requisition by the state agent, who was occasionally compelled to resort to military aid, Greene was reluctantly compelled to yield to the general inability, and to rely on the precarious and ruinous old mode, adopted through necessity and continued from the same cause. The evacuation of Charleston would of course change the state of the country, and

give vigor to enterprising individuals. Then, and not till then, could he indulge the hope of effecting the necessary change in subsisting his army; and he was obliged to rely upon the same event for procuring the requisite clothing, rendered more and more necessary by the close approach of winter.

Exclusively therefore of the importance of the expected event, in a military and national view, it became the peculiar object of anxious solicitude with the American general as it presented the only resource to relieve his army from difficulties, which must, unless surmounted, lead to disbandment.

General Leslie had declared, in his orders of the 7th of August, his intention of withdrawing his army; but September had passed away, and Charleston still remained in possession of the enemy.

In the course of the preceding month, governor Matthews had contrived, through his influence with some of the royalists in Charleston, who had resolved to throw themselves on the mercy of their country, to procure a small quantity of the most necessary articles of clothing. This fortunate acquisition, added to a supply forwarded from Philadelphia by means of the superintendant of finance, enabled the general to cover the most naked of his army; and the unceasing exertions of the state commissary, aided by the co-operation of the quartermaster general, produced an agreeable change in the quantity and quality of provisions. Still the situation of the army was deplorable, and much remained to be done to give durable comfort to

the troops, whose past distress is thus described by general Greene in an official letter written on the 13th of August. "For upwards of two months more than one third of our army was naked, with nothing but a breech cloth about them, and never came out of their tents; and the rest were as ragged as wolves. Our condition was little better in the articles of provision. Our beef was perfect carrion; and even bad as it was, we were frequently without any. An army thus clothed and thus fed may be considered in a desperate situation."

The delay and uncertainty in evacuating Charleston, however productive of gloomy forebodings in the American camp, did not stop the enterprise of adventurous individuals, who, believing the event at hand, seized, as they presumed, the sure opportunity of advancing their fortunes. Many of these procured admittance into Charleston, and entered into contracts with the British merchants, whom they found as desirous of selling their stock on hand, as they were eager to buy it.

Among the adventurers who, about the end of August or beginning of September, made their way into Charleston, was Mr. John Banks from Virginia. This gentleman, (no doubt with permission) after a short stay in town, visited the American army. Here he was introduced to general Greene. Well knowing the naked condition of his countrymen in arms, and convinced of the general's solicitude to relieve their sufferings, he offered to procure and deliver whatever might be wanted. Greene having been, as before mentioned, autho-

rized by the superintendant of finance to enter into contracts for supplying his army, did not hesitate in accepting Banks' proposal, and a contract was arranged with him for the requisite clothing to be delivered on the evacuation of Charleston. This was the first opportunity which had presented of effecting the long wished and much desired object. It was embraced with avidity, and Mr. Banks completely executed his contract at the designated period, to the great joy of the general and army.

The preparations for evacuating Charleston began now to assume a determinate character; and the doubts heretofore entertained on that subject dissipated. The American general held still his position at Ashley hill, shutting up every avenue to intercourse between town and country. The enemy no longer attempted to interrupt this operation, but fixed in his design of withdrawing from South Carolina, he avoided unavailing conflict. Thus passed the autumn, and general Leslie, although never intermitting his preparations to retire, still continued with his army in Charleston. At length, early in December, the embarkation of the military stores, ordnance and baggage, commenced. When this was completed, the troops followed, and on the 14th the embarkation was finished. General Wayne, with the legion and light infantry, had, for some days previous, by order of Greene, placed himself near to the quarter house for the purpose of entering the town as soon as it should be evacuated. To this officer, Leslie informally intimated his wish to prevent injury to

the town, in which he presumed on cordial coincidence from the American general, and which he insinuated was only to be effected by prohibiting every attempt to interrupt the embarkation of the retiring army.

Wayne communicated to the general the intimation he had received from Leslie, who directed him to conform to the same.

Accordingly no effort was made to disturb the enemy's embarkation, which took place without the smallest confusion or disorder, the light troops under Wayne entering into town close after the retirement of the British rear.

Thus was the metropolis of South Carolina restored to the United States, after having been in possession of the enemy from its surrender to sir Henry Clinton (on the 12th May, 1780).

The governor with his suite was escorted into the capital on the same day. On the next the civil authority resumed its former functions, and the din of arms yielded to the innocent and pleasing occupations of peace.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

1100 S. MICHIGAN AVE.

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

TEL. 733-7321

1968-1969

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

1100 S. MICHIGAN AVE.

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

TEL. 733-7321

1968-1969

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

1100 S. MICHIGAN AVE.

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

TEL. 733-7321

1968-1969

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

1100 S. MICHIGAN AVE.

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

TEL. 733-7321

1968-1969

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

1100 S. MICHIGAN AVE.

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

TEL. 733-7321

1968-1969

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

1100 S. MICHIGAN AVE.

CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

TEL. 733-7321

1968-1969

APPENDIX.

Q.—Page 293.

Headquarters, Martin's Tavern, near Ferguson's Swamp, South Carolina, September 11th, 1781.

SIR,

In my last despatch of the 25th of August I informed your excellency that we were on our march for Fryday's ferry, to form a junction with the state troops, and a body of militia, collecting at that place, with an intention to make an attack upon the British army laying at colonel Thompson's, near M'Cord's ferry. On the 27th, on our arrival near Fryday's ferry, I got intelligence that the enemy were retiring.

We crossed the river at Howell's ferry, and took post at Motte's plantation. Here I got intelligence that the enemy had halted at the Eutaw Springs, about forty miles below us; and that they had a reinforcement, and were making preparations to establish a permanent post there. To prevent this, I was determined rather to hazard an action, notwithstanding our numbers were greatly inferior to theirs. On the 5th we began our march, our baggage and stores having been ordered to Howell's ferry under a proper guard. We moved by slow and easy marches, as well to disguise our real intention, as to give general Marion an opportunity to join us, who had been detached for the support of colonel Harden, a report of which I transmitted in my letter of the 5th, dated Maybrick's creek. General Marion joined us

on the evening of the 7th, at Burdell's plantation, seven miles from the enemy's camp.

We made the following disposition, and marched at four o'clock the next morning to attack the enemy. Our front line was composed of four small battalions of militia, two of North and two of South Carolinians; one of the South Carolinians was under the immediate command of general Marion, and was posted on the right, who also commanded the front line: the two North Carolina battalions, under the command of colonel Malmady, were posted in the centre; and the other South Carolina battalion, under the command of general Pickens, was posted on the left. Our second line consisted of three small brigades of continental troops,—one from North Carolina, one from Virginia, and one from Maryland. The North Carolinians were formed into three battalions, under the command of lieutenant colonel Ash, majors Armstrong and Blount; the whole commanded by general Sumner, and posted upon the right. The Virginians consisted of two battalions, commanded by major Snead and captain Edmonds, and the whole by lieutenant colonel Campbell, and posted in the centre. The Marylanders also consisted of two battalions, commanded by lieutenant colonel Howard and major Hardman, and the brigade by colonel Williams, deputy adjutant general to the army, and were posted upon the left. Lieutenant colonel Lee with his legion covered our right flank; and lieutenant colonel Henderson with the state troops, commanded by lieutenant colonels Hampton, Middleton, and Polk, our left. Lieutenant colonel Washington with his horse, and the Delaware troops under captain Kirkwood, formed a corps de reserve. Two three pounders under captain lieutenant Gaines advanced with the front line, and two sixes under captain Browne with the second.

The legion and state troops formed our advance, and were to retire upon the flanks upon the enemy's forming. In this order we moved on to the attack. The legion and state troops fell in with a party of the enemy's horse and foot, about four miles from their camp, who, mistaking our people for a party of militia, charged them briskly, but were

soon convinced of their mistake by the reception they met with. The infantry of the state troops kept up a heavy fire, and the legion in front, under captain Rudolph, charged them with fixed bayonets: they fled on all sides, leaving four or five dead on the ground, and several more wounded. As this was supposed to be the advance of the British army, our front line was ordered to form and move on briskly in line, the legion and state troops to take their position upon the flanks. All the country is covered with timber from the place the action began to the Eutaw Springs. The firing began again between two and three miles from the British camp. The militia were ordered to keep advancing as they fired. The enemy's advanced parties were soon driven in, and a most tremendous fire began on both sides from right to left, and the legion and state troops were closely engaged. General Marion, colonel Malmady and general Pickens conducted the troops with great gallantry and good conduct; and the militia fought with a degree of spirit and firmness that reflects the highest honor upon that class of soldiers. But the enemy's fire being greatly superior to ours, and continuing to advance, the militia began to give ground. The North Carolina brigade, under general Sumner, was ordered up to their support. These were all new levies, and had been under discipline but little more than a month; notwithstanding which they fought with a degree of obstinacy that would do honor to the best of veterans; and I could hardly tell which to admire most, the gallantry of the officers or the bravery of the troops. They kept up a heavy and well directed fire, and the enemy returned it with equal spirit, for they really fought worthy of a better cause, and great execution was done on both sides. In this stage of the action, the Virginians under lieutenant colonel Campbell, and the Marylanders under colonel Williams, were led on to a brisk charge, with trailed arms, through a heavy cannonade and a shower of musket balls. Nothing could exceed the gallantry and firmness of both officers and soldiers upon this occasion. They preserved their order, and pressed on with such unshaken resolution that they bore down all before

them. The enemy were routed in all quarters. Lieutenant colonel Lee had, with great address, gallantry, and good conduct, turned the enemy's left flank, and was charging them in rear at the same time the Virginia and Maryland troops were charging them in front. A most valuable officer, lieutenant colonel Henderson, got wounded early in the action; and lieutenant colonel Hampton, who commanded the state cavalry, and who fortunately succeeded lieutenant colonel Henderson in command, charged a party of the enemy, and took upwards of one hundred prisoners. Lieutenant colonel Washington brought up the corps de reserve upon the left, where the enemy seemed disposed to make further resistance; and charged them so briskly with the cavalry and captain Kirkwood's infantry, as gave them no time to rally or form. Lieutenant colonels Polk and Middleton, who commanded the state infantry, were no less conspicuous for their good conduct than their intrepidity; and the troops under their command gave a specimen of what may be expected from men, naturally brave, when improved by proper discipline. Captain lieutenant Gaines, who commanded the three pounders with the front line, did great execution until his pieces were dismounted. We kept close at the enemy's heels after they broke, until we got into their camp, and a great number of prisoners were continually falling into our hands, and some hundreds of the fugitives ran off towards Charleston. But a party threw themselves into a large three story brick house, which stands near the spring; others took post in a picquetted garden, while others were lodged in an impenetrable thicket, consisting of a cragged shrub, called a black jack. Thus secured in front, and upon the right by the house and a deep ravine, upon the left by the picquetted garden and in the impenetrable shrubs, and the rear also being secured by the springs and deep hollow ways, the enemy renewed the action. Every exertion was made to dislodge them. Lieutenant colonel Washington made most astonishing efforts to get through the thicket to charge the enemy in the rear; but found it impracticable, had his horse shot under him, and was wounded and taken prisoner. Four six pounders

were ordered up before the house—two of our own, and two of the enemy's, which they had abandoned—and they were pushed on so much under the command of the fire from the house and the party in the thicket, as rendered it impracticable to bring them off again when the troops were ordered to retire. Never were pieces better served; most of the men and officers were either killed or wounded. Washington failing in his charge upon the left, and the legion baffled in an attempt upon the right, and finding our infantry galled by the fire of the enemy, and our ammunition mostly consumed, though both officers and men continued to exhibit uncommon acts of heroism, I thought proper to retire out of the fire of the house, and draw up the troops at a little distance in the woods; not thinking it advisable to push our advantages further, being persuaded the enemy could not hold the post many hours, and that our chance to attack them on the retreat was better than a second attempt to dislodge them, in which, if we succeeded, it must be attended with considerable loss.

We collected all our wounded, except such as were under the command of the fire of the house, and retired to the ground, from which we marched in the morning, there being no water nearer, and the troops ready to faint with the heat, and want of refreshment, the action having continued near four hours. I left on the field of action a strong picquet, and early in the morning detached general Marion and lieutenant colonel Lee with the legion horse between Eutaw and Charleston, to prevent any reinforcements from coming to the relief of the enemy; and also to retard their march, should they attempt to retire, and give time to the army to fall upon their rear and put a finishing stroke to our successes. We left two pieces of our artillery in the hands of the enemy, and brought off one of theirs. On the evening of the 9th, the enemy retired, leaving upwards of seventy of their wounded behind them, and not less than one thousand stand of arms that were picked up on the field, and found broke and concealed in the Eutaw Springs. They stove between twenty and thirty puncheons of rum, and destroyed a great variety

of other stores, which they had not carriages to carry off. We pursued them the moment we got intelligence of their retiring. But they formed a junction with major M^cArthur at this place, general Marion and lieutenant colonel Lee not having a force sufficient to prevent it: but on our approach they retired to the neighborhood of Charleston. We have taken five hundred prisoners, including the wounded the enemy left behind; and I think they cannot have suffered less than six hundred more in killed and wounded. The fugitives that fled from the field of battle spread such an alarm that the enemy burnt their stores at Dorchester, and abandoned the post at Fair Lawn; and a great number of negroes and others were employed in felling trees across the road for some miles without the gates of Charleston. Nothing but the brick house, and the peculiar strength of the position at Eutaw, saved the remains of the British army from being all made prisoners.

We pursued them as far as this place; but not being able to overtake them, we shall halt a day or two to refresh, and then take our old position on the High Hills of Santee. I think myself principally indebted for the victory we obtained to the free use of the bayonet made by the Virginians and Marylanders, the infantry of the legion, and captain Kirkwood's light infantry: and though few armies ever exhibited equal bravery with ours in general, yet the conduct and intrepidity of these corps were peculiarly conspicuous. Lieutenant colonel Campbell fell as he was leading his troops to the charge, and though he fell with distinguished marks of honor, yet his loss is much to be regretted: he was the great soldier and the firm patriot.

Our loss in officers is considerable, more from their value than their number; for never did either men or officers offer their blood more willingly in the service of their country. I cannot help acknowledging my obligations to colonel Williams for his great activity on this and many other occasions in forming the army, and for his uncommon intrepidity in leading on the Maryland troops to the charge, which exceeded any thing I ever saw. I also feel myself greatly

indebted to captains Pierce and Pendleton, major Hyrne and captain Shubrick, my aids-de-camp, for their activity and good conduct throughout the whole of the action.

This despatch will be handed to your excellency by captain Pierce, to whom I beg leave to refer you for further particulars.

I have the honor to, &c.

NATH. GREENE.

His Excellency the President of Congress.

Extract of a letter from Lieut. Col. Stuart to Earl Cornwallis.

Eutaw, September 9th, 1781.

WITH particular satisfaction I have the honor to inform your lordship that, on the 8th instant, I was attacked by the rebel general Greene with all the force he could collect in this province and North Carolina; and after an obstinate engagement, which lasted near two hours, I totally defeated him, and took two six pounders. Soon after I had the honor of writing your lordship from Thompson's, I received information of Greene's having moved with the rebel army towards Cambden, and crossed the Wateree at that place, and, from the best intelligence I could collect, was on his march to Fryday's ferry, on the Congaree. The army under my command being much in want of necessaries, and there being at the same time a convoy with provisions on their march from Charleston, which would necessarily have obliged me to make a detachment of at least four hundred men—which at that time I could ill afford, the army being much weakened by sickness—to meet the convoy at Martin's, fifty-six miles from the camp. The distance being so great, a smaller escort was liable to fall by the enemy's cavalry, which are very numerous. I therefore thought it advisable to retire by slow marches to the Eutaws, where I might have an opportunity of receiving my supplies, and disencumber myself from the sick, without risking any escorts, or suffer myself to be attacked at a dis-

advantage, should the enemy have crossed the Congaree. Notwithstanding every exertion having been made to gain intelligence of the enemy's situation, they rendered it impossible by way-laying the by-paths and passes through the different swamps, and even detained different flags of truce which I had sent on public business on both sides. About six o'clock in the morning I received intelligence by two deserters, who left general Greene's camp the preceding evening about seven miles from this place; and from their report the rebel army consisted of near four thousand men and four pieces of cannon. In the mean time I received intelligence by major Coffin, whom I had previously detached with one hundred and forty infantry and fifty cavalry, in order to gain intelligence of the enemy, that they appeared in force in his front, then about four miles from my camp. Finding the enemy in force so near me, I determined to fight them; as from their numerous cavalry a retreat seemed to me to be attended with dangerous consequences. I immediately formed the line of battle, with the right of the army to Eutaw's branch, and its left crossing the road leading to Roche's plantation, leaving a corps on a commanding situation to cover the Charleston road, and to act occasionally as a reserve. About nine o'clock the action began on the right, and soon after became general. Knowing that the enemy were much superior in numbers, and at the same time finding that they attacked with their militia in front, induced me not to alter my position, unless I saw a certain advantage to be gained by it; for by moving forwards I exposed both flanks of the army to the enemy's cavalry, which I saw ready formed to take that advantage, particularly on the left, which obliged me to move the reserve to support it.

By an unknown mistake the left of the line advanced and drove their militia and North Carolinians before them; but unexpectedly finding the Virginia and Maryland lines ready formed, and at the same time receiving a heavy fire, occasioned some confusion. It was, therefore, necessary to retire a little distance to an open field, in order to form; which was instantly done, under cover of a heavy, well-directed fire from

a detachment of New York volunteers, under the command of major Sheridan, whom I had previously ordered to take post in the house to check the enemy, should they attempt to pass it. The action was renewed with great spirit; but I was sorry to find that a three pounder, posted on the road leading to Roche's, had been disabled, and could not be brought off when the left of the line retired. The right wing of the army being composed of the flank battalion, under the command of major Majoribanks, having repulsed and drove every thing that attacked them, made a rapid move to the left, and attacked the enemy in flank; upon which they gave way in all quarters, leaving behind them two brass six pounders, and upwards of two hundred killed on the field of action, and sixty taken prisoners, among whom is colonel Washington, and, from every other information, about eight hundred wounded, although they contrived to carry them off during the action. The enemy retired with great precipitation to a strong situation about seven miles from the field of action, leaving their cavalry to cover their retreat. The glory of the day would have been more complete, had not the want of cavalry prevented my taking the advantage which the gallantry of my infantry threw in my way.

I omitted to inform your lordship in its proper place of the army's having for some time been much in want of bread, there being no old corn or mills near me. I was, therefore, under the necessity of sending out rooting parties from each corps, under an officer, to collect potatoes every morning at day-break; and unfortunately that of the flank battalion and buffs, having gone too far in front, fell into the enemy's hands before the action began; which not only weakened my lines, but increased their number of prisoners.

Since the action, our time has been employed in taking care of the wounded; and, finding that the enemy have no intention to make a second attack, I have determined to cover the wounded as far as Monk's Corner with the army. My particular thanks are due lieutenant colonel Cruger, who commanded the front line, for his conduct and gallantry during the action: and lieutenant colonel Allen, majors Daw-

son, Stewart, Sheridan and Coffin, and to captains Kelly and Campbell, commanding the different corps and detachments; and every other officer and soldier fulfilled the separate duties of their stations with great gallantry. But to major Majoribanks, and the flank battalion under his command, I think the honor of the day is greatly due. My warmest praise is due to captain Barry, deputy adjutant general, major brigade Coxon, lieutenant Ranken, assistant quarter master general, and to acting major of brigade Roebuck, for the great assistance rendered me during the day.

I hope, my lord, when it is considered that such a handful of men, attacked by the united force of generals Greene, Sumpter, Marion, Sumner, and Pickens, and the legions of colonels Lee and Washington, driving them from the field of battle, and taking the only two six pounders they had, deserve some merit. Inclosed is the return of the killed, wounded and missing of his majesty's troops. From the number of corps and detachments, which appear to have been engaged, it may be supposed our force is great; but your lordship will please to observe, that the army was much reduced by sickness and otherwise. I hope your lordship will excuse any inaccuracy that may be in this letter, as I have been a good deal indisposed by a wound which I received in my left elbow, which, though slight, from its situation is troublesome. It will give me most singular pleasure if my conduct meets with the approbation of his majesty, that of your lordship, and my country.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

3 commissioned officers; 6 sergeants; 1 drummer; 75 rank and file, killed.					
16	ditto.	20 ditto.	2 ditto.	313 ditto.	wounded.
10	ditto.	15 ditto.	8 ditto.	224 ditto.	missing.

R.—Page 326.

Head Quarters at Montmorenci, on the River St. Lawrence,
September 2d, 1759.

SIR,

“I wish I could, upon this occasion, have the honor of transmitting to you a more favourable account of his majesty’s arms; but the obstacles we have met with, in the operations of the campaign, are much greater than we had reason to expect, or could foresee; not so much from the number of the enemy, (though superior to us,) as from the natural strength of the country, which the Marquis de Montcalm seems wisely to depend upon.

When I learned that succours of all kinds had been thrown into Quebec; that five battalions of regular troops, completed from the best of the inhabitants of the country, some of the troops of the colony, and every Canadian that was able to bear arms, besides several nations of savages, had taken the field in a very advantageous situation; I could not flatter myself, that I should be able to reduce the place. I sought, however, an occasion to attack their army, knowing well, that, with these troops, I was able to fight, and hoping that a victory might disperse them.

We found them encamped along the shore of Beaufort, from the river St. Charles to the falls of Montmorenci, and intrenched in every accessible part. The 27th June we landed upon the isle of Orleans; but receiving a message from the admiral, that there was reason to think the enemy had artillery; and a force upon the point of Levi, I detached brigadier Monckton, with four battalions, to drive them from thence. He passed the river the 29th, at night, and marched the next day to the point; he obliged the enemy’s irregulars to retire, and possessed himself of that post: the advanced parties, upon this occasion, had two or three skirmishes with the Canadians and Indians, with little loss on either side.

Colonel Carleton marched with a detachment to the westernmost of the isle of Orleans, from whence our operations were likely to begin.

It was absolutely necessary to possess these two points,
Vol. II.

and fortify them; because from either the one or the other, the enemy might make it impossible for any ship to lie in the bason of Quebec, or even within two miles of it.

Batteries of cannon and mortars were erected, with great despatch, on the point of Levi, to bombard the town and magazines, and to injure the works and batteries. The enemy perceiving these works in some forwardness, passed the river with 1600 men, to attack and destroy them. Unluckily they fell into confusion, fired upon one another, and went back again; by which we lost an opportunity of defeating this large detachment. The effect of this artillery has been so great, (though across the river,) that the upper town is considerably damaged, and the lower town entirely destroyed.

The works for the security of our hospitals and stores, on the isle of Orleans, being finished, on the 9th of July, at night we passed the North Channel, and encamped near the enemy's left, the Montmorenci between us. The next morning captain Dank's company of rangers, posted in a wood to cover some workmen, were attacked, and defeated by a body of Indians, and had so many killed and wounded, as to be almost disabled for the rest of the campaign. The enemy also suffered in this affair, and were in their turn driven off by the nearest troops.

The ground to the eastward of the falls seemed to be, (as it really is,) higher than that on the enemy's side, and to command it in a manner which might be useful to us. There is besides, a ford below the falls, which may be passed for some hours in the latter part of the ebb, and beginning of the flood tide; and I had hopes, that possibly means might be found of passing the river above, so as to fight the marquis de Montcalm, upon terms of less disadvantage than directly attacking his entrenchments. In reconnoitring the river Montmorenci, we found it fordable at a place about three miles up; but the opposite bank was entrenched, and so steep and woody, that it was to no purpose to attempt a passage there. The escort was twice attacked by the Indians, who were as often repulsed; but in these rencounters, we had forty (officers and men) killed and wounded.

The 18th of July, two men of war, two armed sloops, and two transports with some troops on board, passed by the town without any loss, and got into the upper river. This enabled me to reconnoitre the country above, where I found the same attention on the enemy's side, and great difficulties on ours, arising from the nature of the ground, and the obstacles to our communication with the fleet. But what I feared most was, that if we should land between the town and the river, captain Rouge, the body first landed, could not be reinforced before they were attacked by the enemy's whole army.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, I thought once of attempting it at St. Michael's, about three miles above the town; but perceiving that the enemy were jealous of the design, were preparing against it, and had actually brought artillery and a mortar, (which being so near to Quebec, they could increase as they pleased,) to play upon the shipping; and as it must have been many hours before we could attack them, even supposing a favourable night for the boats to pass by the town unhurt, it seemed so hazardous, that I thought it best to desist.

However, to divide the enemy's force, and to draw their attention as high up the river as possible, and to procure some intelligence, I sent a detachment under the command of colonel Carleton, to land at the Point de Trempe, to attack whatever he might find there, bring off some prisoners, and all the useful papers he could get. I had been informed, that a number of the inhabitants of Quebec had retired to that place, and that probably we should find a magazine of provision there.

The colonel was fired upon, by a body of Indians, the moment he landed, but they were soon dispersed, and driven into the woods; he searched for magazines, but to no purpose, brought off some prisoners, and returned with little loss.

After this business, I came back to Montmorenci, where I found that brigadier Townshend had, by a superior fire, prevented the French from erecting a battery on the bank of the river, from whence they intended to cannonade our camp.

I now resolved to take the first opportunity which presented itself, of attacking the enemy, though posted to great advantage, and every where prepared to receive us.

As the men of war cannot, (for want of a sufficient depth of water,) come near enough to the enemy's entrenchments, to annoy them in the least, the admiral had prepared two transports, (drawing but little water,) which, upon occasions, could be run aground, to favour a descent. With the help of these vessels, which I understood would be carried by the tide, close in shore, I proposed to make myself master of a detached redoubt, near to the water's edge, and whose situation appeared to be out of musket shot of the entrenchment upon the hill. If the enemy supported this detached piece, it would necessarily bring on an engagement, what we most wished for; and if not, I should have it in my power to examine their situation, so as to be able to determine where we could best attack them.

Preparations were accordingly made for an engagement. The 31st of July in the forenoon, the boats of the fleet were filled with grenadiers, and a part of brigadier Monckton's brigade from the point of Levi. The two brigades under the brigadiers Townshend and Murray, were ordered to be in readiness to pass the ford, when it should be thought necessary. To facilitate the passage of this corps, the admiral had placed the Centurion in the channel, so that she might check the fire of the lower battery, which commanded the ford. This ship was of great use, as her fire was very judiciously directed. A great quantity of artillery was placed upon the eminence, so as to batter and enfilade the left of their entrenchments.

From the vessel which ran aground, nearest in, I observed that the redoubt was too much commanded, to be kept without very great loss, and the more, as the two armed ships could not be brought near enough to cover both with their artillery and musketry, which I at first conceived they might. But as the enemy seemed in some confusion, and we were prepared for an action, I thought it a proper time to make an attempt upon their entrenchments. Orders were

sent to the brigadier generals, to be ready with the corps under their command. Brigadier Monckton was to land, and the brigadiers Townshend and Murray to pass the ford.

At a proper time of the tide, the signal was made, but in rowing towards the shore, many of the boats grounded upon a ledge that runs off a considerable distance. This accident put us into some disorder, lost a great deal of time, and obliged me to send an officer to stop brigadier Townshend's march, whom I then observed to be in motion. While the seamen were getting the boats off, the enemy fired a number of shells and shot, but did no considerable damage. As soon as this disorder could be set a little to rights, and the boats were ranged in a proper manner, some of the officers of the navy went in with me, to find a better place to land; we took one flat bottomed boat with us to make the experiment, and as soon as we had found a fit part of the shore, the troops were ordered to disembark, thinking it not yet too late for the attempt.

The thirteen companies of grenadiers, and two hundred of the second royal American battalion, got first on shore. The grenadiers were ordered to form themselves into four distinct bodies, and to begin the attack, supported by brigadier Monckton's corps, as soon as the troops had passed the ford, and were at hand to assist. But whether from the noise and hurry at landing, or from some other cause, the grenadiers, instead of forming themselves as they were directed, ran on impetuously, towards the enemy's entrenchments in the utmost disorder and confusion, without waiting for the corps which were to sustain them, and join in the attack. Brigadier Monckton was not landed, and brigadier Townshend was still at a considerable distance, though upon his march to join us in very great order. The grenadiers were checked by the enemy's first fire, and obliged to shelter themselves in or about the redoubt which the French abandoned upon their approach. In this situation they continued for some time, unable to form under so hot a fire, and having many gallant officers wounded, who, (careless of their persons,) had been solely intent upon their duty. I saw the absolute ne-

cessity of calling them off, that they might form themselves behind brigadier Monckton's corps, which was now landed, and drawn up on the beach, in extreme good order.

By this new accident, and this second delay, it was near night; a sudden storm came on, and the tide began to make; so that I thought it most advisable not to persevere in so difficult an attack, lest, (in case of a repulse,) the retreat of brigadier Townshend's corps might be hazardous and uncertain.

Our artillery had a great effect upon the enemy's left, where brigadiers Townshend and Murray were to have attacked; and it is probable that if those accidents I have spoken of had not happened, we should have penetrated there, whilst our left and centre (more remote from our artillery) must have borne all the violence of their musketry.

The French did not attempt to interrupt our march. Some of their savages came down to murder such wounded as could not be brought off, and to scalp the dead, as their custom is.

The place where the attack was intended, has these advantages over all others hereabout. Our artillery could be brought into use. The greater part, or even the whole of the troops, might act at once. And the retreat (in case of repulse) was secure, at least for a certain time of the tide. Neither one or the other of these advantages can any where else be found. The enemy were indeed posted upon a commanding eminence. The beach, upon which the troops were drawn up, was of deep mud, with holes, and cut by several gullies. The hill to be ascended very steep, and not every where practicable. The enemy numerous in their intrenchments, and their fire hot. If the attack had succeeded, our loss must certainly have been great, and theirs inconsiderable, from the shelter which the neighboring woods afforded them. The river St. Charles still remained to be passed, before the town was invested. All these circumstances I considered; but the desire to act in conformity to the king's intentions, induced me to make this trial, persuaded that a victorious army finds no difficulties.

The enemy have been fortifying ever since with care, so as to make a second attempt still more dangerous.

Immediately after this check, I sent brigadier Murray above the town with one thousand two hundred men, directing him to assist rear admiral Holmes in the destruction of the French ships (if they could be got at), in order to open a communication with general Amherst. The brigadier was to seek every favorable opportunity of fighting some of the enemy's detachments, provided he could do it upon tolerable terms, and to use all the means in his power to provoke them to attack him. He made two different attempts to and upon the north shore without success; but in a third was more fortunate. He landed unexpectedly at De Chambaud, and burnt a magazine there, in which were some provisions, some ammunition, and all the spare stores, clothing, arms and baggage of their army. Finding that their ships were not to be got at, and little prospect of bringing the enemy to a battle, he reported his situation to me, and I ordered him to join the army.

The prisoners he took informed him of the surrender of the fort of Niagara; and we discovered, by intercepted letters, that the enemy had abandoned Carillon and Crown Point, were retired to the Isle aux Noix, and that general Amherst was making preparations to pass the lake Champlain, to fall upon M. de Burlemaque's corps, which consist of three battalions of foot, and as many Canadians as make the whole amount to three thousand men.

The admiral's despatches and mine would have gone eight or ten days sooner, if I had not been prevented from writing by a fever. I found myself so ill, and am still so weak, that I begged the general officers to consult together for the public utility. They are all of opinion, that (as more ships and provisions have now got above the town) they should try, by conveying up a corps of four or five thousand men, (which is nearly the whole strength of the army, after the points of Levi and Orleans are left in a proper state of defence,) to draw the enemy from their present situation, and bring them to an action. I have acquiesced in their proposal, and we are preparing to put it in execution.

The admiral and I have examined the town, with a view to a general assault; but, after consulting with the chief engineer, who is well acquainted with the interior parts of it, and, after viewing it with the utmost attention, we found, that though the batteries of the lower town might be easily silenced by the men of war, yet the business of an assault would be little advanced by that, since the few passages that lead from the lower to the upper town, are carefully intrenched, and the upper batteries cannot be affected by the ships, which must receive considerable damage from them and from the mortars. The admiral would readily join in this, or in any other measure, for the public service; but I could not propose to him an undertaking of so dangerous a nature, and promising so little success.

To the strength of the country, the enemy have added (for the defence of the river) a great number of floating batteries and boats. By the vigilance of these, and the Indians round our different posts, it has been impossible to execute any thing by surprise. We have had almost daily skirmishes with these savages; in which they are generally defeated, but not without loss on our side.

By the list of disabled officers (many of whom are of rank) you may perceive, sir, that the army is much weakened. By the nature of the river, the most formidable part of this armament is deprived of the power of acting, yet we have almost the whole force of Canada to oppose. In this situation, there is such a choice of difficulties, that I own myself at a loss how to determine. The affairs of Great Britain, I know, require the most vigorous measures; but the courage of a handful of brave men should be exerted only where there is some hope of a favorable event. However, you may be assured, sir, that the small part of the campaign which remains, shall be employed (as far as I am able) for the honor of his majesty, and the interest of the nation, in which I am sure of being seconded by the admiral and by the generals. Happy if our efforts here can contribute to the success of his majesty's arms in any other parts of America.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JAMES WOLFE.

N.—Page 370.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B.

York Town, October 20th, 1781.

SIR,

I have the mortification to inform your excellency, that I have been forced to give up the posts of York and Gloucester, and to surrender the troops under my command, by capitulation, on the 19th instant, as prisoners of war, to the combined forces of America and France.

I never saw this post in a very favorable light. But when I found I was to be attacked in it, in so unprepared a state, by so powerful an army and artillery, nothing but the hopes of relief would have induced me to attempt its defence; for I would either have endeavored to escape to New York by rapid marches from the Gloucester side, immediately on the arrival of general Washington's troops at Williamsburgh; or I would, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, have attacked them in the open field, where it might have been just possible that fortune would have favored the gallantry of the handful of troops under my command. But being assured by your excellency's letters, that every possible means would be tried by the navy and army to relieve us, I could not think myself at liberty to venture upon either of those desperate attempts. Therefore, after remaining for two days in a strong position, in front of this place, in hopes of being attacked, upon observing that the enemy were taking measures which could not fail of turning my left flank in a short time, and receiving on the second evening your letter of the 24th of September, informing me that the relief would sail about the 5th of October, I withdrew within the works on the night of the 29th of September, hoping by the labor and firmness of the soldiers to protract the defence until you could arrive. Every thing was to be expected from the spirit of the troops; but every disadvantage attended their labor, as the work was to be continued under the enemy's fire; and our stock of intrenching tools, which did not much

exceed four hundred when we began to work in the latter end of August, was now much diminished.

The enemy broke ground on the night of the 30th, and constructed on that night and the two following days and nights two redoubts, which, with some works that had belonged to our outward position, occupied a gorge between two creeks or ravines, which came from the river on each side of the town. On the night of the 6th of October they made their first parallel, extending from its right on the river to a deep ravine on the left, nearly opposite to the centre of this place, and embracing our whole left, at the distance of six hundred yards. Having perfected this parallel, their batteries opened on the evening of the 9th against our left; and other batteries fired at the same time against a redoubt over a creek upon our right, and defended by about one hundred and twenty men (of the twenty-third regiment and marines), who maintained that post with uncommon gallantry. The fire continued incessant from heavy cannon, and from mortars and howitzers, throwing shells from eight to sixteen inches, until all our guns on the left were silenced, our work much damaged, and our loss of men considerable. On the night of the 11th, they began their second parallel, about three hundred yards nearer to us. The troops being much weakened by sickness, as well as by the fire of the besiegers, and observing that the enemy had not only secured their flanks, but proceeded in every respect with the utmost regularity and caution, I could not venture so large sorties, as to hope from them any considerable effect; but otherwise I did every thing in my power to interrupt their work, by opening new embrasures for guns, and keeping up a constant fire with all the howitzers and small mortars that we could man. On the evening of the 14th, they assaulted and carried two redoubts that had been advanced about three hundred yards for the purpose of delaying their approaches and covering our left flank, and included them in their second parallel, on which they continued to work with the utmost exertion. Being perfectly sensible that our works could not stand many hours after the opening of the batteries

of that parallel, we not only continued a constant fire with all our mortars, and every gun that could be brought to bear upon it, but a little before day-break on the morning of the 10th, I ordered a sortie of about three hundred and fifty men, under the direction of lieutenant colonel Abercrombie, to attack two batteries which appeared to be in the greatest forwardness, and to spike the guns. A detachment of guards, with the eightieth company of grenadiers, under the command of lieutenant colonel Lake, attacked the one; and one of light infantry, under the command of major Armstrong, attacked the other: and both succeeded, by forcing the redoubts that covered them, spiking eleven guns, and killing or wounding about one hundred of the French troops who had the guard of that part of the trenches, and with little loss on our side. The action, though extremely honorable to the officers and soldiers who executed it, proved of little public advantage; for the cannon having been spiked in a hurry, were soon rendered fit for service again; and before dark the whole parallel batteries appeared to be nearly complete.

At this time we knew that there was no part of the whole front attacked on which we could show a single gun, and our shells were nearly expended. I therefore had only to choose between preparing to surrender next day, or endeavoring to get off with the greatest part of the troops; and I determined to attempt the latter, reflecting that, though it should prove unsuccessful in its immediate object, it might, at least, delay the enemy in the prosecution of farther enterprizes. Sixteen large boats were prepared, and, upon other pretexts, were ordered to be in readiness to receive troops precisely at ten o'clock. With these I hoped to pass the infantry during the night; abandoning our baggage, and leaving a detachment to capitulate for the town's people, and the sick and wounded, on which subject a letter was ready to be delivered to general Washington.

After making my arrangements with the utmost secrecy, the light infantry, greatest part of the guards, and part of the twenty-third regiment, landed at Gloucester; but at this criti-

cal moment, the weather from being moderate and calm, changed to a violent storm of wind and rain, and drove all the boats, some of which had troops on board, down the river. It was soon evident that the intended passage was impracticable; and the absence of the boats rendered it equally impossible to bring back the troops that had passed, which I had ordered about two in the morning. In this situation, with my little force divided, the enemy's batteries opened at day-break. The passage between this place and Gloucester was much exposed; but the boats having now returned, they were ordered to bring back the troops that had passed during the night, and they joined in the forenoon without much loss. Our works in the mean time were going to ruin; and not having been able to strengthen them by abattis, nor in any other manner than by a slight friezing, which the enemy's artillery were demolishing whenever they fired, my opinion entirely coincided with that of the engineer and principal officers of the army, that they were in many places assailable in the forenoon, and that by the continuance of the same fire for a few hours longer, they would be in such a state as to render it desperate, with our numbers, to attempt to maintain them. We at that time could not fire a single gun; only one eight inch and a little more than one hundred Cohorn shells remained. A diversion by the French ships of war, that lay at the mouth of York river, was to be expected. Our numbers had been diminished by the enemy's fire, but particularly by sickness; and the strength and spirits of those in the works were much exhausted by the fatigue of constant watching and unremitting duty. Under all these circumstances, I thought it would have been wanton and inhuman to the last degree to sacrifice the lives of this small body of gallant soldiers, who had ever behaved with so much fidelity and courage, by exposing them to an assault, which, from the numbers and precaution of the enemy, could not fail to succeed. I therefore proposed to capitulate; and I have the honor to inclose to your excellency the copy of the correspondence between general Washington and me on that subject, and the terms of capitulation agreed upon. I sincerely

lament that better could not be obtained; but I have neglected nothing in my power to alleviate the misfortune and distress of both officers and soldiers.

The men are well clothed and provided with necessities, and I trust will be regularly supplied by the means of the officers that are permitted to remain with them. The treatment, in general, that we have received from the enemy since our surrender, has been perfectly good and proper. But the kindness and attention that have been shown to us, by the French officers in particular,—their delicate sensibility of our situation, their generous and pressing offer of money, both public and private, to any amount,—have really gone beyond what I can possibly describe; and will, I hope, make an impression on the breast of every officer, whenever the fortune of war should put any of them into our power.

Although the event has been so unfortunate, the patience of the soldiers in bearing the greatest fatigues, and their firmness and intrepidity under a persevering fire of shot and shells, that I believe has not often been exceeded, deserve the highest admiration and praise. A successful defence, however, in our situation, was, perhaps, impossible; for the place could only be reckoned an intrenched camp, subject in most places to enfilade, and the ground in general so disadvantageous, that nothing but the necessity of fortifying it as a post to protect the navy, could have induced any person to erect works upon it. Our force diminished daily by sickness and other losses, and was reduced when we offered to capitulate, on this side, to little more than three thousand two hundred rank and file fit for duty, including officers, servants and artificers; and at Gloucester about six hundred, including cavalry. The enemy's army consisted of upwards of eight thousand French, nearly as many continentals, and five thousand militia. They brought an immense train of heavy artillery, mostly amply furnished with ammunition, and perfectly well manned.

The constant and universal cheerfulness and spirit of the officers, in all hardships and dangers, deserve my warmest acknowledgments; and I have been particularly indebted to

brigadier general O'Hara and lieutenant colonel Abercrombie, the former commanding on the right, and the latter on the left, for their attention and exertion on every occasion. The detachment of the twenty-third regiment, and of the marines, in the redoubt on the right, commanded by captain Apthorpe, and the subsequent detachments, commanded by lieutenant colonel Johnston, deserve particular commendation. Captain Rochfort, who commanded the artillery, and indeed every officer and soldier of that distinguished corps, and lieutenant Sutherland, the commanding engineer, have merited in every respect my highest approbation: and I cannot sufficiently acknowledge my obligations to captain Symonds, who commanded his majesty's ships, and to the other officers and seamen of the navy, for their active and zealous co-operation.

I transmit returns of our killed and wounded. The loss of seamen and town's people was likewise considerable.

I trust your excellency will please to hasten the return of the Bonetta, after landing her passengers, in compliance with the article of capitulation.

Lieutenant colonel Abercrombie will have the honor to deliver this despatch, and is well qualified to explain to your excellency every particular relating to our past and present situation.

I have the honor to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

FINIS;



